BACKGROUND MEMOS FOR YOUR TRIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-199-3-11-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: December 7, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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4W.Kt I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
7 December 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Background Memos for Your Trip
Attached are the following background memos and estimates
which I thought you might find useful in preparing for your
forthcoming trip to the Middle East:
-- CIA Memo, "Syria's Rulers and Their Political
Environment." This short memo is intended to give
you a general feel for the political environment within
which you will be operating in Damascus.
MORI C03014558 Pgs
2-11 ONLY.
W. E. Colby
Director
SECRET
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MEMORANDUM:
SUBJECT : Syria's Rulers and Their Political Environment
The Men
Syria's leaders are soldiers, socialists, and from the
provinces rather than the big cities. They are also relatively
young, mostly in their early forties. Each of these characteristics
effects the nature, outlook, and policies of the government in
Damascus.
The arm has been the principal agent of political change
in Syria since that country achieved its independence at the
end of World War II, ruling directly or in association with
political groups for most of that time. Once celebrated for
the frequency of its military revolts, Syria is no longer the
erratic coup-prone cockpit of inter-Arab politics it wa"s in the
1950s and early 1960s. President Asad, a career officer and
former head of the air force, reached the heights of power by
carefully building a network of well-placed supporters in the
army. He continues to maintain this system; his brother commands
a key security unit, for example. Asad was a founding member
of a group which has been dominant within the Syrian army -- the
military organization of the Baath Party -- for over ten years.
He survived many changes within that group until he cane to
control it himself.
The Arab Socialist Baath (Resurrection) Pa. , he
vehicle through which Asad governs. Founded in ascus a quarter
century ago with the goals of liberating and unifying all Arab
countries, it has been an important force seeking to develop
socialism in an Arab framework. It has been plagued with
factionalism, and rival Baath organizations now govern Iraq and
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came. Syria's socialism is a moderate one; half the economy is
in private hands.
Key military figures, including President Asad, Defense
Minister Talas, and Interior Minister Zaza, as well as a
majority of cabinet members and civilian Baath Party leaders
are from provincial towns and villages. These men have supplanted
Syria's former rulers, who were drawn from merchant-absentee
landlord families, centered in Damascus, Aleppo and other cities
and were almost exclusively Sunni Muslim in religion.* In the
late 194Qs, when Hafiz al-Asad was a secondary school student,
about to join the Baath Party, it was inconceivable that he,
from an undistinguished provincial family and an Alawi as well,
could become President of Syria. The position was legally
reserved to a member of the dominant Sunni Muslim majority and
an urban leader of that community always filled it. It is a
measure of the change that the Baath and the soldiers have wrought
in Syria that members of minority groups, once relegated to
secondary status, now may legally occupy any position in the
country.
Republic (1958-1961). Since taking power in 1963, the Baa.th
and its soldiers have concentrated on Syrian concerns and
interests, with particular attention to improving social and
economic conditions for the rural areas from which its leaders
failure of Syria and Egypt to make a success of the United Arab
Syria, each claiming to be the sole legitimate party. Broader
Arab considerations were pushed into the background after the
The relative youth of Syria's leaders has meant that their
politically formative years came after Syria won independence.
In those years, the key political issue of the country came to be
the struggle of nationalists and progressives against the
traditional leadership exercised by important families which
combined large land holdings, commercial interests and political
* Seventy percent of Syria's people are Sunni (orthodox) Muslims.
Minorities, such as Alarai Mustims, who make up ten percent of the
population., and Christians in the past could not aspire to the
highest military and civilian posts. (See Annex for further detail.)
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power. Syria's leaders of today are less concerned with the
imperialists as enemies than, say, Nasser was. Moreover, the
Syrian rulers have conclusively won out over the former ruling
class.
Their Administration
Syria's leaders are proud of their record in office over
the past decade. They have provided Syria with its longest stretch
of stable government since independence. The only significant
change between 1966 and the present occurred in November 1970 when
Asad ousted his rivals within the Baath ruling group. Those
rivals had born responsibility for the abortive Syrian military
incursion into Jordan in support of the fedayeen in September 1970.
Since_Asad carried out his "corrective movement", as the event is
known in Syria, he has extensively restaffed the upper echelons
of the Party and government with his own supporters. Domestically,
the Asad administration has done little that is different from its
predecessor. It has pushed ahead improving the administration,
trying to involve the population politically in a variety of mass
political organizations, and working for economic betterment.
Politically, Syria is a country of the left; the center
and right of Syrian politics were destroyed by the early 1960s..
