H. DRV POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 2, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

L-1--?-L LI-/60/0 4-led LI! uo!leoWsseloaCI 04 u0Peic10 ON
SA/10710A
Ad03
a3ZIIINYS
L-1--?-L LI-/60/0 4-led LI! uo!leoWsseloaCI 04 u0!400210 ON
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
MAIO
220
reMature.
When the GKR attempted to contactUN repr
ntatives in Moscow under guise of a visiting sports
Out), the trip was at the last moment not authorize
he USSR.* and large, the Soviets probably do
great interest in Cambodia and view it prin Y
rms of their relations wtith Hanoi. The Sov a have
ost no influence in Cambodia today and m have even
the insUrgentS come to power and circ ibe Soviet
tivities the same way they are circ ribe6 in Hanoi
av
Soviet Ambassador TOIstikov
eague in Peking on October 30
orner" were that you are co
Hcompromise" solutio
s his own reasons for
ouk is 4 wasting ass
ttlement in Cambod'
topped because
d is Now Zealand
his own views'sfrO
0 Peking chiefly to
odia; that Chou
a settlement because
that the USSR wants a negotia
and the DRV wants the fighting
nts to get on with the job of eco
-
ad been reach between the U.s. and USSR on ways and
ans of br ng about a Cambodian settlement. The N
land dor commented he was left with the impr
hat To v believed you would succeed in working ou
solution while in Peking, and that Tolstikov
afraid the Soviet Union would be left out in the
ess
his
rk

a-
ere
mic
ion
a
as
Ht DRV
For Over 40 years, Vietnarnesii Communist leaders have
pursued the goal of establishing control over all of Indo-
china. As late as 1949., they were still openly advocating
the establishment of an "Indochinese Peoples' Republic."
Since then., however, they have, for cosmetic purposes, been
more circumspect and have Publicly claimed to support an
independent and neutral Cambodia (and Laos). It thus seems
likely that Hanoi wants to establish a regime in Phnom Penh
which it can control from behind the scenes. For this
reason,- the North. Vietnamese would no doubt prefer an exclu-
sively her Communist government; however,'s'hould the mili-
tary situation remain stalemated through the 73-74 dry
season, Hanoi might seriously consider a Laos-type solution
if it believed the communists would prevail in a coalition.
The other alternative would be large-scale NVA intervention
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2910/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
JtLLFE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
S CRET/NODIS
23.
which would probably succeed militarily, but would be
a blow to insurgent prestige and would incur some
risk of GVN and possibly (though not likely) U.S. inter-
vention. In any case, the DRV is not likely to make
such a decision before the end of the year when it has
had a chance to assess the insurgents' dry season per-
formance. The DRV probably did not expect the Phnom Penh
government to survive very long after the August 15
bombing halt, and was no doubt surprised (as were many
on our side) that Phnom Penh, Surrounded by insurgent
forces, did not somehow disintegrate after the bombing
halt. This has no doubt prompted a complete review
of the DRV's strategy in Cambodia --particularly in re-
spect to direct, large-scale NVA participation in the
war. ,(Hanoi presently has 21,000 troops in Cambodia,
of whom 3.000 are Combat and 18,000 are administrative
services (e.g., logistical) personnel. Since January
27, 1973. Hanoi has Shifted some 15,000 troops from
Cambodia to South Vietnam.)
Apart from its long-range objective of establishing
hegemony over dochina, Hanoi would probably like to
bring the war in Cambodia to a satisfactory conclusion
as soon as possible in order to:
-- free resources and manpower for the main effort
South Vietnam;
the use of Romp ng Som port (which would
reatly enhance the resupply and reinforcement of
forces in MR'S III and IV of South Vietnam);
ttain more indigenous resources (especially
rice) in Cambodia; and to
gain the Political and psychologicaladvantage
in South Vietnam which would result from the defeat or
eclipse of the present Phnom Penh government.
Sihanouk has both enhanced and complicated
s efforts in respect to Cambodia. His inter-?
national prestige has been useful in the political
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
rd diplomat c arena. On the other hand he remains
n Unpredictable and sometimes uncontrollable free
? It whose Public utterances are often an embarrass -
both to Hanoi and the insurgents. In 1971/
anoi assigned leng sary to keep tabs on Sihanouk
and to accompany him wherever he goes, This, however,
as not kept Sihanouk completely under control-
anoi repeatedly voices public support for Sihanouk
s "head Of State" and "the legitimate, genuine and
consistent representative of the state of Cambodia"
but Hanoi would want to see his role severely restricted
ehoUld he ever return to Cambodia. Hanoi also has
consistently demanded that the U.S. cease all "inter
ference'' in Cambodia and that the Cambodian problem
be settled on terms formally announced by Sihanouk
and. cHuNX (e.g. Sihanouk's Five Points).
