IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-199-3-4-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 6, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/10: LOC-HAK-199-3-4-4
SECRET
OCI No. 2731/73
6 December 1973
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Implications of the Arab Summit.
The leaders of all Arab states, with the exception of
Libya and Iraq,,met in Algiers on 26 November for a three-
day conference to discuss the military and political aspects.
of the current Arab-Israeli situation. Decisions made in
Al ,per's were :essentially a' confirmation o s 1 ions ad o ted 11 e -sew e~-in the privacy of the i atera contacts that
mo` s'" t'rab' heads of state prefer as a medium for their diplo-
macy. The decisions will influence future Arab policies
only to the extent that they accord with the views of the
individual leaders.
The summit as such will thus have little impact on the
forthcoming peace conference. By gathering the Arab leaders
together in the same conference hail, ,it neverthele'ss' served
to' expose more c1earl -- -for the benefit o ose who may
have had doubts ts- lust which' states control the course of
events and how far-those states are prepared to gq to accom-
On issues of war and
tone; __on matters ot oil 'an
eaee,.president Sadat 'set the
omina e . n eac case, pola:ay~iac~ been determined before
.
rmm It convened, the other leaders knew it, and efforts
he su
to steer a difference course,,if made at all, were easily
turned aside.
Sadat went to the summit having decided to press for-
ward with diplomatic efforts. to resolve the Arab-Israeli dis-
pute. No apparent attempt was made to. dissuade him,.despite
continuing doubts among, for instance,,the Algerians. No
,one 'seri~ousl challenged the limited objectives Sadat and'
e carerui.ly con-
trolled Cairo and Algiers press ispatcies on summit pro-
ceedings,.and virtually all speeches during the conference,.
meticulously referred throughout to the restoration of
"occupied" Arab lands, thus consciously setting limits to
Arab territorial ambitions. Apparently -even an earlier
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resolution passed by the foreign ministers' conference affirm-
ing the Arab character of Jerusalem was watered down, report-
edly over.Faysal's objections,.to call only for the city's
liberation from Israeli control.
Sadat'.s success in maintaining control over. negotiating
policy was matched by Faysal's success in oil matters. Al-
though there is some indication that producers not willing
to sustain the financial losses of a cutback greater than
25 percent will not be forced to institute the progressive
five-percent monthly cuts, raysa,l himself- emerged from the
summit still, ublicly gommi tte maintain i:s decre ee 3`11
.
Japan had already been agreed upon unilaterally by the Saudis.
The summit meeting, ,by not seriously challenging the
established policies of either Sadat or Faysal, thus endorsed
the leadership role each had already assumed. On the ques-
tion of negotiations, Sadat received an implicit mandate to
attend the peace conference and to negotiate or not 'as he
sees fit. He. would have done the same had the summit not
met at-all, and it is doubtful that even the presence of
Libya and Iraq. would have altered his determination.
If the summit had little effect on Sadat's.negotiating
policy in general, the gathering did point up one'area in'
which'..Sadat will be the follower rather than the leader in
setting Arab policy. With regard to the Jordanian-fedayeen
Faysal the summs s action to ease the res rM ions on
less. If, 'there is, to be a relaxat'.ion,' it will be decided b'
by President Bourguiba and of ers--inclu ing, by one account,
Egypt--to induce a slight relaxation apparently proved fruit-
ma ey controls the West Bank after it has been removed from
Israeli control,.and he will gauge his support for the feda-
yeen or for Jordan according to its effect on Egypt's own
interests. Where those interests cease to be involved,,
neither party can-expect firm backing.
The summit's designation of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) as' the sole representative of the Pales-
tinians was a matter of, pragmatism for Sadat, if not for the
other Arab leaders. Bringing the fedayeen along on the
c follow tfi-e_-trend of ou -si
o pinion. He pro ly has little- real interest in o u i.
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SECRET
negotiating track and thereby undercutting their ability to
sabotage a peace settlement:is critical to Sadat, and it
was undoubtedly this concern that motivated his vote.for the
PLO at Jordan's expense. Beyond this,Sadat has'lon made
it clear that ''he will note allow the Pales Minlan ues ,on to
1n er` er:e ;MET We" .e ggYp ian' as'pec s: O' ' a sett emen an 09t,
once negotiations begin,,the fedayeen must arge y fend for
themselves against Israel, Jordan,.and the US.
The. same pragmatism applies,,in Sadat's view, to King
Husayn. Sadat does not intend to abandon the King; nor
apparently-does he believe that Husayn should or will carry
through on his threat to boycott the peace conference. He
will work on Husayn,,as he worked on the fedayeen, to follow
along on a unified Arab negotiating track. As with the
fedayeen, ,however, ,S-adat's Is','su ortt 'for Husa n_ extends 'only
so, far, 'as Jordan's 'interests ouch on his own. '-- When nego-
a.a ions are under way, a w17:1 a ance e weight of
Arab support for the Palestinians, and Arab willingness to
abandon Jordan, against the weight of Israeli opposition
to the fedayeen and the US position on the.Palestinians.
His own position will be governed by his perceptions of
which way the scale is tipping and how this affects his
abili.ty.to regain Egyptian territory.
The summit may have crystallized Sadat's thinking on
the Palestinian issue as it-affects negotiations, but ,it
did not significantly alter his previous views and it will
not .alter his willingness or ability to negotiate. Nor, for
that matter, did the meeting change the policies of the
other Arab leaders on this or any other question involved.
in the negotiations. The Jordanian-PLO conflict was, the most
-s ign'ificant iss uue in ion
ante issue will be resolved without reference to-the-;um-
mi.t's decisions.
.The conference `thus will have. an i
act on negotiations
t ion at the ta37 . o
that, it h.as: highlighted likely _obstac es' to' rog
ea.
ress. They
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