FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON CHINA FROM JOHN S. SERVICE BASED ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO THE PRC AND TALKS WITH CHOU EN-LAI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: December 3, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
MEMORANDUM W
NATIONAL SECURITY
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR.
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DOS Review Completed.
f
INFORMATION Q..
Further Observations on China from
John S. Service Based on His Recent
Trip to the PRC and Talks with Chou
En-lai
At Tab A are four transcripts prepared by Marshall Green giving
John S. Service's impressions of his recent trip to China, and, his
recollections of talks with Chou En-lai. Mr, Green had, an informal
weekend with Mr. Service two weeks ago, and questioned, him on the
basis of lists of items prepared,by CIA and State.
Following are the key points contained in these transcripts:
Internal Chinese Political and Social Situation: Service was not
aware of any sense of tension or crisis during his October visit to the
PRC. Other than Yeh Chien-ying, there were no military leaders in
evidence; yet he did see the English language edition of a magazine with
Lin's picture on the cover (along with Mao). [We have
report from the PRC which asserts that the magazine was circulated to
foreigners to "mislead" them about the leadership crisis. ] After coming
out of China, Service discovered the news about Lin's alleged fall from
power. He says he remains at a loss to explain the situation. Be does
not now doubt, however, that Lin is out.
Service says that he doubts that Chou En-lai is the political "king-
pin" in the leadership. Chou is so preoccupied with foreign affairs, ob-
served Service,. that someone else --- or some group -- must be running
internal affairs behind the scene.
Service sensed no disagreement among the cadre over the
President's trip to Peking.
During his trip to Szechwan Province in China's south-west,
Service was struck by the lack of Uublic evidence of the military as an
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
S CRET
administrative force. -scialses_ were in civilian dross, and few military
vehicles were in evidence,, He said that because so few foreigners have
been to ,Szechwan in recent liars. there was exceptional (and fr3.d"s iy
public curiosity over his presence as he visited the city where he was born.
Service was struck by the ease of corramuiication access to the
'"outside world" from China. He called Hong Kong from Canton, and
Berkeley, California, from Peking, with no tr mblee.
Service was impressed. by the lack of social tension among the
population. People were "good to each other"; there did not seem to be
competitive pressures; and there was a great sense of confidence. He
was struck by the lack of differentiation in working sad social arrange-
I twoon the sexes. In contrast to Hong Kong, he found no srual themes as is so evident in Westena-style advertising.
Service felt that the Chinese would continue to invitee foreigners to
visit the PRC to establish a favorable impression abroad of "Socialist
construction" in the "now China. " When be asked Chou :n-lei about the
possibilfc ntef scholars and students coning to do research and study
Chou observed, "not this year. 1' Service sensed a lack of interest in
trade with the U. S. at this time.
-- Foreei nAffaia s- Taiwan is the pre-eminent problem concerning
Chinese loaders, according to service. They recognize that there can be
no overnight switch in U. S. policy toward the ROC. What seems essential
to them is that there be no U. S. promotion of "Taiwan independence. "
Chou En-l*i vaguely hinted to Service that he envisaged a "special economic
statues" for the island when reunited with the mainland, but no special
diplomatic status.
Oxon, En-lei, said Service, is seeking to undermine the U. S. -
Japan tie. As a condition for establishing diplomatic relations with Japan.
the PR.C may demand that the U. S. -Japan security treaty be abrogated.
China will continue to play on the desire of the Japanese to "Set to Peking
before the U. S. t" Service said he also expects the PRC to be active in
inviting overseas-Chinese and Taiwanese to the mainland in order to
further undermine support for the Nati.onaalist&.
Service said that Chou En-lei was not happy with the idea of ii. :a.
recognition of Mongolia as he sees the country as a Soviet paatppet.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
SECRET
service carried an oral message to Chou from Veng Ming-min.
P'*ug wants to establish contact with Chou through a visit to Peking.
