LON NOL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN PHNOM PENH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-19-1-36-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: December 9, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/30: LOC-HAK-19-1-36-0
MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Late last week, Sirik Matak, Chief of State Cheng Heng, and members
of the FANK General Staff appealed to Lon Nol to coordinate the
direction of military operations and to use established command
the magnitude of the government defeat.
Six. All of the Embassy, military, and CIA. reports we have seen
indicate that Lon Nol's mismanagement contributed substantially to
and ineffective handling of the recent Chenla II operation along Rout
friction in Phnom Penh. Specifically at issue is Lon Nol's arbitrary
December 9, 1971
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE
Lon Nol and Political Problem
in Phnom Penh
Recent Khmer military reverses have created serious political
channels. According to all reports, Lon Nol rejected these ideas
out of hand.
As a result, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak are now at loggerheads, although
relations between the two have not yet been permanently damaged. As
you know, the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak axis has been the major stabilizing
factor in the political scene, and the question now is whether that
relationship will survive the current difficulty. If it does not, Lon
Nol would probably remain in power, but would be more isolated and
even less effective.
Sirik Mats only American intervention
we persuade Lon Nol to take six month's rest abroad.
could prevent a government crisis of major proportions. He urged that
CIA's Far East Division chief in Washington,
that
Matak means what he says, and that we should act before it is too late.
told me today
CEC ]1 T
DOS and JCS reviews
completed.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/30: LOC-HAK-19-1-36-0
INFORMATION
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/30: LOC-HAK-19-1-36-0
T
A.mbasasdor ;watek also regards th* situation as very serious,
at is st report he do a not believe that we should intervene directly
(Tab a). he it stressing the need for Khmer qty and solidarity as
appropriate. (Rewev'er, wa sk may have filed his cable before
receiving word of Matak's direct appeal. )
omment. 1 agreed iwt the situation is serious and C "t
we should consider taking actions of some tort. These might include:
? Getting to Lon Not through his doctor and move him out of the
country for deal tree$tineeaat, either to a ti. ,'~. facility or elsewhere
as appropriate (he was considering going to Japan for a check-tip some
weeks back).
.__ Having Admiral McCain, Geentraal ibra,ma or + neral Weyand
approach Lean ;dead for a heart-to-heart military talk, st.reasing the
need for military professionalism. I. e. getting Lou Not out of the
direct chain of command. It eeaaccesrafal, this would alleviate the rot
of the politicaat friction as well, and allow Lou Merl to remain to the
country.
Instructing Ambassador wank to i*teercedee with Lon #ol, easing
tally the saaxnee argument at above.
I have asked the CIA to forw*rd any suggestions it might have for easing
the problem.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/30: LOC-HAK-19-1-36-0