TALKING POINTS ON LAM SON 719

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 3, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
April 3, 1971
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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
 TALKING POINTS ON LAM SON 71 Q
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
The South Vietnamese entered Southern Laos in early February in
order to disrupt the operation of the Ho Chi Minh trail and the southward
flow of enemy supplies bouixd for Cambodia and South Vietnam. Hanoi's
If, for example, the North Vietnamese had chosen to evade South Vietnamese
forces, then there would have been relatively little fighting and. the operation
response to this operation is an important factor in assessing the outcome.
would have been assessed more in terms of supplies destroyed or bottled
-up. But for several good reasons, such as the importance 'of the area,
'the short supply lines to North Vietnam and the availability of reserve
forces in southern North Vietnam -- the North Vietnamese as anticipated
undertook a major counter attack. They reinforced the area strongly with
some of their best divisions, not only to defend the trail system but in an
attempt to inflict a major defeat on the South Vietnamese as well. As a
result, the most intensive fighting since 1968 developed.
Immediately Measurable Results
In terms. of immediately measurable results, the weight of evidence
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s that South Vietnamese forces acquitted themselves very well in the six
weeks of fighting which followed the initial incursion into Laos. Many of
the ARVN units involved fought without respite for 40 days and, in the
judgment of our field commanders, the ARVN forces fought extremely well.
Because of the intensity of the fighting, these units did take some heavy
 losses - now estimated at 1400 killed and 4700 wounded. But reported
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
enemy losses weWnore than 13, 000 killed and-xiy more were
were put out of combat. Some reports of enemy losses in Vietnam in
wounded., In terms of combat effectiveness, we estimate that the
equivalent of 13 enemy maneuver battalions were rendered ineffective
in the course of the fighting whereas only 4 out of the 22 ARVN battalions
the past may have been exaggerated, but this time the estimate may be low.,
The enemy acted more aggressively than he had in several years with
the result that he exposed himself to concentrated allied firepower and
air attack. -Thus, we believe the ratio of enemy to friendly losses
at least 5 to 1, a very high price for Hanoi to pay.
Impact on the North Vietnamese Logistics System
The North Vietnamese had to move more supplies South to Cambodia
e - nemy's logistical system, although some perspective can be provided.
was
It is too early to be precise about the impact of Lam Son 719 on the
and South Vietnam this year than last in order to make up for the loss
of three major means of supply: the Port of Sihanoukville; purchases
under Viet tong control in South Vietnam but which are now under
in Cambodia; and food obtained from areas which had previously been
the authority of the government. Moreover, he comments he had
suffered great losses in the Cambodian-sanctuaries last year.
Thus, the Ho Chi Minh Trail has become an even more vital element
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
 in No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8 re
reasonably certain that the enemy, supply movement was well behind
last year's pace even before the Lam Son operation began.
The Larn Son operation clearly compounded Hanoi's problem.
It disrupted the Ho Chi Minh trail complex, physically blocking various
branches of the trail. South Vietnamese forces found or destroyed,
or called in U. S. air power to destroy, some 4900 individual weapons,
1900 crew served weapons and thousands of tons of ammunition and other
supplies. This was in addition to the vast quantity of supplies, ammu-
nition and equipment which was consumed by the North Vietnamese in
Laos instead of continuing down the trail to be used in South Vietnam
or Cambodia. Moreover, when the North Vietnamese were obliged to
engage ARVN forces in a fixed battle position, their units massed and
.became targets for concentrated Vietnamese firepower and U. S. air
power which destroyed over 100 tanks and many artillery pieces, some
300 enemy trucks were destroyed directly in.the operation and 4300
more were destroyed by air interdiction while the operations were in
progress. Finally, because North Vietnamese logistics units were
engaged in the fighting and were badly damaged, their resiliency in
restoring the flow of supplies southward has been degraded. An estimated
3500 enemy rear service personnel vital to the operation of the trail
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18 : LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
..,u. these wsic.eraiions must De vzeweu cW-iuaL wi.a Tact that the Ho
Chi Minh trail:. complex is useful as a logistics system only during the
Forestalling Anticipated Enemy Offensive Activity in South Vietnam
lost to them in the Lam Son operation.
the rains come in the next four or five weeks,, the' Communists will have
little time in which to attempt to make up all the weeks that have been
dry season, which began later this year than usual. Therefore, when
A significant measure of Lam Son's achievements will be the
major attacks- agairist ARVN and U. S. forces located in the northern
Vietnam during the current dry season. If Lam Son had not-been under-
taken, the North Vietnamese would have had the real option of launching
these two efforts have precluded major enemy offensive operations in South
conjunction with ARVN operations conducted simultaneously in Cambodia,
degree it succeeds in forestalling enemy offensive activity. Viewed in
the short-fall in their supply efforts will prevent them' from mounting
provinces of South Vietnam. Looking to the future, we believe that
major offensives in South Vietnam in this dry season and will delay any
offensives they might have planned over the next dry season because it
will take them that much longer to rebuild their stocks.