W"h.u " eer'vicee raised P'eng's request. Chou waived it off with the
cosrrn nt that it P'e*g wants to send an enMssary* who is not publicly
identified with the "Taiwan tndependeuce Movement" he could do so.
The emissary can then report back to Pang.
SECRtET J141i1R1Bs,,psr ! I Z13/71
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
Louise
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
November 24,?1971,
'T
SECRET
Dear Henry:
you may be interested in looking over tthe
attached memoranda I prepared responsive questions put to me by the Agency as well as
Al Jenkins about -onskaboutihisSSiXpandsone-half
particular questx.
weeks in China.
Sincerely yours,
Marshall Green
Enclosures:
1. Memorandum to Mr. Jenkins
. Memorandum
The Honorable
-Henry `A. Kissinger,
Special Assistant to the president
for National Security Affairs,
The White House.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
V ,"., .,. - _ '' W
ton's request, could you staff
i
ns
Per W
the attached to Mr- Holdridge with an,
X number.
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
Wasliington, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STA-rE
SECRET
November 24, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. John Service
Responsive to your request of November 15, 1 gook.p,,
your list of questions with Jack Service in the course of iy
many hours of talks with him this past weekend. Since he was
not there as a reporter but rather as a tourist and guest of
Chou En-lai, he did not have much to offer on the particular
points you raised. Here are his responses, keyed to your
memorandum:
1. Central. Leadershi and Military-Civilian Relationshi,)s ?
Until he got back to Hong Kong,' Service was... completely
unaware of t.he Lin Piao episode. Even Jaci- Bel.ton,' a writer.,
WLLV WUV- _L' riLLLJW dLIUUL the L.LL1 L1.clU affair if anybody ULU Lit
foreign circles in China, said nothing about it in his
several meetings with Service.
Service received no coimnents or hints about the PLA
officials listed in your memo. The only official in that
group who as in evidence was Yeh. As for Lin, Service showed
me a little red booklet (which was a kind of memo pad) which
was handed out to all travelers on planes and trains which
had Lin's famous quotation (when sailing the seas, depend on
the helmsman) in Lin' s own calligraphy embossed on the cover.
Everyone knows that this is Lin's statement and writing.
Service recalls seeing in various places copies of the
October issue,of the Peoples' Pictorial with Mao and Lin on.
the cover. He obtained a copy of this in Hong Korgwhen he
learned for the first time about Lin's denigration. Service
commented that of course, the October issue was prepared
before September io all probability.
In talking with Adler, 1-Iayton and diplomats in Peking,
he heard about. many criticisms of the 516 Group and the Red
Guards. BOLI"L were depicted as extremists, dangerous elements.
On the other hand, he did not hear Lin''s name associated with
those groups, and Service himself is not clear with regard to
Lin's connections with the 516 Group.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23 : LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 . No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
r V
SECRET
No one commented on or alluded to the crash of the
Chinese plane in Mongolia. He did not know about the
episode until he got back to Hong Kong. Nor was there
any evidence of a political crisis or any comments about
the allocation of resources issues.
As for the military role in administration, everyone
was extolling the PLA for its patience, forebearance and
for the splendid role it had played in connection with Ythe
whole cultural revolution. There were no signs of any
antipathy or alarm with the PLA which seemed to be held
universally in high esteem. He was unaware of any changes in
the pecking order and detected no concern over military rank
or responsiveness to party discipline.
_ There was no fear expressed or adverse reaction to the
impending visit of President Nixon. The general reaction
seemed to be one of pleasure that President Nixon was coming
to China. It was seen as a feach r in the cap of Mao and China
and clear evidence that the world was now beating a path to
China's door. China had "arrived".
