FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S 1971 REPORT ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-12-3-43-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: March 4, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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SPECIAL MEMORAN
D
UM
FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION
TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S 1971 REPORT
ON U. S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
For Official Use Only
4 March 1971
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WARNING
Laws relating to copyright, libel, and communications require
that dissemination of this publication be limited to persons
having an official interest in its contents. Exception can be
granted only by the issuing agency, and users are warned that
noncompliance may subject violators to personal liability.
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4 MARCH 1971
CONTENTS
I. NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
West Europe . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 1
The Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Latin America . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
II. COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
East Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
North Vietnam and the PRG . . . . . . . . . . . 34
The PRC and North Korea . . . . . . . 38
Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
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FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S REPORT
ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S
SUMMARY
NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
WEST EUROPE: The principal British papers welcome the President's
report in general as evidence of continued U.S. commitment to
world peace, although the TIMES perceives certain elements of
"self--righteousness." West German reaction too is mostly favorable,
with commentators seeing.a close identity between the views of
Bonn and Washington, especially in regard to Chancellor.Brandt's
Eastern policy. Paris' LE MONDE, however, condemns what it sees
as a general hardening of line in comparison with last year's
report and concludes that the President has decided to seek a
military victory in Indochina.
MIDDLE EAST: Among the Arab states, Jordan's reaction is the most
affirmative. .Its commentators welcome some of the statements on
the Middle East, albeit with reservations and requests for clarifica-
tion. Cairo's comment overall is more negative, but AL-AHRAM finds
"new signs deserving attention" and says this "important document"
will be studied with care before the regime comments officially.
Other Arab observers mostly regard the report as another indication
of U.S. sympathy with Israeli viewpoints. Tel Aviv's reaction'.is
mixed; there is approval of the U.S. position on negotiations and
determination of borders within the framework of a peace agreement,.
but adamant opposition to the "Rogers plan" on final borders.
AFRICA: North African commentators, concentrating on the Middle
East section of the report, for the mc,st part see nothing that is
new. One Tunisian paper welcomes the reference to the legitimate
aspirations of the Palestinians. A Johannesburg broadcast sees
some merit in the report's opposition to enforced changes in the
white regimes of southern Africa, while a Nigerian commentator
terms opposition to violence against apartheid "disgraceful."
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ASIA: Japanese observers, less complimentary than last year,
draw unfavorable comparisons between this year's report and its
1970 counterpart. Several see undue emphasis on military
strength. Observers in Nationalist China express disagreement
with the President's statements on Communist China, while
welcoming his reassurance regarding continued U.S. commitments
to Taipei. Some Indian critics object to the section on
Indochina, while others hail signs of "a more coherent
policy" on Indo-Pakistani issues.
LATIN AMERICA: Reaction from Chile and Peru is mostly critical,
with spokesmen taking special exception to sections of the
report dealing with the establishment of Chilean-Cuban ties
and withdrawal of U.S. aid from unremittingly hostile states.
A Brazilian paper, on the other hand, praises the report as
indicative of a new realism in U.S. policy vis-a-vis Latin
America.
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
THE USSR: Picturing widespread favorable reaction to the Soviet
Government statement denouncing the operation in Laos, which
Moscow issued the day the President's report was released,
Soviet media have carried only limited, low-level comment on
the report. An "international review" article in PRAVDA, asking
how the United States can speak of a new course aimed at peace
when it has moved to widen the "aggression" in Indochina, is
the most authoritative Soviet comment to date. TASS' account
of the report notes that it "gives certain space" to U.S.-
Soviet relations but, asks how one can reconcile statements
about a new approach to relations with the USSR and the
socialist countries with the intention "proclaimed in" the
report "to continue subversive activities against the socialist
countries." With respect to the sections on both Indochina
and the Middle East, Moscow concludes that the report augurs
no change in U.S. policy. TASS' account of the report ignores
the portion on China, but a Soviet broadcast to Chinese
listeners remarked on the "friendly and harmonious tone"
of the passages on China--"a signal inviting China to collude
with the United States."
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EAST EUROPE: East European reactions include notably restrained
criticism from Poland in the third month of the Gierek regime,
balanced by a discernment of some positive features in the report.
By contrast, voluminous and largely stereotyped comment from
Czechoslovakia, reflecting the increasingly conservative tenor
of Prague propaganda, is virtually unrelieved in its negative
appraisal of the report. Along with Bulgarian comment, as usual
seconding Moscow, and East German comment that typically outdoes -
Moscow in abusiveness, Czechoslovakia's is the harshest to issue
from Moscow's East European allies.
Romania's reaction takes the form of a highly authoritative
article in-the party daily SCINTEIA which treats the report in
more than usually harsh terms but registers a hope for continued
development of Romanian-U.S. cooperation despite differences on
such issues as European security.
Yugoslavia's comment, taking note of the announcement in the
President's report that Tito has accepted an invitation to pay
a return visit to the United States, balances restrained criticism
of the report with mild praise.
Characteristically hostile comment in Tirana's ZERI I POPULLIT
includes the inevitable swipe at alleged Soviet "revisionist"
collusion with the United States.
THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS: Hanoi's reaction is highlighted by a
2 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement which alleges that the
President merely repeated old arguments about Vietnamization
that "have been completely refuted by reality." Other Vietnamese.
communist reaction includes statements issued by the DRV and PRG
spokesmen in Paris--on 25 and 26 February, respectively--and
criticism by the deputy heads of the two communist delegations
at the Paris session on 4 March. Hanoi's first press comment
came in a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 3d, the same day
the press carried the foreign ministry statement.
The propaganda for the most part glosses over the details of the
President's remarks and reiterates long-standing themes: the
Nixon Doctrine is merely a tool to pursue colonialism, to make
Indochinese- fight Indochinese and puppet soldiers die in the
place of Americans; the President's refusal to agree to a time-
table for the withdrawal of all troops and to abandon support
of the Thieu-Ky regime shows that he does not want a negotiated
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settlement; following the incursions into Cambodia and Laos,
the Administration is "threatening" the DRV and planning "new
military adventures" against it; and the President has not
given up hope for a military victory.
CHINA: PRC media have publicized some hostile Pyongyang and
Tirana comment and reported the DRV Foreign Ministry statement
but have mentioned the report only briefly and in passing in
original comment. Peking has ignored the President's statement
of policy toward the PRC but cites a Pyongyang attack on U.S.
intent to "permanently 'guarantee' the status of the Chiang
Kai-shek clique" in the United Nations.
NORTH KOREA: Typically intemperate comment from Pyongyang is
replete with the usual rhetoric about U.S. "unbounded aggressive
ambitions." The party organ NODONG SINMUN dwells on charges of
U.S. schemes to dominate Asia, and Pyongyang repeats its chronic
complaint that the United'States is engaging in "war preparations
against" North Korea.
CUBA: Havana questions the President's sincerity in speaking of
respect for Latin American governments regardless of their
ideologies, finding a "contradiction" in his "warning" that the
United States "would discontinue aid to Latin American nations
which show continued hostility toward it." Stating that the
President "reasserted. the old policy of hostility and isolation"
with respect'to Cuba, Havana reiterates Castro's line that Cuba
is not interested in "rejoining the so-called inter-American
system" as represented by the OAS.
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NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
WEST EUROPE
BRITAIN The major British newspapers gave prominent news coverage
to the President's report and in general welcomed
it
editorially. The DAILY TELEGRAPH calls it "encouraging: because
as a
shows "a clear determination to maintain America's strength
factor for peace." The paper notes President Nixon's intention to
present a low profile overseas while continuing to honor treaty
commitments and maintain a nuclear shield. "This about asrsatis-
factory a formula as could be reasonably hoped
concludes.
The FINANCIAL TIMES sees the President's intention to fight ?hethe
"dangerous" trend toward isolationism as the "saving g
report and particularly welcomes the affirmation that U.S. forcess
in Europe will not be cut back unilaterally. It says the emphas
of American foreign policy continues to lie with the "firm warning"
to Moscow not to seek "exclusive or predominant positions" in the.
world. The paper terms all this a "heartening assurance of a
sustained U.S. commitment to the maintenance of international
security."
The TIMES describes the report as "detailed and sincere in its
aspirations for world peace but criticizes the President for stick-
ing to a definition of the legitimate interests of both sides in the
Indochina conflict that has been "consistently rejected by the North
Vietnamese ever since the Paris talks began." it contrasts this
position with President Nixon's handling of the Soviets and Chinese,
s
which has "more clarity and a awareness of
aseonetof thefgreat
lie." The pepex.says that by acknowledging
powers in Asia, the President "goes a long way to bury the contain-
ment of the past." It notes that he had some "reasonable and states-
manlike things" to say to the Russians but doubts whether observing is
"capable of appreciating the Soviet point of view," the report is "infused with elements of the self-righteousness which
he attributes to the Russians." The paper concludes that if there
is to be a general understanding, Mr. Nixon must "at least acknow-
ledge those elements of Soviet foreign policy which are shaped
largely by insecurity and the desire to equal the United States as
"
a global power.
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The SUNDAY TELEGRAPH notes that while the report shows that America
will avoid "crusading interventionism," this "emphatically does not
mean that America intends to disengage." The TELEGRAPH suggests that
the whole report is premised on the satisfactory conclusion of the
Vietnam war and declares that it would be "tragic if any crushing
new setback in Vietnam were to undermine the foundations of this
carefully constructed and impressive diplomatic structure."
In his OBSERVER column, William Millinship says the President put a
"marked accent on toughness and. determination, betraying an anxiety
to reassure America's allies and to warn her adversaries against
interpreting the Nixon Doctrine as a cloak for opting out of
America's responsibility abroad." Henry Brandon, writing in the
SUNDAY TIMES, makes a similar point, saying that the President's
"prime.concern in foreign affairs is the growing isolationism" in
the United States. The President's "courageous" decision to main-
tain U.S. troop levels in Europe, Brandon says, is an indication
that he is not "rigidly adhering" to the formula of doing no more
abroad than domestic opinion would sustain.
