CIA MEMORANDUM ON INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-15-4-7-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 2, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COU
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DR.
JOHD HOLDRIDGE_~
CIA M* emorandum on International Aspects of
the President's Trip to China
At Tab A is a CIA memorandum on the international aspects of the President's
trip to China. You have asked for comments.
in deterring the USSR, gaining a voice in an Indo-China settlement, isolating
the ROC on Taiwan, and hedging a revival of Japan's power and ambition, as
well as in reclaiming China's traditional role as the dominant and central
power in Asia. The memo also states that in East Asia most national leaders
will assume that because the President is going to Peking, the U. S. will have
The memorandum states in general that most governments will welcome the
trip as signifying a step toward peace, although some countries will tend to
exaggerate China's world role and apparent flexibility. The Chinese them-
selves, the memo says, will be able to advance their interests via the trip
paid the higher price.
More specifically, the memo notes that:
ON-FILE NSC
RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
- ROC leaders will privately regard the visit as a "betrayal, " but
have no alternative but to maintain as close a relationship with
the U. S. as possible. No drastic reorientation of policies is
foreseen, either foreign or domestic.
-- In Japan, there has been considerable pique at the U. S. course and
Sato's position has been weakened. However, U. S. and Japanese
interests remain congruent, and the Japanese leaders will not wish
to be too far out of step with the U. S. despite efforts to have Japan
adopt a more independent stance toward both Taiwan and Peking.
increasingly suspicious of Peking's foreign policy. In South Vietnam,.
there will be greater concern that the U. S. will ultimately disengage
on terms negotiated with the communists. Vientiane and Phnom Penh
will.b,ssume that the war will eventually be resolved in ways beyond
their control.
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Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there is a feeling that the visit may
imply a premature U. S. withdrawal from regional security
responsibilities (particularly in Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore);
tendencies toward accommodation with Peking will be accelerated
in all states. In Korea, the ROKs will be concerned over a
possible reduction in U. S. military support, while Pyongyang will
be uneasy over Peking's intentions toward the U. S. Both Australia
and New Zealand will move more quickly than before toward
relations with Peking.
-- In South Asia, Pakistan will be pleased at seeing its two best
supporters come closer together while India will be given "consider-
able pause" in any moves toward war with Pakistan over the prospects
of a US-PRC detente.
-- As far as the USSR is concerned, the Soviets will be resentful and
suspicious, but unlikely to revise drastically the main lines of their
current foreign policies. Attacks on Brezhnev's leadership by
hard-liners may occur, thcugh; a m re toward better relations
with Peking could also occur. There will be a hope in Eastern
European countries that moves toward world peace will cause the
USSR to ease its hold on them, coupled with anxiety that the reverse
could happen.
-- Western European nations will view the development favorably, and
those which have recognized Peking will see their policies as having
been vindicated. Some worry, particularly in West Germany, may
occur over the prospects for East-West detente if the Soviets feel
encircled and react with anxiety and aggressiveness.
Comment:
The CIA memorandum is a good, although certainly very preliminary over-
view of how key nations and areas of the world may react to the President's
Peking visit. I have only a few reservations:
Accelerated tendencies toward Southeast Asian accommodation
with Peking will not necessarily occur. While the various govern-
ments will try to sound out Peking's attitude toward them, each
country will react in ways which will reflects its national situation,
and in countries where too much contact with Peking could create
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has actually tried to dampen down the thought that diplomatic
relations with. Peking will be established soon.
domestic problems because of the ethnic balance (e. g. , Singapore,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) there will be caution. Malaysia
Given the level of animosities existing between Moscow and Peking,
a Soviet move in the direction of improving relations with the PRC
as an outgrowth of the President's visit would appear to be a very
unlikely possibility.
The thought that India may be slowed down from attacking Pakistan
is comforting, but perhaps overly optimistic. Mrs. Ghandi may
not wish to take overt action, but she may yet be pushed into it
despite the negative considerations by the emotionalism of Indian
politics.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
20 July 1971
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: International Implications of the Presidential Trip to China
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The President's Journey to Peking will be regarded by almost
all governments as the beginning of a new phase in Sino-American rela-
tions which will profoundly affect the future balance of international
power and influence. Most will welcome the development, applauding it
as an act of realistic statesmanship and a move toward peace. But all
will view it from the perspective of their own interests and, on this
ground, some will be apprehensive.
2. The fact that Peking was moving to resume an active role in
world politics has been evident for some time. What will surprise many
will be the radical acceleration of this development signaled by a will-
ingness to enter into direct contact with the United States at the
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highest level. The result may be a tendency in some quarters to exaggerate
the significance of China's world role and the flexibility with which that
role will be played.
