SYMINGTON AMENDMENT ON LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-17-3-12-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 1, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
1 October 71
Dr. Kiss Inger :
I have proposed lunch on next
for Stennis.
?Ft-t
Monday afternoon at 3:00,
?
5:00
would also be possible, lf
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
-General Haig:
HAK talked to Stennis today,
and indicated to me that
the lunch meeting I had
scheduled for him with Stennis
would no longer be
necessary.
Coleman
002-1/A,
A c-7
fit-
NSS, DOS, Navy, Army,
OSD Reviews Completed
May Contain
Congressional
Material.
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gi
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
URGENT ACTION
1 October 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER.
FROM: J. F. LEHMAN:
SUBJECT: Symington amendment on Laos
Senator Symington's amendment to the Military Procurement Bill limiting
all expenditures to 200 million (our bill contains 450 million) which was
defeated in committee, will be voted on the floor on Monday. We do not
yet have a reliable vote count but it could be very close.
We had a strategy meeting this morning with MacGregor and undertook
the following measures:
?Abshire, Korologos and Cowen will spend today and Monday on
the Hill, each with one of three state briefers, Bill Sullivan, Mark
Pratt and Joe Wolf, visiting senators and briefing each individual
senator.
--Talking papers and speeches which we prepared on a classified
and unclassified form some weeks ago, have been and are being
distributed through Scott's, Griffin's and Dole's offices.
--A meeting has been set up for Monday morning in Senator Scott's
office for the Republican leadership and selected Republican senators
for the purpose of rallying them to an all-out effort. Clark MacGregor,
General Haig and Dave Abshire will brief.
As you know, Senator Stennis has talked with Laird and Helms and informed
the President that he will not support CIA operations in Laos after this year.
You approved our recommendation that you meet with Senator Stennis at an
early date, to explain to him the importance of our policies in Laos.
(See package at Tab B.)
We have just received word that Senator Stennis has authorized Ed Braswell
(Chief of Staff SASC) to work with Symington on a compromise solution for
Monday. This must be stopped. So far no one has really made the effort to
-SECRET-
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111
-SECRET-
2.
sell Stennis on the importance of our Laos policy, and he now feels that
the Executive Branch is putting the onus on him by not making a strong
public defense of administration policy.
As you know, we cannot live with any compromise that would be acceptable
to Symington. To stop this development you must call Stennis directly
before Monday.
Recommendation:
That you call Senator Stennis and make the following points:
1. You would like to get together with Senator Stennis to discuss
the problem of subsequent years' budgeting of operations in
Laos, sometime next week or the week after. (As per your
decision at Tab B.)
2. You wanted to call him before you get together and before
the vote on Monday to convey to him the importance you
placed upon the full authorization for Laos remaining intact
in this year's bill; that no ceiling such as that in the Syming-
ton amendment is acceptable.
John Holdridge has prepared talking points at Tab A.
Concurrence: John Holdridefp40
-SECRET-
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October A, 1971
Your talking points for telephone call to Senator Stennis on Laos:
-- We absolutely cannot have a ceiling on U.S. expenditures in Laos.
- This would undercut the entire Nixon Doctrine, which seeks to
assure countries being subjected to aggression or subversion that
the United States will provide them with the military and economic
assistance which they need to preserve their independence. If
limitations are imposed in Laos, other countries would assume
that.their needs might not be met, and the credibility Which the
President has tried to achieve on our honoring commitments
would be destroyed.
- It is cold, hard fact that without U.S. assistance to Laos at
at least present levels, the present Government of Laos will
collapse and all military resistence there will cease.
-- With the collapse of Laos, the whole situation in Indo-China
could take a promised turn for the worse. A successor to the
present Lao Government might demand a halt to our bombing
and the four North Vietnamese divisions now being tied down
- in Laos would be free to fight in South Vietnam and Cambodia.
? This in turn might have a bearing on the President's China
initiative. It is imperative that we approach Peking as a world
power able to exercise influence in Asia, and not as a defeated
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IIP IP
power being forces out under conditions amounting to a military
defeat.
Senator Stennis should know that the main purpose of Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma's visit to Washington was to receive
reassurances that we would continue to support his Government,
and compel the Communists to honor the Geneva Agreements on
Laos of 1962. It would be the shabbiest treatment for a dedicated
ally which has suffered enormously to be in effect betrayed by the
U.S.
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shington, O. C. ?
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September 2, 1971
11..w L.,041)1.5 14,d .11.11ora M1111.1ry Ploi.uromont
ithorizatioa Hill which includes a portion of !he authorization for
inding United States operations in Laos. Moreover, as you know, for
number of years the Central Intelligence Agency also has funded a
art-ion of U. S. programs in Laos.