But it is a moderate leftism. Baath Party members hold the principal
cabinet posts and dominate the administration, education, and the
press. Other leftwing political movements, including the Communist
Party, are included in a National Progressive Front, the. cabinet,
and a virtually powerless People's Assembly. Only the Baath is
allowed to conduct political activity in the army.
Syrian pride and self respect at the achievements of recent
years have undoubtedly been bolstered by the recent fighting,
in which the Syrian forces gave a respectable account of themselves.
It is in fact a measure of Asad's confidence in the solidarity of
his position, in the degree of authority he had, and of Syrian
self-confidence in general that he agreed with Sadat to plan the
dual attack on Israel, and that they actually carried it out (this
involved a degree of state-to-state cooperation and trust, unique
in post-World war II Arab affairs).
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The Syrian Army has long been riven with factionalism, and
this carries with it the possibility of efforts to change. the
leadership of the country by force. An attempt on Asad's life
was made during the summer of 1973. Personal and factional in-
fighting could, therefore, lead to Asad's ouster. Lacking
extensive information on political attitudes of Syrian officers,
we cannot gauge this with any precision. But the Syrian officer
corps has, by virtue of its members' social origins and because.
advancement has been chiefly for loyalty to the Baath Party,
become a fairly homogeneous group. If Asad were overthrown,
his successor would most certainly be an officer of the Baath
persuasion, sharing many of the same domestic social and economic
goals. But Asad is noted for his pragmatism; a successor might
be more of an ideologue or might not have the same views on foreign
affairs.
Attitudes Toward External Matters.
Syria has been a bitter opponent of Israel since 1948. In
addition, Syria. retains legacies deriving from a longstanding pro-
Palestinian involvement. Damascus was an early and vigorous
supporter of fedayeen extremist action against Israel. Since
Asad took control, he has endeavored to make the fedayeen in Syria
and, to the extent possible, in Lebanon responsive to the interests
of the government in Damascus. But there is domestic opinion
favoring Syrian policy strongly supportive of Palestinian rights.
The existence of this opinion -- which is not measurable to any
precise degree -- does put limitations on Syrian freedom, on how
far and fast Asad could go in dealing with the Israelis. This is
a constraint which, for example, does not effect Egypt to any.
serious extent.
Syria's relations with the West in modern dimes have been
on the poor side. Damascus was a principal home of the Arab
independence movement. Between the two world wars, Syrian politics
consisted largely of a struggle to oust the French from the
mandate over Syria.. In the first decade of independence, Syrian
politics centered on a struggle by nationalists and progressives
to oust the conservative, monied landlord-merchant class, which
looked to the West for support. Syria was an early opponent of
US efforts to construct a Middle East defense grouping in the 1950s.
and otherwise to deny the Middle East to the Soviets. Moreover,
Syrian leaders have lively memories of efforts sponsored by the
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West in 1956 and 1957 to overthrow the left-leaning government
in Damascus. The US took particular blame for its sponsorship
of the 1957 attempt. Three diplomats were expelled, and evidence
presented in the trials of accused plotters severely incriminated
the US along with some neighboring states.
The Syrians have not let an antipathy to the West -- which
has moderated some in recent years -- lead them into Eastern arms
either. The Baathists are on good terms with a variety of
communist and socialist parties and with communist states as
diverse as Yugoslavia and North Korea. The Soviets are looked on
as good friends, but Syria has avoided some of the closeness that
Egypt and Iraq have from time to time exhibited. For Damascus,
friendship with the Soviet Union is a two-way exchange, in which
Syria. gains certain advantages but which must not infringe on
Syrian independence.
In the present. tricky situation, Syria wants to get back
territory, but is uncertain and afraid of playing a card lest. it
fail to win the point and the card be wasted. Hence, Damascus'
propensity for letting others set the pace comes to the fore.
Syria has backed part way into accepting Resolution 242, when
other Arabs have openly done so., has agreed to receive the Secretary
now that he has been welcomed in many other major Arab capitals,
and probably will edge into other moves. The Syrians' attitude
will continue to be one of caution, "how far can we go without
losing face." It will probably be accompanied by a sort of
truculence in handling matters which will involve inconsistencies.
The Syrians did this in 1972, when they simultaneously made noises
about improving relations with the US and held a travelling US
diplomat prisoner for several weeks. They are doing something
analagous now, holding Israeli war-prisoners, when release would
seem to promise Israeli concessions in return.
