SUMMARY OF MOOSE/LOWENSTEIN REPORT ON LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-15-5-55-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: August 11, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-15-5-55-9
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-15-5-55-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-15-5-55-9
MOOSE- LOWENSTEIN REPORT ON LAOS-May_1971
Highlights of a staff report submitted on May 21, 1971 by James Lowenstein
and Richard Moose to the Subcommittee on U. S. Security Agreements and
Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
A declassified version was entered into the Congressional Record by
Senator Stuart Symington on August 3, 1971 at Page S-12960.
Note: Senator Symington states that the report was reviewed by
representatives of the Department of State and Defense and the CIA for
five weeks and that "much information was deleted at their insistence. "
The staff report makes the following major points:
The war is run in most respects by the U. S. Embassy in Vientiane.
Most observers consider the military situation to be growing steadily
worse, with the initiative clearly in the hands of the enemy.
The North Vietnamese rnntrnl pan to 60%6 of the country, including the
western edge of the Plain of Jars and virtually the entire Bolovens
Plateau.
-w Friendly forces total 95, 000 to 97, 000. With very few enlistments,
no national conscription system and a 30% desertion rate for new
recruits, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain adequate
force levels. Tkie result resembles "a press gang operation. "
Enemy forces total 39, 000 Pathet Lao (PL) and 100, 000 North Vietnamese
(NVA), with NVA units bearing most of the fighting and casualties.
The NVA may be deliberately sparing the PL forces for the future.
Chinese forces now total 14, 000 to 20, 000. Sited in 154 camps, they
have extended their road and have added major new increments of
anti-aircraft weapons. Despite restrictions,
bombed the road in January 1970.
U. S. air operations are down from a 1969 level of 400 sorties a day
to a late April rate of 282 a day. Reported figures for trucks damaged
or destroyed have increased geometrically to 10, 000 this April, but
"are not taken seriously by most officials, including Air Force officers, "
who generally discount them by a factor of 30%.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-15-5-55-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-15-5-55-9
The U. S. began B-52 missions against northern Laos as early as
February 1970. Under Secretary of State Irwin has now acknowledged
this fact. The Embassy indicated these missions had been increased
since last year.
Lam Son 719 operations did not slow the enemy' s supply trends, but
this year only 10% of the enemy' s input is getting through as against
33% last year. In the first four months of 1971, 4, 000 to 5, 000 tons
got through, or half of last year's rate.
U. S. sorties in Laos are controlled by rules of engagement which "seem
to make it impossible for villages or other non-military targets to
be bombed.'' But, "there are plenty of instances" known to American
civilian employees in which civilian targets have been bombed.
The U. S. Embassy apparently has no system for regular photographic
review of individual strikes, although it does ask for special photography
if a violation appears to have occured.
The military assistance program is much higher than previously reported.
The FY 1970 figure is now said to be not $74. 2 million but $125 million
and even this ceiling was actually increased to $146.4 million.
Assistance appears to be running at $162. 2 million for FY 1971, to
increase to $252.1 million for FY 1972.
The most effective Laotian military forces and cutting edge are "the
irregular forces which are. trained, equipped, supported, advised,
and, to a great extent, organized by the CIA. 11
The CIA supervises the Lao guerrilla operations closely. The irregulars
are guaranteed evacuation by Air America helicopters and subsequent
military care, which for some is in a U. S. field hospital at a Thai
air base in Udorn, Thailand. 25X1
The principal arguments for official secrecy about the irregular forces
in Laos include the wishes of General Vang Pao and the CIA and the
fact that the U. S. would be accused of violating the Geneva Agreements
of 1962.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-15-5-55-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-15-5-55-9
! ?
There is considerable confusion in accounting for the number and
categories of Americans in Laos.
The mission does not seem to have made much of an effort to keep
a record of factors responsible for generating refugees and thus
cannot refute allegations that most refugees are generated by U. S.
bombing. Some AID officials, estimate that Z to 5% are generated
by the bombing.
Two hundred thirty-two U. S. personnel are listed as missing in Laos
but there is no firm evidence that they are held prisoner in Laos by
either the North Vietnamese or the Pathet Lao.
A Pathet Lao representative told the writers that North Vietnam had
provided no list until after the bombing halt and that the Pathet Lao
similarly would not do so as long as the bombing continued.
The report concludes with the following view of prospects:
Negotiations prospects are very slim. The new (April) Pathet Lao
proposals are apparently harder than previous proposals and include a
demand for a bombing cessation throughout Laos before talks can begin.
Furthermore, "the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese are in the
strongest position they have ever enjoyed.
-- "As far as U. S. policy is concerned, it is quite apparent that many
American officials regard the continued prosecution of the war in
Laos as an essential adjunct of our current military strategy in
Vietnam.... buying time for Vietnarriization. In this sense, we are
.indeed using the-Lao for our owrrpurposes at an increasingly heavy
cost to them in lives and territory. "
i'.... Laos will remain a hostage available to the North Vietname se
should they wish to draw American airpower away from Cambodia and Soutl
Vietnam, embarrass the U. S. , threaten Thailand or bring the Chinese
into closer involvement. "
Souvanna Phouma ".... seems to be increasingly isolated from other
powerful figures in his country who wish to involve the U. S. , or the
Thai, even further in the defense of what remains of their country,
knowing that they cannot possible defend it themselves. "
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-15-5-55-9