WHITE HOUSE ROLE IN MALTA NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-17-3-2-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

r
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-17-3-2-7
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET /OUTSIDE SYSTEM INF
SUBJECT: White House Role in Malta Negotiations
I ~~~ I ~'G~vLI
Since the Maltese elections in mid-June, the White House has been followin
Mintoff's moves and the development of US policy toward Malta on a close
and regular basis. There have been several noteworthy instances when the
White House has had to intervene to keep US policy on the desired track.
-- Immediately after Mintoff's victory, we revised State's business-as-
usual policy guidance message to Embassy Valletta to make it clear that
while the US wished to remain on the best of terms with Malta the nature of
our future relationship would depend on the course Mintoff chose to follow.
-- NSSM 135 on US Policy Toward Malta was issued in mid-July,
triggered by State's instructions to Embassy Valletta to raise the drydocks/
ship visit issue with Mintoff on a bilateral basis-at the very time when he
was attempting through such bilateral arrangements to play NATO nations
against each other.
-- During the drafting of the NSSM 135 response, the NSC representative
had to insist on the development of options recognizing US interests, including
continued NATO presence and future Sixth Fleet visits, at. a time when the
agencies had decided that Malta was a European problem and our sole interest
was in keeping the Soviets out.
_- Following exploratory talks with Mintoff in mid-July, the UK informed
NATO-members that they would have to help share the financial burden of any
new UK agreement with Malta. The White House had to kill State instructions
to our NATO representative stating that the US viewed Malta as a European
problem, "a concrete test of the Europeans' willingness and ability to take on
added security burdens. " At White House insistence the instructions were
revised to reflect that the US was considering assisting the UK.
SECRET/OUTSIDE SYSTEM
RP
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-17-3-2-7
O obey 1, \1971
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-17-3-2-7
1P Ir
SECRET/OUTSIDE SYSTEM -2-
-- The White House arranged for $5 millio
to be earmarked for the US contribution to the UK(NATO) package if required.
-- In late July/early August, when Mintoff was demanding an immediate
and unconditional $4. 8 million quick-fix to solve his immediate financial
crisis, the State Department adopted the UK view that there was in fact no
crisis. On August 4, the White House instructed State to inform Mintoff
that we were prepared to give him the quick fix with the understanding that
he would proceed to negotiate in good faith with the UK and to recognize US
interests.
While State was able to persuade the White House not to take this step, State
responded to White House pressure by undertaking to persuade the UK that a
quick fix payment would be required. By the time that the UK had reluctantly
agreed, Mintoff, of course, had solved his quick fix problem by accepting
cash from Libya, cash paid to him in return for his having ousted NATO from
Malta.
During the Malta negotiations we have had less than complete success in
getting State to clear policy-level instructions on Malta with the White House:
You will recall that on September 14, Mintoff
o ask what bilateral assistance the US was prepared to offer
House instructed State to inform the UK that we are attaching no new strings
to our contribution and that our payment will be forthcoming as soon as we
can work out transfer arrangements.
and 'to renew is request that you visit him. State, without clearing with the
White House, instructed our Charge to do little more than reiterate to Mintoff
our interest in Sixth Fleet visits, and not surprisingly this produced a
negative reaction from Mintoff.
- Following the Mintoff -Heath agreement of September 19, State, without
White House clearance, let it be known to the British that we are not planning
to pay our share of the UK(NATO) cash offer for six months, and that our
payment will hinge on successful conclusion of the negotiations. The White
SECRET/OUTSIDE SYSTEM
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-17-3-2-7