3. The expectations and apprehensions of the major states concerned,
as discussed below, will probably be tempered as the Sino-American dialogue
proceeds. Peking's concrete aims -- to increase deterrence of pressures
by the USSR, to gain a voice in the Indochina settlement, to isolate and
weaken the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, to hedge against a revival of
Japan's power and ambition -- will emerge in perspective and tend to be
taken eventually as part of the normal landscape of world politics.
4. Peking is able and willing to contemplate the possible advantages
to be gained by a more flexible approach to the United States at this
time, in part because it perceives United States power in Asia, and par-
ticularly its military presence in Indochina, as being on the wane.
Given this perception which has now existed for a year or more, it was
no longer essential to hold to a rigid and totally uncompromising position
toward the United States and there emerged the possibility that Peking's
interests could be advanced as a consequence of contacts with the United
States.
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5. Closely linked in time to this perception of the United
States posture was China's emergence from the chaos of the Cultural
Revolution. This audacious gamble had its costs and many problems
remain to be solved. While upsets are still possible, China now
seems to be firmly on the move. The net result appears to be a
new confidence on the part of the top leadership -- Mao Tse-tung,
Lin Piao, and Chou En-Lai -- and a new dynamic in domestic and
foreign affairs. With its people hard at work, China is preparing
-- on the basis of economic growth, military potential, and moral
force -- to reclaim its age-old role as the dominant and central
power in Asia. It expects recognition of this role to come 'by
.right, which means that Japan, the states of Southeast Asia, and
the Western world must pay an appropriate price to earn China's
favor and good will. Nonetheless, Peking is acutely aware of the
distance it has to go in making good its claims and of the many
obstacles which remain in its path.
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II. EAST ASIA
6. In those parts of Asia which have long experience in dealing
with imperial China, the President's visit may have a unique impact.
Asians have been accustomed over the centuries to seeing their rulers
travel to Peking; in more recent times the flow has included friends and
worshipers of Mao from all corners of the.earth. Against this background
and tradition, it will be difficult for the Asians to comprehend the pur-
pose of the leader of the world's strongest power in making the long trip
to Peking. While accepting and welcoming it as a move toward peace, they
will tend to believe, in the absence of obvious contrary evidence, that
the United States President has paid the higher price. As realists, these
countries will move to adjust their positions to what they perceive as the
evolving growth in Chinese power and influence.
Nationalist China
7. As could be expected, initial reactions by. officials of the
Republic of China indicate that they have been badly shaken by recent
United States contacts with Peking. The GRC's more emotional statements
have questioned United. States credibility and the National Assembly has
described the United States action as a "betrayal of allies". Official
spokesmen have described the present crisis as the most serious to hit
the government since it was evicted from the mainland in 1949.
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8. Once beyond the immediate period of shock and bitterness,
however, Taipei is likely to turn to more sober reassessments of its
position. Even though it may continue to vent its anger against the
United States in public, the government is likely to conclude in pri-
vate counsels that actions taken against the United States are likely
to damage the GRC far more than the United States. Even'under emotional
stress, the GRC is not likely to forget that it has nowhere else to
turn; no other government is willing or able to replace the United States
as the guarantor of Taiwan's security.
9. Thus, beyond the impassioned rhetoric, Taipei is likely to
concentrate on efforts to pin down United States intentions. It will
probably seek explicit reassurances on United States defense commit-
ments toward Taiwan. The military, in particular, will hope to carry
on as usual. In this way, and by trying to exact public guarantees of
United States support, it will hope to place a limit on any United
States concessions to Peking.
10. Internally, the Nationalists will be especially alert for any
hints of evolving security problems. Any activity by the small Taiwan
Independence Movement will be harshly suppressed. There will be height-
ened concern over the possibility of dissidence among students and
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even among the top ranks of the military. The GRC will probably take
the prudent action of rechecking its carefully selected and strategically
placed security forces. During this traumatic period, the GRC will prob-
ably show even less tolerance than usual for criticisms of its leadership.
In the circumstances, a "spontaneous" demonstration aimed at United
States installations on Taiwan cannot be ruled out. But Taipei will pro-
ceed with caution in this area, fearing not only United States reactions
but also the possibility that such a demonstration might get out of control
and turn against the government.
11. The United States move toward improving relations with Peking
will probably not cause an immediate major upheaval on Taiwan.