2. The Trip to Szechwan
Service saw several indications of continuing support for
Lin'Piao aside from those mentioned above. These evidences
were not manifested in Szechwan but elsewhere. In Yenan, his
guides Insisted on showing him Lin's wartime cave dwelling,
not that-of Chou though Service pressed hard to see it. Lin's
slogans were still widely evident. His calligraphy is still
popular. However, in Hangchou, near the end of his trip, he
found that all the pictures had been taken down. (Their
absence was clear from markings on the walls.) There was no
explanation for this phenomenon. No one professed to know why.
He saw no signs of nervousness on the part of local
leaders anywhere.
He had nd'intimations about the position and prospects
of Chang Kua-hua.
Local leaders did not comment about 'the events in
Peking or the news about canceling, the October parade.
His escort made no connent.aries about local officials.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
SECRET
Service did comment that Madame Mao was never mentioned.
He found this puzzling, and he commented that the implication
would seem to be she had lost popularity (if indeed she ever
had it).
3. Strategic and Security Observations During Trip
to Ch' eng-tu.
Service commented that he found it baffling there,wasno evidence of military movement to and from Ch'eng--tu. H&?,
saw no organized military movements with the following three
minor exceptions. Near Peking he saw 20 to 25 jeep-type cars
in formation but they seemed to be empty and were probably
being delivered somewhere. In Sian, he saw a small unit of the
military at drill. In Hangchou he saw a formation of motorcycles
with sidecars. But that was all. The Army was visible only in
the sense of there being a lot of army in uniform strolling
about the parks, visiting shops and mingling in the every-day
life. Only occasional sentries or guards were seen.
He did not see any public security troops, although
he saw quite a few policemen (unarmed) directing traffic. He
commented there were probably a lot of plain clothesmen.
To repeat -- if there was a crisis-in China, there were
no outward manifestations of it. On the other hand, as he
pointed out, he arrived in Peking 14 days after the famous
September IT meeting. There could have been evidences of a
crisis before he arrived.
4. Travel Controls.
Obviously there are a.lot of travel controls and restric-
tions, but he was completely in the hands of his Chinese hosts
and it was they who controlled the Services' passports and made
all the travel arrangements.
His_tr?p -were arranged by the Chinese Peoples Association
for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (sic)
As to freedom of movement and.contact, he and his wife
walked freely around Peking. Nobody followed them. The Game
was true in Shanghai.. However, elsewhere his movements were
rather closely controlled, not so much by his hosts as by other
factors. For example, in Ch'eng-tu and Chungking the Services,
being the first foreigners to visit those cities in many years,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
SECRET
were the center of great popular attention. Curious crowds
thronged about them wherever they went, ,with the result they
had no desire to wander out on their own.
He could make phone calls anywhere. There was a direct
dial system in Peking. When he was in-Canton, he called Hong
Kong. When he was in Peking, he called Berkeley, California
(via Tokyo) . - All mail the Services sent (they mailed many
letters, including about a dozen to my wife) was received
here in about '6 to 10 days. Letters were always mailed"frpm
the hotel or hostel post offices where they stayed. Interna-
tional air letters cost 43 cents postage, aerograms 12 cents.
Several letters sent by friends were not received and Service
commented this was probably due to the fact that our post
offices erroneously sent them to Taiwan. If so, Taiwan pro-
bably destroyed the letters.
There were no restrictions on the use of a camera
except when flying. At the beginning. of each flight it was
arinounced there could be no use of cameras, binoculars or
telescopes on the planes. However, it seemed perfectly all
right to use cameras and binoculars on the trains.
He was able to purchase books, magazines and tourist
items quite freely. These items were furnished gratis by the
hotels and hostels he visited. In fact, -there were all kinds
of magazines and papers in various languages (including Japanese,
Urdu, Swahili, as well as European languages). It was just a
matter of help yourself.
Travel today is far easier than during the war but more
difficult than before the war. Trains and planes are greatly
improved. The only question. is getting approval for travel to
various parts of China. In this connection, Owen Lat.tiinore,
though asked along with Service by Chou to visit China, is
holding back until he can get approval to visit Inner Mongolia.