The United States,
pproxim n PL-4w
lier plans 74 Caibodianlmi
ailed for about 0 million dollars
n, supplies and almost $6 million
he end of US bombing and ammunition
between $600,000 and $800,000
esuited in, projected military
his fiseal Year of $310 to $
Y,74 expenditures ?(if
erefore be aPProximate
US military aid
O field a 220/000
0,000 man uppong
n. basic
itary pro
n exizene
stance
uni
. training.
penditures
ly have now
quirements for
ion. Total USG
obtained) would
designed to enable the GKR
ht infantry force with a
staff. We are concentrating
and discouraging massive
Attrition of material and amnu
.11 account for more than 80% o
Our conomi help basically supplies foreign
ange for essential imports to shore up the gov
an return to normal condit
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
SANITIZED
COPY
FOLLOWS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
TO P SECRET/SENSITIVE
E.EcLusivLy EYES ONLY
US-tR.V Ezchanges
on Cambodia
US Draft Understanding May Z3, 1973
B. US Draft Understanding, June 4, 1973
C. US--DRY Agreed Uic1erstading, June 1 , 1973
D. US Note to DRY, Oct. 4, 1973
DRY Reply, Oct. 23, 1973
F. US Note to DRY, Nov. , 1973
TOP SECRT/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY ETS ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
25X1
L-1--?-L LI-/60/0 4-led LI! uo!leoWsseloaCI 04 u0Peic10 ON
9M0110A
Ad03
a3Z11INIIS
L-1--?-L LI-/60/0 4-led LI! uo!leoWsseloaCI 04 u0!400210 ON
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
25X1
DECLA E No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
Aug, .-t ipLYM
ATIONAL
OUI5.)
ECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
November 2, 1973
SUBJECT:
Peking'
Indochina
Hanoi
opposes
evidence
concerned
SEC TA
WILLIAM
Chinese
in Indoc
Y KISSINGER
TEARMAN
a
on to DRY Hegemony
agness to restrain the North Vietnamese and to help us in
roba,bly in part determined by China's basic position on
n Indochina. China analists tend to believe that the PRC
al.'s hegemony in Indochina. On the other hand, there is
support another view that China is either resigned to, un-
bout or even desires Hanoi's eventual domination of Indochina.
The paper at Tab A examines this question and concludes that available
facts tend to support the latter thesis. Ti this thesis it4 in fact valid
we cannot really know), Chinese willingness to pressure Hanoi
delaying an, offensive or making concessions on Cambodia would be
ainly determhe by Peking's desire to improve relations with the U.S.
not by a desire to thwart North Vietnamese ambitions in Indochina.
The following is
paper:
China Q
Eu
DRV He
y of the principal points made in the attached
fears Hanoi could fall under Soviet inf uenc
also fears that a jjanpi-controUed Indochina eouid be a
troubieso rival in Southeast A
pre
China would like to Play a primary role in the area and therefore
autonomous states in Indochina.
There have been fricti
PRC has taken stepsin respect
indicate a Chinese pference for
s betweenthe DRY and PRC, and the
ambodia and Vietnam which
zed, Indochina.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
DECLAS No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7
SECRET
The xenophobic North VIetna?rnese would actuafly restrict the
role in an Indochina under theIr control. The USSR could not likely
gainbases or special influence which would be ijmicaI to Chinese interests,
a's power position vis-a-vis a unified Indochina would still be
overwhelming and no
open to challenge.
The PRC and DRY have been orripatible neighbors h no lasting
enoes.
Chinese roan hutlding In Laos cthn be seen
Vie narnese position there.
supporting the North
he DRV appear t be in basic agreemeflt on Cambodia.
:ooperation In. this regard is illustrated by Chinese acceptance and even
nhancement f the role of Ieng Sary, liarioi's watchdog on sihanouk.
Moreover, aiter Sihanouk's ouster, the Chinese offered to reject Sihanouk
and to recognize the now government, if the North Vietnamese were given a
free hand in Cambodia.
Thbiese have beeri more forthcoming than the Soviets in
supporting Hanoi's position vis-a-vis South Vietnam.
byiet policy toward Laos and Cambodia indicate he USSR is more
interested in a balkanized Indochina than is China. For example, continued
Soviet ion of the Loft Not Government was contrary to DRV interests.
-- China haslong known of the Vietnamese Communist leaders' designs
on Indochina and has, nevertheless, substantially supported their efforts in
the area.
China has supported ts call for
ported lianoi-controlled elements in Indochina.
e unity and has sup-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17 : LOC-HAK-117-3-1-7