The Syrians hate to be thought of as weak or subject to
pressure. They have done a pretty good job of resisting outsiders
both eastern and western, of building a new social system, of
establishing themselves as important in Arab councils, and even of
fighting Israel. But they are still not sure of themselves and of
their position, and they continue to take refuge in truculence and
negativism, attitudes which will be at least as apparent on the
peace issue as on any other important Syrian interest.
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ANNEX
DOMESTIC FACTORS IN THE SYRIAN SITUATION
The Political Role of the Armed Forces
1. The Syrian Army became a major factor
in political life immediately after the French
departed in 1946. It has ruled the country
directly or in association with political groups
for more than half the time since independ-
ence. It had a principal part in bringing Syria
into the United Arab Republic (UAR) in
1938 and was the agent of the breakup of that
union in 1961. Faction has succeeded faction
in control of the armed forces over the past
25 years.
2. The Baath Party became the political in-
strument of the Syrian Army in the 1960s.
Founded in Syria in the early 1940s, with
the goals of freedom, socialism, and pan-Arab
unity on a secular basis, it was a civilian party
until 1963. During the era of the UAR, Syrian
officers assigned to Egypt for what Nasser
viewed as political unreliability, clandestinely
founded a Baath military organization sepa-
rate from the main Party. This group master-
minded a coup on 3 March 1963; collaborating
with civilian Baathists who shared their anti-
Nasser and Syria-first sentiments, these of-
ficers took over the Party and ousted its
founders in a second coup of February 1966.
3. The officers who came to dominate the
army in the 1960s represent a- sharp break
with Syria's traditional political leaders. The .
latter had come from the landlord-merchant
class, centered in the big cities and primarily
Sunni Muslim. As the Syrian Army grew from
a few thousand at independence to 30-40
thousand in the 1950s, it needed more officers.
Under the mandate, the French had recruited
security forces from rural areas and small
towns, especially minority regions. With the
city population lacking a tradition of military
service, rural youth had substantial oppor-
tunity to seek economic and social advance-
ment by enrolling in. the military academy..
The officer corps, now largely from rural
backgrounds, contains a much greater number
of members from minority groups than those
groups' proportion in the total population.
Alawi Muslims are especially prominent.
4. Many Syrian officers took up the Baath
doctrines of secularism and moderate socialism
(the Baath's goal of Arab unity lost much of
its appeal during the UAR period). Once
they rose to power, such officers sought to
improve the lot of the peasants and of the
lower middle classes from which they had
come. Secularism, in the twin sense of giving
SECRET
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less of an official place for Islam and of
abolishing the practice of reserving certain
posts for certain sects, had great appeal to
the minority representatives and they have
done much to advance it. Popular sentiment
still insists that the president be a Muslim;
the incumbent is an Alawi, in a post formerly
reserved for a Sunni. But other positions in
the cabinet or in the government are no longer
reserved for members of particular sects. In
the armed forces, of 13 prominent general
officers, 4 are Alawis, 6 are Sunni, and 3, in-
cluding the Chief of Staff, are Christian. (In
the 1950s, a Christian officer could aspire only
to head the ve'erinary or quartermaster corps.)
Seats in the People's Council are now dis-
tributed on the basis of social origins (over
half must be workers or peasants) in place
of the former distribution on the basis of
religion.
5. The Syrian armed forces are the regime's
principal support; they include a 100,000-man
army organized into three infantry and two
armored divisions, an air force of 9,000 men
and some 400 aircraft, a 7,500-man air defense
force, and a navy of 2,000 men and 8 missile
patrol boats. The military establishment ac-
counts for half the regular budget. The army
has had no difficulty in maintaining internal
security on the few occasions it has been
called upon to do so in recent years, but its
record "against external forces is poor. Israel
seized the heavily-fortified Coian }lei hts in
Jordan defeated and
repulsed a Syrian tank force which moved to
support fedayeeri in 1970. The Syrian Army's
crsrpetence has been adversely affected by
the political ambitions of its members and by
the Policy; of promotion and assignment for
loyalty to the Party or its leader,
8. Syrian military personnel are also as-
signed in some numbers to Saigah, the
Damascus-sponsored fedayeen organization.
Through such personnel and through Baath
Party militants in key positions, Syria man-
tains control over this organization,
The Governmental System
7. The soldiers run Syria in cooperation with
and by using the Baath Party. Baath Party
members hold the principal government cabi
net posts, dominate the administration, edu-
cation, and the press. There is a Damascus
based pan Arab leadership, but the Party in
Syria is run by a leadership for the country
(the Regional Command), chosen at periodic
party congresses. Here, as in the army, Alawi
Muslims are especially prominent. There are
party units for each province and for each
district within a province. At all levels there
exist interlocking relationships among party,
army, and civil administration; for example,
provincial governors and police chiefs are fre-
quently members of the provincial party
leadership. There is little opportunity for those
outside the pyramid of executive authority to
affect decisions,
8. Syria's formal governmental structure in-
cludes a President, Prime Minister, and a
Cabinet; the relative power of these offices
has varied under different regimes. From 1966
to 1970, power was exercised by a group of
top level military (and civilian) Baathists; no
one person dominated all aspects of policy
(Asad was one of the group); President Nur-
al-din Atasi wvas substantially a figurehead.
