THE SIHANOUKVILLE ROUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-12-1-38-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: February 23, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
FROM:. JOHN H. HOLD1DGF~ '- `-
SUBJECT: The Sihanoukville Route
W
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
26119
ACTION
MORI/CDF 000196628 p3-4
000196631 p5-18
At your request, Mr. Helms prepared an unclassified version of the CIA
study on deliveries of supplies to the Communist forces operating against
South Vietnam via the Sihanoukville route (Tab B). This study goes into
some detail in showing the extent to which the Communist forces relied
upon Sihanoukville for sustaining their operations in the southern half of
South Vietnam. It could therefore be of considerable use in underlining
the rationale for the President's decision to move into Cambodia.
However, Mr. Helms points out in his cover memorandum to you (Tab A)
that release of this study might run the risk of providing enterprising
reporters with the means of down-grading the impact of our Cambodian
operation, since the supplies we captured fell significantly below the total
volume of war materiel delivered to the Communists through Sihanoukville.,
For example, while we captured enough weapons to equip 74 infantry
battalions, deliveries through Sihanoukville were sufficient to equip 600
infantry battalions.
Mr. Helms also points out that this unclassified statement implies the
existence of a well-organized logistics system, and that it would take no
great amount of imagination to figure out that the system would not have
been able to function without the cooperation of very high Cambodian
officials - some of whom must still be in the government today.
selected people who would not misuse it.
My personal reaction to Mr. Helms' caveats is that they are very well
taken. Since public opinion has come to accept our Cambodian operation
as being a success,, it might be desirable not to release the study for
general circulation, but to hold it in reserve for backgrounding carefully
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RE COMMENDATION
V
That you not authorize the general distribution of Mr. Helms' study but
hold it in reserve for selective use in backgrounding persons who will
not misuse it.
Approve Disapprove
ISIN
V~ It.
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22 February 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: The Sihanoukville Route
1. Attached is the unclassified statement on the Sihanouk-
ville route you requested. I am sure it.will prove the im-_
portance of the route and the critical nature of the Laos
Panhandle now that Sihanoukville has been denied. May I note,
however, that this paper could be used by critics to point up
two areas of vulnerability.
2. First, an enterprising reporter could make unfavorable
comparisons between the reporting on the results of last year's
Cambodian operations on the one hand and figures on the amount of
supplies delivered to Sihanoukville on the other. Using Ad-
ministration figures, he could, for example, point out that
although we captured enough weapons in Cambodia last year to
equip 7I infantry battalions, deliveries to Sihanoukville were
sufficient to equip more than eight times that number -- 600
infantry battalions. Other similar comparisons between amounts
of materiel captured and deliveries to Sihanoukville are:
- About ten times as many individual weapons --
222,000 delivered versus 22,892 captured.
- More than six times as many crew-served weapons --
16,000 delivered versus 2,500 captured.
- More than eleven times as many rounds of small
arms ammunition --- 173 million delivered versus
15 million captured.
- More than nine times as much rice -- 61,000 tons
delivered versus 7,000 tons captured,
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W W
3. Second, please note that this unclassified statement
implies the existence of a well-organized logistic system which
could not function without the cooperation of very high Cambodian
officials.. It would not take much imagination to figure out that
these must have been the same officials who now lead the current
government.
Richard Helms
Director
Attachments - 2
Unclassified Statement on the
Sihanoukville Route
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The Sihanoukville Route
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W
THE SIIIANOUKVILLE ROUTE
INTRODUCTION
North Vietnam's offensive activities in South
Vietnam have always been overwhelmingly dependent on
the provision of personnel and material inputs from
outside South Vietnam. Most of the manpower required
to sustain its aggression has been provided from
North Vietnam's own population. But without the sub-
stantial material and financial assistance provided
by its Communist allies, Hanoi would have been unable
to maintain a credible military threat to the peace
and security of South Vietnam.
The traditional channel for moving men and sup-
plies into South Vietnam was through an elaborate
logistic system in the Lao Panhandle which the North
Vietnamese have maintained for more than a decade.
As the war expanded and the North Vietnamese required
ever increasing amounts of supplies to carry on with
the war, they began to expand their logistic system
and to establish alternative logistic routes. This
effort culminated in the establishment by late 1966
of a system for moving military supplies from Chinese
ports through the port of Sihanoukville to VC/NVA base
camps along the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border.