Nevertheless, there will be many who will read United States actions as
marking the beginning of the end for the Nationalist regime. This will
be especially so if, as now seems likely, the GRC loses or gives up its
seat in the UN this year. Native Taiwanese will see new hope for an
independent government, or at least one in which they can play a larger
role. Within the GRC there is likely to be covert consideration of other
options, not excluding a change of government. Some may even examine
the idea of tentative feelers toward Peking. But for all the agitation
that may shake the GRC, it is difficult to picture any drastic-reorienta-
tion of policies as long as Chiang Kai-shek remains active.
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Japan
12. In Tokyo, the United States announcement has been something of
a bombshell. The Sato government is greatly disturbed on three counts.
Politically, it is considerably more vulnerable than before to charges
of stalling in building a viable Japanese relationship with Peking.
There is also genuine concern -- at least in the Sato-Kishi wing of the
conservative party -- that Washington may have taken a giant step toward
abandonment of the GRC and the island of Taiwan; the Japanese themselves
had counted on much more time to develop and experiment with a de facto
"Two Chinas" policy, and may well view the United States move as pre-
maturely foreclosing this option, Finally, and perhaps most important
in the long run; Japan's cherished policy objective of becoming the
West's "bridge" to China would appear to have suffered major damage.
13. The consequences may be most apparent in Japanese domestic
politics. Sato's increased vulnerability on China policy will substan-
tially increase Intra-party pressures for his retirement this year
(rather than next) and will also harm the prospects of his designated
heir, Foreign Minister Fukuda (who is equally vulnerable on the issue).
To meet the attack, Sato may agree to new concessions to Peking on such
issues as trade credits and official political exchanges. In this way --
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and as the dust settles in Washington and Peking -- he may gain time to
restore party discipline on the overriding issue of full diplomatic rec-
ognition. But Sato has always been anathema to Peking and it seems
likely that any persistent Japanese tide in favor of Peking will eventu-
ally carry Sato out of office.
14. Tokyo's foreign policy planners are certain to return to the
drawing board in pursuit of ways to adjust to the new uncertainties
opened up by the announcement -- for both the long and short term.
Whatever tactics the Japanese adopt, there will be emphasis on projecting
a more positive image of Japan as a factor on the Asian political scene,
and seeking a more independent stance than before toward both Taipei and
Peking. But United States and Japanese interests in Asia remain, after
all, basically congruent, and for all its pique with the United States
move, there remain distinct limits on Japan's freedom of action. It is
\not in the long run going to want to be too far out of step with Washington
in dealing with the march of events in Asia. There are no doubt great
differences of view in Tokyo about how to go about adjusting, and uncer-
tainty about how far things will go. But the question will be under
much more intensive study from now on, and Japan may have to define its
long term role earlier than it had anticipated.
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 The Indochina Area
15. It is by no means clear at this time that the recent move will
have appreciable effect on the course of the Indochinese war; Hanoi
rather than China calls the communist tune in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Traditionally suspicious of Chinese motives, the North Vietnamese are quite
obviously concerned that their interests may be subordinated in any
across-the-board Sino-American deal. They may, for instance, anticipate
that the Chinese, in an effort to avoid upsetting the budding detente
with the United States, will now urge Hanoi to exercise restraint in the
war. Hanoi would resent and resist any such advice. Indeed, it is doubt-
ful that Peking has either the leverage or the inclination to force Hanoi
down any road it does not want to travel. But it is likely'that, despite
any assurances from Peking, Hanoi will become increasingly wary of
Chinese intentions in the area and increasingly inclined to question the
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,Scope and direction of Peking's new activist foreign policy.
16. As for the South Vietnamese, there will be greater concern
than before that United States disengagement will be conducted ultimately
on terms negotiated with the communists. And, on the military side, there
will be concern that additional constraints will be placed on the employ-
ment of United States air power. In the political realm, some in
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Saigon are already interpreting the United States initiative as an election
boost for "Big" Minh, the "peace" candidate. As for Phnom Penh and
Vientiane, convictions will be reinforced that the war will eventually be
resolved in ways beyond their control by powers greater than themselves.
Other Statea
17. Elsewhere in East Asia, the United'States move is also seen
largely through the prism of local security needs. While virtually all
governments applaud in principle the approach to China, there is concern
that it may imply a relatively rapid and -- in their view -- premature
United States withdrawal from security responsibilities in the region.
The Malaysians, who have increasingly staked their security on some sort
of regional compact between the major powers, appear.least worried. Nor
are the Filipinos, from their safe distance, particularly upset. Indonesia
and Singapore, however, tend to take a more ominous view of the Chinese
threat; they are likely to seek United States reassurances. All this
and more can be said regarding the Thai despite their own persistent
overtures to Peking. In all these states, it seems clear that existing
tendencies toward accommodation with Peking will be accelerated.
