COMMUNIST CHINA'S GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 11, 1970
• Content Type: NIE

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APPRCVED EXpR RELEASEA1
DATE; MN 1001
I
V.ORET
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TIMATE
NUMBER 134.70
ME 13-3-70
11 June 1970
Communist China's General
Purpose and Air Defense Forces
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*ma
no f011owing inteffigeatte
this eriffoisafor
The Otetrel +44004:0 MO the keolkernoe orternlandlons of the Disport.
' own* Of Stag and DAM% Old the NSA.
Lt, Oen. IL E. Cochromin. Jr4 USW, Do Director of Control Inroligonal
Dr. Rey & Chu; Do Oliveto of Inialligonat and Smooch, Doparhaont of Sado
1.t. Don. Donald Irs Swine% the Oiroceoe, Deform Iroolituarren Aging,
Or. Logic W Tordsda, for the Moder, National Socerity Agency
Dr. Ciwor3U 4itoichardt. far dor Acristont %Wild Mancolor, Akenk gnaw Con%
minim =
Afeofairafrige
fAt 0. CNigor, for the Aulsiont to Itto rr?oi Federal Sumo of lomat.
gado*, Oho robins Wino ?aide of his tirtbdi
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THE
To setsis the s and disposition of the Chinese
Communist general defense forces ltb pink:elar
reference to the impact of domestic political developments and Sim.
Soviet tension"
WALINIST CHINA'S GENERAL
RPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES
CONCLUSIONS
A. Twenty Years have now been expended in Oornmunlst
effort to strengthen and modernize Its armed forces. Peke& per-
sistent %vintagers' to allocate a !arse shore of its resouroes to military
pewees has yielded some creditable results. At the same time, how-
ever, the effect has been beset by difficulties caused by disruptive
economic 'mod politico policies and by the smbivelerice between
Maoist military doctrine and the requirements for building a modern,
profeesional military force.
L The upheavals of the Cultural Revolution interkered with mill.
buy trang and degraded the combat capabilities and reedineas of
the Chinese Arnied FOMOS. But the extent of this degradation and
the degree of it" persistence up to the present time le in dispute.
CIA and INR believe that the level of training is still well short of
normal to the army because of continued heavy involvement in non-
MOE* OCtiVitiet and that progress in exploiting the People's Taber*.
tion Atuty PPLA4 Aont these tasks will be skew, DLt and NSA on the
other hand, believe that training in the army approached nonnal
levels in 1960 and that any residual degradation Isk combat readiness
; and effectiveness is slight, A discussion of the evidence On these points
at hoe is contidned in person* 12 to 17.
C. The deteriorating (1041rie of Sino.Soviet relations, which fi it
deprived of extensive military assistance and then in recent
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1. the PLA hes the capability for putting
aP a fonnidable defense DI the mainland. Its printing strength hes
In the size ottbe ground forces (about two and onolalf million) and
their fighting potential as an infantry force. Although China's military
Amos is basically defensive, its forces could overwhelm lie neighbors
in Southeast Lute or Korea if not opposed a modio.= outside powers
I and, as it is demonstrating in Indochina, can provide Important
assistance to insurgent groups across its southern borders.
E. In cementing combat against a modem opponent, however,
each branch of the PLA would have critical weaknesses. Army units
are believed to hi sarioudy deficient in motorized transport end heavy
armament the air defense system probably lacks an adequate corn-
snunications end date processing capability end could not withstand
a large-on* soplxisticoted sir attack; and China's navy, while growing.
Is still little more than a coastal defense force.
As estimated, current spa projected production programs will
not, for many years, provide sufficient quantities of the various types
of weapons and equipment needed to remedy materiel deficiencies
and to robe the PM to modern combat standard.. But the Chinese are
perseverbag?and almost, =eta* wit] continue to do so under any
foreseeable lesdership?nith a fairly broad range of modernization
along the following lines:
iddrough the only is deficit in firepower and
to have made less progress in modomization than
meets& the firepower of Chinese combat units
Already well supplied with small Amu, ground units
tanks and artillery.
2. Mr Forces. All elements of Chines lir defense apparently have
been imgemed. Comma and oxrtrol capabilities have probably in-
creased, more and better riders have been deployed at an increasing
ate, and blip12 Production probably has recovered from the Cultural
Revoke:Ica. SAM deployment, however, has been proceeding slowly
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1
uncertain about Chinese p for producing
evidence that an aircraft of nathe design
been produced in Chino.
exceptions, naval shipbuilding programs
fly during 1909 from the Cultural Revo-
and Ctifl?flt expansion of shipyards indicates that new programs
could emphasis it being placed on production
of Inger, longer tinp ships capable of extended patrols. Construction
of 11-class submarines now avenges about two units a year, and
China ha, begun to build destroyers. Old destroyers are being con-
verted to carry endse
DISCUSSION
Thew years the %WY equipped reolgee Ltheintleo Amy MAI
entered Kenn and fought in as first and only war against a well-milliPtunt
modem forms. Although Mime leaders had noon to be satisfied with the
resourcefulness and ondurstre of their army, at kart some of them retnintred
? that Chines semi* and psetensione gtrat power rale required a substantial
Ant to strengthen and modernise its tinned force& Such au effort wee initiated
In the midst of die war and has continued to the Present del'.
2.ThUPLhMmedobprugem1i,ioreefteldsandIthtodayan
organization of oansiderable site and defensive potential, with a capability
? to mount substantial offerable ?parttime in the adjacent arras of Southeast Aria
and roes. Nonethelesr, there are the striking facts that the PIA'. overall prog.
; rear hes bran somewhat limited and uneven and that much of its time and energy
has been absorbed by political and oimmanic hoctioes.
3." In the broadest wise. the MA'S Progress is airoksgenot modem force
has been limited. by the fundamental weaknesses of Chines Industry and tith.
nobly. Beyond that, however, in doveikopmerst has been strongly awed by
tendency to iys priority to the political rule rad mission of the Iran'. by
his concepts for the defense of 'China through the strum of Peoples Mr, rad
by the Cousequores at his challenge to the leading mia of the USSR
4. The modendsradon of the PLA 'suffered its first major upset when Mote
1958 Cara Leap Pornend brought on a collapse of industrial production in
China. Thera diffittiitire were compounded by the n4thdriond of Soviet redltety
and Oseneenio elobtanoo la MO,
5. It was oda at the tam of the decade the Lin Mao took over the leading
Winery ;gringos In bath the party end the governme* a move which ushered
in a period of mowed efforts at political and ideohneral 'rectification* of the
PLA. Military production preplan* never lost their strong claim on resources,
but the resurgence of the 741eoht ideological approach to army building may
11N14111X 3
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CULTURAL REVOLUTION
the political *rid wird upheaval brought on
continue% and it hes become inereseingly
greeter in the first tem y.rn mr so than
As the authority of the party and goverrommt epperatm
was ailed apse first to maintain general order end stability,
role of pesemnaker and arbiter between factional groups,
omme leadernrip of the moaned Bovolutiomuy Committees
government orgsobations, business end industrial enormities.