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The so-called Sihanoukville route rapidly became a
primary route for logistic support of the VC/NVA
forces in southern South Vietnam, while the Laos
route was used primarily to resupply the forces in the
northern half of the country.
One of the results of the Allied incursions into
Cambodia was that the United States government was
able, through the capture of large amounts of enemy
documents and the acquisition of other information,
to obtain a detailed appreciation of the magnitude.,'
and importance of the Sihanoukville route. This
document presents the major findings of our analysis
of this evidence.
Development of the Sihanoukville Route
Even prior to the initiation of large-scale
deliveries of military supplies to the port of
Sihanoukville, the Communist forces made extensive
use of Cambodian territory for base areas and sanc-
tuary purposes. In addition it was common practice
to purchase small amounts of supplies from Cambodians
engaged in smuggling activities.
Over the years the use of Cambodia as a source
of supplies, particularly for sorely needed foodstuffs,
grew in importance. In early 1966, Cambodia became an
active ? participant in Chinese Communist programs for
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the provision of foodstuffs to Communist forces
operating in the rice deficit areas of South Vietnam
and Southern Laos. By the first quarter of 1970 the
Communist forces in these rice deficit areas had
received 64,200 tons of rice and over 3,300 tons of
salt from the Cambodian market.
After less than a year of operation this arrange-
ment was changed radically and Sihanoukville became
a channel for the provision of all types of military
supplies. In December 1966 the Chinese-flag ship.
He Ping arrived at Sihanoukville and discharged 1,060
tons of military cargo. This shipment, the first of
at least ten deliveries, marked the opening of
.the so-called "Sihanoukville route." As such it
was the cornerstone of what was to become over time
an elaborate and sophisticated logistical system.
Chinese Deliveries to Sihanoukville
Between December 1966 and April 1969, Chinese
Communist ships carried about 21,600 tons of military
cargo (see Table 1), and about S,300 tons of non-
military supplies to Sihanoukville for delivery to
VC/NVA forces. Military deliveries included weapons,
ammunition and explosives, radios, and engineering
equipment. Non-military supplies included food,
medicine, and clothing.
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CHINESE COMMUNIST DELIVERIES OF
MILITARY SUPPLIES TO SIHANOUKVILLE
FOR VC/NVA FORCES
3,760
2,490 2,410
0
(Food)
Dec Feb Mar Aug Oct Jan Mar Aug Jan Apr
1966 67 67 67 67 68 68 68 69 69
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-12-1-38-5
Military Supplies,
After the initial delivery in December 1966 the
Communists took full advantage of the Sihanoukville
route. Deliveries of military supplies totaled about
6,200 toms in 1967 and more than 7,500 tons in 1968.
~~t6-~e
In-O- during the first four months alone, about
6,800 tons of military supplies were delivered to
Sihanoukvi.l le .
The military deliveries consisted of extremely
large quantities of weapons and ammunition. Included
were 222,000 individual weapons, over 1.6,000 crew
served weapons, 173 million rounds for rifles and
light machineguns, almost 11 million rounds for
crew-served weapons, and over one-half million
mines and hand grenades. The number of individual
weapons delivered (rifles, pistols, and submachine-
guns) was sufficient to equip on a one-time basis
over 600 VC/NVA infantry battalions; the number of
crew-served weapons (heavy machineguns, mortars,
and so forth) delivered could have equipped slightly
over 200 battalions. Tables 1 through 4 provide
detailed breakdowns on the ordnance delivered to
Sihanoukville.
Non-Military Supplies
The first shipment of non-military supplies
earmarked for the VC/N;TA occurred in Mr. rc:h 1907 5vi (h.
4 -
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the delivery of?20 tons of medical supplies on the
He Ping. Non-military supplies, especially vitamin-
enriched foods, were delivered on all subsequent
shipments for a total of 5,300 tons. Indeed, such
food was the only cargo delivered on the Ji Ning in
August 1967. These vitamin-enriched foods were
used primarily to improve the diet of convalescing
sick and wounded soldiers. The very large delivery
of these foods on the Ji Ning (1,240 tons) as well as
on the You Yi (960 tons) in January 1968 undoubtedly re-
flected Communist preparation for the general offensive
during Tet-1968.