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18. The Korean situation could obviously be greatly affected by
any full-scale United States-Chinese rapprochement, and this possibility
is much on the minds of the Koreans -- North and South. Pyongyang would
resent any moderation in Peking's support of its brief against the United
States; and will be watchful of any reluctance to offer military aid.
Peking must be aware of North Korean unease; a few days ago, it supplied
some high-level condemnation of the United States on the Pyongyang
banquet circuit. Negative reactions in the South arise from apprehensions
over the possibility of reduced United States military support for the
ROK.
19. In Australia, recent events have clearly embarrassed Prime
Minister McMahon. McMahon spent much of recent weeks criticizing his
Labor opponent's alleged softness toward Peking and is now busily back-
pedaling, while Labor -- which in any case has a good shot at power in
the next general election -- stands to gain in the exchange. A similar
situation in New Zealand has been resolved without damage to the incum-
bent conservative leadership but both countries seem certain to move
more quickly than before toward diplomatic relations with Peking.
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III. SOUTH ASIA
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20. The Pakistani military regime, feeling estranged from most of the
world and fearful of war with India, has seen only two major countries --
China and the United States -- as actually or potentially helpful to it.
Pakistan has never been comfortable with the fact that its two best friends
have been enemies. A change of any degree here would obviously be welcome
because it might strengthen Pakistan's security against India at a time
when it badly feels it needs it. Beyond this, it is doubtful that the
heavily preoccupied Pakistani Government has given much thought to the
United States-Chinese move. It will judge the unfolding process of United
States-Chinese relations almost entirely in terms of whether it promises
to hurt or harm Pakistan with respect to the threat it feels from India.
21. The news clearly caught India by surprise; public remarks to
date indicate considerable uncertainty amongst officials, newspapers, and
\the general public. But anti-Chinese sentiments are strong in India; the
United States too has come in for widespread and bitter criticism for its
recent policies toward Pakistan. The danger of Indo-Pakistani war, imme-
diately precipitated in this case by the Indians, is now greater than at
any time since 1965. Thus the prospect of a United States-Chinese detente
-- even marginally facilitated by the Pakistanis--- must give New Delhi
considerable pause. In these circumstances the Indians are likely to
seek further support and assurances from the USSR.
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IV. EUROPE
The Soviet Union
22. Though they may not feel free to say so publicly, the Soviet
leaders can view the announcement of the President's forthcoming trip
only as a piece of bad news which might get worse. It is not merely
that they regard the implications of the journey as distinctly unpleas-
ant; or only that they fear that cooperation between the United States
and China would impinge on many Soviet interests and concerns in many
areas. It is also that they are afraid that their opportunities to
respond effectively are few.
23. First thoughts in Moscow will thus reflect apprehension and
resentment; the suspicion will be strong that old fears of Sino-United
States collusion have now been confirmed. There will thus be a strong
element of emotionally tinged distrust in the USSR's initial reactions.
This may manifest itself in the general atmosphere of United States-
Soviet relations -- in the manner of Soviet diplomats and negotiators,
in the tenor (though perhaps not the specifics) of Soviet propaganda,
--.and in'-the content of private Soviet remarks.
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24. Moscow is not likely, however, to proceed in anger to revise
drastically the main lines of its current foreign policies. These
latter have been conceived in full awareness of the possibility of shifts
in Chinese attitudes and positions. And the national interests and
objectives that Soviet foreign policies are intended to serve -- as in
the Middle East, in Europe, and toward the United States -- are not
likely in the Soviet view to be greatly altered (though they certainly
will be complicated) by improvements in relations between the United
States and China. In Western Europe, for example, the Soviets seek
.through essentially moderate policies to gain acceptance of their
position in Eastern Europe, to reduce United States influence and expand
their own, and to avoid risks and problems which would complicate their
posture toward China. None of these goals is likely to change solely
as a consequence of Sino-United States cooperation. Similarly, the
USSR's motives in SALT will probably remain basically unaffected.
25. For tactical purposes, and in the short term, however, the
Russians might indicate less urgent interest in negotiating with the
United States. They might, for example, conspicuously drag their feet
in the Berlin talks (where they do not seem to be in a great hurry in
any event); they might hope that this, in addition to distressing the
United States, might stimulate apprehensions about Washington's policies
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among its West European allies. But Moscow is not likely on this
account to completely disrupt the Berlin talks; to do so would
jeopardize its policies in Western Europe as a whole.