China. In the process the PLA acquired a wide veriety
rttyand roman& functions which emended deeply
of Mune society.
past few yews Mel* elements of at least 15 of China's 34 armies
way from their Immo beset for moons relating to the political
dlionhances of the thne. In most Instances these move, were pit.
in *atom mid did not remit in a net drill of forces. Most of
;.4' their new areas and some at least ere widely dispersed
and administrative talcs. Similar use is being made of
which remain closer to their home garrisons. From 1251
appreoSmetely CO percent of Chinese ground fore* units have been
at one time to mother In these nonmilitary activities.
aonsiderahly Meier.
The PLA baa been a clothes as well as an lnstrvmmt of the Cultural Bevolu.
Ione nt Ideher lersh of the PLA W41 psiuly1*csinth.
steps. Some of these purged apparently favoredomstencting ChInis
Forces along moventionel and profession lbw* and ran afoul of
ides of a highly politichred unitary establishment. DiNerencea also do.
Crelit primates and programs for developing Chines economic and mill-
Imes which led been tommehated by the damaging effects of
Crest Leap Irevend and hi* Wailing of SinnSoclo relations,
mem to have been brought down as a result of Wined
aped lithe coons of the Cultural Revolution rather than
past pokey dlifesinces,
S. In my we. ablaut ball of the top military leadership wee purged. The
Military /ado Ormanittore the highest official body responsible for military
planet* lost sliest bull of its Mending numbers and was reorganised. The
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t whick i meponrible for cocedinattrig combat cpers
level of cUualtleL Comerenders of the ennorml. forces,
corps weft purged, as were the
and railway corps. The musky list
millimy profeedenels and ,politleal
Theo was also * heevytoll at the military region and military district
lavele. At them levels it was mostly political officers who fell. With a few
notsble aseeptions; purges and factional activity were limited at the army level
and below. .
U. Nonethelese, the PIA has emerged as a more powerful political force
dem** the buffeting it has received Nine of the 25 full and alternate members
of .the Polithem chosen at the Nindi Party Congress In April la* were PIA
members. Military ;Olken DOW are the top men or hold powerful positions in
nearly all of die Revolutionary Committees governing Chimes major adirdn-
lenstive them 'Ilse military is prominent in municipal and county governments
anwell. In addition, the PIA ia still the only effective nada:Heide instrument
of 'control avoidable to Peldng: as a result the PIA is playing a signifieant if
not peadondnalit role in the political reorganization and party rebuilding that
Ii currently- but stlawly-4eing carried forward. The PLA is thus in a stems
paha to mond Its power at local levels and probebly at the national level as
well. Despite thh enhanced political position, all the available evidence 'bows that
rq.ersel ocenneendoe are responsive on military matters In national authorities.
Impend on rtainhip ond .Morole
It Trend* M indicated above, a large number Of army units have been
identified with nonmilitary actiAtim. The key questions are, of courne. the
from these units who were, and who continue to be,
such duties and the extent to which these persovurcl and
as have participated in moaningfal military lailt11111,,
lifts Is neither clear nor firm and it is subject to widely
re interpretations, in turn. are central to lodgments
bat readiness and 'apothems of the PLA..
Ii that our data base an training in the PLO& always
, we have never been able to follow the activities of
;nth to establish the extent and nature of normal
eleficienry oplies in some degree to all the services, but
bs
14. 'The major swift:in f evidence available consists of die following;
a. Testimoie, from individuals entering Hong gong and letters from the
China mainland which give ft roiled picture of FLA sketivityr
h. A continuhig man of Chinese went and radio reporting detailing the
involvement of Chinese Army units and indivichutb in prepagandis and
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4 de
?
political work and In adinintstritive tasks throughout (he grrienanent, the
econemp, * the echoed system. .
Lei*laYi the lowing 'Soviet Snot should have brought a rapid with.
*swat of PLA penennal from Cultural Revolution Mike at lust in
? in the ?LA to tencantrate 0111 mambo mellow& DIA and NSA harm that the
evidence on the meamption of training in nes indicates that this did happen,
probabiy to a considerable agent. Moreover, DIA and NSA do not find pupa-
referemose to PLA involversort in non-military activities to be permute*
evidence of the wind' umbra of troops invoked end the time expended in
such acthdttee. : =
la Attil MID manhole agree that training in the Chinese Mr Faye and Mir/
probable in 11 normal Ire* (winds OM low by VS or &Atm etudarde), But
the contkined sad unehuit refesonces in the news vie& to amty involvemerit
In administrative and piopagauda talks lead CIA and INR to believe that the level
of army *aiming is wall short of tiOrMil.
17. These aro differennes of degree and they cennot be quantified fa any
?meardstsfol way on timbale of resent evidence. Thus, DIA and NSA emphasize
indiestors of theresUMPUon, ci bihdeg; CIA end INR emphasize Whetters of
the continued ineolumesert of eta array In bermnilitary activities,
IS. Morale. Morale and discipline must_ have been adversely affected by
the dieraptioo and divisiveness that the Cultural lievolutine brought to Meese
society as a whole. For a nine PLA leaden appeared divided at various levels
and in rem* wire *objected tolyl abuse front (*Moral groups. Pollt-
ical attacks against many `sersior offloers could only have added to the ovendl
problem, To some?netent 'morale probably centieues to suffer. Although them
hae been thee to myth the loreset el the damage caused by the purge of ste.
Lima Level mammy om MA commoden down to the erdlitusy reglad level
at,pyilhb0pe*Wbot tense silo uncertain political environment. Top
level civilian leaden ere In oconsiderable d ifpreoompied with Internet
pobtlad problem. Due to this condition we believe that overall police guidance
and zoilituy phasing subject to some ,Imeertainty ind delaW
1
w OM DOW 1001011, Dinstcr, Px4ernae Inhkiligotoce Amoy, polka that the leo
know* IMISOOININF 01011,iO4 Vow two Story ar alai kr" satitaty peatiem sae wear
IIi be Mal by &km land le Me tentakl gareentneet ifider oath attaasateasec
be ltelavat lb seeseaselle b teatlatie that PLA cirkert LTV PO lover usite doe
simented am* awl sareeletay which chgotetrrtted the Cultural Poroktksa,
MOlompo as airimierrost epidoishodly coix-,,iykNi with totem/ political rabies* oho
wathatial tlelems destelbed ta Swam n ftistkut lint Otsego tedium piesteing
ttrieiti old im
?