1 strongly defended the budget requests for Labs for fiscal year
J72 and the full request was approved by the Committee. 1 have con
hided, however, that for the CIA to continue funding any portion of
ia Laos operation after fiscal year 1972 would be b serious mistake
Id possibly jeopardize the success with,.which the CIA carries out i.ts
rher -world-wide functions.
one tdirt InvuivRmpnt in im,,s is now a matter of put)::::
0\611VII
Dreover, as you know, the U. S. programs in Laos have become an issue
'thin the Senate which will doubtless be raised by floor amendments.
hese considerations have led to demands that all the CIA budget be
avealed and debated. The Laos matter therefore adds to the difficulty
n protecting the CIA budget against demands for greater disclosure.
Thoro is the, flual considorotion of lho fact thof Iho priffmr/
urpo,..12i I Iho Aqemoy 10 C0110(.1 ftfid coAlluolo in10111011,nco, lho
aos pro9r.im sorvos to jeopardize ihis primory funGlion duo to iho
riticism of its involvement in the Laos operation.
I am writing now to advise you that I cannot support any further
unding with respect to Laos as a part of the CIA budget for fif;cal
ear 1973. I urge that other funding alternatives be conidered in
onnection with the formation of the fFscal year 1973 CIA budget.
This letter is written to you directly because of the serious
ature of this matter and the interagency relationships involved.
(Mesi re..poetfully yours,
k I
-
John C. Stennis
,Chairman
Senate Armed Services Committee
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'MANTRA'. INTCLUGENCE AGENCY
? WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
20 September 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
-..?,? .Assistant to the President for
" ?'?? National Security Affairs
SUBJECT:
?
Senator Stennis' Letter to the President
of 2 September 19 71 on CIA's Role in Laos
1. In response to requests from your Staff for cOmment
on Senator Stennis' letter, it is important first to understand the
background of the Senator's concern as it relates to his ability to
protect the security of the Agency's budget and operations in the
Congress.
? 2. The attached mernn-rAndurn (Tab A) recounts p-ie
opposition ox xey members of the Congress to Agency
funding of and participation in paramilitary programs of ,the scope
of the Laos operation. There is also concern, as noted in Senator
Stennis' letter, that the problems arising from the Agency's
involvement in Laos will jeopardize -what the Senator refers to
as its-"primary function" of collecting and evaluating intelligence.
3. In response to the direction of higher authority we have
continued our executive role in the Laos operations, but I believe in
the light of the concerns expressed in Senator Stennis' letter it will
be difficult, if not impossible, for us to continue in this role
Indefinitely. Those key committees on whom we depend for our
appropriations and our protection from damaging public exposure
and political debate appear firmly committed to the proposition
that they cannot support the continued inclusion of funds in the
Agency's budget for Laos-type operations. In addition, it appears
extremely doubtful that they will long countenance the Agency's
conduct of such operations even if the funds were overtly appro-
priated as a line item in the Defense budget.
? '
?;.: 5
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?
4. It is increasingly clear that the longer the Agency stays
in the Laos operation, the more likely it is that the Congress will
be inspired to introduce legislation designed to limit the capacity
of the Agency and the Administration to undertake covert para-
military operations. So far the several bills introduced in the
Congress to impose restrictions either on funding or the partici-
pation of the Agency in paramilitary operations have been defeated
or are pending. It is unlikely that we can rest with any assurance
on the proposition that such. legislation in the future will be defeated,
particularly if the opposition to it is not wholeheartedly supported by
the members of our oversight committees.
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6. We recognize that these last two options will not be
warmly endorsed by the Departments of State and Defense but they
seem to us Lhe only rci.libLie aiLornativcc
I suggest that a detailed review of
these options should be undertaken by an ad hoc interagency group
to be appointed by you to come up with specific recommendations
as to how this complex matter can best be resolved. Through the
years, I have been able to persuade our oversight committees that
our current procedures were really the best with which to carry
on the paramilitary operation in Laos. With the visibility recently
given to these operationsthowever, I do not think they will accept
this position any longer.
Richard Helms
Director
Attachments: 2 .
As stated above
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1141444 d
TAB A
?
17 September 1971
? SUBJECT: Congressional Attitude Toward CIA Funding of
- Major Paramilitary Activities
1. For many years the attitudes of the current Chairmen
of the Agency's subcommittees, including their predecessors,
were that the Agency's budget should remain as small as possible.
There have been expressions that the larger the budget the more
difficult for the subcommittee chairmen to deal with members of
the full committees and the Houses of the Congress as a whole.
rrhit; -.1ifficuity existed not only in the .ApproPriatic.nr:
Co mm itteem s
Specifically, when
programs begun and managed by CIA became too large and visible,
our subcoMmittees have Urged that program responsibility as well
as funding be dropped by the Agency and picked up by Defense. This
memorandum will review four programs in which this problem has
arisen?Rural Development Cadre (RDC), SWITCHBACK, IstiACSOG,
and operations in Laos.
