PEKING'S CURRENT POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND ITS IMPORT FOR U.S. - PRC RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-113-1-3-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 3, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM IF .
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
March 3, 1976
SUBJECT: Peking's Current Political Instability and Its
Import for U.S. - PRC Relations
Recent developments in the Peking political scene -- the unexpected
announcement that a relatively unknown leader, Hua Kuo-feng
(rather than Vice Premier Teng Hsiao--ping) , has been appointed as
acting Premier; the release in December of a long-detained Soviet
helicopter crew; and the February visit to China of former
President Nixon -- reflect some interesting developments in the
tensions within the leadership of the People's Republic of China
which have been evident in a general way since 1970. The following analysis
places the political turmoil now apparent in the Chinese capital, and
signs of some uncertainty in Peking's foreign policy orientation, in the
context of these longer term trends. It also suggests some implications
of these recent developments for the course of U.S. PRC relations in
the year ahead.
The study reaches the following major conclusions:
-- Teng Hsiao-p'ing, groomed for the Premiership since 1973 .by
Mao and Chou but under continuing criticism from Party radicals, was
blocked in gaining the Premiership in January because he had. alienated
key military leadE rs who have become temporary allies of the Party's
radical faction.
-- The outcome of the current conflict in Peking is indeterminate,
but the most likely developments are either, (a) once the radicals
have brought about Teng Hsiao-p'ing's demise they will draw back and
work within the coalition leadership which Chou En-lai built up over
the past several years, or (b) the radicals will overplay their attack
on Teng and other rehabilitated leaders, alienate their temporary allies,
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and produce a counterattack that will lead to their own fall. It seems
doubtful that the Party's leftist faction can dominate the Peking
political scene for a sustained period.
Mao Tse--tung's role in the current leadership dispute is
ambiguous, probably because the Chairman is not in full control of the
situation. He has been aloof from various radical leaders in recent years,
and thus far has not given overt support for their attack on Teng. He
probably withdrew his backing from the Vice Premier when he was
unable to command sufficient support from the Politburo for the
Premiership, and he appears to have given at least tentative support to
Hua Kuo-feng. Mao, however, has his differences with the leftist fac-
tion and the military and may be playing a rather passive role in the
current conflict. His physical frailty, difficulty in speaking, and
personal isolation (heightened by the death of his longtime associate
Chou En-lai) increasingly weaken him as an active leadership force.
Mao's death in the next year or two could compound the present insta-
bility in the leadership.
-- The release of the Soviet helicopter crew last December, and
the recent visit to China of former President Nixon, are indicators of
political cross-currents on foreign policy issues. The military and
some others in Peking may be urging a less hostile orientation toward
the Soviets and greater aloofness from the U.S. Mao, however, remains
determined to keep the Russians at a distance and strengthen relations
with a U . S. that will actively counterweight the Soviets abroad.
-- There is very little the U.S. can do to influence the PRC as the
current leadership feud plays itself out. We are passive observers of
that situation, as were the Chinese as they watched the unfolding of
Watergate. We are most likely to hold the Chinese to their foreign policy
course of dealing with us if we can reassert a more active foreign
policy that combines efforts to reach agreements that serve our interests
with both Moscow and Peking, and at the same time demonstrate a willing-
ness to stand up to Soviet pressures. Completion of normalization of
U.S.- PRC relations might make the relationship less vulnerable to
criticism in China, but such a move would invite contempt rather than
respect if taken from a position of weakness in foreign affairs, and with
an attitude of beseeching China to hold to its "American tilt."
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Has a Coalition of Party Radicals and Military Leaders Upset
Chou En-lai's Succession Plans?
By all evidence available to the USG, Chairman Mao and Premier Chou
En-lai personally led the process of rehabilitating Teng Hsiao-p'ing --- who
had been purged in the spring of 1967 during the Cultural Revolution --
and then gradually prepared him to assume the Premiership. Teng
first reappeared in April of 1973, not long after the Chinese leadership
had knowledge of Chou En-lai's illness with cancer. Teng's rehabili-
tation was not only part of a purposeful effort to prepare a smooth
succession to Chou's leadership position, but more generally to
accelerate the pace of rebuilding orderly processes of political and
economic administration within the PRC.