Moo M. Ploileindior,lbs Lasecno, NituoAl Security Agency; afai,, G. *orb A.
hisChabtleat. the Allailigit Chid of Staff for ErTO,11(itorce, Department al the Anon Copt.
WOW N. Ma* foe ibe AMidtit Chid er Ncril Orrretterka (Iraairocoio). Deportment
oh. Noggus *ft Ow, Wowed fUtkm*h., for tin Aoistont Mief of SUN. bitstliginas,
SINN 111, illesve. aloe itaIn thu teetrage
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!
L stows LISELATION ARMY TODAY
Minafife* tbf FORM and Ootenavo hioatorti
la hem din otdost? Mane "?oorounie military policy ban ben to provide
ant of all for the defense of the mainlaud, Until recent yews, at learn, Peking
visemod the US as its pad* entray, The positioning of line ground forces
Telma and Anent to Keres, sod strenuous efforts to build op sir
Ps net Chna and to develop a eripebility to defend coastal miters
emcee about the potential of US flattery power,
intervention in South vietnam and the bombing of the North in UM
tamed Rides to emphasize the development of air defenses elms the nether*
herder and to strangtherr naval forces in the area from Canton south. While
there lust been no significant 7trengthening of ground forces in math Chine,
6 bedety of marts indicate that the Chinese are bury improving and expanding
mil and road nets, and coahlitlurg military storage facilities to arm eau the
borders Of North Vietnam, Laos, and to a lesser extent, Minna,
IL We at get certain whrit to make of this construction octivity. SOMO of
the road and rail iii.vork can be explained as occessarf to economic development
and political consolidation In the remote and sometimes turbulent bonier regions.
The soavey may also reflect a gtmernl concern for defense against foreign
aggression, although it see n% doubtful that Peking 'would expect more than
minor hamssments in this sre. Soule of the road construetto4 does, however,
hied * the herders of 1401 and Burma?In the case of Loos, road censtructiors
mediates ammo the border. The-se roads do, of course, enhance Chinese cape.
bade to support Insurgency or to project their own forms Into onsinisisti South.
east Ada.
IL Since about 19I5, the USSR has been steadily building up its military
strength along the Sino-Sot border, In the spring of 191300 SOTIOM border
clashes owned along the -1,11511r1 [liver, and In the ensuing months there were
further border incidents rin mo,cto,..? rnOlInted apsychologimai campaign that
raised the speeter of somy.. iQrt of mnpr Soviet artack against ChM'. Con-
eequently, Ming rimy regard-T de 1,rcSE as at imit a coequal of the US as
althea mew, Indeed., the cla.s1( so prubAb:y now vie* the Smut* 01 the MOTO
iwonediste imd direct duvet.
23. Although ft is clear tl?Jat t wsls aware of the Soviet buildup soon after
It holiest, Minot military rtrtcnq down to 1969, at /cast, antra cautious and
united In Imp& in, 14)65 t ',,,gan to extend and improve their air defense
wining nine along thcl r.Xil frontier, but not on a crash hula. 'Mere
were no ilondleens snow:, ,1 i malor ground force units toward the Sine-
Seetae frontier, ln fact t!,._ m.Linr F.otlion of two armies we.-mod out of
Manchuria to deal with problems cog,n,..oted with the Cultural Ilevolutle.i, and
the mat areas cf 56i/clang and Inner Mongolia continue to be ivy thinly
arraring with regular Farr ct modest reinforcement of these MOW
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
Although the Chinn*
tory medicos apperentb, hos continued to defers-
in derseter, In OM Inner Mongolia was divIded among th. Sbcnyang.
Partial and Leech= Military Region:, an action which provides tinner corn.
mendend control OVIlt the northeor border area Deployment of radars in the
has been incermsed. The reported inevetee in the level of training, Porfico.
I hely among air trod naval units, is almost certainly linked with Sino-Sovkt
Along vrith there military prepordiona Poking los beam "strident
pesparstiond" earopaign which includes new effort' to increase industrial
agricultural production and to disperse population and smell industrial
longstanding goals of the repro The campaign also Includes a
nation-wide program of ad/ raid shelter construction and food stomp for and-
pricy use.
23. Aron from their purely military aspects, these activities clearly MVO
the regimes faUlatade and social goals and help unlfy the mutiny alter a long
peeled of intend tonssoll. They oho *sive to put the Soviet lint= on rotes
that Chins Is preperad. If it musk to Solt
20. Other &famine ilfeeseree. The Chinese have long had a program for
placing some of their military and military related Facilities undergronod. Some
naval hoses now under construction Are being provided with underground fa-
cattier, some of which sea repotted to be protected berthing. foe submarines
and smaller daft Construction now underway at some airfields could provide
underground hangers for part of Chines jet fiehter form.
27. A general pattern of chgging hr would moire INUC in terms of passive de.
ofisiort Or Of ming hoothot'dment, Puticule* to dew of the vulnerabilities
of Mae active detentes spinet such attacks, The love behind the construe.
tion of the huge earth-mounded structures, which have been reported In out
China is lea obvious, Apleusibi. eiplenation for these facilities is that they are
designed to previde defensive areas points for important strategic end political
centers. Thh function would fit with the emeredve work being deaf to build
cave and tunnel strong points aims the toast where the tarok Favors such
defames. But the WOW utility of the taros mounds aid* a molorn? MAO.
roomy breeder is open to question and we aro not yet confident that we under,
stand the reasoning which Iles behind their construction. Sores measure of their
impedance to ?Ado, is evident, however, in the sacrifice of good agricukurel
had tri oast Chin",
*km teed
SO. In lade, Peking for the third time In four years altered the length of
service for new recruits in the PIA, The terms of service In this army, navy
and eh, harm were ineresied to throe, four and flys yam respectively. The
return to longer tenni of service probably reflects a derive to raise the level of
skilled manpower In: the rersioot.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
;
29. assumed control over Pubfic Security Forcer
took over the peremilitary Prod
Subsequently smile iliseavesed military training may have been conducted wit
them orpnizations, particularly among FCC units located In bold** semis Over
the last few yeas same aklitiorial but vent. Wig training also may have been
provided to certain militia units While we doubt that this training has been
sufficient to mike three orgenixatirms effective front line edlunoto of the PIA.
they do constitute a readily mild& source of organised manpower that could
be used hi defensive and delaying isetione along the Soviet herder.
Miiitary Eqvipment Programs
30. The limitations of Chiniel mientific gerial, and Industrial
capabilities and the disruptive effects of Maelet political and economic pollei.-a
of the pad decade are highly visible in the projrains far production of con-
ventionil military hardware. In terms of design and developme* the high
priority given to nuclear weapons systems seems to have absorbed much of
the avaibible talent, With few exceptions the Chinese appear to have done little
original design work on conventional weepons As a vonsequence, most of ther
pnxioetion, of military hardware is based on Soviet equipment and production
metrology enquired prior to lain
31. We see no early end to the bind on MD removes despite the high
priority on such resources that milinny prIgrarni will continue to enjoY, Some,
additional time may he neeerrery to overcome the adverse effect: of factionalism
and political disputes which good evidence demi developed during the Cultural
Revolution in the Natiorrel Defense Scientific and Technological Commission,
In any event, there has ban * four year disruption of scientific and teehn7rial
education and there is yet no sign of e resumption of such education on a
sound basis or a hived scale.