For the past two years Asad has been both
President and head of the Baath Party and is
clearly the ruling figure. He has maintained
control of the country by: (a) insuring that
officers loyal to him are in charge of key mili-
tary and security units, and (b) reorganizing
the Party and placing members loyal to him
in key government and Party posts as well as
in the directing committees of mass organi-
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9. The Syrian Government is highly au-
thoritarian. Nonetheless, in the last six years
or so, successive governments have tried to
instill a sense of popular participation among
the citizenry through: (a) the development
of mass organizations for almost every con-
ceivable economic, professional, and social
group in the country, e.g., peasants, artisans,
petroleum workers, teachers, bureaucrats, stu-
dents, women, and so on. Total membership
of these groups runs into the hundred thou-
sands; Baathists are invariably to be found in
their national ruling committees, but infre-
quently. below that level, (b) local admin-
istrative councilss, elected in March 1972; while
these have limited power, the elections were
fairly free and many Baathists failed to
win election, (c) a recently elected People's
Council of 186 members, of whom 95 are
workers and peasants as required by the con-
stitution. Its authority is limited to debating
cabinet policy, ratifying laws, and approving
laws laid down by the executive. A third to
a half of the members are Baathists.
10. The Asad regime has also recognized
the existence of other left-wing political
movements by including them in the National
Progressive Front. The Front is dominated by
the Baath, which provides the chairman
(Asad) and eight of 16 seats on the govern-
ing board, but gives legal status to four other
organizations; the Communist Party, the pro-
Egyptian Arab Socialist Union, the Socialist
Unionists (composed of ex-Baathists and also
pro-Egyptians), and the Arab Socialists (fol-
lo,~vers of Ak-rani Hawrani, a powerful poli-
tician in the 1950s). Each of these movements
is also represented in the Cabinet. The terms
on which the Front was founded permit only
the Baath Party to conduct political activity
in the army. The influence of the other groups
is limited, but their leaders act as if they be-
lieve that such a modest position is preferable
to inactivity or to functioning clandestinely
under oppressive controls-which had been
their fate in the past.
11. In sum, Syria's post-revolutionary style
is that of a one-party system. The route to
power in Syria lies through the Baath Party,
particularly through its military organization.
Civilian party members can also achieve re-
sponsible positions in the administration,-but
they must be prepared to serve the wishes of
the soldiers who dominate it and who have
the force to back up their wishes. Those
presently in power have been influential with-
in the party and the army for a dozen years
or more and the government is no longer
prone to the wild swings in government policy
that characterized Syria in the 1950s..
The Economy
12. Ten years of Baath rule has provided a
continuity of administration which has had.
beneficial effects on the economy, in contrast
to the frequent changes which characterized
Syria in the 1950s. There are changes in per-
sonnel from time to time of course, but on
the whole the provincial governors, directors-
general, and administrators of various projects
stay around long enough to Iearn, their jobs
and to carry out government policies with a
certain degree of confidence that a given pro-
gram will be completed, not interrupted by
political upheaval. Administrative performance
is far from miraculous, there is a substantial
amount of inefficiency, and slowness in inn-
plementation is common. Thus the last of the
land, expropriated from large landholders be-
ginning in 1958, was distributed to the peas-
ants only in 1969.
13. Nonetheless, there has been substantial
progress in building. an economic and social
infrastructure. School population has about
doubled in the past 10 years, with over half
of school-age children now in class. Farms are
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privately owned but a large percentage of
owners are enrolled in agricultural coopera-
tives which provide some fundamental agri-
cultural services. There has been steady prog-
ress in improving the rail and road network.
The former has nearly doubled in mileage
with a new railroad being built from the coast
to the far northeast corner of the country.
Paved road mileage has increased by 50 per-
cent in the last five years. The largest single
project is the great dam on the Euphrates
River. The first stage was. completed in July
1973,: it will bring a million and a half acres
under irrigation over a period of some years,
more than doubling Syria's irrigated land and
reducing dependence on erratic rainfall, allow-
ing settlement of nomads, and. adding greatly
to electric power production.