The Chinese Communist Party, and the organs of governmental
administration, had been destroyed during the Cultural Revolution of the
late 1960s when Chairman Mao, using a coalition of Party radicals
and military leaders headed by Defense Minister Lin Piao, removed
from power Party and state leaders opposed to his policies. By late
1968, however, Mao and other leaders who had weathered the Cultural
Revolution purge came to feel that the chaos of the preceding three
years had produced too much domestic social turmoil and economic
stagnation. They were concerned, moreover, that China was
vulnerable to a number of developments on the international scene --
particularly the growing aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, as
had been demonstrated by Moscow's invasion of. Czechosolvakia in
1968 and the deployment of a major military force on China's
northern frontier. Senior PRC leaders also feared that in view of
their advanced age, a disorderly succession crisis in Peking would
hold serious temptations for the Russians, who have a long record
of seeking to manipulate China's internal politics to their own
advantage.
In this context, Mao and Chou En-lai initiated in 1969 what has proven
to be a protracted and unstable process of realigning China's
foreign policy, rebuilding a Party and governmental system capable
of giving the PRC coherent political leadership, heightening the pace
of economic growth, and strengthening China's national security
against pressures from the Soviet Union. Resistance to this policy
trend has come primarily from the two groups who acquired power
during the Cultural Revolution: the military; and Party radicals,
symbolically led by Mao's own wife, Chiang Ch'ing.
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The initial breakthrough in this process for Mao and Chou came in the
summer of 1970 when the Chairman and Premier succeeded in purging
one of the major leaders of the Cultural Revolution's radical faction,
Ch'en Po-ta. This was the first real weakening of the radical-military
political coalition which had grown beyond the Chairman's control.
A second major development occurred in the same period (the summer
of 1970) when Defense Minister Lin Piao was blocked in his effort to
establish himself as Chief of State of the PRC. Mao had been trying to
get Lin and the military out of politics and back into defense activities
well before the spring and summer of 1969, when several serious
border clashes with the Soviet Union transformed the Sino--Soviet
political feud into a military confrontation.
Mao might well have pro-
voked them in order to heighten attention both worldwide and within
China to the Soviet menace, and to create pressure on the Chinese
army for a return to purely military pursuits.
After the purge of the summer of 1970, Mao and Chou moved to
establish contact with the Nixon administration, which had been
signalling its interest in an authoritative dialogue with the PRC since
1969. They also kept political pressure on Lin Piao, which stimulated
the Defense Minister to plot a coup aginst the Chairman. It was the
discovery of this plotting which led to Lin Piao's surprise flight to
Mongolia in September, 1971, a "defection" which was aborted when
Lin's plane ran out of fuel and crashed, killing all aboard.
Subsequent to the Lin affair -- throughout 1972 and during the first
half of 1973 ---- Mao and Chou pressed their domestic and foreign policy
lines without much opposition. President Nixon's visit to Peking in
February, 1972, and China's normalization of relations with Japan in
September, "tilted" Peking's international orientation toward the West.
Domestically, the Chairman and Premier proceeded to rebuild the
Party organization and restaff governmental positions which had been
inactive since the late 1960s. This effort at institutionalization was
symbolized by the convening of the Tenth Party Congress in the
late summer of 1973, and the subsequent holding of a National People's
Congress (in January, 1975).
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Kissinger's planned August, 1973 trip to Peking .
In the month preceding the 1973 Party Congress, however, signs of
overt opposition to the "centrist" political coalition around Premier Chou
became evident in China's national media. There were attacks on
Chou's rationalized educational policy; and certain military leaders
seemed to side with the Party's leftist faction. There was veiled criticism
of the policy of bringing back to office officials purged during the Cultural
Revolution (such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who had reappeared in public
several months earlier). It appeared that Party radicals and military
leaders might be making common cause in a behind-the-scenes effort
to prevent Mao and Chou from further eroding their positions.