Z. RDC - A project for developing Vietnamese teams to
carry out social, medical, and economic improvements in South
Vietnam's rural areas.
a. During early and mid-1966, questions were
beginning to be raised by Agency congressional sub-
committees about continued CIA budgeting and responsi-
? bility for the RDC program. At meetings with the Agency
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on 21 and 22 September, the subject was discussed by
the Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations
Subcommittees. Senator Russell specifically stated
that he hoped the Agency could get out of the RDC
program in view of its planned expansion.
b. In a 6 April 1967 letter to the Bureau of the
Budget, signed by George Mahon, Chairman, House
. Appropriations Committee, and Carl Hayden, Chair-
man, Senate Appropriations Committee, concern was
expressed about funds for the RDC program and the
. fact that they were in the Agency's regular budget.
The letter pointed out it was difficult to handle funds
for this open program as a classified budget item.
The letter then requested that 'consideration be given
to an alternative method of funding for FY 1968.
? c. The Chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee, Mr. Mahon, by letter dated 9 June 1967
to Senator Hayden, Chairman of the Senate Appropri-
ation 5 Comn-Aft"e, reduced the Agency's haiclarA by
? allowing only sufficient funds for three-quarters of
the fiscal year. The Agency was advised that the
intent of this reduction was that the Agency should be
relieved of the funding for this program as of the
beginning of the fourth quarter of 1968 and there would
be no funding through the Agency thereafter. It specif-
ically pointed out that this was not intended as a cut in
the program level; it was a means to force the Executive.
Branch's hand. The Senate Appropriations Committee
later concurred in the House action.
? d. Agency funding ceased at the beginning of the
fourth quarter of FY 1968, but the Department Of
Defense requested assistance through channeling of
funds for an interim period while it attempted to resolve
certain procedural aspects. The Agency agreed to this
for the final quarter of FY 1968.
. SWITCHBACK -
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4 Lai .
Appropriations Committee might well direct the Agency
. to phase out of certain paramilitary programs.
On 14 July
1970, Representative Mahon said he "agreed 130 percent
with Senator Russell's position on Agency funding of opera-
tions in Southeast Asia."
? b. Throughout the remainder of 1970 and 1971,
there were continued expressions of concern from our
subcommittees concerning Agency funding of para-
military programs in Southeast Asia.
These concerns culminated in the letter
from Senator Stennis to the President of 2 September 1971
in which he said, ". . for the Agency to continue funding
any portion of the Laos operation after fiscal year 1972
would be, a e4rious mistake and possibly jeopardize
the success with which.the CIA carries out its other world-
wide functions." Trle 0.14., said he ". . . ca:Inct r.-..7:;?:?rt any
further funding with respect to Laos as a part of the CIA
budget for fiscal year 1973."
c. In explaining further to the Agency his position,
on 14 September 1971 Senator Stennis expressed his view
that the Agency should get out of the entire Laos operation
as soon as possible. He added that so far as funding Was
concerned, he was unalterably opposed to any funding from
the Agency's budget after FY 1972 and that as far as other
.aspects of the Agency involvement were concerned he
realized this could not be done overnight but he thought
it had to be done as soon as practicable. It was his opinion
that the Congress simply will not tolerate continued use
of the Agency's special authorities in this manner, which
an. increasing number of Congressmen regard as circum-
venting the will of the Congress.
1 ?
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mir(
TAB B
17 September 1971
SlEtims_t_2_21A Manasement of the Irregular Program in Laos
Background. Since 1961 irregular forces have assisted the regular Lao
Army to resist Communis: encroachment. These irregulars have been
given support and guidance by the Central Intelligence Agency as the
executive agency for the United States Government. The program
started with the use of hill tribes, primarily Meo under General
Vang Pao, and expanded to include lowland Lao.
The Ambassador has exercised overall United States policy
control of the ?ro ram.
It has funded and delivered military logistics
- materiel and given trairiing and tactical guidance to the Meo and Lao.
Tn 1970, due to 4n'e?reas-ing Communist pressure and the
exhaustion of Lao manpower resources
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Because the additional expense
and logistics requirements exceeded CIA resources, the Department
-of Defense fianded the program from the Military Assistance Service
Funded (MAST) Program.
As a result of interagency agreement
inthe spring of 1971, it is 71anned after this fiscal year to fund
salaries for all irregulars
and all logistics and support air costs from MASF.
Lao and Meo irregular units are all under the
command of the Laos Military Region Commanders. CIA officers
insure proper distribution of materiel-and salary payments. They
provide tactical. advice and operational planning. They also provide
the ,on the ground appreciation of the tactical situation which permits
the Ambassador and his staff to influence the Lao leadership in the
conduct of operations.
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In the broadest terms we see the following as the principal
options. These options are not mutually exclusive in that adoption
of Option II could well lead to Option III. We assume the continuation
of U.S. tactical air support in the case of all Options.