FRANCE The report was given brief factual treatment in monitored
Paris broadcasts, and available editorial comment is
limited. The report "differs appreciably from that of last year,"
LE MONDE says editorially, being in effect "a series of warnings
aimed equally at the USSR and at North Vietnam." LE MONDE expresses
regret that the President "appears to have decided to seek a military
victory in Indochina"; it claims that this hardening of line on
Indochina "is found again in U.S.-Soviet relations and even, to a
certain extent, in relations among the allies."
The communist L'HUMANITE published a short. item summarizing the
main themes of the message, with the terse comment that "it does
not differ appreciably from that of last year, and an article by
Yves Moreau criticizing the President's.concept of regional
associations. In Vietnam, Moreau says, association means . ,
Vietnamization, which has not only prolonged the war but extended
it to Laos and Cambodia and now risks the launching of a massive
attack against North Vietnam. President Nixon's concept of
association in Europe, Moreau contends, would limit freedom of.
action "within the framework of an Atlantic world."
WEST GERMANY The West German press and radio widely summarized
highlights of the President's message, but
editorial reaction is not extensive. There is widespread publicity
for a DPA dispatch quoting "Bonn government quarters" for the
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conclusion that the report indicates a "remarkable unison"
between U.S. and West German policy. Also according to DPA, "a
government spokesman" has said the report confirms "the full
measure of agreement" reached in the discussions between the West
German Foreign Minister and top U.S. officials.
An editorial in FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG says the report
makes it clear that there is no such.thing as. a new U.S. isola-
tionism. Europe should take note, the paper declares, of
Washington's intention, to look again at the possibilities for a
fairer distribution of burdens and responsibilities; the Ameri~
cans have gone further on the road to partnership thinking than
.the European, who instead of mocking must recognize that the ball
is in his court.
NEUE RUHR ZEITUNG claims that the report unequivocally supports
Chancellor Brandt's Eastern policy. President Nixon's statement
of confidence, the paper says, is linked to concrete measures,
for the United States will,not withdraw its troops from Europe
without compensatory action by the East. Similarly, a Hamburg TV
commentator affirmed that the passages in the report on Bonn's
Ostpolitik may be interpreted as clear backing for the Federal
Government's position. But even here, the commentator declared,
the report makes it clear that Washington considers itself
directly involved.
OTHER COUNTRIES Elsewhere in West Europe, available editorials
comment is slight. The Rome radio, reviewing
the main points of the message, expressed the opinion that the
report contains "no new ideas worthy of great note, but rather
veiled comments on which the attention of 'observers is now
centered." The Italian paper IL MESSAGGERO views the report, in
conjunction with the recent Soviet statement on Indochina, as a
"precise indication of the general deterioration of East-West
relations, particularly Soviet-American relations."
The Madrid paper YA,.while agreeing that Southeast Asia must be
of prime concern to the President, argues that "Nixon was stronger
when he focused on other international problems such as cooperation
with Europe, Africa, and Latin America on bases that are highly
respected by these blocs." NOTICIERO concludes that the President,
"has added nothing new to his well-known political theories and
continues to consider Europe his country's most important ally."
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A Radio Lisbon press review reports an EPOCA editorial that
claims the President "almost confesses the guilt of American policy
as regards Africa." The report, EPOCA says, indirectly condemns
the "intense and odious propaganda drive" of recent years against
South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese presence in Africa.
The paper observes unhappily that this implicit condemnation was
balanced by the announcement that Washington would continue the
arms embargo against South Africa and tighten economic sanctions
against Rhodesia.
THE MIDDLE EAST
THE UAR Egyptian media have given the report substantial
coverage, with comment varying from AL-AHRAM's remark
that it is an important document deserving close study to the Cairo
radio Voice of the Arabs' view that the President drew no closer
to the Arab position.
Cairo radio says the President again declared U.S. support for
Israel's expansionist aims; although he emphasized the U.S.
desire to establish better relations with the Arabs, he "took
Israel's side" on the questions of borders and negotiations. The
President, Cairo adds, sees no contradiction between the principle
of Israel's return of the territories and the "so-called slight
alteration" of the border. The radio says the President attacked
"the Soviet Union's call for imposing the Security Council
resolution" to solve the crisis; in-his opinion, Cairo notes, the
Soviet Union is trying to impose a solution and is demanding that
the big powers work to establish peace, while the United States
supports negotiations between the sides concerned. Cairo also
notes the President's expression of regret that the continuing
tension in the Middle East is preventing the United States from
establishing fruitful relations with all the Arab states..
UAR media list Mr. Nixon's four principles to be considered in a
settlement, two of which are singled out by AL-AHRAM as "new
signs deserving attention." For the first time, the paper says,
Mr. Nixon "admitted" that the Arab states will not accept any
settlement not providing for the return of the territory occupied'
in 1967, and for the first time he referred to the Palestinian
people's legitimate-aspirations. Also for the first time,
AL-AHRAM says, the President used the expression "minor adjustments";it
points out that France has used this phrase to mean actual administra-
tive adjustments "on the Jordanian border."
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An AL-AKHBAR editorial,.noting that President Nixon said he does
not believe the Arabs will surrender any of their land, asks
what he, the United Nations, and the major powers intend to do.
AK.HBAR AL-YAWM suggests that a peaceful solution may be achieved
if the President puts pressure on Israel to "put into effect
what he said" in his statement. But the paper adds that he
might go back on his statement, "as he has done before," and then
fighting will have to be resumed.
A Voice of the Arabs commentary does acknowledge the President's
statements on Palestinian aspirations and Arab desire to recover
the lost territory, but says that in spite of such remarks the
report "expresses a view identical to that of Israel's." Taking
issue with Mr. Nixon's "demand for borders through negotiations"
and his opposition to "borders stipulated by the big powers," the
commentary charges that this attitude "demolishes" the Security
Council resolution.
JORDAN Amman expresses appreciation of the President's state-
ment of principles regarding. return of territory and
recognition of Palestinian rights, but has reservations with
regard to his views on implementation of these principles. Voic-
ing these opinions, Foreign Minister 'Abdallah Salah, in remarks
reported by Amman radio, praises the President as one of the
world's figures who best understands the Middle East situation
and desires to find a settlement. But'he notes that the President's
reference to negotiation of final borders by the sides concerned
"is close to the viewpoint of Israel." The foreign minister
wonders if Mr. Nixon's remarks on the Palestinians are a hint at
establishment of a "weakling Palestinian. state."
An Amman radio commentary welcomes the President's comments
concerning the Palestinians, but asks for clarification. Like
the foreign minister, the radio declares that restitution of
the injustice done the Palestinians must not mean committing a
further injustice at the expense of more Arab land.
The Amman paper AU-DUSTUR feels that the United States is capable
of pursuing a more positive role of forcing Israel to withdraw,
which it calls the most important point in the crisis. AD-DUSTUR'
believes Washington could change its image in the Arab world a
great deal if it were to adopt a firm, positive stand insuring
implementation of Security Council Resolution 21+2 and complete
Israeli withdrawal. In another commentary, the paper wonders about
Washington's intentions toward the Arab world in view of Israeli
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Deputy Prime Minister Alon's "hardened stand" on withdrawal-. Amman
radio also reviews an AL-URDUN article which notes that Mr. Nixon
pointed out that the four powers view the Middle East situation in
light of their own interests--as, the paper adds, does Israel; the
Arab countries, it says, are the only party not working in accord-
ance with national interests, due to lack of unity of action.
SYRIA Critical Damascus reaction is typified by AL--BA'TH's
comment that the President's report indicated that the
United States "only works at increasing tension" and that it .
reconfirmed "hardline" U.S. policy. And ATH-THAWRAH declares that
the report reaffirms U.S. support for Israel's expansionist aims.
Radio reportage, citing news agency accounts, points out that
while the President described the Middle East situation as
extremely dangerous and said both sides must make concessions, he
"did not offer any new proposals," thereby-indicating an indecisive
U.S. policy. A Damascus radio commentary on the Persian Gulf,
summing up the President's comments on that area, sayshe defined,
U.S. policy toward the gulf as "based on encouraging the amirate
rulers to establish a suspect federation" which would serve as a.
substitute for the British after the "partial withdrawal" of
British troops.
IRAQ The only available comment from Iraq is an AL-JUMHURIYAH
article, reported in Baghdad radio's press review on the
27th, which predictably assails U.S. policy and the idea of a
political solution of the Mideast-problem. The President "excelled
in playing with words and creating pretenses" that the United
States has recognized the principle of Israeli withdrawal, the
paper says, but he coupled this recognition with a condition which
completely undermined it by emphasizing border arrangements. List-
ing the President's four principles, AL-JUMHURIYAH says "the most
ridiculous thing" is that each of them undermines the other. With
regard to the third point, on guarantees, the paper claims that
what is intended is provision of international guarantees for
Israel and "nonrecognition of the Palestinian right to- liberate"
the homeland. As for the fourth point, on Palestinian aspirations,
AL-JUMHURIYAI says this does not go beyond compensation in U.S.
dollars or "Arabization of the Zionist occupation of Gaza and the
West Bank by establishing a Palestinian state which will be tanta-
mount to an Israeli colony."
It appears, the paper says, that Mr. Nixon has "brought nothing
new and has not wanted to detract anything" from Israel's demands
for recognition, peace, and guarantees for secure borders after
"cutting away what conforms to its new map." AL-JL1MHMJRIYAH says
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that what is new in the statement is that the President explained
all these matters frankly for the first time, asserting what has
been clear from the beginning--that the real meaning of a peaceful
solution is "surrender and submission to the Israeli and U.S.
demands."
LEBANON Beirut radio says the President -accused the Soviet Union
of "rejecting" his proposals for controlling the arms
race in the Middle East. The radio reports UAR and Jordanian press
comment as well as the Jordanian Foreign Minister's
reaction to the report, but originates no comment.
The diverse Beirut press is reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY
(MENA) as "unanimous in the belief" that the President's report was
"biased toward'Israel, supported Israel, and adopted Israel's view-
point" on a settlement. AN-NAHAR, according to MENA, is not
impressed by the reference to Palestinian rights, calling it
"general talk" and saying the United States has. made similar state-
ments on dozens of occasions. The President's report proves,
AN-NAHAR says, that the United States has changed its position
on the basic issue: it previously supported Resolution 2112 which
provides for withdrawal first, but it has now adopted Israel's
position on changing borders first. The paper says what the Arabs
want is for the United States to implement the UN resolutions
rather than to "indulge in mere talk as others have been doing."