In foreign affairs, the summer of 1973 also saw the first signs of pres-
sure against our new relationship with the PRC: Chinese cultural and
scientific delegations which had visited the U.S. were criticized
upon their return for being too favorably impressed with what they
had seen in America. The Foreign Ministry expressed opposition to
the Marine guards at our Liaison Office (ultimately expelling them in
April, 1974). In the wake of the Congressional cut-off of funds for
the Cambodian bombing operation, the Chinese reneged on their
offer to assist us in working out a negotiated resolution of the
Cambodian conflict; and they forced a postponement of Secretary 25X1
the Nixon Administration's detente negotiations with
the Soviets -- particularly the treaty on prevention of nuclear war __
was generating growing concern within the Chinese leadership (as
we knew privately from protests which Peking passed to us through
secret diplomatic contacts) .
In short, during the second half of 1973 signs of dissention in China's
political debate on both domestic and foreign policy issues began to
surface. These indications of contention within the top leadership
have grown in intensity over the subsequent three years in the con-
text of a series of campaigns of criticism of "Lin Piao and Confucius,"
attacks on one of Mao's favorite novels and on Chou En-lai's educa-
tional policy, and in organizational preparations for the Tenth Party
Congress and the National People's Congress. The basic dynamic
of this situation seems to have been that the two groups within
the constellation of political forces around the Premier which were
being deprived of political power -- the Party radicals , and the
militar - were invokin various domestic and foreign olio
issues to defend their positions:
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-_ The radical faction attacked educational policy, the liberali-
zation of culture and the arts, and heightened interaction between
the PRC and the outside world in the areas of human contact and
trade. They criticized a de-politicized program of economic
development and abandonment of the policy of "self-reliance" for
the PRC in economic and defense matters. They criticized the Mao/
Chou policy of rehabilitating senior officials purged during the
Cultural Revolution.
-- The military (along with some leaders within the Foreign
Ministry) began to criticize Mao's policy of tilting toward the
U.S., particularly as the various Soviet/American negotiations
associated with "detente" made it appear that the U.S. might be
"colluding" rather than "contending" with China's major security
threat, and as Congress rendered the Administration increasingly
passive in foreign affairs.
At certain points in time it appeared that the Party radicals and
military might successfully challenge the Mao/Chou policy line by
re-allying themselves to prevent the further erosion of their
power positions. In the summer of 1973, just before the Tenth
Party Congress, Shenyang Military Region Commander Chen Hsi-
lien seemed to support radical attacks on education policy; and in
the wake of China's military action against the Paracel Islands in
early 1974, Mao's wife seemed to bid for support from the military.
These two groups are not "natural" allies by general political
orientation, however, and each time they appeared to move toward
each other to protect their respective positions the moderate coalition
apparently prevented their coalescence.
In late 1973 the Military Region Commanders were reshuffled to new ter-
ritorial commands in a move -- brokered by Teng Hsiao-p'ing -- which
cut off these powerful men from long-held organizational bases.
Teng seemed to have the respect of the military, although his active role
in reshuffling the territorial commanders may have generated some
grievances against him.
In late 1974 Teng was made Chief of Staff of the Army, and Party official
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was appointed political commissar, further strength-
ening civilian control over the military (although perhaps reinforcing
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a political tension between Teng and Chang). Both Teng and Chang
delivered major speeches to the National People's Congress in
January, 1975. Teng's statement contained a thinly veiled criticism
of the Cultural Revolution, while Chang defended the "newborn
things of socialism" which had grown from the purge of the 1960s.
Teng probably laid some of the groundwork for his current political
vulnerability in his critical remarks to the Congress. In contrast,
Chang's defense of the radicals' position may have been evidence of
some political strain between himself and Teng that has worked to the
Vice Premier's detriment in the current conflict.
In the summer of 1975 Teng and Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying
convened a two-month long session of the Party's Military Affairs
Commission which produced decisions to streamline and heighten the
modernization of China's military services -- developments designed
to further professionalize the army, and perhaps "buy" their support
through the infusion of higher levels of funding for modern weapons
systems. Moreover, in the fall of 1975 Teng moved a long-time col-
league from Szechuan Province to assume the role of commander of
the Peking Military Region and thus assure the security of "his"
capital (although in the process displacing Chen Hsi-lien, who had
held that position since the command shuffle of late 1973).