-Jack Belton has managed to get permission to visit Sinkiang
and may be there now. The current emphasis seems to be on
letting foreigners visit those parts of China where they were
born or where,.they lived at one time.
Service commented that China does not seem to he
in% rested in tourism. Travel is allowed or en'couragccd only
for the purpose of impressing foreigners-and for other
pr:-paganda. reasons.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 MAY I 4 o El 00N
UNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
TO
oran aul7
J r r v %If 4n! o V L40 V/ J$ V
EA/ACA - Mr. Jenkins
EA - Marshall Green
November 23, 1971
SUBJECT: ? Conversation with Jack Service: Questions and Answers
The following are questions which you asked me to put to Mr.
'Service, which I did, and I accompany each question with his res-
ponse. The answensto some of these questions are, of course, covered
in his memorandum of conversation with Chou which you already have.
1. Question: Did Chou mention the leadership crisis in the PRC?
Answer: No
Q. Did Chou seem to feel that a deal with Taiwan was possible?
Did he refer to internal conditions in Taiwan? If so, did
he seem well informed on them?'
He did not refer to internal conditions in Taiwan and he
did not imply that a deal with Taiwan is really possible,
although conveying the idea that it was possible in US
circles this might have some value. Chou's main concern
was that the US might support a Taiwanese independence move-
memt after Chiang quits the scene. Chou feels that such an
independence movement could not succeed without US and
Japanest support. -
Q. As the price for raising Sino-British diplomatic representa-
tion to the Ambassadorial level, the Chinese_ are reported to be
demanding a much tougher statement on Taiwan than that asked
of the Canadians or others. Specifically, they seem to want
some sort of reiteration of the 1943 Cairo Declaration (pro-
mi_sing that sovereignty over Taiwan would be returned to
China at war's end) and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation
(declaring that the terms of the Cairo Declaration would be
carried 'o1 t+. Did Chou En-lai allude to or imply this kind
of double s tanda"rd for signers of the Cairo Declaration in
your discussion with him of the Taiwan problem?
CONFIDENTIAL
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
CONFIDENTIAL
A. Chou did not refer to the Cairo Declaration in his private
talks with Service, but he did mention it in passing in his
talk to the 70 Americans (including Huey Newton). However,
Service cannot recall exactly the context in which he
mentioned it or precisely what he said about the Cairo
Declaration. Certainly it was not in the context of the
above question.
What did Chou have to say about Japan? Its relationship
with Taiwan? Korea? Southeast Asia? Did he *seein genuinely
concerned about Japanese militarism?
A. Chou did not have much to say about Japan except that it
was a creature of the US and that he was concerned over
Japan's relationship to the Taiwanese independence move
ment. He said that we must guard against the future
possibility of Japanese militarism, but he did not seem
particularly concerned over that' possibility. Huang Hua (in
his conversation with Service in Ottawa) seemed far more
concerned over that issue. Chou said nothing about Japan's
relationship to ::ores or SEA.
According to Jack's interpretation of Chou's viewpoint,
Chou is seeking to undermine ties between the US and Japan
and that if Japan wants to normalize diplomatic relations
with the PRC, it will quite possibly require that Japan.
scrub the US-Japan Security Treaty.
Service further commented that anti-Japanese feeling is being
whipped up in various parts of. China through films depicting
the Sino-Japanese War and putting Japan in the worse possible
light. Such films were beii.ig shown, for example, in the hostel
in Ch'engtu, a theater in Chungking and a theater in Canton
during his trip.
5. Q. When Chou talked about domestic policy in the PRC did he
invoke authoritative statements by Chairman Mao, or did
he speak on his own authority?
A. The impression'was that he was speaking on his own authority.
Probably "as Mao said" crept into his conversation from
time to time, but since this is'such standard conversational
forin,Service just cannot recall. It was his definite
impression, though, that Chou was very much in command (this
will be covered in a separate memorandum).