Sit. Military production, even where dodos and other technical problems
have berm ;rived, has in many nisei fallen below levels that we would have
considered chniteible In= Peking's point of view and within their capabilities
This has been due, tfi patt, to the 000nernio &weeders& of the Crest Leap 10
years ago and nsore recently to the Cultural 'Revolution. For example, it is be-
lieved that lighter einoraft production dropped significantly during 1967-1008,
and various *WM showed a decline to naval shipbuilding doling the lame
period; Although there is little dime evidence, it Is likely that some other types
of military production silo declined because of the Cullum] Revolution,
Sit The pattionlat &irruptions of the Cultural Rem:41*M have now been
lorgely ovot011oist indeed It *peers that military mediation in 1410 on an overall
bads will equal the previous high of 1060, Nonethelees, we do not yet see an end
to the longstanding orieven pattern of military procurement. Them patterns aro
Nor* explained by economic disruptions and we are somewhat puzzled
by the orderine of priorities if, as we belies.* likely, resources and pleat facilities
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
1 t ?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05 : LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
114
34. Chinda
fightimi potential en
Ce?mmenist Army CCA):
oarrent data, hut le figure of
withis plue or minus 18 percent. This strength hes sot changed jubit*ntlafly
ova the pest decade., The overall deployment of the army has also
subetandelly the woe with the bulk of the Found forces still deployed In a
1.50 mileivide band extending from euuthein Manchuria southward along the
coast to the borders of Vietnam
35. Considering its Importance, the CCA probebly has made len progress in
modernization than might have been expected. Detailed study of metal pho-
tography of army budlike:ions in tha Shenyang Milihwy Region shows that up
to the time of this tie overnights the meaning and equipment levels of units
varied widely. More Signifinantly, tho great majority of units in the armies of
the Shereong Isfilittuy .Begion speared to be seriousbr deficient in mobility
and fimpower?ePecifkally. balmy ,ertiVery. trucks and other Wheeled vehicles,
orator and armor support vehicles?by VS or Soviet stendards. Even by the
acidosis that we have estimated kr the Chinese TOO, they NIV'ete
defichmt in mobility and had shortcomings in firepower. (See pump* 9441
of Annex for forther,lindings of this antibmis.) Most kriportarely. we do not
believe that prophotices rotes of 'them items of equipment weld by nay have made
Dewed V. BMW" oween. wpm. busittstene AeeWtelteese it It telerts?
that the ghat ematehali Mao wan,* Preetelement pseui "Mt the
eeateh aotherty in whow of the inteMinfee etheleted leek 01
Write& omen* lad Teklataireetersest et the threat See WNW*
eaphadit ea le rieS motel Mew emotes masa eeeditset with
the /*triter. Naomi Saco* Aram Mel Cs.. jerePhA.
.111 111141 ter iebt011erter, Dittirtmmt ti the Ariel CNA,
.(kief. at Naval Omni** Chmaignee), lleterheleet
lather/IA fur the Asaktart Met at Stet Ititatirteet,
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
u deficiencies to a significant degree. Thus it is most probable that they
continuo to exist, In addition, we believe that because of their Orate& loestioti,
the Sherayang armies should have lied at least an average claim to new and
additional equipment; thus it is likely that similar equipment shortages are
common among Chinese snake elsewhere.
In additive, the anny's involvement hs internal effostrs mhos serious ques.
done concerning the ability of its cassonanders to assemble divisions quickly
and coordinate their activities effectively, This factor and equipment defielesdes
make it maw that the Chinese Army is much less a ready and effective force
than WS previously fudged it to be and less able than we had thought to engage
its conventional combat against modem opposition. Even though military training
his moved forward in the past yes it still &emits probable that the Chinese might
encounter cenolderable difficultly in quickly prdecting large forces toward sod.
doily threatened border sow or evert of concentrating and maneuvering ground
form effectively within their own regional basica
31 Little effort owns to have been expended in developing more endie equip.
meet for the ground forces. Although the Chinese probably have the required
skift and technology to develop a %dial ballistic mini* there is no information
which indicates that the Chinese are worldeg on such a system. This being the
cue, it le unlikely that the Chinese could deploy a tactical missile much before the
mki.19100,, if indeed they hove current plans to develop such a system, Even
though a smell chemical warfare research program apparently exists? there is no
evidence that China hes committed Important resources to eithef a chemical or
biological wiriest program. Military training emphasises the defensive aspects
of chemical warfare.
Al, and Air Defense forms
38, All elements of Mai air defense apparently have
the past 18, menthe, and training activity probably increased somewhat during
vOINNAMM11111.14ww
Lt. con. Denali V. lionent, the Minter, Dolan famadieme Aileen, does not believe that
the MA% hevolvarat in fennel *Yoke at this thus ism VIM it tO liettittettli *404 ifs
rens* elhttivesemi. N VIrvice* *healed in porsergiii 3 OsvirqutrAb% the FLAN ova
-
mallow *Wenn are aokeatioldered a sionditent impodiment to the eentethtele and moditiee
ties Cl lane nrc?ii pruned Amok
analyali of the iffieivaing phatenaphy *haws that the Chinon ninny *Mom robe**
an snippety defluient MI motor inniport by %stele sattnerth and by the requital:Noe of
thin owned 'Mac Its aetuai maim these deficiestein would be reftirted to a con-
siderable &wee lot the employment of eleilimo Wanspometlen Wisdom end the
? tha eimyre federation mono itanipadatiati talffinuab, On* sat errand is the eaub,
Wider*5 n banopoetation lbuft teOthiltille 10 el(oni rePhf maltatY WadoP
In mason erase hut In the.. erns where Chino would most likely tosemble leer aumbers Of
uplbe.mkti ord highway rottweeke an inequity for the timid mocatton of then Wawa.
VW Aim Nog Owlet. the Direette. Sown Inettetty Ammon Con. SoloPh
hicatitilltut, die Santsistift CIAO of Staff fee lM,iltwan. Deparattora oi esa Arnyi Capt.