In sum, by late 1975 all evidence was that Teng Hsiao-p'ing was mov-
ing successfully to consolidate his political position, and was seeking
to back it up with support from China's military. At the same time,
there was continuing if muted evidence of opposition to this trend of events
from Party radicals. In late August they provoked a short-lived polemic
on the issue of granting "amnesty" to renegade officials (apparently
another indirect attack on Teng and others who the Vice Premier was
restoring to positions of responsibility, such as former Chief of Staff
Lo Jui-ch'ing -- also a purge victim of the Cultural Revolution -- who
reappeared in early August) . Yet each time the political left tried to
build pressure against Teng through a public criticism campaign, the
Chou-Teng coalition was able to contain the attack.
This pattern began to repeat itself in November, 1975 with renewed criti-
cism in the universities of a moderate education policy. A debate sur-
faced, but then seemed to recede as the target of the attack, Chou En-lai's
Minister of Education, made a pro-forma self-criticism. At the turn of the
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year, however, the new year's day editorial launched a sharply worded
defense of the Cultural Revolution and attacked those who migl-lt seek
revenge for the purges of the late 1960s. And then on January 8 Chou
En-lai died, creating a fundamentally changed decision-making problem
for the Chinese leadership. Not only did they have to choose a replace-
ment for the Premier, but as well fill three major positions on the Politburo
Standing Committee vacated by the deaths of Chou and two other senior
leaders in 1975. As the Politburo met in the second half of
January to vote on these positions, Teng Hsiao--p'ing --- by all
evidence in a strong, but challenged position for the Premiership --
was blocked.
What happened? Our best estimate is that the Party's radical
faction, a constant source of resistance to Teng's rehabilitation over
the preceding three or four years, finally gained allies in its effort
to prevent the man they had purged in 1967 from consolidating his
position -- and thus establishing himself in a role where eventually
he might wreak vengeance on them for their treatment of him during
the Cultural Revolution. Webel.ieve Tend m have given. the radicals
teinporar allies r alienating; lc eolale in the seniorrrriiit.ar
establishment -- particularly Chen Hsi-Lien (now rumored to be acting
Defense Minister in place of the elderly and infirm Yeh Chien-yin-1) .
In addition, Party leader Chang Ch'un-ch'i.ao may have withdrawn.
support from Tong (if he ever backed him) -- particularly in a situation
where there was no longer the ameliorating presence of Chou En-lai,
who had overseen Teng's rehabilitation and constructed before his death a
loose coalition of leaders composed of rehabilitated and Cultural Revolution
Party officials, senior military commanders, and senior government cadre.
The relatively youthful (mid-fifties) Hunan official 11ua Kuo-fang ---
Politburo member, Minister of Security and of Agriculture -- seems to have
been chosen as a compromise candidate for the Premiership. He is not,
however, a clear favorite of the radicals, having been attacked in Peking
wallposters during 1974 for having suppressed leftist factions in Hunan
Province during his tenure there as Chairman of the Provincial
Revolutionary Committee. More importantly, the senior leadersh p has
as yet been unable to agree on appointments to the three vacancies on the
Politburo Standing Committee (or four, if `I'eng Hsiao-p'ing has now lost
this position) .
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Teng's fate remains uncertain. He is under increasing attack in the
national media and has been vilified by name in some campus wall
posters, but we have no evidence at this time that the Vice Premier
has lost his key Party, government, or military positions. I believe
that it is now most unlikely that Teng can regain the Premiership or
even retain his State or military responsibilities. The key question
is whether the radicals will rest content with Teng's demise, or
whether they will press their attack against numerous other officials
rehabilitated since 1973 by Chou En-lai.
Peking in a Period of Political Turmoil
The evolution of Peking's immediate political situation is indeterminate.
A February 17 People's Daily article explicitly stated that the Central
Committee has been split by the issue of naming a successor to Premier
Chou and filling the vacant Politburo Standing Committee positions. It is
unlikely that Teng I-Isiao-p'ing will go down without a fight, and we believe
there are many people in the central leadership who will be most reluctant to
see the attacking radicals gain the upper hand. Moreover, their
temporary allies in the military or Party apparatus are unlikely to
be firm supporters over an extended period of time.
