NEW COMMUNIST EMPHASIS ON COUNTERING PACIFICATION -- BACK TO BASICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-18-5-18-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 29, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-5-18-7
FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE W
INFORMATION
November 29, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
New Communist Emphasis on Countering
Pacification -- Back to Basics
A new emphasis on countering pacification is reflected in recent
articles in the North Vietnamese Army daily Quan Doi Nhan Dan (QDNID)
and in new COSVN instructions. Cadre have been instructed to return
to basics in rebuilding the political and military structure needed to
cope with the "temporary realities" of GVN success in the countryside.
Only recently do the Communists seem to have become fully aware that
their success in South Vietnam entirely depends on effectively countering
pacification. They had been concerned about the dangers of pacification
since early 1969 (if not before); however, they initially failed to realize
that, in the aftermath of the Tet offensive, the "accelerated pacification
campaign" would be far more successful than past such programs. Prior
to 1970, Hanoi probably also believed that the pacification effort largely
depended on the presence of regular Allied units. When large numbers
of ARVN forces were diverted from pacification during the Cambodian
intrusion, pacification, nevertheless, proceeded apace. Moreover, the
disruption of Communist logistics in Cambodia greatly aided pacification.
(COSVN Political Officer General Traci Do, in fact, publicly admitted that
the Cambodian intrusion gave the GVN an eight month gain in pacification.)
Hanoi began to realize that it had been ill-informed about the intrinsic
strength of pacification, and instructed cadre in the field to institute
their own "Hamlet Evaluation System" (HES). Subsequent VC "HES"
reports no doubt gave Hanoi a clearer idea of what it was up against in
the South Vietnam countryside. This, in turn, resulted in considerably
increased emphasis on countering pacification through a combination of
political and military measures. This approach, however, came to
naught because of a dearth of both political and military assets.
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w
In the meantime, other matters gained, priority. First came LAM
SON 719 and then the GVN election campaign. Only by exploiting the
political dissention and turmoil associated with the elections could
Hanoi hope to make any rapid political gains in the South. The Com-
munist side had, to a limited extent, even believed in the possibility
of an anti-Thieu. Coup.
These hopes failed to materialize and the Communists were largely
ineffective in exploiting a rare opportunity to improve their position in
the urban areas. Thieu won and was assured of continued U. S. support;
moreover, organized anti-GVN opposition crumbled. There no longer
remained. any hope of easy political gains, and the Communists were
forced to concentrate on the laborious, but essential, task of reversing
pacification through a step-by-step rebuilding of their apparatus in the
countryside -- going back to basics,
As QDND noted, in combatting pacification, the Communists have had
to conduct an "extremely fierce struggle".. and "retake one village and
hamlet after the other... This. has brought about major changes in the
war." The paper indicated that the "'anti-pacification fight" was essential
both to political gains (in the countryside and cities) and to main force
operations. It warned that this fight can "never be belittled or neglected
and we cannot be optimistic nor belittle the enemy schemes." This clearly
implies that, heretofore, pacification had not been realistically confronted.
Quan Doi Nhan Dan described in relatively sober detail pacification tech-
niques which, it asserted, are based on Sir Robert Thompson's theories
on the primacy of population control. The paper noted that whereas Kennedy
hoped to achieve pacification in 18 months and Johnson in two years, Nixon
(on Thompson's advice) advocates a 10 to 15 year program. Moreover,
unlike his two predecessors, Nixon sees pacification as "a basic strategic
measure" to be supported by "all military activities. "
According to QDND, the essential elements of "Nixon's very perfidious
pacification plan" are:
Relocating "compatriots" ("people-herding") to areas under GVN
control and turning the rest of the countryside into "deserts or no man's
lands" ;
SECRET
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-5-18-7
IRW
The Political Task
Both =ND and the COSVN instructions describe how "firm political
bases" are to be built. The latter stresses the.importance of exploiting
local anti-GVN grievances and carefully' selecting local GVN officials,
police, etc. for assassination. As L : ND put it: "By annihilating a
ringleader we frighten a whole unit." -
In implementing these instructions, local cadre -- those closest to the
people -- are to be given increased autonomy and flexibility in order to
increase grass roots support and rebuild the Party apparatus. Legal
cadre (those who live openly in GVN-controlled areas) are also to be used
to infiltrate and subvert bona fide groups and organizations as well as
GVN military and self-defense units.
In short, the Communists realize that little progress can be made in
combatting pacification without increased popular support - achieved
through either persuasion or force. As JDND stressed: "Only when the
masses are ideologically stirred and reorganized" will Communists be
able to "continue their protracted, fierce fight. " Recently in Peking
(November 2.0) Premier Pharr: Van Dong described the anti-pacification
effort as "the political struggle in the countryside. "
Shifts in Administrative Boundaries
The Communists have reportedly redrawn provincial and administrative
boundaries probably to enhance the new emphasis on grass roots political
organization. In Military Regions 3 and 4 there has been a consolidation
of provinces and subregions, disbanding of some provincial committees
(in MR 3) and the reassignment of many district cadre to the village level.