Milan N. floteb, lot the Amnon Chief of Naval Opeonins (Iatatitancla), Dapartna.at
of the Nom ant !Ulm Cety Ellwood Itathovith fee the Ashton Chief of Sint lantlitenoe,
United Stater Ms Toste. alio lain in thin hobo's,
MIME 11
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
R`4
o Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
mute= still has a limited
also believed to suffer
.In the event of
be expected to severity
the number of attacking
rapidly become stunted and hence in.
b, a few of the Mig.liis in Chine have
no More dna 115 percent of Chime* total
a eapebthty. China's 1,023 1110.191 have s low super-
1 of Mig.111,* received hors the Soviet Union
margiall eitlybIBlY for engaging ether
uncertain tlx.ut Chinese plans for produc-
have had eight years now to study,
given them by the Soviets,
eec either hive experienced great
Appears to be the mod bkely
the bl4,21 In the hopes of &t-
own design. If the /Oar is
be available in quantity for
the mon,
at les* five
41. Them is some evident* that en aircraft of native design based on the
lif1g40, has been produced In China. We are unable to predict whether such
an arm* might be need in an intercepter or ground attack role, or possibly
both. In any event if this aircraft is in reader:Cow we harm It will he several
years before it could he available In ubitential numberip,
431. We now believe that production of the Soviet designed TU./S jet medium
bomber began at the Yenliang Airframe Pleat about OK Some 10 bombers
could hive been Produced by now. The production rate could inmost gradually
and leech a level of about 4 or a month by late 1911 initial operationsl deploy.
inept of this drama probably has begun. It it likely that the Meese will eon.
side, the VI40 primarily as a delivery vehicle for mins weapons.
43. Although little is known of the Chinese doctrine on MA employment,
they have a alembic MA farce which has benefitted from combat experience
In North Vietnam, This fare* memo to be deployed primarily in eastern China.
extending from the North Korean border southward down the oast mud along
12
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!i No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
the bo,don with countrist in Southeast AMa. it Is probably deployed in point
*knee and to protect Mated me Chinese AAA
force will probshly pin In effectiveness with deployment of additional weapons
and continued trelnirri.
44 SAki units have bees activated much
than we expected and
there are misi about IS mans In the fiehi. Deployments nvoragnd about four per
year &slug 191304913B and the deployment patent now pievides abetter defense
of a few imports* etrategle hug*. Nevertheless., the 5A.4 force will not add
dgeilkuntly to Chlee's overall * defense +livability for some time to come.
SAW and AAA If located together would maximize the effectiveness of these
air defense weapon systems.
a& Three has been no dignifies* change in the tactical *Ike and air support
capabilities of the Chtnese Communist Air Force for etemy years, IL-38e ere still
the May jet bombers which the Chimes have in any quantity (about 300) and
their ,few ground attack fighter divisions are equipped with Mig-15,14441/
11/401. Purchase of hump** den& from the USSR have only marginally
Improved the airlift and airborne assault capability, and any improvement over
the next how ruts is likely to depend alms* entirely on such purchases. The
Chinese probably have only a limited cepobility for the employment of ECM
In support of offensive Wakes.
Naval Foxes'
44 and operations of the Chinese Communist
navel forms all indicate that their primary minion continues to be coasts] defense.
Although =VII /MAO is immuring, the USW is now capable only of providing
adequate defense *grand smell surface forces intruding Into coastal waters. Its
aothathinerine warfare (ASW) cipshility Is minimal by modern standards end
limited to areas *Amy* to naval hues where surface ships me readily avollable.
Virtuitly no priority hat yet bees OM to imprieting the capabilities of the
naval air force or to construction of ships which would improve Chimes very
limited seagoing ainphibiont capability
4?.. With few exceptions, naval eldpbuilding programa probably recovered
fully during 1080 from the CUltend Revolution Coastal patrol craft, including
missile boats, are being turned out m an foreseeing rate. Construction of &class
submarines now average about two units a year and an ',falderal shipyard
probably has lawn, submarine construction* Ohl deetroyers received years ago
from the USSR are befog onweited to eeny cruise missiles. Minn has Mso
begun to mUds now dui of destroyer which may be hosed on a modified
&SIP of the Soviet Kodak, Puticelmly in view of the conversion of the older
deaneries, we think it likely these new ships will also he equipped with cruise
inimiles, It appears that a greeter emphasis is now being placed on mourns
which will provide Urger, longer range ship capable of extended patrols, in
addition, shipyard amoeba currently under way indteetca that the Chinese
may be planning Wiliness) naval *ovum.
*NM
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
so missile program baa developed very
cesetruottel in the emly Sift at opposite
. No additional atm how been Wend-
indigene that this tempo? has been de-
titer which have been dammed It is
ve been workhrg on as alternative eye.
stye cruise miwile which they are cur
degraded Chinese military
nese. morale and &Winn The resumption .of
which we believe occurred in mid.lirell .pmb-
; ably served to overcome emu of these deficiencies. This inclose should con-
tinue if the current mood of nmdenuice in. Peking persists during the months
*heed Rut the promos of extending the FLA, particularly the omen from its
1 involvement In natilnilltuy activities will be difficult and dow? especially since
Peking continues to be beset by political problems and is making only very :elow
. protests In tebuildbrg. the party and In amornpliddng other orgaithitioma
rowing. Heiglitioed Minion ..lretworen Chins, and the Soviet Voice during the
past you seem to have 144 some inhering influence on Porkier& but not enough
to jolt the Chimee leaderthip Into any crath effort to improve the army's corn,
'1D
but readiness Thus, though developments seem to be tending toward returning
OW entire PLA to woo norns01 footing, much of the time and wove, at least
I of amity .persontrel,.!: is likely to o3attnue to be diverted by noolnilibuy activity
and politiord strew *the met few yeers.4
I
Projerted prodnetien programa will net for many Orin, provide sufficient
quantities Of the vesicles typos of weapons and equipment needed to remedy.
.earione mateviel ..end to Mae the PLO, to modem combat standards.?
/te the pewees of Modernizetion wee famed. Ao. Chloe,* win hoo .otoothY
. rising meson& oome. Not larrly will outlay, for eiquipatrort thoreuto, but u
more equipment towhee the field, .operotions and nta1nta4iinco coati will go
up. IrWthennale, ale.crogit tau** prodritidon" more to be rut vdog .from? the
, , ? ?
.1 'Lt. Cm.' Destakt V. fienesik .the Dietetor, ? bees. Outwore Apiary* bellow that the ? ?
sweempristi Cl toileiliE In *S has reaffielent new to overcool* wit of the Oilturif .
&Weeder to minim* .mettl* .and Wile" Miaow, it *We opinion that
MA's lentel prom tredve) a. counderahlt orpeadlein if its. and owIrnr ,
hut the levelveinret .004.exppc0,4 to solittoodolly, kap* oval* T.adSme-
Nest .1:nroonr? Wind Ort.? foriph A.
the Chief of IteM Sir I of the Mop Capt.