I believe there are two likely patterns of evolution of the present
situation:
-.. Restabilization of the "Chou" Coalition, The radicals may
limit their current attack to Teng, but then pull back and accept a
restabilization of the loose coalition of rehabilitated and Cultural
Revolution cadre, State officials, and military which Chou En-lai put
together after 1974 and which presided uneasily over Peking's politics
until the Premier's death. This pattern would be evidenced by Teng's
demotion or demise, appointment of a mixture of leftist and moderate
leaders to the Politburo Standing Committee, and the emergence of
several new faces in the military hierarchy -- perhaps Chen Hsi--lien and
his supporters in the military. There must be strong pressures on the
leadership to prevent a serious blood-letting, and thus I believe there
is a substantial likelihood that even if Teng falls the coalition leadership
will be reconsolidated under Hua Kuo-feng.
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-- The Moderates Take Revenge. The radicals could overplay their
attack on Teng by seeking to purge other rehabilitated leaders, however,
and alienate their temporary allies in the military and Party. This could
stimulate a moderate counterattack against the left that would see the
demise of a number of radical leaders -- Mme. Mao, ideologue Yao Wen-
yuan, and young Wang Hung-wen.
We have firm evidence of Chairman Mao's displeasure with his wife's
political activities; and the radicals, who have now unleashed much
personal bitterness and the spectre of the country in renewed chaos, are
rather weak as an organized political force. They have access to the
national media through control of the propaganda ministry, and can
generate a voice in campus wall poster debates , but they control no troops
and face Party and state bureaucracies now rebuilt with many cadre who
had been purged during the Cultural Revolution.
The left is continuing to press its attack on Teng Hsiao--p'ing at this time;
but despite their effort to evoke the spirit of the Cultural Revolution in
media polemics and campus wall posters, I am impressed with the tenta-
tiveness of their attack. It is now a month since public attacks on the
"unrepentant capitalist roader" began, and Teng is still not mentioned
by name in the national media, and the indirect attacks on him still do
not explicitly call for his ouster -- suggesting significant limits on the
power of the attackers. A continuing period of uncertainty on the person-
nel issues which have now split the leadership will indicate that the
radicals are unable to build support for their cause; and over time im-
mobilism in Peking's political process resulting from the current situation
is likely to work against their effort to build a new leadership coalition
that will "defend the fruits of the Cultural Revolution."
China's military, in particular, seems to be seriously divided by the
current political in-fighting. If the leadership conflict deepens, the
army will play an increasingly important role as factional alignments
evolve. In this situation, the possibility of coup attempts cannot be
ruled out, although there is no evidence of such a development at this
time .
-- The Radicals Reshape the Succession. The least likely develop-
ment of the current situation would be that the Chinese Communist Party's
leftist faction will consolidate its position, presumably with Chairman Mao's
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blessing and on the basis of a coalition that includes key military
leaders. Chang Ch'un--ch'iao would probably be their candidate for the
Premiership. Such an evolution would very likely see the demise of
many of the state, military, and Party officials recently rehabilitated by
the late Premier Chou, and a heightened politicization of all aspects of
life in China. In such circumstances the country would likely draw back
from the active level of involvement with the world which characterized
the PRC's foreign policy under Chou En-lai..
We doubt that this is a likely future for Peking's political
scene, however, because Chiang Ch'ing and other radical leaders seem
to lack either the firm support of the Chairman or the ability to construct
a leadership coalition which will sustain a dominant position for themselves.
The Current Ambiguity of Chairman Mao's Position
Where does Chairman Mao stand in this current situation? The radicals
have clearly tried to make it appear that he is behind their attack on Teng,
yet the signs of unambiguous support for their position -- the Chairman's
personal and public identification with leftist leaders, or support for a
radical candidate for the Premiership and other posts on the Politburo
Standing Committee --- are not evident. We believe Mao has lost
considerable influence over the current situation, for he lacks the
physical capability to project himself in leadership debates and has
lost -- with the passing of Chou En-lai --- a close colleague who linked
him to the larger process of Peking's politics.
Some of the current uncertainty in Mao's position seems related to signs
of disagreement between the Chairman and other elements in the leader-
ship which have been evident in muted form over the past several years.
The Lin Piao affair generated considerable strain between Mao and the
People's Liberation Army (PLA). Lin's coup attempt made the Chairman
highly distrustful of the military, and Mao sought to sharply limit their
political influence through the campaign, of criticism of the dead Lin Piao
which was promoted throughout China in 1973-74. For their part, the
military blamed Mao for having personally selected Lin to play the key
role which he did during the Cultural Revolution, and for having let
him acquire such power.