AL-ANWAR accuses the United States of duplicity in its attitude to
the Middle East, "pretending" that it is anxious to achieve peace
while doing everything possible to encourage Israeli intransigence.
In its customary vein, AL-MUHARRIR.charges that the President
has frustrated all international efforts to eliminate the "Israeli
aggression" and has "obstructed further moves" by Jarring, the
Security Council, and the Big Four.
AL-HAYAH observes regretfully that the report as a whole does not
indicate a U.S. desire to take effective steps to solve the crisis.
The paper feels that the President's statement on solving the
border question through negotiations detracts from the importance
of his reference to Israeli withdrawal; this statement alone, the
paper-says, is sufficient to maintain the deadlock. Describing
the President's stress on the dangerous character of the crisis
as even more important, AL-HAYAH notes his statement that the
United States does not seek a dominating position in the Middle
East and will not allow others to achieve such a position. The
paper calls this "American threat" an indication that Mr. Nixon
does not see an early end to the crisis. Citing his call to the
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Soviet Union to halt the arms race, AL-HAYAH observes that the
world, as seen by Mr. Nixon, is not headed for peace and he
therefore wants to put the blame on the USSR.
FEDAYEEN Palestinian fedayeen broadcast comment is predictably
COMMENT negative. The clandestine Fatah Radio refers to
President Nixon's "hostile statements" and dismisses
Zionist efforts to "appear disturbed" as only an attempt to conceal
collusion. At the same time, it is critical of "certain Arab
quarters" which welcomed the President's statement.
The Voice of the PLO Central Committee, broadcast from Baghdad,
ostensibly reflects the views of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, but Cairo's AL-AHRAM on 25 February reported the
PLO Central.Committee as announcing that statements broadcast
by this radio express only the views of the Iraqi Government. A
typically vituperative commentary carried on this program assails
"Nixon the Zionist" as aiming at perpetuating the Zionist presence
in Palestine, but is equally vociferous in denouncing "hireling
radios and officials"--not identified, but meaning Jordanian--for
praising the :"mighty efforts and deep understanding of this filthy
Yankee."
The Voice of the Storm, broadcast from Algiers, also purports to
express Palestinian opinions but probably reflects as well the
views of the host government. A commentary carried by the Voice
of the Storm lists the four requirements for peace in the Middle
East set out in the President's report and declares that they are
the "very points around which the American-Zionist game has been
played since the beginning of last January." It adds that the
call for big-power guarantees is meant to "stabilize Israel's
gains." The commentary goes on to say that the U.S. bias in
favor of Israel is not transient but is based on a coincidence of
interests. Instead of proceeding on the basis of an "imaginary
change" in U.S. policy, the commentary concludes, it would be
more appropriate for the Arab states to put all their resources
on the road toward battle.
ISRAEL Israeli comment is mixed, Jerusalem radio stressing
that political circles there reacted favorably to two
points in the President's report--his support for the principle
of negotiations and the need fore. the. parties themselves to
determine borders. But the Israeli Forces Radio observes that
U.S.-Israeli relations are characterized by mutual disappointment,
with Washington regretting Israel's latest note to Jarring and
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Tel Aviv viewing the President's foreign policy statement as
disappointing. Israel's "bitterness" regarding the timing of
the President's report is no less than its bitterness regarding
the content, the radio says: The very fact that Mr. Nixon
reiterated his support for the principles of the Rogers plan
limited the negotiations before they have even begun.
Taking the more. optimistic approach, Foreign Minister Eban, in
an interview carried on the Forces Radio on the.26th, underlined
the President's "vehement and telling stress" on agreement and,
He found one stress that is "perhaps slightly new"
in the President's remarks about Soviet policy in the area; there
is a hint here, Eban said, that if the USSR wants to reach agree-
ment or coexistence it must make a "comprehensive alteration" of
its policy.
Other Israeli political figures are reported-as setting forth
their opposition to the "Rogers plan"--Secretary Rogers' December
1969 address in which he stated the U.S. belief that any changes
in pre-existing boundaries should not reflect the weight of con-
quest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations. Thus
Tourism Minister Kol is reported as saying Washington must be made
to realize that the Rogers plan will-not be the basis for peace.
Knesset member Menahem Begin is said to have called for a public
campaign in the United States against the Rogers plan and against
Mr. Nixon's remarks calling for recognition of the Palestinian
aspirations, asserting that the U.S. Administration is "interven-
ing limitlessly in our national life and actually trying to dictate
to us." Herut leader Ezer Weizman believes the report proves that
"the Nixon plan, the Rogers plan, and the withdrawal plan are all
"
one and the same.
Deputy Prime Minister Alon, in a Jerusalem radio interview on the
27th, did not rule out sharper confrontations with the United
States while progressing toward a political solution. Asked if
there is any doubt, after the President's report, that the United
States is "still confronting Israel" with the Rogers plan, Alon
said there has never been any doubt that this is the plan of the.
U.S. Government, and "it has worried us particularly since it
was brought to the attention of the world and us." Alon expressed
the opposition of the whole government to the "Rogers map," but
added that in contacts with the U.S. Government in general and
President Nixon,in particular, Israel had received clarifications
and commitments which give enough guarantees that there will not be
an imposed. peace and therefore imposed insecure borders.'. He did
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not rule out the possibility that Israel can convince the United
States to abandon the Rogers plan as unjust to Israel.
Jerusalem radio's press review notes that the papers' received the
President's report with mixed feelings. HAARETZ welcomes the
statement that agreement on final borders must be within the frame-
work of a peace agreement, but sees his reiteration of the Rogers
plan as strengthening Israel's enemies and indirectly the Soviet
Union. HAARETZ later says the President "rejected Israel's demand'
for secure borders" and remarks that "this spells the beginnings
of confrontation with the United States." The paper adds that
Mr. Nixon is "disregarding his promise that the United States
will not pressure Israel into accepting unsatisfactory borders."
LAMERHAV believes the U.S. position remained close to Israel's on
the nature of peace but is closer to the Arab position on the
territorial question.
The Jerusalem POST comments that President Nixon.'s..report is open
to varying interpretations. The POST disagrees with Alon that it will
be possible to persuade the United States to withdraw from the
Rogers plan, arguing that Israel must convince.both the United States
and Egypt that it will not agree to any plan opposed to its interests.
HATZOFE finds positive elements in the U.S. policy of checking Soviet
domination in the Middle East as well as in. the trend toward an
undictated peace agreement, while also acknowledging U.S.-Israeli
differences of opinion on the border issue.
GREECE, CYPRUS, No comment has. been monitored from the radios
TURKEY, IRAN of Athens, Nicosia, Ankara, or Teheran on the.
President's report. All these radios gave the
document moderate news coverage, Athens radio noting that the Greek
papers reported it prominently.
AFRICA
NORTH AFRICA Little coverage or comment is available from
North African and Sudanese media. Khartoum's.
reaction is represented only by a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report
that Sudanese Deputy Prime Minister 'Awadallah, arriving in Cairo,
said the President had changed only his "tone," not his thinking.
Libyan coverage has included short news-items and. comment by UAR
and Lebanese papers. A Bayda radio commentary notes that the
report contained a number of points reflecting partiality for
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-- 11 -
Israel but at the same time supported Secretary Rogers' plan for
a political settlement. Bayda points out that the President said
a settlement requires restoration of Arab territory with minor
.border adjustments if necessary. It takes exception to the state-
ment that future borders must be negotiated between Israel and the
Arabs, observing that this contradicts Security Council Resolution
242 and the Rogers plan. The radio notes U.S. acknowledgment of
Soviet interests in the Middle East, adding that the President was
cautious about "what he called any effort by a big power" to insure
a dominating position in the area.
The Tunis news agency TAP reviews an article in the Socialist
Destour Party paper L'ACTION which terms Mr. Nixon's recognition
of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians a "favorable
change" which is bound to have an impact on Israel's attitude
toward the Palestinians. The paper AS-SABAH, on the other hand,
sees no new elements in the U.S. attitude toward the Palestinians.
In an article also reviewed by TAP, the paper considers it unlikely
that the United States would support the Palestinians in recovering
sovereignty over their homeland, in view of its known position con-
cerning the existence of Israel. Thus, it says, "there has been
no progress in the problem."
Algiers radio asserts that the report contains nothing new and
indeed once again endorses Tel Aviv's "expansionist" aims. In a
brief, editorialized report on the section on Indochina, the
radio says the President declared that his only objective, "as
he put it," is to end.the war in Indochina and adds that "he
alleged" that it is the DRV which forces him to continue the war.
No comment is available from Moroccan media.
SOUTH AFRICA, The Johannesburg and Salisbury radios factually
RHODESIA. reported the President's references to Africa.
Johannesburg comments that the U.S. policy seems
to be one of noninterference in Africa with the exception of
southern Africa, where he feels morally obliged to foster change.
But Johannesburg also says President Nixon has gone on record
in opposition to attempts to isolate the white governments of
southern Africa.
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-- 12 -
OTHER COUNTRIES Other monitored sources have reported on the
message, particularly those aspects that deal
with Africa, but there is little substantive comment. A Nigerian
radio commentary complains that the President said the United
States will observe the UN embargo on arms sales to South Africa
but will not accept violent revolution against the apartheid system.
The commentary goes on to call it a "downright disgrace" for a world
power to reject violence against "cruel and inhuman" systems, while
at the same time accepting "the legitimacy of violence against the
people of Vietnam and Indochina." This is both "uncivilized and
subhuman," the commentary says.
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- 13 -
AsIa
JAPAN The President's report has drawn considerable reportage
and comment in the news media but little.public reaction
from government officials. The English-language JAPAN TIMES reports
that Foreign Ministry "sources" informally noted that President
Nixon "regarded Japan officially for the first time as one of the
'big four powers' in the Pacific region." The "sources" believe
the reference to the unchanged status of U.S. bases on Okinawa
after reversion was intended to put at ease those Congressmen
concerned about U.S. security requirements in the Far East, and.
they "paid special attention" to the reference to friendly and
competitive U.S.-Japanese relations and the desire for settle-
ment of the textile issue. On the China issue, Foreign Minister
Kiichi Aichi said in the Diet in reference to the President's
report that he did not think the United States had shaped a new
China policy yet, according to KYODO. Aichi noted in response
to a questioner that the report did not spell out a two-Chinas
formula but rather refrained, wisely, from presenting a clearcut
stand on the matter.