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
W
CONFIDENTIAL V
3.
Was there any hint of Chou's attitude toward expanded
travel and cultural exchange between China and the US?
Any hint of when a Chinese group might be expected to come
here?
Service brought this up several times with Chino and Chang
of the Foreign Office. Chou raised the subject with the
group of 70 Americans. He J.ndicated that there would be
more Americans in China with more freedom of travel, but
when service pointed out that there would be many Americans
who would like to visit China for study and research
Chou's answer was that the time was not right for that; now
is the time for people-to-people contacts. Service asked
about Americans visiting the Trade Fair and was told "not
this year".
7. Q. In discussion of US-Chinese trade, was there mention of PRC
assets frozen in the US? The "China differential" in US
strategic trade controls? Any hint of the PRC's willingness
to begin direct trade?
A. ivo.
No.
At John Davies' request, Service asked about casein purchases
from China. His question was ignored. His total impression
of trade was there is no prospect of direct trade at the
present- time.
8.
Did Chou appear surprised that the PRC had won in the UN
this year?
A. The answer is yes. In fact, his conversation with Chou
which tools play don Oct. 27, two days after the surprise
vote in the UN /resulted in evident confusion for the Chinese
Foreign Office. They had clearly been caught off guard.
Throughout his three-hour conversation with Chou, there were
constant interruptions with regard to developments in NY.
Chou barked orders to Chang Wen Chin, head of the American/
European Section. of the Foreign Office who was sitting in
on the meeting. Chang would then disappear to carry out
these orders which related to arrangements for China's
participation in the UN.
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 ? . I No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
V
CONFIDENTIAL 4.
What does Service think the Chinese reaction to US recogni-
tion of Mongolia would be?
China would probably not be happy about our recognizing
Mongolia. This would be seen as the US catering to the
Russians and China would be suspicious of our using Mon-
golia to spy on China. The Chinese have simply given up on
Mongolia and see it as a completely Soviet satrapy.
10. Q. is there a direct evolutionary relationship discernible
between life in the Yenan of the ' 40s and the Pl.C in the
'70s? In retrospect, are there features of life in the
PRC which Service would have found impossible to predict
from his experience in Yenan -- i.e., were there surprises?
A. There is definitely a discernible evolutionary relationship,
between the Yenan experience and China today. The Yenan
exper4ence provided the roots of the cultural revolution
and the great sense of confidence,.uplift and do-it-yourself
spirit of 1971. In other words, the Yenan spirit was
revived by the cultural revolution. Sending students and
nndres to tfiR Mnv 7 srl-hnn't s for ?sel f -reinvi.pnrat-i.nn and
the swarming of "volunteers" to work in the countryside are
expressive of the Yenan spirit.
Yes, there were surprises. He was surprised by the lack of
tautness and tension; by the way people are so"good to each
other". There is true egalitarianism; there is no swearing.
The peopl-es' needs are taken care of; the pace of life is..
relatively easy and smooth, even though the people continue
to work hard. The current system has removed competitive
pressures.
latter
Certainly this / is surprising in the wake of excesses of
the cultural revolutionary period.
11. Q. One of the main themes of the Chinese dynastic history is the
corruption of the dynastic founder and his followers by the
availability of luxuries after they-have achieved power.
What contrasts axe there between the life-styles of CCP
leaders today and those they led in Yenan? if the contrasts
are at all significant, how would Service assess their impact
on the long-term vitality of the regime?
A. The leadership has preserved a relative degree of austerity
in the wake of the cultural revolution, but it is hard to
say how the top brass really lives. Obviously they avoid
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
CONFIDENTIAL
evidences of high living, but what they have and hold is
anyone's guess. Probably little. What luxuries there are
for the leadership is in the form of bureaucratic privileges,
good food (which most Chinese now have) and probably com-
fortable living quarters. In the latter connection, there
were lots of hostels for cadres. These-hostels are luxurious
with big rooms and suites.