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This personal aspect of dispute between the Chairman and PLA was rein-
forced by disagreement over national security issues. At least some of the
military leadership seems to have taken the view that Mao's policy of main-
taining a high level of tension with the Soviets while at the same time
tilting toward the U.S. was unnecessarily provocative to Moscow. As
SALT negotiations and Congressional constraints on the Administration's
foreign policy were enhanced after 1973, this argument probably
acquired greater force in internal leadership debates and made the
American connection increasingly controversial .
Mao's uncertain role in the leadership was emphasized by his long
absence from Peking between June of 1974 and April, 1975. The
Chairman remained off in the provinces (although he continued to
receive a flow of foreign visitors during this period) and played al-
most no visible role in the National People's Congress of January, 1975,
Mao's aloofness from the leadership scene may have been a reflection,
in part, of his disagreement with the conservative economic program
which was promulgated by the Congress . The fact that Chou En-lai
and Teng Hsiao-p'ing were so clearly behind the law-and-order approach
to accelerating the pace of China's economic growth at the National
People's Congress (and given that Mao's only personal identification
with the event was to urge that workers be given the right to strike)
has suggested to some analysts that the Chairman had significant
differences with the Premier and with Teng. This may have been true
to some degree (and there is good reason to believe that Mao's support
for Teng's rehabilitation was not the result of any personal affection
between the two, but out of a recoonitinn of nolitiral r~ar~ccitcrl?
Mao
aloof from leftist leaders.
The Chairman seemed to give more open support to the left in the
second half of 1973 when he received foreign visitors with young Wang
Hung-wen at the door of his residence; yet by 1974 .Wang ceased to play
his role as "doorkeeper" when Mao received foreigners, and at this same
time we began to receive a stream of indictions that Mao was quite dis-
pleased with his wife's efforts to build a national leadership role for
herself through promotion of her revolutionized Peking operas, ap-
peals for support from the military, and occasional public promotion
activities -- such as giving her life's story to an American woman
historian and playing an active role in hosting Imelda Marcos when
she visited China in September, 1974.
gave visa e support to eng s rehabilitation, and that he has remained
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In sum, we believe that Mao's role in the current leadership situation
may be rather passive. The Chairman probably withdrew his support
from Teng Hsiao-p'ing when it became evident in late January that
the rehabilitated Vice Premier was unable to muster a substantial
margin of support within the Politburo for the Premiership. Mao has been
reported as supporting the selection of Hua Kuo-feng, although in a some-
what tentative way. As with the case of Lin Piao, Mao is in a difficult
position on the issue of Teng's future, for over the past three years he
has been publicIv identified ' of national
leadership. Party cadre
are grumbling about Mao's disruptive influence on the political process:
the left for his past backing of Chou's rehabilitation program; and the
right for his current failure to give active support to all that Chou had
built before he died.
Despite these indications of unhappiness with the Chairman, however, we
doubt that Mao is in danger of being repudiated by a leadership which
still needs him as a symbol of legitimacy. Mao continues to exercise a com-
manding role over foreign policy issues, and can probably still carry the
day on domestic matters of critical importance to him. We doubt that the
Chairman will throw his weight fully behind the Party radicals, for he is
sensitive to the need to prepare for his own succession by building a stable
leadership coalition, albeit one which will support foreign and domestic
programs which relfect his own policy preferences.
In the present situation we can only watch for signs of the direction in
which Mao chooses to cast his influence, although one must add that the
Chairman's death within the next year or two would seriously compound
the possibility of a major blood-letting within the Chinese leadership.
His passing, however, would probably be to the ultimate disadvantage of
the radicals, and give the military even greater influence over the evolu-
tion of the leadership lineup .