Japanese editorial reaction is less complimentary than last year,
and indeed several papers draw explicit unfavorable comparisons
between this report and its 1970 counterpart. The English-language
YOMIURI, for example, says last year's report furnished '.'hope for
a transition from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation,"
but this-year "in general the,tone of the message tended to place
more weight on the politics of power." The English-language ASAHI
EVENING NEWS argues similarly that last year's message led one to
believe Washington's diplomacy might "finally succeed in.disengag-
ing itself from a policy of overreliance on military strength.'.'.
But the latest message, the paper says, is "completely the opposite."
TOKYO SHIMBUN, concentrating on changing Japan-U.S. relations,
asserts: "The United States is no longer the leader country but
just one of the major powers, with many agonies. The United States'
'days of glory' are over, yet it has so far not been able to come
up with a new vision to strive for." An economic commentator told
JOZ television viewers that the emphasis on U.S. trade based on
"mutual benefits" means that "U.S. status on the international
stage has been lowered and reflects the current difficult situation
faced by the United States."
SANKEI says the message underscores a belief that peace can. be
maintained only by the logic of strength. "What has come to the
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fore again is the image of the old hawkish Nixon who held communist
countries in deep distrust," it says. Seeing no likelihood of a
U.S.-China rapprochement in the near future, SANKEI concludes that
"Japan should cope prudently with the China problem on the basis
of the long-term outlook." The economic daily NIHON KEIZAI says
the report indicates that "Japan will be forced to bear new
economic responsibilities in the future, and the scope of those
responsibilities will be far greater than those previously assigned
under the Nixon Doctrine."
Japanese newspaper correspondents stationed in Washington have
given their own views: NIHON KEIZAI's correspondent Kokuho--"It
can be said that the people of the world have been disappointed
by Nixon's message, which avoided touching on a clear policy for
peace." ASAHI correspondent Koto--"The theory running through
the Nixon message, which emphasizes the Nixon Doctrine, can in
summary be termed a 'theory of balance' favorable only to the
United States." MAINICHI correspondent Ishimaru--"Nixon's message
this, year has shown the figure of the old Nixon, who belongs-to
the hawks, and has suggested the future of the Nixon diplomacy--
that it will grow more conservative." SANKEIcorrespondent Abe--
"The need for Japan to establish its independent policy has
become more important . "
The Japan Communist Party carries comment critical of the message
in its daily AKAHATA. The editorial says that although last
year's message presented the Nixon: Doctrine under a peace-loving.
cloak, this year's brought to'the fore the "position-of--strength"
policy. The emphasis on Japan's role in Asia shows that "the
Nixon Doctrine expects Japan, as 'a major power,' to play a more
positive role in gathering Asian puppet regimes together into an
anticommunist force in line with the U.S. policy of aggression,"
the paper says.
REPUBLIC Official spokesman and editorialists in Nationalist
OF CHINA China express disagreement with the President's
statements on Communist China, but at the same tau
welcome his reassurances regarding continued U.S. commitments
to Taipei. -A Foreign Ministry spokesman argued that it is
futile for the United States to try to change the hostile
attitude of the Chinese Communists by a unilateral show of favors.
The paper LIEN HO PAO asserted in its initial comment that..
President Nixon "is making a terrible mistake in pursuing ,a 'two
Chinas' policy; he will only invite more trouble through contacts
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- 15 -
with Peiping." His reiteration of U.S. commitments to the Republic
of China-is-welcomed nonetheless, the editorial said. A few days
later, the same paper was sharply critical of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs--"insensitive" and "cowardly"--for limiting'itself
to mild expressions of disagreement. The ministry failed even.
to register a formal protest, the paper complained, as the State
Department itself expected.
INDIA The New Delhi radio says most Indian papers have
commented on the report. The NATIONAL HERALD is quoted
as observing that President Nixon is "probably entirely sincere"
when he reflects on his failure to make peace and that he has
something to say on each of the vexing questions troubling the
American conscience but "nothing that promises a new angle."
President Nixon's statement on the prosecution and extradition
of all plane hijackers is interpreted by Radio New Delhi as
supporting India's demand for the return of the hijackers of an
Indian plane. The radio observes that the President did not.
specifically mention Pakistan's complicity, but "what he said
vindicates India's stand."
According to the radio, the leftwing DAILY PATRIOT-urges the
President to immediately withdraw American forces from. Indochina,-.
while the-HINDUSTAN TIMES observes that the extent of U.S. air
support in Vietnam poses "new dangers."
The TIMES OF INDIA editorially welcomes the President's "new sense
of realism" and observes that "Nixon is finally evolving a more
coherent policy for the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent." The paper
praises the President for taking "a more mature approach".when
he said his Administration could not press for a closer relation-
ship with either India or Pakistan than their own interests led
them to desire. The paper expresses the hope that with the
revised statement of U.S. policy objectives in South Asia, the
"strains that became noticeable in.the relations between New Delhi
and Washington will ease."
The AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA of Calcutta sees "ominous" signs in the
President's words. The paper observes that Mr. Nixon "shed tears
over his failure to bring about peace" in Vietnam, but argues that
it is difficult to accept his sincerity because he wishes to
achieve something as a "precondition" fdr peace. The paper
asserts that since all his attempts have proved abortive, the
President. has turned to increasing pressures on Hanoi, and.this.
cannot be seen as anything but "a policy of desperation, which
usually ends in defeat."
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-16 -
PAKISTAN The only available comment appears in a Bengali-
language broadcast over the Karachi radio, which
describes the message as "quite significant from various angles
and points of view" and praises the President for explaining U.S.
foreign policy in detail. The broadcast warns: "The time has
now come for the United States to realize its many responsibilities
as the biggest power on earth. If from now on the United States
does not give a rethinking to all matters and make necessary
changes in its basic foreign policy, the prospects of establishing
peace in the world will further deteriorate."
THAILAND The report has been given prompt but moderate-coverage
by the Bangkok press and radio-TV, which almost
unanimously.agree that it "contained little that was new." Most
of the.press.headlines stress President Nixon's disappointment..
at failing-to restore peace in Vietnam and his appeal for mutual
concessions to achieve peace in the Middle East. -
Comment in Bangkok's vernacular press is scant, with most-papers
relying.solely on U.S. sources for reports on the message, which.
was publicized under various headings over a period of three-days.
Thai leaders have made no response to the President's praise for
Thailand's role in the development of regional organizations and
in providing support for the effort to repel North Vietnamese
aggression.. Only the English-language BANGKOK POST features this
reference to Thailand on its front page.
An editorial in the other English-language daily, the BANGKOK
WORLD, observes that the President's expectations are "finely
balanced" on the hope that regional groupings can supersede out-
side powers in the roles they have played in the East Asia area.
Stressing that no nation in Asia has been more active in supporting
regional projects than has Thailand, the editorial expresses a
"sense of frustration" over the slow development of these projects.
It concludes: "Mr. Nixon may well feel that the pressures. at
home make his doctrine of indirect involvement more pertinent.
than would ordinarily be the case, but it hardly seems appropriate
to create the image that a substitute already exists."
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- 17 -
OTHER COWTRIES Available comment from other noncommunist Asian
nations is sparse. The STRAITS TIMES of Kuala
Lampur publishes an editorial hailing the message as "a clear
enunciation of America',s foreign policy aims" and "an effective
answer to critics who see the South Vietnamese offensive in
Laos with American air support as Washington's challenge to
Peking." A Seoul radio broadcast highlights the fact that
the report characterized South Korea as an excellent example
of the progress of the Nixon Doctrine. The Saigon radio and
press appear to have made no comment on the report--as was
also the case last year.
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LATIN AMERICA
- 18 -
In a speech reported promptly by Havana's FRENSA LATINA,
President Allende responded to three points raised in
the President's message: Chilean relations with Cuba, Chilean..
relations with the United States, and the status of the inter-
American system. Allende denied that Chile's establishment of
diplomatic relations with Cuba can be interpreted as "a challenge
to the inter-American system," contending that Chile reestablished
relations with Cuba because "it had the moral and political
obligation to redress an. injustice committed in the name of
interests and ideologies which were not Chile's or its people's."
He pointed out that Mexico did not break with Cuba.
CHILE
has come forth from the Government of Chile" and that "we have
sought the possibility of dialog."
On the subject of Chilean-U.S. relations, Allende reportedly stated
that the Chilean Government "wants friepdly relations with the
most powerful country of the hemisphere, as long as it allows
Chile to differ and disagree and negotiate from different points.
of view." He noted that "nothing that may imply undue criticism
Allende also took issue with President Nixon's interpretation of
the May 1969 Vina del Mar conference, contending that the -
consensus there was that "Latin America and the United. States..
had divergent interests as the result of the former's dependence
on the latter." Noting the President's statement that Allende's
.election had "deep implications" for the "inter-American system,"
Allende said Chile's attitude is "constructive" as exemplified
by the fact that "despite our criticism of the OAS system, we
remain members of that organization to set forth our .viewpoints
in its midst with the hope that dialog will impose itself" and -.
open the way to "a new concept in inter-American relations."
Sharper criticism appears in an editorial in the Chilean Govern-
ment newspaper LA NACION. It says that Latin America and the
world "continue to wait for some consistency between the North
American President's expressions of peace, nonintervention, and
sensible partnership and his actions." Asserting that the
president's report contains "nothing new" and is "simply:a
restatement of earlier definitions," LA NACION complains that
only 11 pages of the 180.-page document are devoted to Latin
America-a fact "which demonstrates once more the small place
hemisphere policy occupies in the overall concerns of the United
States." In support of the same point it notes the "absence of
an undersecretariat for Latin American affairs after more than
70 years of pan-Americanism."