12. Q. What changes are there in the Yenan and Ch'engtu of today
by contrast with their state in 1944-45?
A. Yenan is no longer an important center except as a mecca
for the CCP. Conditions of life in Yenan are improved
of course with land terracing, waterworks, and improved
housing. In Ch'engtu the countryside has not changed as
much because it was always well -irrigated. However, canals
have been straightened now as property rights have been
transferred to the state, and double cropping is generally
practiced, unlike the old days. The cities have changed
in. Szech'uan. There are wider streets and lots of parks.
The roads are paved in the cities and some in the country-
side. Most roads are in good repair. There is considerable
industrialization. There are two bridges in Chungking (where
there were none before), one?a railway bridge over the
Yangtze some miles out of Chungking, the other is a rail/
vehicular bridge across the river which joins the Yangtze
at Chungking. There are cable cars on the high embankments
of Chungking.
13. Q. What: sort of treatment did the Black Panther delegation
receive in Peking, and what was their deportment while there?
A. Black Panthers seem to be treated with normal courtesies.
They were polite and discreet and not too far out in dress.
They claim to have had a private talk with Chou En-lai.
There was some talk of Huey Newton having been snubbed by
Chou, but what in fact happened was that Chou turned to him
at the end of the conversation with 70 Americans to express
the hope that when next Newton came to China he would come
with a multiracial group. (Service explained that Chou was
impliedly criticizing the Black Panthers for having too
narrow a base.)
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 i
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
W
CONFIDENTIAL 6.
14. Q. Does Service have any information on the "American young
j people's grou" led by Carmelita Hinton, which is reported
to be working on the Tachai Commune?
15.
A. This group turned out to be a bunch of kids who went down
to a commune where most of them got sick and wherce most of
them are now returning from their bleak experience. Their
leader, Carmelite Hinton, is "slightly daft". There is.
another group like that one from France which is, now,goirig
out into the communes, probably with the same results. , _
Q. How close to standard is the Mandarin spoken in Szech'uan and
other areas far from Peking these days?
A. The national language, Mandarin, is being pushed everywhere
but in Szech'uan the dialect is close enough to Mandarin
so that people don't feel they really have'to change. Hence,
there hasn't been much change in the use of Mandarin in
Szech'uan, whereas in places like Canton, where the dialect
is very different, one notes the striking effect of national
language. Service commented on the sharp contrast between
Kwangtung, where Mandarin is widely understood, and Hong
Kong where he was not understood.
16. Q. After having been to the PRC, does Service have any sub-
stantive differences with the accounts of conditions there
presented by Reston and other American and Canadian journalists
who lackyService's extensive experience and expertise?
A. Service has no substantive differences with the accounts
of conditions presented by Reston and others; it is merely
a question of emphasis. He would emphasize certain things
they do not. He doesn't recall anything in their writings that
he found really wrong. Of the writers, Ed Snow seems to be
the soundest. There seems to be general agreement among
the visitors about the visibles like the abundance of food,
but it is in the interpretation that considerable differences
appear
17. Q. Does Service subscribe to the reports of complete egalitarianism
in interpersonal relationships?
A. Yes. Additionally, women are given complete equality with
men. There is no exploitation of sex'. Women and men share
the same kinds of work. The total effect is one of whole- -
someness but, from the Chinese viewpoint, unattended by a
feeling of drabness that might be the Westerner's conclusion.
m~ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
W 1 1W
CONFIDENTIAL
For the Chinese, life as a whole is so much better.that
there is a positive, favorable reaction to the state of
society today. Service spoke of the cultural shock one
receives in arriving in Hong Kong (where sex is exploited to the
nth degree) after 6 1/2 weeks in China.