Impact of the Present Situation on Peking's Foreign Policy Orientation
Foreign policy issues have not been at the core of the political instability
now evident in Peking, although the continuing conflict among senior
leaders appears to be having some influence on the conduct of foreign
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policy. As noted above, Mao appears to have been under some pressure
from elements within the military to lower the level of tension in, the
Sino-Soviet dispute. It is from this perspective that the December 27
surprise release of three Russian helicopter crewmen who had been
held by PRC authorities for more than 18 months on charges of spying
appears to reflect the influence of those in Peking who want to lower
China's vulnerabilities to Soviet pressure. Given the recent evidence
of a significant military clash on the Sino-Soviet frontier in mid-October,
it appears that a very specific irritant stimulated the leadership in
Peking to make a conciliatory gesttire to Moscow ---- if not to throw the
Soviets off balance politically as they prepared for the 25th Party Congress.
(Two more speculative aspects of the border clash/ helicopter crew
release situation are worthy of parenthetical comment: It is interesting
that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese have given any publicity to the
border clash. Indeed, the Russians have vociferously denied the existence
of any problems on the border in recent propaganda, partly in reaction to
Chinese press articles emphasizing the need for heightened preparedness
by their militia in border areas far to the west of the October clash.
Presumably neither Maocow nor Peking. wanted to create a situation
where the U.S. would feel it had heightened influence over its position
because of a deteriorating situation with respect to its primary adversary.
Secondly, given the indication that it was Chinese troops which were
"over the line" in the October clash, one can speculate that Mao -- as
in 1969 -- anxious to ensure that China remains on an anti-Soviet course,
directed more provocative border patrolling procedures in order to
provoke an incident which would sustain the controntation with the Soviets.
If this was the case, then the evident fact of pressure for a conciliatory
gesture toward Moscow, and of Mao having to back down by releasing
the helicopter crew, acquires heightened significance.)
Of related interest is the visit to China of Julie and David Eisenhower
at the time of the helicopter crew release, and the recent visit of
former President Nixon at the time of the fourth anniversary of the
signing of the Shanghai Communique and the Soviet's 25th Party Congress.
I believe that Chairman Mao, who is the only one who could have initiated
the idea of a second Nixon visit, had three motives in mind in arranging
for the trip of the former President (something which had it origins in
the late summer and fall of last year) :
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-- Mao wanted to highlight to a domestic audience the continuing
commitment of the PRC to the Shanghai Communique and a tilt toward
the U.S. -- perhaps in the face of some pressure for a modification of
China's foreign policy orientation to one less provocatively hostile to
the Soviets.
- Mao may also have wanted to provoke the Russians into a
reciprocally hostile posture (to mirror his own) at the time of their
25th Party Congress, and thus again undercut the argument of those with-
in China who might call for a more flexible orientation toward Moscow.
-- The Chairman was also probably trying to signal to the U . S .
his desire for a strong anti-Soviet foreign policy in Washington (one
which he associates with Mr. Nixon in the years 1972-73) and for
completion of the normalization process (which Mr. Nixon had indicated,
prior to his resignation, that he intended to do before 1976).
In short, I believe that the Soviet helicopter crew release and the Nixon
visit can be seen as indicators of countercurrents in Peking's debate
on foreign policy issues; There is some pressure, very likely from
elements within the military (although Mao hinted to the President in
December that this pressure was also coming from officials in the Foreign
Ministry and other "young people" critical of Huang Chen and
Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua --- leaders identified with the
American connection) for an easing of tensions with the Soviets, and
perhaps for less of a tilt toward the U.S. Mao, however, is trying to
lock the country into an irreversible and inflexible anti-Soviet stand.
In view of what some in China may characterize as an increasingly
passive American role in foreign affairs, however, and with
concern about a U.S. orientation to the Soviets that is less overtly
hostile than would serve China's interests, and with heightened
doubts about the U.S. commitment to complete normalization, the
Chairman may be having trouble sustaining his position.
If there is one aspect of the current situation which is helpful to Mao
it is Soviet behavior in the wake of Chou En-lai's death. Moscow has
taken a clear position in propaganda directed against China of trying
to turn the positive sentiment for the "reasonable" and "pragmatic"
Chou against "madman Mao," even to the degree of fabricating a last
will and testament of the Premier (floated in Japan) which hinted at the
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need for renewed good relations with the Soviet Union. The Russians
have also suggested that Hua Kuo-feng is a man they might be able to talk
to. At the same time, Party Secretary Brezhnev took an inflexible line on
China in his 25th Congress speech, asserting the need for sustaining
an uncompromising struggle against Maoism as a political position
basically hostile to Marxism and the socialist camp. Brezhnev concluded
that if there is to be an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, the ball
is in China's court. "
Thus, Mao is likely to be able to point to recent Soviet actions as a
reaffirmation of his view that the Russians will inevitably try to manipu-
late China's internal politics to their own advantage -- and thus they
must be kept at a distance --- and that Moscow is giving no indication of
changing its "revisionist" policies. Hence, the Chairman can argue, any
flexibility on Peking's part will only be read by the Russians as a
sign of weakness, or give Moscow an opening which will be used to
try to influence Peking's currently troubled political scene.
