PACIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-15-1-10-2
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 14, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-15-1-10-2
DOS, Army, OSD
Reviews Complete
? 1A
NATIONAL SECURI
CONFIDENTIAL / SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSIN
FROM: Robert L. Sanso
THROUGH: K. Wayne Srni
SUBJECT: Pacification
able to obtain some useful views on pacification from: ri '
situation, spurred by the poor performance of Jacobson I was
While I did not attempt to make an appraisal of the pacification
- Ev Bumgardner
-- Dave Elliott i
-- _a one -half day trip to the Delta villages where I did re search
three to four years ago and Larry Lynn and I visited eighteen months
ago.
Before I review these sources, the issue of Colby's replacement has
generated some interesting responses:
-- Several Mis sion, and DOD sources have contacted me to
urge strongly that Joe Mendenhall, Ambassador Sullivan's
candidate, not be given the job. All of these people have worked
with Mendenhall and believe he is definitely not the man for the
job. (Mendenhall reportedly has been recalled from an overseas
inspection trip by State.)
-- Cooper is stretched very thin in the economic area, in part
because he does not rank Mossier and spends an inordinate amount
of time on bureaucratic problems. The economic issues are
becoming very important and a good case could be made for
elevating Cooper to deal with these alone. This would permit him
to work at the highest levels with the GVN where in my judgment
he would be much more effective than Berger.
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-15-1-10-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-15-1-10-2
CONFIDENTIAL /SENSITIVE
If Cooper were to handle both economics and pacification he would
need a strong deputy for pacification. One argument for such
a dual role is that CORDs is turning more towards civil develop-
ment. Another is that corruption, after peace the major political
issue now, has to be dealt with by freeing the economy and by
exerting U. S. pressure through the advisory system. Cooper
would be good on these issues.
- Bumgardner listed Vann as ideal for the job and Komer
as a second best. (Bumgardner was not very enthusiastic about
General Cushman's performance in the Delta where in Bumgardner's
judgment he has been "militarizing" the pacification program since
Vann departed.
FSOs and some military officers, from which a choice can be made.
I fear that the is sue of Colby's replacement has been given too
little thought outside the Komer "old boy" network. We need a
list of about ten candidates, including several high-ranking
threat areas is not being given adequate attention by the GVN.
Thieu must be pressed hard on this. There is no reason to
increase RVNAF above 1. 1 million men if reallocations are made.
Two divisions could be freed from MRs 3 and 4 if RE-PP
reallocations are made.
-- The issue of reallocating RF-PF forces from low to high
added.
The GVN stands a good chance of holding South Vietnam
although there will be losses in security, particularly in MRs 1
-- Reallocations to central Vietnam can be made by taking from
two Delta divisions a regiment of recruits from central Vietnam.
These would be moved to MRs 1 and 2 and locally recruited personnel
and 2.
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-15-1-10-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-15-1-10-2
CONFIDE NTIA L /SENSITIVE
-- The GVN needs a shock to get moving again in pacification.
We should set a fixed date for total U. S. withdrawals - - e. g. the
end of 1972.
-- We can get our tactical aircraft out of South Vietnam.
What the South Vietnamese really need is helicopter gunship
support.
- Theiu will win the Presidential election. His control of
the administrative apparatus permits him to mobilize support
for the candidates he favors. The district chief will identify
the pro-Thieu candidates, travel with them to the villages and
use the Phuong Huong program and other administrative
instruments to intimidate rivals. Village Chiefs will see clearly
that to get ahead or avoid being set back they must deliver the
village vote for Thieu. The main threat to Thieu is the peace
sentiment and it would take a major preelection VC offensive
Bumgardner does not anticipate for this to blossom in a way
that would defeat Thieu.
USIA should not be allowed to pull out of South Vietnam.
-- Despite Bumgardner's previous opposition to land reform,
he does not believe it has hurt Thieu and it may benefit him in
the long run. The GVN's failure to pay the landlords. is a
principal cause of the recent PAAS survey finding that 40 percent
of tenants are still paying rent even though the law does not
require them to do so.
-- Phuong Huang is not working as an anti-VCI measure. It
is too near the end of the war in many people's judgment for them
to finger the VCI. We oversold the 1968 Hue experience.
-- The South Vietnamese have begun grading a selected number
of secure districts for HES. They appear to be making accurate
assessments.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-15-1-10-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-15-1-10-2
W
As you may know, Dave Elliott is engaged in a six months project
to update his earlier work on Dinh Tuong province. I- also worked
in two. districts in Dinh Tuong and spent one-half day there.
The different conditions Elliott and I found are. instructive in several
respects:
-- Dinh Tuong is a key Delta province. If the GVN succeeds
in Dinh Tuong it is a good bet it will succeed in the Delta.
-- One always finds contradictory evidence in Vietnam. Often
the views of the beholder are confirmed.
-- Elliott's efforts are concentrated in the VC stronghold areas
of southern and central Dinh Tuong while the districts I visited
in eastern Dinh Tuong are now secure by most measures.
-- Elliott has spent several months on his effort. I was in
Dinh Tuong for one-half day.
According to Dave Elliott, the following conditions exist in the areas
he is studying:
--: the GVN has expanded security greatly and the VC military
forces are defeated.
-- the VC political apparatus is still intact and secure in isolated
orchard fortresses. Forced movement of villagers has not enabled
the GVN to burn out the VCI and is politically costly to the GVN.
- - the GVN is very corrupt and politically inept. The Phuong
Huong program is used to purge villages of opponents to Thieu and
obstacles to corruption.
-- whereas the VC still have support dating from their earlier
land reform program and anti-French posture, the political
ineptitude of the GVN is the best VC program.
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-15-1-10-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-15-1-10-2
if the GVN suffers a major defeat, e. g. in MRs 1 or 2 the
VC cause will regain momentum and recruitment, the principal
the following:
-My discussions with Vietnamese friends in the two districts revealed
obstacle, to a VC military capability, will pick up.
Security is excellent. Some villages haven't seen the VC
in two years.
- RF -PF performance, which one family told Larry Lynn and
118 months ago had caused it to turn against the GVN, was cited by
this same family as greatly improved. Ironically this improvement
is due to the performance of the RF-PF training center commander
-in the District, who is one of Dave Elliott's former interviewers.
The overwhelming preponderance of GVN forces was cited
as assurance that the VC could not re-build,
because of Thieu's land reform program. The landed and rich classes
-- One landlord family, when asked who would win the election,
replied that President Thieu would although they would not vote. The
.reason given was that "the poor people control this village now
have no influence.'
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-15-1-10-2