18. Q. Reports from China in recent times have been overwhelmingly
favorable to the regime and the society. What negative
factors has Service observed? _
A. There are negative factors, of course. These are not so
much in the eye of the beholder as in the mind of the
experienced observer. The latter wonders what is going to
happen next. Mao may be a God, but who succeeds him? And
how can this transformation be negotiated peacefully? More
importantly, there is no room for dissent and even though
the regime is effectively persuasive today this is achieved
through moral oppressiveness. The people are enthusiastic
now but will they continue to respond to the regime? Nor
is there any place for intellectuals or elitists in the
system. The universities are "a?disasteii area today". Thus,
how is china to obtain the high skills required for real
advancement?
. CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 UN' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
eon"annd'm2
EA/ACA - Mr. Jenkins
SUBJECT:
Marshall Green
P' eng Ming-min
w
je
P'eng called Jack Service before his departure to ask
that he put in ,a good word with Chou En-lai so that.P' eng
could visit China and otherwise establish contact with Chou.
When Jack raised this with Chou, the latter waved
the request aside ,.but'said he would be willing to see
Taiwanese who are unconnected with the Taiwanese independence
movement. In Chou's own words (as best Jack could recall):
"Any friends of P'eng who have not taken part or approved
of the Taiwan independence movement can: come here and then
report back to P'eng."
cc: Amembassy Taipei
" Tokyo
EA/ROC - Mr. Mosher
EOB - Mr. Holdridge
SECRET
rr f ....... T).._j. n....r r .r > ., ..,,rr r? +.r
W~1wYY r.NrYIY IV.1 t?41.
til ../. wr. rl+.bw Lv.rwJ .1 t6.bYN1 Y.J 010 ?1*1. A.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
DATE: November 27, 1971
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
W
SI CRET/.`3I..N$ ITIVL
MEMORANDUM FOR', TH17. RECORD
December 2, 1971
SUBJECT: Observations by Mr. John. Service Regarding his
Recent.Trip to Chang
In this final memorandum on my conversations with jack.
Service, I cover his random observations about US-Chinese
relations and issues in those relations. For purposes of
brevity, his- observations are put in the first person singular.
In other words, from now on "I" equals Service..
~c ~ h ~F ?h 7'c ~'r ~ 9k 9c ~c .
All the offi.c'i.ais I met were curious about President
Nixon -- what makes him tick? What: are his motives in opening
this ' dia logue with China? How strong is the China lobby? Why
is the US so attached to Chiang Kai-soak? I was also asked
a lot of questions about anti-war sentiment in the US, and
it was clear to mp.. f-hAt- tllp P1~C may he a V:i~"trjm11 of it ` cwrL
propaganda in exaggerating the strength of leftist anti-war
groups in the US. When, I was asked how President Nixon managed
to cope with this strong mounting sentiment, I replied that
his Vietnarnizaticn program had diffused the more mod-erate anti-
war sentiment, and as a result the mass movement-against the
war had declined: I commenced that as long as President Nixon
gave clear evidence of winding down the war he would probably
succeed in blunting'the, opposition and keeping it manageable.
Mao cultism. and hysteria are way down. It may be that
the Chinese are sensitive of foreign criticisms of excessive
worship of Mao, but they are also probably pretty sick of all
the book-waving. ; They may also be thinking of the day when
Mao isn't around.
During Chou's meeting 'with representatives of the Black
panthers and of ",Young Lords", he was at paths to point out how
every good Marxist kno rs.. that the correct policy is to
negotiate and sometimes not-to negotiate. Chou. recounted the
long record, of negotiations between China and the US and USSR.
"Thus, when Nixon sacy he wnnL-s to come to China, our response.
is that we will ttolk to hian."
SEE,CRFT/SEF,NS:rrxv
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
W r
S1.CR1!'.T/S NrITI
VE
.
W
I just dar.' t. think that Chou Is kingpin. There is some
other man or men ox group that is running. the country. How
could Chou run the country when he is so deeply preoccupied
with. foreign affairs, ceremonies and greeting people? He is
a super . an, but China's domestic problems are so vast that not
even a superman could do what Chou is now doing and still have
control of internal affairs.