Implications for U.S. Policy
From the perspective of recent history, the period from late 1971
through the first half of 1973 was the time of maximum coordination in
the growth of our re-opened political dialogue with Peking. Unified.
leaderships in both countries pursued common political and security
objectives -- and they each had the authority to act. This quality of
tacit coordination was lacking on the Chinese side in the years 1969-70,
until Mao and Chou gained the upper hand over internal. opponents in
the summer of 1970; and it gradually weakened in the U.S. beginning
in the summer of 1973 as Watergate took hold of our domestic political
debate and Congress exercised an ever more inhibiting influence over
the Administration's conduct of foreign policy.
The tragedy of the current leadership conflict in China is that just as
the U.S. is moving to a renewed consensus on foreign affairs, and
backing it with strengthened executive authority, the Chinese are
themselves dissipating their political consensus through an increasingly
disruptive succession crisis.
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Just as Peking could only passively watch the U.S. as the Watergate
crisis played itself out, we are now in a period where we can only watch
the evolution of the Chinese leadership struggle and hope that it does
not totally immobilize Peking's decision-making process -- or (if Mao
were to die) generate a significantly modified foreign policy orientation.
The prospects do not seem great that the Chinese will turn back toward
the Russians even with Mao gone, or that the Soviets will overtly in-
volve themselves in Peking's current leadership crisis; but it does
seem likely that the Chinese have entered a period where they will
find it difficult to take major political initiatives, or reach a consensus
on contentious foreign policy choices. The most likely problem we
will have to face in our still fragile relationship with the PR.C is the
Chinese withdrawing in upon themselves in a leadership blood-letting with
an accompanying dissipation of the Peking-Washington political dialogue.
What can the U.S. do in this situation? Some might argue that if we
were to resolve the Taiwan issue and complete normalization we could
hold. the Chinese to the relationship built over the past five years.
While such a move might, indeed, make the U.S. connection less of a
point of controversy in Peking's current leadership turmoil, it would
only invite contempt from the Chinese if taken with an attitude of
concern about holding them to their "American tilt" and from a general
posture of passivity in foreign affairs due to continuing Congressional
constraints . The most important thing the U.S. can do to regain
the initiative in its China policy is to reactivate a more assertive
and coherent foreign policy. The active search for positive agreements
with both Moscow and Peking, in combination with firm action to oppose
aggressive Soviet behavior (as in Angola), can revitalize the dynamic
in our foreign policy which was most evident in 1972-73. In such a context,
the Chinese will both fear being isolated as we establish positive agree-
ments with Moscow, yet draw confidence from our ability to oppose the
Russians' outward thrusts. Such a posture on our part would renew
Chinese perceptions of the legitimacy of the Mao/Chou foreign policy
initative toward the U.S.; and in such a context normalization would be
seen by Peking as a sign of American strength and not weakness. (For
their part, the Soviets can probably be counted on to misplay their dealings
with Peking, and thus sustain Chinese distrust of Russian intentions, which
remains the driving force in Peking's foreign policy in any event.)
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Chairman Mao's invitation to Mr. Nixon, while galling for its impact
on our domestic political debate and degrading of public support for
a relationship with the PRC, was basically a sign that China still
looks to the U.S. for an active, anti-Soviet foreign policy, and wants
completion of the normalization process. If Mao does not die within
the next two years, and if we are able to pursue more forcefully our
own interests abroad, the U.S.- PRC relationship can regain some of
its previous vitality. Unfortunately, at present the probabilities have
greatly increased that China's current political conflict will dissipate
the energies and attention of PRC leaders on domestic feuding and the
country will become itself an increasingly passive factor on the world
scene.
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