FRENCH PROPOSAL TO MANUFACTURE INTEGRATED CIRCUITS IN POLAND (S/S 7101011)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-12-3-38-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: March 4, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
Match 4, 1971
Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT: French Proposal to Manufacture
Integrated Circuits in Poland
(S/S 7101011)
To confirm my telephone notification, the President
has decided that we should continue to oppose the
French proposal to manufacture integrated circuits
in Poland.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
cc: Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Bergsten
SECRET
Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
February.25, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: French Proposal to Manufacture Integrated Circuits
in Poland
7
The French are pressing forward on a $100 million industrial transaction
with Poland. You approved our assent to the first phase of this operation in
October 1969 allowing the French to export silicon transistor technology.
Since June 1970 the French have been seeking our agreement in the inter- - ' '
national Coordinating Committee for Export Controls (COCOM) for the second
state of the project allowing manufacture of integrated circuits in Poland.
In October we opposed their request.
The French then suggested a series of technical discussions and invited
American experts to visit the SESCOSEM plant in Grenoble to examine the
technology which would be reproduced in Poland. The French claim that their
Grenoble plant had two separate production lines, one capable of making
military-quality integrated circuits; the other makes a lower grade civilian
quality circuit and would be the prototype of the Polish plant. The French
maintained that their proposed sale would not significantly enhance Eastern
bloc military capabilities and would not be a danger to Western security.
In order to establish a basis for US Government decision, the agencies took
advantage of the French invitation for an American expert to visit the Grenoble
plant, but they now disagree on the implication of the expert's report and on
whether or not we should accede to the French request.
In short, State recommends that we approve the transaction as one unlikely
to be dangerous to the US national security and as necessary because of the
serious foreign policy consequences of a refusal on US-French relations.
Secretary Laird recommends that we continue our refusal primarily because
the proposal would significantly enhance Polish (and Soviet) capability to
produce in large numbers high quality low-cost integrated circuits for military
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aim PI SIyL{s HAS SEEN....
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foreign applications for shipment of electronic products to Eastern Europe
while denying this same market to American producers.
usage. CIA confirms the Defense analysis. Secretary Stans also concludes
that the tratisa.ctlon-wou,1d; represent a: major eecqrity`.risk, .In.4 .dd tion,.:he
argues that acquiescence would place us in the untenable position of approving
The French maintain that the strategic implications of the transaction would
be minimal. A number of high French officials have indicated that they will
consider US refusal a blow to US-French relations. Should we continue to
refuse, there may be a direct appeal from President Pompidou to you. It is
also quite possible that the French would decide to go ahead anyway, which
would undermine Western cooperation in the COCOM.
RECOMMENDATION
You have two choices:
1. I tend to agree with Defense and Commerce that we should continue
to oppose the sale at this time. This course will cause displeasure with the
French, and provide no guarantee that the French will not proceed with the
sale despite our opposition (and undermine COCOM); but they have not been
sufficiently cooperative of late, especially on Southeast Asian affairs, to
justify approval on essentially political grounds since the security implications
appear on balance to be ohe negat' side.
Appro
Disapprove
2. Agree to the sale as proposed by State, overruling Defense and
Commerce.' This would be consistent with the approach of making political
gestures to the French, but could have negative security implications.
Approve
Disapprove
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