This move was designed to release scarce cadre for the lower level
political activity now being emphasized.
In the sparsely settled northern central highlands, four new provinces
have reportedly been formed along South Vietnam's western border.
Here the Communists might believe they have the best chances of 'building
"revolutionary 'bases." They do not expect the ARVN to penetrate this
remote area, as did U. S. forces. Moreover,, a higher level of infiltration
into this area provides more cadre for all levels than are available elsewhere.
Also,there is less need for indigenous cadre in the highlands.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-5-18-7
 No Objection to
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-- Creating a "very dangerous spy network," Phoenix, targetted
against the infrastructure; (The Communists have been far more con-
cerned about Phoenix than is generally realized.)
-- Deploying police to harass VC in the villages, a "new, barbarous
move of the enemy";
Fortifying villages defended by PSDF, police, an intelligence
network and "combat youth platoons";
-- Organizing village councils and family groups;
Establishing military posts near cities, along, main communication
lines and intersections and in "the concentration camps [resettlement areas]
and strategic hamlets" in order to "isolate the revolutionary forces in rural
areas and prevent the PLAF's strong attacks";
-- Conducting psychological warfare by creating a "fake prosperity"
in GVN-controlled areas, intensifying the Chieu Hoi campaign, and by
"sowing disunity and confusion among the people and stirring doubts about
the revolution. "
Measures to Counter Pacification
Building "Revolutionary Bases"
QDND stated categorically that "only by building firm revolutionary 'bases
can there be a strong anti-U. S. -puppet struggle movement. " It further
called for the building of "firm political bases" to be used in developing
the guerrilla forces and for fighting while strengthening these forces.
Significantly the paper cited Binh Dinh as a model province where "revo-
lutionary bases have grown stronger. " Binh Dinh is one of the few provinces
in which Communist main force units (2 regiments) are stationed on a con-
tinuing basis. U Minh, which also has main force units, was the other area
cited where "guerrillas still operated vigorously." This was probably an
unintended admission of Communist dependency on the presence of main
force units in developing "revolutionary bases" and in conducting the
guerrilla warfare needed to expand Communist control.
SECRET
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-5-18-7
Despite present emphasis on political action, the military aspect of
counter pacification has not been neglected. Here the emphasis is to
be on low level attacks against isolated outposts (to "smash the enemy's
rural defense system"), "strategic hamlets," and those marked for
assassination.
QDND further states:
-- "Only by smashing scores of enemy strategic hamlets in each
area" can the Communists enlarge areas under their control and "achieve
liaison among their bases. r'
-- "Only by smashing strategic hamlets and concentration camps in
large chunks" can a "new situation" be created and the GVN's rural defense
system be shaken.
-- "Only by launching concerted, large-scale offensive waves under
a unified plan will the southern armed forces and people be able to achieve
high combat efficiency, deal the enemy vigorous blows and demolish military
subsectors. Close coordination among the regional forces is of great sig-
nificance in supporting the regional people's forces in attacking fortified
positions and in smashing U. S. -puppet counteroffensives.''
QDND had also stated that the anti-pacification fight was to create "conditions
for the development of military operations in strategic areas." ("Strategic
areas" generally means where Communist main force units are based or
where they have the greatest advantage.)
Conclusion
Since the abortive Tet offensive, the Communists have been caught in a
vicious circle. The subsequent weakening of the Communist military and
political position in the countryside enabled the GVN to pacify a. large part
of the countryside. This, in turn, denied the Communists the supplies,
manpower, intelligence and other essential support mainly provided by
the population. Without this support, the main force units were hindered
in supporting the guerrilla forces essential to the infrastructure in con-
trolling the population - - and so on. In short, until more of the population
is brought under Communist control, the main force operations essential
to victory will be limited.
SECRET
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-5-18-7
W W
-Whether the new emphasis on building grass roots support will succeed
where all else has failed - remains doubtful. The downgrading of district
cadre to the village and hamlet level will, certainly create morale problems.
These cadre will no doubt resent such apparent demotions and furthermore
will be exposed to considerably greater danger in trying to work among the
population.
The granting of increased autonomy to local cadre has not worked too well
in the past. Without tight supervision and control, many cadre tend to
shirk their responsibilities and remain under cover. A principal strength
of the Communist side is its organization and discipline, and this will be
debilitated by increased lower level autonomy.
It will also be difficult for the Communists effectively to exploit popular
grievances in the countryside where GVN support is the strongest. Even
those opposed to the GVN still, in most areas, prefer it to Communist
control.
The new approach to pacification does not seem to anticipate much direct
main force support in the near future except along the fringes of South
Vietnam where these forces hopefully can engage the ARVN and divert it
from pacification tasks. Presumably Communist "regional forces "
(guerrillas, local forces, etc.) are to increase their efforts, in "close
coordination, ' during such main force encounters. This, however, will
be also easier said than done.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-5-18-7