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PERU Available Peruvian reaction is largely critical. Accord-
ing to REUTERS, the Peruvian ambassador to Mexico
responded in an interview to the warning that nations hostile.
to the United States may be'deprived of U.S. aid. "What does
Mr. Nixon consider hostile acts, and to what aid does he make.
references?" he asked; "is he by chance making reference to the
myth of foreign aid through the so-called investments by-the
U.S. firms" which "remit to the United States triple the amount
of their investment in dividends and interest?" In.the same-
context, Housing Minister Luis Vargas Caballero stated: "A
free and sovereign country like Peru should neither fear nor
accept threats from anyone--large or small."
An editorial in the official government newspaper EXPRESO calls
the President's Latin American policy statements "infamous threats"
and "the policy of the big stick." The paper says that "the
vagueness of the terms used to determine the possible cause for
the suspension of aid will allow the United States to continue to
feel authorized to suspend aid in the event of any conflict which
may come up between the imperialist companies and the countries
in which they operate."
An editorial in LA CRONICA calls the President's remarks on
suspension of aid "inaccurate and evil-minded." Denying that the
Peruvian Government has engaged in "a witch-hunt policy against
foreign companies," the editorial asserts that on the contrary,
"it has always encouraged their establishment and dynamic growth.
within the framework of respect of the laws so long as they
benefit the community." As for the fishing dispute, the
editorial asks: "Is it 'harassment' when a free and sovereign
country enforces its laws to punish owners of pirate, vessels
trying to fish indiscriminately in its territorial waters?."
In a more' conciliatory vein, the conservative newspaper
EL COMERCIO editorializes: "President Nixon's proposals-
on-preferential tariffs and aid to foreign countries which respects
their national dignity are correct." The paper finds the threat
to suspend aid to hostile countries "contradictory and.
unfortunate," but it points out that North and South America have
a common destiny in many areas and that "there is not, nor.
can there be in Latin America a condition wherein hostility
against the United States is implicitly presumed."
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BRAZIL Limited radio reaction reports without comment the
President's remarks on the possible repercussions. that
Chile's recognition of Cuba may have on the inter-American system.
Brazilian radios have also prominently featured reportage on the
statements on a worldwide agreement on air piracy and the forecast
of intensified cooperation to prevent kidnaping of diplomats.
The Rio de Janeiro paper 0 GLOBO welcomes the report as a sign of
a new realism in U.S. policy toward Latin America--brought'about,
the paper says, largely by President Allende's election in Chile,
In the short term, the paper warns, "the long period of omission
will give the Castro-Allende team solid advantages, and the
realism proclaimed yesterday will suffer the consequences of the
day-before-yesterday's lack of realism."
OTHER COUNTRIES Monitored radios in other Latin American
countries have reported fairly fully on the
message, but little comment is available. Buenos Aires'
independent newspaper CLARIN, in the only monitored. Argentine
comment, welcomes the fact that the President's report "rules
out the danger of the mistakes to which the past messianism led."
But the paper regrets that "U.S. Government policy toward Latin
American development persists in a mistaken focus, because if-
there were any clear ideas on the matter many of the conflicts
would disappear immediately."
A columnist in the Panama City paper EL PANAMA AMERICA observes
that the U.S. Government is decreasing its military expenditures..
at the cost of very serious domestic labor problems. "Evidently
the communists do not believe in the veracity of these cuts or
are blinded by their own warlike fury," he declares, and thus "it-
is logical that under these conditions President Nixon should.
convey to-his people and to world opinion his concern over the
possibility of new clashes."_
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- 21
II,. COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
THE USSR
On the day the President's report was released, Moscow issued its
first, belated protest against the Laos operation announced two
and a half weeks earlier by South Vietnamese President Thieu. Wide
publicity for the Soviet Government statement and meager propaganda
reaction to the President's report reinforce the possibility that..
the release of the statement may have been timed in part to offset
the impact of the report. Soviet reaction to the report has been
confined largely to news items and routine, low-level comment, the
most authoritative being an "international review" article by
Bragin in the 28 February PRAVDA which asks rhetorically how it
is possible to speak of a new course aimed at peace when the United
States has embarked on new steps toward widening the "aggression"
in Indochina. By contrast, last year's report on U.S. foreign
policy occasioned an article in IZVESTIYA by the paper's authorita-
tive commentator Matveyev two days after its release.
The initial TABS account of the President's report on the 25th,
carried the next day in the central press, said Mr. Nixon
"pretentiously announced" that it was the intention of the United
States to play a new role for peace in the world and to search
for new ways leading to peace. But, TASS continued, "the Republican
Administration has no intention of introducing any corrections in
its foreign policy course, which will continue to be founded on the
'Nixon Doctrine.'" This conclusion was echoed on the 28th by a
panelist in the domestic service commentators' roundtable show, who
contrasted the President's words with U.S. actions in Indochina and
asserted that the message "is not directed toward a search for
peace, toward the goal of peace in Indochina" or elsewhere.
A TASS dispatch-on the 26th said the New York TIMES has observed
that the document "contains no new ideas or proposals." TASS cited
the Washington POST for the observation that the message is
"formulated in the propagandistic spirit [which] more resembles a
platform for the forthcoming contention for the Presidency in 1972
than a government document on U.S. policy in the 1970's." And a
domestic service report on the 26th said the message was received
"with no special enthusiasm by the American public." While it was
"saturated with wordsabout peace and the so-called peace-loving
aspirations" of the Administration, the broadcast asserted, it has
to all appearances not misled the public.
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The Indochina and Middle East portions of the foreign policy report
predictably are given the most attention in available Soviet
propaganda, while other key issues -- notably U.S.-Soviet relations
and U.S. policy in Europe -- are treated largely in. passing.
INDOCHINA Featuring numerous reports and roundups to portray
worldwide: favorable reaction to the 25 February Soviet
Government statement, Moscow depicts the President's report as
arousing widespread criticism. A Washington-datelined dispatch
in PRAVDA on the 27th emphasizes domestic criticism, focusing on
adverse congressional reaction to the President's comments on
Indochina and observing that the report has given new impetus
to the antiwar movement in the United States. Beyond reaction
reports of this kind, Soviet comment on the Indochina portion of
the report has been scattered and.minimal.
A brief Radio Moscow account of the President's report on the
25th said it indicates that "the Republican Administration
apparently does not intend to make any amendments to its foreign-
political course, which, as before, is based on the Nixon .
doctrine." The radio added that "the American; President continues.
to insist on his 'right' to organize armed intrusions into such
neutral countries as Cambodia and Laos."
A panelist in Radio Moscow's weekly domestic service roundtable
program on the 28th made the point that it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between-the President's report "and what the United
States is doing in Indochina." He added that "despite all the
dodges, the President does not promise total withdrawal of
American troops from South Vietnam and Indochina; he once again
puts forward his old theories, his old positions . . . on mutual
withdrawal of troops."
MIDDLE EAST Moscow's response to the Middle East portion of
the President's report has thus far been generally
confined to carping remarks by commentators that the report reveals
no change in Washington's pro-Israeli policy. The Soviet Govern-
ment statement on the Middle East, issued two days after the
President's report, does not explicitly refer to the message.
A commentary in Arabic on the 28th does link a charge in the
government statement with the President's report; quoting the
statement's assertion that the United States recognizes Arab
rights in words but supports Israel in deeds, the commentary says
that "this was once more confirmed by Nixon's message to Congress."
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-- 23 -
In the 28 February, domestic service commentators' roundtable,
panelists complained of the President's omissions, remarking that
he made only passing reference to the Jarring mission--although it
is the "most important means of reaching a peaceful settlement"--
and paid scant attention to the UN decisions. One panelist went
on to say that the President in effect "appears as an advocate of
Israel," placing the entire burden of reaching a settlement on
direct talks "between the aggressor and the victims of aggression"--
the "persistent leitmotif" of Israel's policy.
An Arabic-language commentary on 26 February, giving virtually no
indication of the content of the report, asserted that every line
indicated that U.S. policy in the Middle East remains unchanged.
Singling out the President's "reference to the preservation of
military balance in the Middle East," the commentary said this
meant increased supply of weapons and loans to Israel, and could
only be interpreted as demonstrating that Tel Aviv will remain
the "tool of U.S. imperialism." It asked rhetorically how, in
the light of the President's message, one could assess U.S. state-
ments that Washington is putting pressure on Israel to reach a
solution, and it concluded that America's "pro-Israel and openly
anti-Arab course" is set out in the President's report.
U.S.-SOVIET The 25 February TASS report on the message
"reeks strongly of the cold war spirit."
acknowledged that it "gives certain space" to
relations between Washington and Moscow. TASS
said that the President, in "admitting the necessity of negotiations
on questions dividing" the two countries, repeated the remarks he
had made in the UN General Assembly last October. Unfortunately,
TASS observed, these remarks "have so far not found any confirmation
in concrete deeds." TASS went on to ask rhetorically how one can
reconcile the President's remarks about a new approach to relations
with the USSR and the socialist countries with Washington's
intention, "proclaimed in the present message, to continue subversive
activities against the socialist countries."
On the 26th, a Kozyakov commentary broadcast to North America com-
plained about State Department spokesman McCloskey's remarks on the
U.S. stand regarding the position of Jews in the Soviet Union. His
statement of the 24th "shed a different light" on the President's-
remarks about U.S.-Soviet relations, Kozyakov said: While the
foreign policy report says the United States would like a new
approach to relations with the USSR and seeks to improve them,
McCloskey's statement proves that "the Republican Administration's
policy remains unchanged.'' This approach, the commentator added,
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-- 24 -
None of the available Soviet comment to date has mentioned the
President's remarks on strategic balance or the strategic arms
limitation talks (SALT) scheduled to open in Vienna on 15 March.
Without reference to the report, however, a broadcast to North
America on 27 February, routinely charging the United States
with stepping up the arms race, said that Secretaries Laird and
Rogers and President Nixon have professed the Administration's
intentitn "to gain military superiority at any cost."
EUROPE AND NATO The TASS account of the report as well as a
briefer domestic service summary noted that
the President emphasized the need to build up NATO's strength.
The TASS account additionally mentioned the President's observa-
tion that the Administration has been under pressure to withdraw
U.S. troops from Europe, but that despite this the United States
will retain and strengthen its forces there.
