BRAZIL--MORE TORTURE REPORTS MAY COMPLICATE MEDICI VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-11-6-24-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: February 11, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/30: LOC-HAK-11-6-24-6
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY INFORMATION
FROM Arnold Nachmanof#
SUBJECT: Brazil--More Torture Reports
February 11, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
bC., ?'.X
May Complicate Medici Visit
Reports of increased use of violence and torture by Brazilian offi-
cials in their campaign against terrorists and subversives have
become much more frequent in recent weeks after having subsided
last. summer. In some cases suspected terrorists apparently have
been done away with after having been subjected to extreme torture
rather than risk their release as part of the ransom in a kidnapping.
The telegram
at Tab B reports that the new Archbishop of Sao Paulo has publicly
denouzo 3,the. authorities in connection with the torture of priests
and nuns. He has been backed up by the Archbishop of Rio de
Janeiro. This incident may touch ofean open Church-Government
confrontation in Brazil and is certain to lead to widespread pub-
licity both here and there.
Increased adverse publicity on the issue of torture in Brazil, per-
baps. leading to demonstrations or other forms of protest both be-
fore and during the Medici visit, could complicate the visit and
prove a serious embarrassment to Medici and the President.
Senator Church has not yet announced the hearings he was supposed
to hold on Brazil, and members of his staff had indicated that those
hearings when held would not focus on the torture issue. However,
increased publicity could trigger early scheduling of hearings
with emphasis on the torture question.
The Medici visit has not yet been announced, primarily because
State has. been unable to resolve its concerns about the invitation
to President Velasco of Peru which could, in part, balance adverse
reaction to the Medici invitation. Brazilian Foreign Minister
Gibson Barboza discussed the 'visit during his recent trip to
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/11/30: LOC-HAK-11-6-24-6
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Washington, and Ambassador Rountree reports that he is under in-
creasing pressure for permission to make a public announcement.
I understand that Assistant Secretary Meyer intends to call you
soon to say that Secretary Rogers has no objection to announcing
the Medici invitation providing no dates are mentioned. There
will probably be heavy criticism if the invitation is announced in
the middle of a flurry of criticism about torture in Brazil, but on
the other hand we are committed to the visit and the Brazilians
could always force our hand by leaking the news if they felt under
sufficient pressure to do so.
to ,de-fus.e the issue again.
renewal of publicity about torture, especially if linked to a confron-
tation with the Church, is likely to draw him in and this time may
severely damage his image unless he takes early and vigorous steps
President Medici may, be aware of the extent violence is being used
by Brazilian security forces, and may even have given his tacit
permission rather than face a collision with hard line elements in
the Armed Forces, but his own instincts seem to be moderate and
he played a personal role in de-fusing the torture issue last year.
Whatever the facts of his involvement, he has thus far managed to
+_.-avoid the. torture. question staining his personal .image. However,
hardliners, or, at a minimum, issue statements which would
cently (memcon at Tab C), but it is questionable whether Gibson
would take this up seriously with Medici. It is possible that
Medici's own self-interest and/or moderate elements may lead
him to ameliorate the situation, or at least make some statements
which disassociate him from the hard-line approach. If he does
not, however, it may be necessary to consider a very private,
direct message to Medici from the President pointing out the prac-
tical problems and potential embarrassment to both Presidents
of a resurgence of international press reports of increased tor-
ture, particularly of clergy. The purpose of the visit--to cement
friendly relations--may very well be jeopardized by the reaction
in our pr-es s and Congress ;--and by public demonstrations during
the visit. The message would not moralize, but would emphasize
.our mutual interest in protecting Medici's and the GOB's image.
Hopefully, he might be induced to take steps to try to contol the
Secretary Rogers expressed his concern about the reports of tor-
ture to Foreign Minister Gibson when he was in Washington re-
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/30: LOC-HAK-11-6-24-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/30: LOC-HAK-11-6-24-6
SECRET/SENFIVE/EYES ONLY
from.the practice of torture..-
attempt to diseassociate himself and official governmental policy
make a joint announcement of the visit.
This is clearly a very delicate and sensitive matter. However, a
direct message to Medici may be the only option we have for affec-
ting a situation which could prove very embarrassing to the
President. 'Very careful consideration would.have to be given to
the content of the message, the choice of channel, and the timing.
I am not suggesting that an approach to Medici be made now. How-
ever, it might be most effective before or soon after we agree to
Attachments:
Tab B - Telegram from Brasilia #095
Tab C - Memcon
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/30 : LOC-HAK-11-6-24-6
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