COMMUNIST PLANS FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-17-3-5-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 1, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/26: LOC-HAK-17-3-5-4
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
49 W,
0
1 16 19 71
SIC ET F NO7OP.N
October 1, 1971
MXMOR, 4.NGVM FOR., DR. RIG'G'ER
MEN H. HOlD
J , J (r
SU33ECT: Co mwaanist Plans for the South Vietnamese
Election
The Communists will employ a combination of political, m ilitaury.
and terror tactics to disrupt and exploit the math Vietnamese
presidential election. according to the Saigon Station. Chief a latest
field appraisal (Tab A); bowev*rr, , he predicts that those tactics will
have, only limited success.
Political Tactic
According to this CAA appraisal, the Cosa muntsts will place greatest
on using both propaganda and Physical coercion to dissuade
people from voting. Little attempt will be made actively to encourage
anti-71"U votiDi.
Basically the Communists hope to exploit the divisive forces unleashed
by the election issue. They also 800 the situation as an opportunity to
join and exploit legal opposition to the GYN.
The Station Chief believes that inordinate Communist preoccupaatiou with
the possibility of a coup has resulted in a xaegle,ct of plans to exploit the
election politically. As a result. few specific instructions seem to have
been sent from iiawt and COSVN to lower echelons leaving the latter
Somewhat on their own in pre -election planning. This has produced a
areas,
certain incoherence in Communist tactical planning. In numy areas,
local cadre baaavo been relatively inactive is combatting the election --
either in anticipation of a coup or because of failure to affect previous
elections significantly.
T /NQYQ*N
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/26: LOC-HAK-17-3-5-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/26: LOC-HAK-17-3-5-4
SIT
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Mtltta!x. Tactics
idon centers. A a-eecoasd response, would be to occupy rural
a coup occur, Communist plans call for military attacks against
areas left unprotected through the witbdrswal of ARYN farees to cope
with the coup in urb*u areas.
In any case, the enemy intends to initiate sour sort of "'high pointT4 prior
to the election. This wtil. probably consist of scattered attacks by fire
and sapper *tt*cks up to and through election day. Terror and sabotage will
probably also Increase. A subst'ant *l step-up is activity has already
occurred in t northwestern area of .l -3 and adjaet areas in Cambodia.
The motion Chief coucl ees that Communist military and political election
tactics will have osiy lixit success doe to GVN preparedness and the
~my's military and political lirnitetions.
We share the atioa Chief's basic conclusions; bow*vor, h* has probably
Overestimated enemy e*pectstions of a coup. The mmunists' assessment
of actual coup opportunities is probably more realistic than he in
in his appraisal. &?coat Gomzrunist stress on coup planning probably is
a combination of morale building propaganda and prudent contingency
the military wide, current enemy attacks on ARV forces at Krok
are probably designed to discredit the CYN on this evo of the election
through a Suoul-typo defeat of the ARVN.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/26: LOC-HAK-17-3-5-4