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Discussion: This option requires the least change from the status quo.
Executive responsibility remains the same. However, all support costs
would be made public and provided from one source.
Pros:
- I. This option has the advantage of continuing a successful
system ui managing the irregular program in Lace,
continues to handle day-to-day support and guidance in-country.
? 2.. This option also meets Senator Stennis' first concern,
' 1. e., removing irregular program expenses from the CIA budget.
, Cons:
1. This option continues the CIA as the executive agency for
this program. This does not meet Senator Stennis' firmly stated desire
to remove the Agency from this role, as soon as feasible. It also risks
Congressional action to limit the capability of the Agency and the
Administration to conduct covert paramilitary operations in the
future, and could jeopardize Congressional support for other primary
Agency functions.
Z. The budget, the program and the Agency's administration
of the program would be subject to Congressional scrutiny outside the
CIA oversight committees and could lead to future exposure of Agency
techniques and personnel.
? 2
?
d
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Option II: Transfer the CIA executive role to
? DOD. CIA will contribute personnel to DOD to
assist in the transition.
Discussion: This would remove CIA from the war in Laos. The DOD
would replace it as the executive agency under the Ambassador. The
budget would become a separate line item in the DOD budget open to
the public view, with the advantages and disadvantages inherent in
that method of funding the program. Management of the program
would require additional military personnel in Laos, in defiance of
the Geneva Accords. Alternatively it could be done with civilian
officers including retired military officers.
Pros:
I. This option meets Senator Stennis' -objection. It removes
money for the Laos irreesaialb ,,,,, t Agency's bnacr.et. it removes
the Agency from management of the program.
2. This option simplifies the command and control structure
for U. S. Military support to the Royal Lao Government.
3. Assumption by DOD of guidance tb the irregular program
\introduces military training and experience into what hl.s become a
largely conventional, positional warfare situation for the irregular units.
Cons:
1. This option would increase the U. S. military presence in
Laos in violation of the Geneva Accords. This could be partially
circumvented by use of TIDY officers from outside Laos, as is now
done in advising the Regular Lao Army, by the assignment of some
CIA officers under U. S. military control, or by the use of genuinely
or ostensibly retired U. S. military officers.
3
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4. A
'cr,?
, ?
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25X1 Option III: Transfer the CIA. role with irregulars
to the Lao
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SA
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Discussion: This option would limit the U. S. role to providing logistics
support, airlift and salary payments. It would mean a more detached
U. S. cognizance of the irregular program and its activities. It would
bring the regular Lao Army and the irregular program under common
a.k.kaziagement.
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?"Pros::
I. This option meets the immediate concerns of Senator Stennis,
. as well a-s those in Congrins who want less U. S. involvement in the
Indochina war.
Z. This option puts more responsibility on the Laos
better preparing them to defend themselves.
Cons: .
I. The U. S. will lose some influence over actions in Laos. The
r,ml ilitary situation might temporarily deteriorate. However, the Lao
r] should be able to conduct their activities at a lesser but acceptable25x1
level.
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2. The U. S. Government will not be as well informed as now
about the irregular program but sufficient information to follow the
situation in Laos will be available from normal reporting.
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3. The U. S. Government would lose its present close
control over U. S. funds and equipment supplied to irregular forces.
?
' ? ?!., .14 els
. .
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UCTIJOer 1, 1971
? Your talking points for telephone call to Senator Stennis on Laos:
-- We absolutely cannot have a ceiling on U.S. expenditures in Laos.
-- This would undercut the entire Nixon Doctrine, which seeks to
assure countries being subjected to aggression or subversion that
the United States will provide them with the military and economic
assistance which they need to preserve their independence. If
limitations are imposed in Laos, other countries would assume
that?their needs might not be met, and the credibility Vkich the
President has tried to achieve on our honoring commitments
would be destroyed.
- It is cold, hard fact that without U.S. assistance to Laos at
at least present levels, the present Government of Laos will
collapse and all military resistence there will cease.
? - -.With the collapse of Laos, the whole situation in Indo-China
could take a promised turn for the worse. A successor to the
present Lao Government might demand a halt to our bombing
and the four North Vietnamese divisions now being tied down
? in Laos would be free to fight in South Vietnam and Cambodia.
? This in turn might have a bearing on the President's China
initiative. It is imperative that we approach Peking as a world
power able to exercise influence'in Asia, and not as a defeated
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power being forces out under conditions amounting to a military
defeat.
Senator Stennis should know that the main purpose of Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma's visit to Washington was to receive
reassurances that we would continue to support his Government,
and compel the Communists to honor the Geneva Agreements on
Laos of 1962. It would be the shabbiest treatment for a dedicated
ally which has suffered enormously to be in effect betrayed by the 25X1
'is.
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