The TASS account further touched on the proposal for a European
security conference--a proposal which it says has been supported
by broad European public circles. According to TASS, the Presi-
dent maintained that the United States is prepared to conduct
negotiations with the East at any forum, but that he "in essence
contradicted his own statement" in suggesting that a conference
will be of little use "as long as its agenda is restricted, in
Nixon's opinion, by very general themes." A l March TASS dis-
patch, pointing up the alleged wide support for a conference,
observes that the President in his message "tried to dampen
interest" in the proposal.
RELATIONS, While. the TASS account ignored the passages on
WITH CHINA U.S.-Chinese relations, a 2 March commentary in
Mandarin over the purportedly unofficial Radio
Peace and Progress touches on this issue for Chinese listeners.
According to the broadcast, the tone of these passages was "so
friendly and harmonious that one couldn't help but recognize
that it was a signal inviting China to collude with the United
States, although the U.S. President would be against the use of
the term 'collusion.' The commentary asserts that the President,
in "raving that he wants to improve relations with Peking, had
not a single word to say" on the key question of Taiwan. Suggest-
ing that there' "is something significant about this," the commentary
concludes that the "imperialists hope that Peking will forsake its
stand on Taiwan and other questions."
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4 MARCH 1971
-25-
:
noting that in
A Radio Moscow broadcast to China on the 26th,
the foreign policy report "Nixon emphasized that we are prepared
" adds: "The United States
to hold bilateral talks with Peking,
is trying to make use of the nia,xnitliSo'ivietrna ure oft htheirnese
leadership's policy, play on the of splitting
n olicy, and reap big profits from their policy
foreig w p and national liberation movement."
the world revolutionary both
AFRICA AND As in their treatRadio Peacetanyear's d Frogressmessage have
LATIN AMERICA Radio Moscow and
tailored some material for audiences
commentary and s Latin America. A 26 February Radio Peace and Progress m ommen will
Africa, for example, says thsage
broadcast in .English to criticism in Africa" since it-is
"undoubtedly come in for sharp It goes on routinely to assail
"demagogy from beginning.to end." including the
U.S, economic and military policies in Africa,
alleged supplying of weapons to Portuguese "colonialists" for use
against guerrilla forces.
for Brazilian audiences, also broadcast
A Radio? Moscow commentary dealing with Latin
on the-26th, says the portion of the message h
wish
America gives the impression that the United States "in
to acknowledge the important transformations taking place
America.".
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EAST EUROPE
Diversified reactions from Moscow's East European allies are
harshest from East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. The
comment from Czechoslovakia, by far the most voluminous, accords
with the increasingly conservative tenor of Prague propaganda
in its rigidly stereotyped emphasis on the theme that the
President's report offered "no change" in U.S. foreign policy.
By contrast, the reaction from Poland in the third month of
the Gierek regime has been noticeably restrained, with
critical comment balanced by a discernment of some redeeming
features. Budapest's comment is meager and moderate,
accompanying largely reportorial coverage. Bucharest's,
notable for its appearance in an authoritative commentary
in the party daily SCINTEIA, is also notable for a more
than usually critical cast, though with qualifying
expressions of a desire for bilateral cooperation to
continue despite U.S.-Romanian differences.
Commentaries from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary all
bring up the Soviet Government statement issued the same day
as the President's report, a Warsaw radio talk on the 25th
remarking that it was "probably no accident" that "only an
hour separated the publication" of the two documents. An
article in the 28 February issue of the Budapest MAGYAR
NEMZET, the most sharply critical of the Hungarian commentaries,
asks if "the Moscow message is correctly interpreted in
Washington." And the Bratislava PRAVDA, in an article
reported by the Prague CTK on 27 February, contrasts the
President's'report with the "serious" Soviet statement
and comments that the U.S. document shows that "nothing
is changing in the most burning problem of American policy,
Indochina," despite the "many flexible words."
CZECHOSLOVAKIA Most of the voluminous commentaries in
Czechoslovak-media play the "no change"
theme in their opening sallies and, unlike the Polish and
Hungarian comment, find little of a redeeming nature in
the President's report. There is predictable, pro forma
censure of U.S. policy in Indochina and a considerable
focus on Europe and NATO.
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- 27 -
A talk entitled "Nixon. and Europe," broadcast in the domestic
service on-2 March, stresses a picture of NATO disunity and
observes that the President "tries to unite the endeavors of
the capitalist world for projects without any conflicts, such
as the struggle against the contamination of the atmosphere and
others." This is the only monitored East European reference to
the proposals on cooperation against air pollution. Playing the
"no change" theme, the commentary concludes that in fact "some
passages. are harsher" than those in last year's report,
"particularly with regard to the socialist countries."
The Czechoslovak comment widely cites the President's statement
that while a war in Europe is not considered imminent, "we must
take into account the possibility that'it might happen." The
2 March TV commentary sees in the call for a more autonomous
Europe an attempt to create a "buffer zone" militarily dependent
on the United States. In this connection the commentary scores
the report's stress on maintenance of "sufficient" military
force in Europe. The initial account of the report carried
in the party daily RUDE PRAVO, a CTK dispatch published on
the 26th, had been more objective in noting that the President
"suggested" negotiations on reduction of the strength of units
in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Fact "through a method
similar to the approach used"-for SALT--first fundamental
questions, then concrete proposals.
The same dispatch, in the only reference to Peking noted in,
the Czechoslovak comment, injected critical comment on "the
two-faced attitude toward the PRC" spelled out in the document.
The United States, it said, "wants to improve its relationship
with the PRC but will not allow it to take its place in the
United Nations."
POLAND Warsaw's reaction has taken the form of a restrained
dialog, featuring critical observations couched in
far less categorical terms than those of the Czechoslovak
comment. The initial Polish reaction, a talk by commentator
Kalabinski broadcast domestically on the 25th, took note of
the document's "calm" and "rather reporter-like tone." It
criticized Vietnamization as amounting to "the well-known.
thesis" of letting Asians fight Asians, but only after
reviewing at some length the President's own concept of the
Nixon Doctrine. Stating that the report gives "relatively
little space" to Indochina, Kalabinski disputed the thesis
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-- 28 -
that the Middle East is "the most dangerous" problem: The
President, the commentator said, "wanted to belittle the
significance of the Indochina conflict not only in the eyes
of his citizens but also in the eyes of the world, above all
the USSR, but the facts we learn daily from Indochina will not
let us forget the dangers threatened by that conflict."
An editorial in the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on the 28th,
entitled "'New Style' of Nixon's Doctrine," concedes that
the Nixon Doctrine, as presented in the President's report,
means "a modification of the style of U.S. involvement in
world affairs" and credits the report with taking "new
realities" into account. But it adds that "the whole doctrine
is nevertheless subordinated to the idea of maintaining
American leadership, waging policy from a position of
strength or, as in the case of Indochina, a policy of war."
The article contends that "in'this context, the Nixon
Doctrine is neither new nor does it modify the essence
of American foreign 'policy."
Citing remarks by Senator JavitsSand Washington press comment
to the effect that the message represents no change in policy,
TRYBUNA LUDU comments that "in this light the President's
more realistic attitude toward the question of solving the
Middle East conflict raises doubt whether it was not
dictated by tactical considerations and whether his words
will be followed by diplomatic practice." An editorial in
the 27-28 February issue of the Catholic daily SLOWO POWSZECHNE
comments more favorably that "Nixon's remarks on the Near
East contain the most specific new elements," which "may
strengthen the prospects of the Jarring mission and a peaceful
settlement."
With respect to Europe, the government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY
on 2 March interprets the President's remarks on the need
to reach agreement in NATO as an admission of disagreement,
commenting that this is "the first confirmation by the
American side that the postwar period has come to an end on
the European continent." The article, by editorial staff
member Ryszard Wojna, highlights the 12 August 1970 Soviet-
West German treaty as exemplifying U.S. inability to stem
the process of detente and the preparation of a European
security conference.
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- 29 -
A brief comment on the President's treatment of China appears in
the Catholic SLOWO POWSZECHNE editorial--a bitter passing remark
to the effect that in contrast to his tough stance toward the
USSR, the President "was much warmer toward China."
HUNGARY Budapest has treated the document chiefly in
reportorial coverage, with MTI transmitting a.
lengthy. account on 25 February that was largely devoid.of
any editorial interjection. MTI's Washington correspondent
Tibor Koeves observed that. the subject of Soviet-U.S.
relations, "examined from the point of view of a balance of
power, runs through the whole study like a guideline." He
mentioned in passing that on the score of Soviet-Chinese
differences, "the President reiterates the view that 'these--
developments open up new problems and new perspectives.'"
Another report, by Washington correspondent Peter Vajda
published in the party daily NEPSZABADSAG on the 26th,
includes generally restrained observations to the effect
that the message,contains "misgivings about detente," a
desire to "set the pace of relaxation in Europe and to
prevent some countries from getting out of line," and a
China policy "waiting for Peking to take the next step."
It adds that while the message discerns "a possibility of,
further progress" in SALT, "it advocates further expansion
of the Safeguard antimissile system, which will open a new
chapter in the arms race."
The most polemical of the relatively few Budapest commentaries
is an article' entitled "A False Image of the World" in the
Patriotic People's Front daily MAGYAR NEMZET of 28 February.
The author says that in using the phrase "Building Peace,"
the President "could hardly have chosen a more astonishing
and ill-timed title right after the unprecedentedly hazardous
expansion of the war in Southeast Asia with the invasion of
Laos." The article adds that "successive defeats of elite
Saigon troops" induced the President "to inform Congress only
by a single vague reference to the 'Laos detour,"' and it asks
rhetorically: "Who will believe the intention of improving
relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC when plans of
deployment are being prepared against the socialist DRV?"
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EAST GERMANY East Berlin media outdo their Soviet allies-in
denouncing the presidential report and play up
what they term the President's warning to "his own allies" in
Europe "against a policy of detente." An article in the-party.
organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 26th charges that the President
painted a gloomy picture of the international situation to.
justify in particular his "policy of aggression" in Indochina
and'fneasures for the further expansion of NATO." Another
article in the same paper on the 27th comments: "Nixon warns
his.own allies in Western Europe against a policy of detente.
He does not stop short of extortion and threats, . . . obviously
out of fear of progress on the road to European security."