26. There are, however, two major questions about possible
Soviet responses which must be left partly open. One concerns the
shape of domestic Soviet politics, the other bears on the USSR's
relations with China itself.
--There may be arguments within the Soviet establishment
concerning the wisdom of the USSR's present foreign policies.
The Brezhnev regime's vaguely conciliatory line toward Western
Europe; its public defense of the need to negotiate agreements
with the United States; and its clearly implied hope to restrain
defense spending and concentrate on the problems of the civilian
economy, all these positions are presumably controversial.
(Indeed, there have beeo hints of controversy in the press and
in the defensive tone of some of the leader's remarks.) Setbacks
.to Soviet policies abroad -- and the President's journey will
be interpreted as a setback-of sorts have an inevitable impact
on politics at home. Some of the leadership will argue that an
excessively harsh response to the United States move might only
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drive the Americans farther into the arms of the Chinese. But,
on the whole, concern about the meaning of the United States
turn toward Peking will tend to strengthen the arguments of
those who distrust the United States the most or who are the
most skeptical about a broad policy of moderation toward the
West. There is very little prospect, however, that the
Brezhnev regime will be forced by such arguments to change
its policies in major ways.
-- Inevitably, if the President's visit to China creates
concern among the Soviet leaders about Washington's motives,
it also produces anxiety about Peking's. Moscow's dislike
and distrust of China are perhaps more intensely felt than
even its dislike and distrust of the United States. It is of
course the spectre of the two countries' acting together,
against the USSR, which forms the most chilling image in
Soviet minds, and it is the actuality of such concert which
the Russians are most anxious to forestall. The notion
might occur that one way to accomplish this would be to con-
vince Peking that its interests would be better served by
an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations than by a move
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toward the United States. But it would be grossly out of
character for the Soviets to adopt a truly conciliatory
stance vis-a-vis China -- they have so far preferred in-
stead to emphasize their military strength in dealings
with the Chinese. Moscow could not in any event be sure
that Peking would not interpret Soviet concessions as
signs of weakness -- indeed, as the fruit of Peking's
dalliance with Washington and thus as an incentive for
even greater Sino-United States cooperation.
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Eastern Europe
27. The East European countries no doubt regard the prospect of
improved relations between the United States and China with some hope
and some anxiety and considerable uncertainty. Hope will rest on the
broad position that all,moves toward peace in the world are good for them
because they may ultimately persuade the USSR to relax its policies in
general and relax its hold on Eastern Europe in particular. But anxiety
will arise from the possibility that the Sino-Soviet conflict will inten-
sify and that -- as has happened in the past -- this will lead to greater
Soviet pressures for conformity within the empire. Finally, there will
be uncertainty because a variety of questions of major interest to the
East Europeans cannot now be answered: what, if anything, do the new
developments portend for United States policy in Europe and toward the
USSR; how does Peking's new posture affect its attitudes toward the USSR
and the Soviet position in Eastern Europe? And what does it all mean
for Romania, the special object of both Chinese and United States interest
and of Soviet concern?
28. Most official East European reactions to the President's journey
and what it implies will of course reflect the Soviet view in greater or
lesser degree. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany may only
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paraphrase Pravda; Poland and Hungary may provide hints of independent
appraisals, but these are likely to be subtle. On the other hand, Romania
will probably cheer, though nervously. Yugoslavia will be pleased but is
likely to explore all the angles with some candor.
Western Europe
29. As indicated by the initial response to the Presidential
announcement, the West Europeans view the development favorably. Most
responsible newspapers regard the move as a spectacular and momentous
action, possibly signifying an important turning point in world affairs
-- even a redistribution of world power. Britain and France see the
United States move as confirming policies they have advocated for years,
especially those associated with efforts to. bring Communist China out
of isolation into the mainstream of world affairs. The Italian Government
sees.the announcement as confirming the wisdom of its own recent decision
`to recognize Peking.
30. Despite this generally positive view of the United. States move,
there are some uneasy stirrings about its implications. Some West European
officials, for example, are resentful that they were not consulted before-
hand. And, some West Europeans, particularly the West Germans -- anxious
about the course of Ostpolitik -- will be apprehensive about the Soviet
response and the effect the move may have on the process of East-West detente.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/23: LOC-HAK-15-4-7-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/23: LOC-HAK-15-4-7-3
w
SECRET
As Le monde has already asked, "Will the Soviets see in Sino-American
rapprochement yet another reason for entente with Washington... or will
they yield to the anxiety and aggressiveness which any prospect of
'encirclement' arouses?"
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/23: LOC-HAK-15-4-7-3