Hanoi will, of course, want to mask the extent to which its
capabilities have been impaired and will therefore endeavor to act as
No Objection to . ~ .
Declassification in Full 2010/03/18 : LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
maybe .willing to spend additional manpower capital in the days im-
if it-is playing from strength. To.project this image, the Communists'-
mediately ahead by.trying to mount a sharp flurry .of attacks in the
attacks off the ground. Such attacks may be specifically directed against
northern part of South Vietnam, and elsewhere if they can get such
U. S. units in an endeavor to increase American casualties, whatever
the cost to Hanoi. Nonetheless, the Communists probably have lost
the ability to mount sustained major offensives and'the overall record
of Communist activity over the next few months can be expected to
The combined military operations also have had the effect of
fought against the First, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth North Vietnamese and
that the Toan Thang operation North of Route,7 inside Cambodia is being
engaging the enemy and keeping his forces distant from the population
of South Vietnam. To illustrate this graphically, it should be pointed out
Viet Cong Divisions, the same units which, at this time of the year in
metropolitan area. As for the enemy units engaged in Lam Son -- the North
1968, were operating inside the city limits of Saigon and the surrounding
Vietnamese 304th, 308th, 320th and 324-B Divisbns -- in February and March o:
and generally harassed the population in the coastal regions. All of these
1968, fought for two weeks in the city of Hue, entered the defenses of Danang,
Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18 : LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
enemy units wer+ gagea znis year away from,w..uat1on centers and,
in fact,, outside of South Vietnam its elf.
Lam Son's Bearing on Vietnamization
Lam Son has underlined the progress which has been made in
Vietnamiz.ation. Three years ago, ARVN units were engaged against
ARVN units.have shown themselves able to deal with the enemy threat in
enemy units in and close to South Vietnam's own population centers. Now
sanctuary areas without the support of U. S. ground combat forces or
advisors whileke- eping' their own territory pa.cffied as well. They have
demonstrated the ability to mount a complex multi-division operation
in conditions of difficult and unfamiliar terrain, adverse weather, and
against a well prepared enemy. Moreover, this is being achieved
with a U. S. presence which has diminished by some 260, 000 men since
February and March are the months of the year in which the Communists
traditionally mount the most extensive military operations in all regions
-?f South Vietnam. This year they'were given an additional incentive to
1.66this because of the fact that such action's--would hams s the rear areas
of A.RVN operations in Laos and Cambodia and would distract-attention
from Chase' two actions. Despite -exhortations' to their- cadre to undertake
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
To illustrate this point further, it should be recognized that
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
such action withixouth Vietnam,' they have beennnable to date to mount
anything "which can even be considered a major successful high point.
In fact, the situation within South Vietnam has. been extraordinarily calm
during. the entire month of February and March with the exception of an
action being taken by ARVN forces against Communist strongholds in the
U Miph forest of Military Region IV.
The ability of the,South Vietnamese forces to sustain security after
the departure of United States forces will, in the' long run, be-measured
by the balance of strength which exists between North and South Vietnamese
forces. Our assessment is that the balance in the Indochina peninsula has
swung in favor of the South Vietnamese. As Ambassador Bunker has
reported, the operation has created confidence among the South Vietnamese
in the ability of ARVN and pride in its accomplishments. There has been
satisfaction in the fact that the fighting has been taken outside the borders
of South Vietnam and that ARVN has been able to inflict far heavier casualties
We conclude, therefore, that the foundation for Vietnam.ization in
South Vietnam is sound and that the process has been enhanced by the
.disruptions Lam Son has caused the enemy and by the increased confidence
it has given the South Vietnamese in meeting their own defense needs.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
 1 ww
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8
...-The curreWpsychological' atmosphere isM some ways reminiscent
of the 1958 Tet offensive. Hanoi extracted maximum political advantage
in the'short run; it was only as time passed that the real physical results
began to tell. This time, we must benefit from that lesson and not let
ourselves be misled by surface appearances or by exaggerated stories.
The operation has achieved its primary objective of carrying the
fight to the enemy's sanctuaries and disrupting his principal lines of
which to. strengthen their armed forces while permitting continued
oominunications and should buy the South Vietnamese additional time in
*ithdrawal of U. S. combat forces.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-13-2-15-8