As for the :mystery about: Li.n. Piao's disappearance, this
was something that was completely unknown to me or suspected by
me during all. my 'stay in China. since returning to the States,
I have heard all kinds of theories about what is happening in
China., but I have little to go on in terms- of my own resources
and impressions. ' however, Lin had such a close relationship to
Mao that to me it is unthinkable that he would attempt to
assassinate Mao or even do him in. Moreover, I am not satisfied.
with any of the theories I have heard about Liin's disappearance.
I rather doubt: that the Army would resist. efforts to re-vitalize
the CCP or that the Army would deeply resent di.e ianpending Chou--
Nixon talks since t:Lne Chinese leaders do? nxot feel, they have made,
any concessions ang stand, to gain. Such talks can be explained
in Marxist terms; As to the allocation-of-priorities theory,
Linn stood against Pang Te-huai on the same sort of argument.
In any case I heard no criticisms of Lin, only rieual references
to him. Of course, he has never been a popular figure and it
.would be unlikely that people would refer to him in conversations.
His picture continues to appear in local. pictorials, and his
well.-known. call igiaphy and sayings were-seen-in-various par. is
of China I visited. On the other, hand, I do not deny the over-
whel.inyng, eVidence that Lin and. ot:l:uer PLA leaders are out. It is
simply that I cannot find Adequate explanations for this
phemvnenon.
of course it could be partly an effort on the part of the
regime to prodtic.e a scapegoat to explain things that might go
wrong and td warn the people against leftist devia t ionism just
as they had earlier been warned against right;-wing d.ev.ia.tionisin
when Liu was si.mil.a y- purged.
The problei i' of Taiwan is pre-eminent:. Chou recognizes
t hot the 1JS cannot switch its policy overnight and that some
evolution will lie required. Meanwhile, fron, Peking's viewpoint,
it: is c sentia.l -that: the US not pa .mote or encourage in any
way Taiwan's ind.epcnnden:ee or be involved in the Taiwanese
' Independence Movement. A reduction of US Forces on. Taiwan would
of course be welcomed but would not be a very i-u-por_ t:ant: factor.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9
SrCR1,T1SENSi:TIV . 3.
Chou vaguely hinted that some special economic stett.ts
for Taiwall might be possible, but that Taiwan could not have
separate diplomatic status. (This arose during his discussion
of P' eng Ming-min.) In, other words, Chou appreciates that
there will be many problems in 'bring Taiwan back to the fold
and that Peking will therefore not require. that the Taiwanese
be amalgamated ismedia rely but in accordance with processes
that could be worked out. Since there cannot be two govea'rvneat:s
of China, Peking will presumably require that the US eventually
scrap its bilateral cormniLment to Taiwan. I would also conclude
that Peking is hopeful that the US will not extend its cowaim:it-
ment to Taiwan beyond Chiang. The ? PRC can wait until. the old
man goes.
Peking will. undoubtedly play upon Japan's desires "to get
to Peking first" ahead of the Americans, isolating Sato on
the China question by overtures to Opposition leaders and certain
factional leaders within the LDP.
We can also expect that Peking will be inviting various
Taiwanese and overseas Chinese to visit: the Mainland., thereby
breaking down. whs t support the IM T now has in overseas. Chinese
circles and contributing to a progressive feeling of isolation
in Taiwan. In this regard, leaders of the Chinese-Chamber
of Commerce of San Francisco, have been invited to China. It
is likely tlhrat: they will' come back enthusiastic about the PRC.
These leaders have. been pro-KMT.
Marshall Creen
cc: Mr. Richard. Solomon, NSC11A/ACA - Mr. Jenkins
CIA S1 CTR11T/SSNS ITTVF
i No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23: LOC-HAK-18-6-24-9