While ignoring the President's Juxtaposition of a Big Four Berlin
accord on the one hand and the calling of a European security
conference and Bonn ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw
treaties on the other, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND says "Nixon demands
that this whole question" of European security "be subjected
to the dictatorghip of NATO." The SED organ concludes that "the
message, which is marked by a sharp anticommunist and
particularly anti-Soviet tenor, is a rebuff to the policy
of the USSR, of the.entire socialist community of states--a
policy aimed at settling conflicts politically, and at
disarmament. What Nixon presented is an adventurist,.
dangerous version of the world which mocks all realism,"
BULGARIA Sofia's comment, predictably, is uniformly
negative. An article in the party organ
RABOTNICHESKO DELO on 27 February says it is evident from all
the solutions prescribed by the President for dealing with
current acute problems that the United States is striving to
establish "supremacy in the world and to dictate its will
everywhere." The paper finds similarities between U.S. .
policies in Indochina and the Middle East, asserting that
the President wants solutions in both areas leading to "thee
consolidation of his puppet regimes" so as to make them
"future mainstays of U.S. domination" in the two regions.
In other comment on the 27th,- OTECHESTVEN FRONT charges that
the President continues to rely on the position-of-strength
policy and says this is just as disastrous for the United
States as for the world political situation. NARODNA MLADEZH
emphasizes that the President is now trying to play variations
on the theme of some abstract "red threat," a theme that "is
obsolescent and doomed to failure." TRUD comments that while
Mr. Nixon has seldom.used the word "peace" with such frequency,
"the explosions of American bombs and shells in Laos are not
at all a suitable accompaniment for his melodramatic tirades."
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4 MARCH 1971
A Radio Sofia commentary on the 25th and a Washington-datelined
dispatch in ZDELaSCO ZNAME on the 26th both lament that "nothing
concrete" is said about European security in the President's
report.
ROMANIA The Bucharest Radio was silent on the President's
report until the 27th, when it broadcast a lengthy
review notable for emphasis on "contradictions" between the
President's words about cooperation with other nations and a
"tendency of domination in international life." The official
party daily SCINTEIA on the 28th carried an expanded version
of the radio report on the 27th, as well as accounts of negative
reactions from U.S. media and public officials and from the DRV's
Paris delegation.
An authoritative Romanian assessment appears in a SCINTEIA
article on 3 March signed jointly by the paper's leading
foreign policy commentators Caplescu and Fintinaru. While
sharply critical of the President's stand on a European
security conference--of which Romania is a foremost advocate--
and on NATO, the article makes it clear that Romania does not
want differences between the United States and Romania to
adversely affect bilateral relations. Observing that one
might have expected a "positive response" from the President
on speeding up the convening of an all-European security
conference, the article, according to AGERPRES, adds:
"Instead, positions of reserve and tendencies toward
procrastination are being expressed by advance conditions"
and by demands for a preconceived solution of "some
complex" problems of political life of the continent.
The article also expresses opposition to the President's
position "on reinforcing American forces in Europe" and
"strengthening the NATO bloc." But it goes on to point
to the "Positive" results of the exchange. of visits by
President Nixon and President Ceausescu and to express
the wish that "profound differences of views" between the
two nations "should not impede the ascending evolution"
of economic, political, and other relations. It also
calls upon the United States "to eliminate restrictions
and discriminations" in relations with Romania and grant
it "most-favored-nation" treatment.
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4 MARCH 1971
YUGOSLAVIA Taking note of the announcement in the President's
report that President Tito has accepted an
invitation to pay a return visit to the United States,
Yugoslav media balance their reaction to the Presidential
document with restrained criticism and mild praise. An
article in the Be gisedaily BORBA on the 27th says: "As. a
whole, the message does not offer any great hopes for the
seventies; it does not answer the basic dilemmas and problems
of the present-day world, but it also does not exclude the
participation of the United States in their solution." The
paper adds that it sets forth "a program which also takes
certain realities of the present-day world into consideration
and which, accepting the changes in world relations, does not
exclude a change in American policy."
The other major Belgrade daily, POLITIKA, also on the 27th,
assails U.S. policy in Indochina but comments that in the
Near East President Nixon's?"judgment is considerably more
realistic and flexible and shows the apparent two-sided
aspiration of the United States to come closer to the Arab
world and to prevent the eruption of a local war which could
act as a detonator of a conflict between the nuclear giants."
Commenting on the President's remarks on the need to promote
good relations with Yugoslavia and Romania, POLITIKA says
this "undeniably deserves to be characterized as a
constructive gesture of coexistence." The Yugoslav news
agency, TANJUG, in reporting the President's message earlier.
on the 27th, singled out for quotation Mr. Nixon's statement
of his intention to ask Congress for guarantees for American
private investments in Yugoslavia and Romania.
ALBANIA Tirana's characteristically hostile reaction
is registered on 1 March in a lengthy article
in the party organ ZERI I POPULLIT which dismissed the
President's report as an attempt to "legalize and instigate
the policy of aggressions and imperialist wars." The paper
says the document represents the first effort to give a
global character to Vietnamization, a strategy "being
drowned in the endless ocean of the revolutionary people's
wax."
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~-33 -
Playing the familiar Albanian theme of U.S.-Soviet collusion,
ZERI I POPULLIT stresses that "Nixon did not hide his
satisfaction with the extent of the development of U.S.-
Soviet relations in the most diverse fields--limitation of
nuclear armaments, spheres of influence in Europe, etc."
Noting that the President spoke of the prospects for
increased U.S. investments in Eastern Europe, it adds that
"Nixon, seeking to calm his partners, the Soviet revisionists,
acknowledged the main interests of their security in Eastern
Europe."
Turning to the President's Asian policy, ZERI I POPULLIT
decries the "dangerous and open acts of war not only
against the DRV and Laos but also against the PRC, which
is their closest neighbor and the one most concerned with-
their security and national independence." The available
ATA report of the ZERI I POPULLIT article makes no?mention
of the President's remarks on China, but a short critical
report on the message carried by the Albanian news agency
on the 27th noted that "Nixon again made an effort to
justify his 'two Chinas' policy."
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- 3i -
NORTH VIETNAM AND THE PRG
The first monitored reaction to the President's report from
Vietnamese communist media was a Liberation Radio commentary
broadcast at 2300 GMT on the 25th. Hanoi media's initial
reaction came in a radio commentary at 0330 GMT on the 26th.
Two hours later, Hanoi's news agency VNA carried the statement
by the DRV spokesman in Paris which had been issued there the
day before. The PRG Paris spokesman's statement was issued on
the 26th and carried by Front media the following day. High-
level Hanoi reaction came on 2 March in the form of a DRV
Foreign Ministry statement--a vehicle that has been used to
comment on important Presidential pronouncements on Indochina,
since President Nixon's 3 November 1969 speech on Vietnamization
policy. Somewhat surprisingly, to date there has been no
official PRG statement on the report; Front statements-frequently
follow DRV statements on Administration policy by a day or two.
. The propaganda does not rebut--or even acknowledge--specific
points in the ?resident's report, instead falling back on
personal vituperation of the President and broad attacks on the
Nixon Doctrine as a device to pursue "neocolonialism." A
notably prominent theme throughout the comment is the-claim that
the President again "threatened" the DRV and that the United
States is planning "new military adventures" against it--a line
that has been conspicuous in both routine and elite propaganda
since rumors of the allied operation in Laos began-circulating
at the end of January. This line is given new, high-level
prominence in the DRV'Foreign Ministry statement of 3 March
which protests "increasingly serious acts of war" against North
Vietnam since'the massive air strikes last November.
HANOI The statement issued by the DRV spokesman in Paris on
the 25th claimed that the President tried "to make
black white," and as documentation it singled out three "lies"
by the President--"pretending" he wants a peaceful settlement,
claiming that the DRV had expanded the war to all of Indochina,
and insisting he wants negotiations while failing to respond
to the PRG initiatives at the Paris conference and in fact
"nurturing illusions of military victory."
The reaction for the most part glosses over the substance of the
President's remarks'on Indochina, instead taking.the occasion
to repeat the usual attack on the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization
as tools to pursue neocolonialism. A VNA commentary on the 26th:.
said that "Nixon's lengthy report did not offer any novelty; he
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4 MARCH 1971
- 35
tried by inflated rhetoric to cover up his extremely reactionary
bellicose colonialist policy." And the initial Hanoi radio
commentary said that "Nixon brazenly emphasized that the Indochina
problem is a manifestation, a concrete example of his doctrine,"
adding that "while Nixon boastfully reiterated his theme that
Vietnamization is a path which may lead to peace," it is in fact
a plan of "having puppets die in place of Americans."
The 2 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement says that in the part
of his report dealing with Indochina the President tried to prove
that Vietnamization was "correct and successful"; that he tried
to "Justify" U.S. expansion of the.war to Cambodia and Laos; and
that he "also uttered threats of war against the.DRV"--a.claim
also made in the routine comment.* The statement refers four
separate times to "new military adventures against the DRV."
The DRV statement says the President "actually.just repeated the
old arguments that have been frequently reiterated since he came
to power--arguments that have been completely-refuted by reality."
It then argues routinely that the purpose of Vietnamization is not
to end the war or withdraw all U.S. troops and that the Nixon
Doctrine "is merely an extremely insidious and cruel policy
designed to use Indochinese to fight Indochinese in order to
promote the Americans' neocolonialist interests." It claims that
Vietnamization has "gradually"failed and is faced with the danger
of bankruptcy" and that it was in this "defeated situation" that
troops were sent to invade Cambodia and Laos. It asserts that
"obviously the Americans do not want to end the war through
negotiations" as the President has stated but are prolonging
and expanding the war.
The statement gives some prominence to domestic and world
opposition to the Nixon policy. Declaring that. partial. troop.
withdrawal and "deceitful peace tricks" have not covered-up-the
"warlike, aggressive nature" of the Nixon Administration, it
says "this is why the Americans and world peoples, including
* This is apparently an allusion to the President's statement
that in-the process of withdrawing U.S. troops.under the Vietnami-
zation policy if North Vietnam took or tried to take advantage
of redeployments by building up its strength in the South and
launching new attacks, "I have made clear on a dozen occasions-.
that I would take strong and effective measures to prevent the
enemy from jeopardizing our remaining forces."