Deliveries to Border Areas
Our evidence enabled us to trace the movement of
more than 18,000 tons or 85 percent of military
deliveries to VC/NVA base camps in Cambodia. These
bases were arrayed along the Cambodian-Vietnamese
border from Ratanakiri Province in the northeast to
Kampot Province in the south.
Deliveries of ordnance t:o these enemy sanctuaries
reached a peak in 1967, when more than 7,700 tons
were delivered to Communist base areas. Deliveries
remained high in 1968, when almost 6,400 tons were
delivered. In the months immediately before the
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Allied incursions into Cambodia last spring, 1,600
tons were delivered to the Communist sanctuaries.
Details on deliveries to the border areas are given
in Table 5
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CHItwBL UU HVIUIU VU1L11 MF18 U LIJCfIt 1 u WWvIA
(ORES VIA S HANA VILLE, 1966-1970
Note= InfOrmetlon On border deliveries N Incomplete.
For Chi, reason tonnages delivered to border areas are
not identical with tonnages delivered to 31hanookvlde.
13ATTAM BANG
Battambang.
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w IV
Table 2
Deliveries of Weapons and Ammunition
to Sihanoukville for VC/NVA Forces, by Year
Tons
Year
Weapons
Ammunition
'1966
(December)
20
980
1967
770
5,010
1968
1,130
5,250
1969
670
5,160
Total
2,590
167400
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Table 3
Weapons Delivered to Sihanoukville
for VC/NVA Forces
Individual Weapons Units
7.62-mm pistol, Type 54 30,900
7.62-mm-submachinegun,
Type 56 115,000
7.62-mm semiautomatic
rifle, Type 56 64,000
7.62-mm light machinegun,
Type 53 130
7.62-mm submachinegun,
Type 54 2,500
7.62-mm AK submachinegun 100
7.62-mm submachinegun,
Type 56 (56-1) 3,0.00
7.62-mm machinegun,
Type 56 5,700
Individual rifles 500
Total 2.21,830
Crew-served Wea~ons
7.62-mm heavy machinegun,
Type 57 1,450
12.7-mm AA machinegun,
Type 54 600
40-mm rocket launcher,
Type 56 9,000
60-mm mortar 1,800
82-mm mortar 1,250.
120-mm mortar 120
75-mm recoilless rifle 390
57-mm recoilless rifle 250
107-mm rocket launcher 30
RPG launcher 1,190
Total
16,080
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Ammunition Delivered to 5ihanoukville
for VC/NVA Forces
Individual Rounds
7.62-nom Type 56 incendi-
ary cartridges
7,000,000
7.62-mm pistol, Type 51
9,200,000
7,62-mm rifle, Type 56
39,1.50,000
7.62-mm machinegun,
Type 56
83,360,000
7.02-mm steel core,
Type 53
22,450,000
7.9-mm cartridge, rifle
4,000,000
7.62-mm tracer, Type 56
7,750,000
7.62-mm tracer, Type 53
200,00"0.-
CKC launcher antitank
rounds
24
800
CKC rifle grenades
)
71,900
Type AT/K44 AT grenade
20,000
Antitank grenades for
.rifles
.30,000
Total
173;300,000
Crew-served Rounds
RPG 7
ammunition
79,900
40-mm
rocket
397,00Q
107-ntm
rocket
15,000
60-mm
mortar
365
200
82-mm
mortar
,
639
200
12.7-mm, Type 54
,
8,120,500
85-mm
10
000
120-mm
mortar
,
53,000
57-mm
recoilless
60,000
75-mm
recoilless
90
000
Rockets (not further
,
identified)
15,000
12.7-min, Type 54 AA
machinegun
400,000
12.7-mm, Type 54 AA
machinegun tracer
100,100
14.5-mm
340
100
37-mm
,
36,000
1.0,700,000
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Table 5
Ordnance Deliveries
to Border Areas, by Province
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Mondolkiri
.20
3,090
850
380
300
Svay Rieng
--
900
2,160
700
100
Kompong Char
70
1,480
1,120
270
90
Kratie
--
410
1,660
600
260
Ratanakiri
--
980
260
--
--
Kampot
20
440
260
200
24,0
Prey Veng/
Kandal/Takeo
--
260
--
200
610
Other
--
160
80
--
--
Total
110
7,740
6,390
2,360
1,600
Note: Information on or er deliveries is in-
complete. For this reason total tonnages de-
livered above do not exactly agree with ton-
nages delivered to Sihanoukville.
1 1
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