Antetrat t'Isvsl Opendiron (toretiletwo), Drpositorot
ihrwd Ankovirk for the Mtant Chief 51 irdf. lineltntertok
.0*. is that. how%
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No Objection to De-Classification in Part 2010/01/05 : LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
able to cope with a nttJar air
they We provide mare and better
In the futoro cannot on be iufBdssst to tater the fact that the navy has
caPlibiktY ouly for coesti.t deirnee alpinist anal intruding surface brad
end an ASW capability only In the vicinity of naval hew
?
, Drigdte these, impatient wardoesses and ihecteomings, the PIA has a
tial defensive capebility. This street& together with the sheer vastness
population and territosy would make a ground Isar modest China
blepropireition even for aged power. The PEA could easily handle
on likely to wise an the Shvo-Indian frontier or anything the Chinese
unamisted, mold mount against the insielend. And, of course, the
overran their neighbors in Southeast Asia or Kona in a cameo.
attaal if not heed with opposition from a modem outside power. More-
over, as it is dersimetmting in Indochina and with ha logistical preparations in
south Chhui. Peking is in an excellent position to meddle in intingincies asvi
unsettled sitnattons atom its southern border.
Polley, Doctrine, and Strategy
52., Chinese military 'novena end force &iposfttoni continue to reflect an
overriding concern for defense. Even their emerging nuclear capability would
fit into this generally defensive posture, when viewed as a deterrent against any
potential enemy. Maoist military doctrine textiles rowed for the enemy and
the need to avoid direct tomato's with superior fames; this bade caution
continuos to guide Chinese military policies today,
511..PoliticaL uneettetntlea in China and Sino-Soviet tension, however, greedy
complicate the protest of making judgments regarding future dm:Mom in Peking
Oil millitexy policy. One thing that seems aimed manila is that the military seater
will retain its high prirotity in the *Vocation of resources. But, es we indicated
shove, the Chbvise have a long way to go in Ribs out and modernizing the
equipment of the general purpose and air defense forces, and only gradual
hnprovement eaves the wide range of requirements will be possible. Competition
from strategic missile end nuclear vnitipon proems, which have the highest
priority Of afl,adde to the piebkm.
M. Mao, though he Concedes the need for modern equipment and for develop.
Ing military skill., Is clearly more interested in the continuing politicization of
the PIA and in using it au the =envier and instrument for bringing about the
Ideological remodeling be treks for all of Mine.* society. Military professtanals,
co the other heady ere likely to be more concerned with correcting China's mill-
:
hay week:news and dealing with Chinal1i many pressing practical problems,
15
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05 : LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
sating to 'which its represented
so chmr. About *II that an
and programs for building and
win be difficult to kW 11
netiesal
emit this
Is that
Pro.
uid provide the PLA withpowerful argument
could also lead to recisions in Peking's set of military
the equIpment and firepower of the ground
whr.e snivel prorrases might be natelled The
Increase if Peking also saw the US es "kering ib
speculation. Aricl it,h equally pourible that Pekin&
prolalensi does not yet see Its way clearly for
titian Ming seems to he showing in the fact of
prob.blp reflects a concern not to make militery
or limn the Soviets. Probably a mOre
do important ground few* deploy.
are making * virtue of necessity;
up to the border where the Soviet
tines anti could use their
the grown advantage. In the
probably mould react with
available. but would not be easily provoked into
to the frontier, In the event of a lingo-male invasion
tegy opals to all for harassing and delaying
up a 1411E01011P GOMM of seksoind strategic nem.
Chinese still appear to be willing to give up territory
Maoist People' Wu deep in Chin".
be strasted. however, that Chinese means and preparations
only aping the Soviets lelitery fames. especially * have
the southern border MU, NW &firmly* makes have
alongChina'S coudise sa well, Peking's
prepare against attach not only km the USSR but
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
r
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05 : LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
The High Command
ThotMsty al Hstlou&I Defense (MND
Military Mobs Committee
authority, The chief /toff components of the M three general dept
-
mew the Cenerel Staff Depeninente the Cenral Minya! Deportment, and
the Gemmel Pan Services Departmettt. Moat combat arms and services, such
is the sir teem navy, armor, artillery, esti selected supporting orvatizations.
asto reprommted at the MND level by separate needquarters. However, theee
ao topants beimigisitent for the infantry forms, which are apparently eon.
belled divinely by die MND.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05 : LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
Wad Into malt** refons
her at Military Regions
II. The Inner hirmgolia
=mit the Shenyang. Petzhig, and lanchou
Is Ism clear, the Tibet Mihaly Region may have
Charon Military Region. These are lettitadal rat c
and in most cues conform to provincial boundaries,
Army
L The y, of which
there are ennhined
arca or tan armies. A typical Chinese army at lull strength would include 3
infantry regiment
and would num y head.
quartets, them are a, service
Ruppert units Assigned to
1. We eetimate that at lull strength the standard faimitty division would
number about 14,000 Wiens and mem Its principal combat elements would
be 3 infantry regiments; I rutillay regiment end I tankiareault gun rogiment,
eddition to the standard infantry division, the Chime have light divisions
for use in mountainous and other &Him* terrain. These type units sue similar
to the munionl division but do not have the taratfeemult sun regiment, are
equipped with lighter artillery, and have lea organic vehimaar transport
$ Coalman; analysis ha strengthened eow confidence that the CCA has
some 143 oeml?at divisions OM latatitty, 23 bonier defensiinsilitory
security, 3 Pittston% 6 armored, and $ cavalry). At the memento' level, however,
leedYtil hm always been more problematical. As a result, we cannot estimate with
high confidence the strength of the OCA. We believe, however, that a figure
of two and one.helf milker is psobatity excrete within plus or mimes 15 per.
cent. (See TABU I.) "'
&
Our overall ineferalandlog ',With respect to the corA hat been dmired
In recent months by the esqiolindon of wird photograpirt acquired Sigel, Mt
of CCA instillations to the Shanyong Military Region. This analyelo could not,
of COUres, rgeillae the final minven on moose' strengthe, equipment lareis,
state of Wain* or Ombra nadinesn Rut it does provide highly useful data from
which witrapolstions can he maJe aoneerning some significant current aspects
of din OCA...4incet Importantly the states of tee* equipment twilit mCLk
unite, Same Whigs of this ansaysis are eat forth balm
Ortnnixailon and Manning
4. Although ell the undo of the Shenyang Milltari Ration had three ht.
hatry divisions, thete Were variations resulting from the addition of rear Berviee.
AAA, or taints), units and the lkieente of Dome artillery, infantry, and moll
WW1
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
?iiNNViN 4444
27 allit000f
Slanol
? 1 Asti.CW
notakootkao ....... 13
14...t...1*.x?ffl
V. Whoa
but furb. Plusto. ot rbawled
'MA the CCA.