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- 36 -
some American politicians, have vehemently protested against'.'
the Vietnamization policy. It adds that "the world's peoples,
including the American people, demand" that an end be put to
the aggression. The statement also observes that the President
again "tried to plead" for his policy, "faced with the American
people's crisis of confidence in the U.S. Administration and
the profound indignation of world public opinion."
The first Hanoi press comment came in a NHAN DAN Commentator
article on 3 March, the same day the papers published the
foreign ministry statement. Neither VNA nor Hanoi radio
carried the text of the article, but VNA prefaced its excerpts
with the statement that the paper's commentary on the President's
report said:
The U.S. aggression in Vietnam and Indochina as a.whole..
is a series of miscalculations, a process of escalation
of war and lies on the one hand and of a headlong slide-
into the pitfall of defeats on the other. Such is the
tragedy of the U.S. aggressors in this peninsula ablaze
with revolutionary war, and the "Nixon Doctrine" is but
one act of,it. `
As reviewed by VNA, the Commentator article says.the United
States has resorted to the "most savage war acts"--raining on
Vietnam and Indochina more bombs than the United States used
in World War II. It adds that "no violence can shake the
Vietnamese people. The U.S..war has only resulted in the
aggressors' bogging down in South Vietnam and in Cambodia and
Laos as well." The article declares categorically that in -
Indochina the whole world has witnessed the failure of..all U.S.
strategies and tactics, all modern weapons, and the most
seasoned armed forces--a failure which "has to some extent
helped upset global strategy and proved that the strength of
U.S. imperialism is limited, although its ambition is boundless."
THE FRONT Comment from Front media follows the general
outline of Hanoi's, with particular criticism of
the President's support for the Thieu-Ky regime. Thus, the
statement by the PRG spokesman in Paris, carried by LIBERATION
PRESS AGENCY (LPA) on 27 February, takes issue. with the
President's declaration that the United States would not "let
down its friends," the Saigon administration. The statement-
also scores the President for "flagrantly and cynically
misconstruing" the present situation in Indochina and at the
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- 37 -
Paris conference, saying he "shamelessly alleged that Hanoi does
.not want to seriously negotiate, that Hanoi 'has made this war
an Indochina conflict."'
A Liberation Radio commentary on the 25th says the President
"repeated his threats toward the peoples in the Indochinese
countries," but adds that "he can intimidate no one." An LPA
commentary on the 27th says that the "gist" of the President's
report is his emphasis on an intention to "broaden the conflict
and increase American aid and air support to the Saigon and
other aggressor forces in Indochina."
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THE PRC AND NoRm KOREA
PEKING Peking media have yet to devote a commentary to the
President's report, reacting to it chiefly through
the proxy of hostile North Korean and Albanian comment. The
first Chinese reactions were passing mentions: A 25-February
NCNA attack on the British decision to sell aircraft to South
Africa castigated the report for opposing "the attempt to
isolate South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese
colonialists"; and a 28 February NCNA report claiming U.S.
defeats in Laos made an apparent allusion to the report in
stating that "Nixon recently moaned that the United States . . .
would have 'more hard choices ahead' in Indochina." A
specific reference to the report appears in a 2 March
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which charges the
United States with trying to "provoke a new war with
the DPRK." Saying that the President referred "to
'progress' in the implementation of the 'Nixon Doctrine'
in Korea" in his report, the article concludes that this
exposes the doctrine as "neocolonialism."
On 3 March NCNA carried reports from the DPRK and Albanian
press as well as the DRV Foreign Ministry statement
denouncing the President's report. Peking's summary of
the DRV statement notes that it says "the United States
does not seek 'to end the war through negotiations' as
Nixon has claimed" and that "war Vietnamization" is
"bound to end in a complete fiasco." The statement,
NCNA points out, emphasized the unity and "iron will"
of the three Indochinese peoples in opposition to U.S.
goals. NCNA sums up the Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN's view
of the report as "a codification of the highly arrogant
U.S. imperialist foreign policy line of aggression" and
"a new heinous challenge and naked threat and blackmail
to the progressive peoples of the whole world." And it
quotes passages from the Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT which
ridicule the President's remarks on Indochina. NCNA
also notes the Tirana paper's remark that the Arab-Israeli
conflict "is fraught with considerable danger to the two
superpowers."
There is no acknowledgment in Peking media of the President's
statement of policy toward the. PRC. The NCNA account of
Pyongyang's reaction does, however, reproduce NODONG SINMUN's
attack on the President's "pledge to permanently 'guarantee'
the status of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in the United
Nations."
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4 MARCH 1971
PYONGYANG The North Koreans reacted promptly with a NCNA
commentary on 26 February and a Commentator
article in the party organ NODONG SINMUN the following day.
Both play customary themes accusing the United States of
aggressive intentions through application of the Nixon
Doctrine. In typically intemperate language, NODONG SINMUN
describes the report as "full of unbounded aggressive
ambition of the U.S. imperialists for world domination"
and as revealing "in all nakedness the heinous nature,
brutality, shamelessness, craftiness, and ferociousness
of U.S. imperialism, the aggressor." -.
Both commentaries denounce the report's effort to "Justify"
the expansion of U.S. "aggression" in Indochina by placing
the blame on the DRV. NODONG SINMUN denounces Vietnamization
and the "invasion" of Cambodia and Laos as the greatest
"crimes" committed under the cloak of the Nixon Doctrine.
U.S. designs for further "aggression," it says, are exposed
by references in the report to a need for continued "high
levels of American assistance and air operations" to
guarantee the safety of American troops and facilitate
their withdrawal. KCNA claims that the report says troops
"will not be withdrawn from South Vietnam if a single U' U.S.
prisoner is detained in North Vietnam," thus proving that
Vietnamization is merely an "artifice" and that the United
States has no intention of pulling out of Vietnam.
Both commentaries criticize the report for urging the
"Japanese militarists" to "discharge their responsibilities."
in Asia, thereby encouraging Japanese expansionist ambitions
and using Japan as a "striking force" for U.S. aggression in
Asia. The commentaries routinely charge that the report
reveals President Nixon's "sinister design to speed up war
preparations against the DPRK," KCNA referring in this
context to plans to give more military aid to South Korea
and speed up modernization of the ROK Army "under cover of"
the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea. NODONG SINMUN
also charges that a U.S. ambition to dominate Asian countries
is expressed in the report's pledge "to permanently 'guarantee'
the status of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in the United Nations."
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CUBA
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4 MARCH 1971
With emphasis on the Western Hemisphere portion of the President's
report, Havana comment plays up alleged internal contradictions in
the document, points to "contradictions between Nixon's promises and
the true facts," and snipes at the very fact that a U.S. President
has issued a report on "the state of the world." One commentator,
on Havana television on 2 March, characterized the document as "180
pages of obscure language" and "the longest message ever"; several
commentaries said there was "nothing new"in the portion dealing with
Latin America; and one called the report full of "cheap demogagy
and ridiculous contradictions," a "repitition of old deceptive words
which adorn a policy of imposition and force."
Citing the view of "several U.S. congressmen" that the President's
Latin American policy has been "a continuous failure interrupted
by occasional disasters," a radio commentary broadcast to the
Americas on 2 March contended that the "only concrete" developments
in U.S.-Latin American relations during the past two years have been
"increased deterioration, increased strangulation of the under-
developed countries of the region, new imperialist threats, and old
unfulfilled promises."
Cuban comment pays particular attention to the President's comments
on Chile and its relations with Cuba and the United States, ques-
tioning whether he is sincerely "prepared to respect all continental
governments regardless of their ideologies or is ready to admit only
those governments which are submissive to Washington.." Havana sees
a contradiction between his promise of respect for ideological
diversity and his "warning" that the United States "would dis-
continue aid to Latin American nations which show continued
hostility toward it."
On the issue of U.S.-Cuban relations, Havana media charge that in
"reasserting the old policy of hostility and isolation" with respect
to Cuba the President "persists in his aggressive policy against
Cuba." Commenting on his position that Cuba's attitude--its
encouragement and support of revolution and its military ties to
the Soviet Union--has kept it outside the inter-American,system,
a Havana radio commentary on 26 February rejoined that Cuba has
repeatedly. said "it is not interested in rejoining the so-called
inter-American system as represented by the OAS, from which it
was unlawfully excluded in 1961 .by U.S. pressure." The commentator
added that Cuba is willing to establish relations "on the basis of
equality"with all Latin American governments which "are willing to
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4 MARCH 1971
oppose U.S. blackmail." On the specific issue of Cuban-Soviet
military ties, the commentator recalled Castro's statement last year
that Cuba would not "commit the error of renouncing its military
ties with the Soviet Union but that, on the contrary, such ties
would be strengthened"--an apparent reference to the Cuban leader's
Lenin Day speech in April.
President Nixon's remarks on inter-American trade relations also
come under Cuban attack, with one commentary contending that he
"again committed himself to apply a series of measures which he
promised two years ago but has not fulfilled." Another Havana
radio commentary, beamed to the Americas on 2 March and dwelling
at length on this portion of the Western Hemisphere section,
charged that the President's references to liberalizing and
expanding trade and to abolishing tariffs and granting preferential
treatment to.Latin American imports were contradicted by his
actions of the past two years, during which "he has employed many
dilatory tricks to evade lifting" trade barriers and Latin American
trade with the United States has dropped significantly. "Nixon has
not only failed to offer solutions," the commentary continued, "but
has rejected those broached by the Latin American countries, cut
foreign aid projects, and issued new threats and pressures that
have hurt inter-American trade." Particularly singled out were the
"so-called Mills bill" and the "new sugar quota law that, under the
proposed amendments, would seriously hurt most of the Latin American
countries."
Minimal comment of a reportorial nature gratuitously criticizes the
portions of the message dealing with U.S. policies in the Middle
East and Indochina, pointing to alleged flagrant contradictions
between the President's words and U.S. policies in those areas.
Monitored Cuban comment has predictably failed to directly
acknowledge the President's enumeration of steps which the
United States has taken in the past two years to extend less
restricted assistance and to increase Latin America's role in
inter-American activities. It did take note of his recommendation
that Congress establish the office of Under Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs, "as if this new post would somehow
change the situation."
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