14. Over the past 10 years Syria has en-
joyed steady economic growth, averaging
nearly five percent annually in the 1966-1970
period, even though agricultural production
virtually stagnated, and well over 10 percent
in each of the years 1971 and 1972, reaching
a gross domestic product (GDP) of about
$2 billion in the latter year. There have, how-
ever, been yearly fluctuations in GDP due
mostly. to the changes in agricultural produc-
tion, which provides over 20 percent of GDP.
Since most farming depends on rainfall, out-
put can fluctuate plus or minus 30 percent
from normal. The state runs industry, banks,
foreign trade, and utilities, but nearly half
of GDP is provided by the private sector
services, small industrial establishments, and
agriculture. Some of the spectacular increase
in economic performance in 1971-1972 was due
to President Asad's partly successful efforts to
induce those who have fled Syria for political
reasons to repatriate their capital and to en-
courage the private sector in other ways. The
main factor, especially in 1972, was good rain-
fall, which permitted a record year for grain.
15. Syria's balance of payments has been
in deficit since 1968, but the deficit began
to shrink in 1971, and the results for 1973
are likely to be a very small deficit or even
a small surplus. Before 1968, a large trade
gap, varying greatly from year to year in re-
sponse to weather conditions but constantly
growing, had usually been covered by receipts
from other sources-e.g., oil pipeline fees,
tourism, workers' remittances. In the wake of
the 1967 war, tourism receipts and transfers
from Syrians abroad fell off, and remained
in the doldrums. By 1971, however, capital
began flowing back into the country. Grain
crops set a record in 1972, and 1973 is an-
other bumper crop year; this helps both to
hold imports down. and to increase exports.
Oil exports have grown to over 4 million tons,
which probably earned some $50 million,, in
1972. The major export, cotton, has held its
own in recent years, earning about $80-$90
million annually. Most significantly for the
future, Syria renegotiated the agreements per-
taining to oil transit fees through Tapline
(from Saudi Arabia) in 1971 and through
the IPC line in 1971 and again in 1972. As a
result, the net foreign exchange income from
oil pipeline activities should amount to $160
million or more in 1973 and subsequent years,
compared to $84 million in 1970. Moreover,
Syria's improved relations with its Arab neigh-
bors have paid off in substantial grants.
16. The increased inflow of income and a
large increase in Syria's use of bilateral trade
credits permitted the Syrian Central Bank to
increase its holdings of gold and foreign ex-
change by almost half in 197-7, to about $125
million (3-4 months of imports) at the end
of the year. By mid-1973, Syria had a foreign
debt of almost $900 million (some $350 mil-
lion economic and $550 million military)----
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mostly to the Communist countries a Payments
on the debt apparently come to less than $40
million annually, however, since the Soviets
agreed to Syrian pleas in 1969 and 1971 and
rescheduled the debt to them to permit pay-
ment of interest only (about $7 million a year)
through 1975. Payments to all creditors thus
are exceeded by annual drawings on economic
credits. Recently the Syrians have been hav-
ing some luck borrowing in the West; at this
juncture it appears that about half the $300
million in foreign credit needed to finance
planned public investment during 1971-1975
will come from the Communist countries and
about half from Western sources such as inter-
national lending agencies, France, and Japan.
17. The policy of the Baath regime aims at
making a more modern economy for its popu-
lation of seven million which is growing . at
over three percent a year. But it has many
The estimated value of military deliveries since
1956 totals some $1 billion ($900 million from the
USSR and $100 million from other Communist coun-
tries) about half was delivered between 1 January
1970 and June 1973. Prices have, however, been
discounted about $400 million, and some $75 million
of the debt has been repaid.
problems to face, including the burden of a
costly military establishment, which the re-
gime feels is necessary to face external foes
and because it leans heavily on the army for
support. Military and security expenditures ac-
count for a quarter of total budget expendi-
tures (half the regular budget), current ex-
penditures in non-security categories for an-
other quarter and the remainder for . invest-
ment, divided equally among agriculture,
industry/mining, and transportation/public
works.
18. Prospects for growth during the Third
Plan period (1971-1975) are good, something
above an average annual growth in real terms
of eight percent. There is likely to be fairly
rapid industrial growth in certain fields such
as textiles, oil and phosphates. There will be
increasing agricultural production as new
irrigation works are finished and through im-
provements provements in technology, Increases in foreign
exchange and earnings through oil transit
revenues and other exports will be of benefit
In short, Syria has laid the groundwork for
further advance. in the economic sector in the
rest of the 1970s.
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