, "rbk VOW* sot& oily by *I$ wait. A podia tome* 11sopomod
1 ot o Nook of or& tam*ii otlotooco owl kisoodybis a11064014
oomtbor
IIW?W4CIL
ariCulde tO
and
21
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
I ?
'..'
;I
4
; ' .1 ledentry
4;
4. 8banya4s armies bed fewer Infantryrolitsneabi than eepeated. The great
Ingority of thew units appeared to be eerloualy deficient in wheeled vehicles
.'. 1 ' ;1 ' . even by atimeted Chinesedard onlye few regiments had attitege
'capacity for their estitreded standerd number of wheeled vehicle* Most bad far
less than this stantleal. %hick" tvere observed ,infrequeody M most infantry
a fairly large mother of relAnonts wore observed without any
wheeled vehicke being sighted.
.,...
P. e. Antitank guns were ideredied at wily a small number of the regiments
obeervect and only onomicandly at these. 7"his suggests that mat Chinese in-
' fanny regiments evert now do not onstakt the heavy weapons battalion with nine
anSitank guns previous'y estimated is standard. In !Owe umiak at least, the
mortar and moodiest rib companies which went prey** pat of this heavy
; weavess battalion pcnhably iHj a*, possibly .attached to reghtsentel had.
quartos as *pante COMplilli,
Ueda in the veil of special vehicle* and etpdpment was observed
fishy dividoes.
te. Feet eitiniplei of efforts to *creme the strength of infantry regiments
were obeerved. During the period of coverage:there were only smell increeen
to hermits and vehicle *nage capacity ate few lefentry units.
Fewer artillery seghninits were ittelltiNd than believed eteletted on the
bait of the landed TVs& Moot of those identified, however, appeared to
" have time to then, quota of artillery pieces, but ease at the aretrievet regiments
, were observed to have the homier :artillery (130 Ann and above) called for
! ih by the TOM Instead. they were equipped with the mime weapons (US rem
,
' and below) found with dividoselevel artillery regiment* Mocked prime morns
were idengfied With noily repintent
h The armor strength of the Shenyang minim was 'cootitined in the tank
and anatilt gun regimen* of their Went/ divisions. 'Arent an observed had
such regiments. Of thren dia majority had the no* three regimen*
' Armor
Almost nfl of the resit:net* bad storage mouthy for doi0 to or over
' the estimated standard of 4$ traded vehicles. These substantial capacities for
trookaf voitiot0 dosage may not be* reliable Wiestion of amtud holdings M
many cum, however. Of the regiments observed with armor, mon bad low armor
counts and the others generally had relatively high armor 140tUtts. These sight-
/ ings *bowed ION correlation with storage cepetity for trekked vetdoko,
,
There were only a few tenuous indication* that equipment levels at tank
and assault gun regiments had beets intreating Regiments may have been grad.
' ?!?J;:i; ???? 22
' .
MSC
;
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
uelly upgrading their srr hweritory b replacing 4ntsgo Soviet T44 hunks
with Chinese or Soviet verde= of the newts T44 tank This eschew could
have been 000111141* at One regiment ex ir dens but based on production esti.
?3, mate amid not have ranked even by now in muck if arty, net increase in
meter holdlnipt. , ,
? I. No new anny equipment such as the Chime counterpart of the Soviet
nT.741 was observed rah Shenyang tank and *nal& gun regiments. Major itsms
of inner support repripmemt mob is fuel trucks, armored reconroaksanat yr
-
hicks, and armor recovery vehicles were ?bogeyed so rarely that it is doubtful
that their allocation we standard. Wheeled teak traseportera end armor vehicles
with edema).? Ind ranks were ismer observed. As wee the c4oe with ermor? pro.
duction estimate muse that net holdings of this equipment can have increased
Air Support and Airborne Assault Capabilities
10. The Chinese have no separate tactical air commantl, and we have no
Information emceeing FLA doctrine on the use of aircraft in a close support
role. At present any tactical strike or ground support minion would fell
on the 3C0 or so IL-28s in the Chinese CONorounist Mr Force (CCAF)
and Chinese Communist Naval Air Rome (CCNA,), and the few fighter clivi-
done In the CCM', which have ground attack as their primary mission. The
remainder of the operational fighter force iesseigned to air defense, with ground
attack ow a secondony rola.
U. The Moos have an extremely limited airborne *snub capability. The
principal limitation en the employment of Chime airborne forces is the smell
ohm of theChinese air transport fleet which caudate lessely of light transports
ends tow Medium tninsports, The medium transports Include IA AN-ill/Cubs
purchased bem the Soviet Union, whir* ere the only rear estmction aircraft
in the Chinese inventory, The AN-Si/Coke light transports, purchased from
the usb esmotitute the only notable addition to the Inventory In the hot I years.
We have no evidence that the Chine* are preparing to produce a medium or
hem transpet.P etime and for a peeled of no more than 7 days* tl.t
mashnum daily total ge (MOO nra.) airlift capability of the Chineee
military transport km* augmented by 50 percent of the civil air fleet is estimated
to be about 1,000 fully eupplied and equipped neve. For supplies only, the
themetied daily maximum is about 355 tom. Siontlerly calculated, the daily short.
range (SOO ion.) kit enpabdtty is **throated to be *bent 13,000 fully equipped and
supplied troop Or SACO Win Of surplice alma, It la ?unlikely, however,' that this
optimum cepabilifor meld be achieved.
Alt
The CCAF OXOCCUee Its administrative sod operational omitmd through
10 Meekel air *striate and * limited number of air elements anigeed directly
to ileadquarters CCAF. Altheesils there is no "Mr Defense Commend' in the
23
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05 : LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
a focal k cabnatod to bit?. Increased by about
Thus imam is band upon oniticabig
continua to batman as room
older Mig.1,11, and bilk171 .4401)&14
tly have about 18 alrasit pa unit
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05 : LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
? 18, Although information is limited, we estimate that no more than 15 per.
oat of Chino fighter lone is equipped with airborne hrtercept equipment
The Urns majority of thew are MUM'. The Soviets may ham provided the
Chimera with a limited mentor of heat-seeking (AA-11) type MIAs when they
deliveced the Mig-ils# and the Chhatm possibly are producing some of these
missiles and perhaps beern-rider missile* uaeIL
17, The extensive Ur survetiburee and control network is emnPrived or tome
730 radar Wee with about 1$00 rodeos. Since NO/ the deploy:nem- of new
:edam (incleding some new models of Chinese design) has increened. Quetta.
five improvement of Odan's air defense radar network probably will centime
felele a high Ow*
18. Although ruler ,deployment generally was widely dispersed, during 1908
and isee a buildup of new radars probably occurred in areas adjacent to the
Sino-Soviet and Sten-Mongollan borders. The net effect of this buildup would be
to provide considerably increased lontranne high- and medial-elate& early
wanting iniel ground control intercept coverage in northern China. Itadu cover-
age pairs* was also increased *bout strateg4c. arms throughout Chia. Despite
the moat learimvemente, China's air defense radar network continues to have
significant weaknesees. It apparently leeks an operational advanced data tams-
minden system and then would have to rely upon manual moist and voice tech.
niques. Low Attu& and a:face search mew remain far from adequate,
and defense against electronic countermeasure; still is limited.
