VIETNAMIZATION PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-11-3-26-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: January 21, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/23: LOC-HAK-1 1-3-26-7 1
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: K. Wayne Smith
SUBJECT: Vietnamization Problems
NSC Review
Completed.
VARMY Review
INFORMATION
January 21, 1971
The evidence continues to accumulate on possible deficiencies
in our support for South Vietnamese forces under the Vietnamization
program. While some of the sources have a vested interest in over-
stating the problem, the evidence does support those who maintain
that we should be providing more support to RVNAF.
While it is true that even under much more favorable income
conditions in the mid-1960's RVNAF desertions were at roughly
current levels per capita, it is hard to explain why they have not
declined in the face of a vastly improved security situation that has
resulted in a sharp drop in RVNAF KIA per capita. The roughly
40% decline in RVNAF real incomes over the last three years is
almost certainly a prime reason for the GVN's continued failure to
make significant progress toward solving the desertion problem.
It would take an act of faith to believe that RVNAF combat forces
that suffer one-third losses annually through desertions can cope,
with a determined NVA threat after U. S. forces leave.
SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/23: LOC-HAK-1 1-3-26-7
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/23: LOC-HAK-1 1-3-26-7
I
SECRET
You recall that the NSSM 99 study raised the issue of whether the U. S.
should leave its forces in MR 3 rather than on the front lines in MR 1
as a measure to reduce casualities. Such a move would also be
consistent with your statement that you would rather have 100% control
over 60%a of the country than 60% control over 100%. I do not believe
we should rule out such an option in subsequent NSSM 99 work.
General Tri cited specific shortages such as the lack of heavy equip-
ment (tank) transporters and a deficiency in spare parts for tracked
vehicles (resulting in a 60% operating rate) and a shortage of heli-
copter support as obstacles to GVN main force self-sufficiency in
MR 3.
While General Tri will probably never be satisfied with the equipment
he has, some of his examples would seem to fall in the "necessities"
category.
Conclusion
Vietnarnization problems such as those raised above will be treated
in the next stage of NSSM 99 now underway. Your signature on the
Vietnamization memorandum I recently sent forward would provide
important assistance to this effort.
SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/23: LOC-HAK-1 1-3-26-7