IS. The end-eirereft forces %dude abont 10 Ur force MA divisions and 7 or 8
*nay ma dividocecwItich are more SithilY Sunset Tho*$ MA **le" are
opendionany subordinate to the CCAF District Headquarters in the erete in
which they are located. AAA defensei are distributed AIM the entire Last Coast
from Hainan Island to the Xoreen larder, and haw concentration of AAA
defend important coastal airfields opposite Titheen. Other rignifieent AAA de-
fenses are located near the North Vietnamese lender, Selected airfields, urban
comphtree, military Installations. end production areas throughout Chine can
also be tweeted to be defended by these worpores.
SA In addition to their conventional AM, the Chinese have a limited SAM
capability. The Chinese practice of mains units shout maims it difficult to
determine the rize of the forte but we believe there are about 25 SAM battalions
currently in the field. There should also be additional SAM equipment in IUD
or training facilities Anduedon and deployment rates have remained low since
the inception of the pingram?about 4 Unite per year Whether the Chinese
Intend to step up tint pace of SAM deployment depends In pert on their mina-
tion of the lassoed' equipment. It is poielble that they are working on further
refleareate or improvements in the system. In any *rent it seems likely that
the SAM force sefil fell well short at 100 units in 1078, and the sir defase system
will continue to rely primarily on Better aircraft. ,
11. na enoitherill in SAM deployment le believed to have drifted from end-
recennaismence to defame of otreiegle tangent. Most of the new bethilterie do-
No Ob.ection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
itt ^Tr
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
are orect1y
set, with headquarters in
Sburgissit and the South
). Immediately sub
sector headquarters
23. The CCN new inclodee 38 subinerhses, 4 destroyers, &enure orcuro,
bout TO hythogoil motor torpedo. boats. II guided Inisitle pebol boats and about
patrol croft, Perecanal strength is est:touted at about MAU Mal! of
MO now sun in the tiara sir force. (See TABLE III for estimated
of Cavil combatants and suprort ships.)
or the pest year or so, the most significant changes in the composition
naval forces have been the equipping of destroyers in the North
missile launchers and the addition of three Brutus submarines
meet The Sands Sea Fleet was falba rtrengdsened by the
firmer Xiourgoan-eless destroyer escort, but compered with the
Sec Meets, it continues to be week in petrol aeons and does
any eubmaines. There is evidener4 however, of coodnuing efforts
Weal*. including the number of submarines assigned to each.
end *evasion of naval, facilities and shipyards condom,
and South Sea Fleet arm.
The Calf sea lift capability remains negligibitpnly about two plus
division (33,000 ,hvorps) or me infantry intone artilkey division
troops) scold be transported stay Wel time and amphibious boning
reochror little ettseticia porkoport operation's, passenger ships of the met.
chant Beet could deliver up to. 58,030 troops. The., are some SOO ocean-sping
cargo ships, some of wIdels probably could be employed in transporting troops
Of supplies. In additiors, in operations where the use of ernelier ships and weft
Is feesible, the Chinas maid employ literally thousand' of junks for transporting
imp. and light equipment. The amphibious fame Is ging and replaerenent will
soon be required It the proem eepability is to be sualatelned.
?
21, Ilse COW is predominantly in air defense forts It includes at least
1$ fighter sterna** (hllg.10theg?17ihfig40) of shout 30 ftlibtIre each, and
approximately 7 letlisbi bomber regiments (1142) of 16 to Saimaa each. Some
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
ate
bY
air
The
inn
TABIZ iii
A1704111 AND. SUPPOPir SHIPS
Errowala sorrow
)00 141,4979
..... 1???? I
I
..... 3'P 40.44
CPO) ? SI
Win tiorwrrra) ...... 11
?
? 4, 44 4 )14 Othi." 373'
.... ?.? 333.
b ? ..... h4
.... ? 11' ?;r? ? ..
osft
OriumiLAL)
(LCUMWLCT)
.... .
)
3.1
.. . , utt ??? .??.'
...... I?0 ? ? 14
AIR) ? 3
401.14G5414.14.4.?' ) ? ? -
...... N
.... ???:, o3
.. . .. ? . ?35
423430
V0.400
13-30
10.400
30.30
4441.4110
SO 2540
35-40
40-30
15-20
3-5
100-110
i???? ? .1 ? t? ? ?11.? ........ ?IIit ? ? 050 700-713
egookniette end mairoonivally
Witoui 4 11.1.4,0144? *ad 3 34/4/41444
104444 124614 okod 3 Auhboalla' A* *quipped with hyd
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4
CENTRAL INN&
'
DiSSEMINATiON tOTfCE
1. This d mint wos disontittalesi by 014 0001,111 latellOOACO Along. ThIs a*PY
Is het dm Information and vso of the recipient and of perms stack, his ionisdistton ors a
noodeaknow book Additional essential chmendnatios may bo motharbed by the Winn%
Inv official' within their tosysiclist sioportments
co. Director of iraelliomsco and Email* her the Denudates* of Stahl
b. Director. Defame intolligence AdellsY0 fat fba ?Mt* of fba SattilarY If
Defense and the orlanisallon of thst Joint Chiefs of Ste
c. AteistoM Oilif of Shaff for inielitoonco, Deportment of dm Amy for the
Deparbeeot of Ons Atari
4. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations ontsflirroco), for dm I:groan/nom of the
Navy
or. Assistant Chief of 3taff. Intelliaonco. WM, for dm Depositors* of shit Air
i. raftil
DireciOr of ifttelloncok. AEC, for the /ksorric trseray COMMIS11011
Assistant Dirseor, fht. for the Federal Bursae of Investigation
Ii. plitectot of hiSA. for the Notional Security Avoicy
?L Dirottor of Central Roforence Sortie% OA, for any other Cesportmore or
OnntasY
2.
sPRIl
arrangement waft
may bo rotainest ordostroyed by ...In accordant* with
or roomed to tho Control Intollioonco kens/ by
tifersoce Stivkik CIA.
3. When this door
Wain It for o period nee In
document should elder ho do*
sohsion should be requested of do farwardMg op
IAC-0-0/2. 22 hos 1953.
4. Thu 1101* of Ale document eirson used sew**
Anis felli-SPREbhis4111/3J3h1LX.
11** avow= reciplarft may
At Om end of this perlorl, the
femoral aillinsY or pop
rowan IS In accordance with
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/05: LOC-HAK-114-6-4-4