LETTER TO PHILIP C. HABIB FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-2-6-21-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2009
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 19, 1969
• Content Type: LETTER

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S_CRETIN F'_RN September , 1969
You mentioned to Tony Lake the bad blood
between Le buc Tho and Le Duan in the
1950'x.
Attached is a CIA report on the subject. I
had not known of this before, and I am glad
you mentioned it.
It was good to sae you.
MORI/CDF
C03358418
Henry A. Kissinger
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
The Honorable Philip C. Habib
Vietnam Peace Mission
American Embassy
Parts, Frances
E CI..TINOF'C''I
HAK:TL:1ds:9/19/69
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INFORMATION
September 18, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: John Hoidridge
SUBJECT: The Supposed Le Duan-Le Due Tho Rift
You have indicated an interest in the particulars of the reported
friction which has occurred in past years between the North Viet-
namese Party First Secretary, Le Duan, and. the chief Hanoi
negotiator in Paris Le Duc Tho. The attached assessment of
this question was prepared for us by CIA (Tab A). It concludes that:
The evidence is so scanty and of such questionable
reliability, that only a few broad conclusions can be drawn.
It does appear that Duan and Tho clashed over policy and
were rivals while heading up the Communist apparatus in
South Vietnam in the 1950's.
Duan appears to have favored a full steam ahead, aggressive
approach to the insurgency, while Tho was more deliberate,
favoring a slower measured approach (this seems to tally
with their styles in recent years).
By the latter 1950's, Duan clearly was the senior of the two
in the Party apparatus and Tho seems to have worked in
harmony with him from Hanoi in directing activities in
South Vietnam.
-- There is no solid evidence that the problems between the
two in the past have persisted into the present.
Comment: We regard the CIA analysis as sound.
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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17 Septerrther 19E9
SUBJECT: The Le Duan-Le Duc
Rift
1. This memo describes the Le Duan-Le Duc
rift which reportedly took place in the early 1950
while both were leaders of the Viet Minh appar ~t
in what was then called Nambo and What is now tho
lower third of South Vietnam.
2. our knowledge of that period is incor;Pletc
and imprecise. It is based on a melange of reports
events of that time. Despite these limitations,
are reasonably confident that a close exarcminati~: r
of the evidence establishes that certain agents
indeed occurred and makes possible some broad
judgements.
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3. Le Duan arrived in N; at bo around 1947
as the top Communist party (bang Lao Dong or DLD)
official for that region. From this formidchlr
power base, he established himself- as overall
conunander of NTambo within three years.
4. Le Duc Tho was dispatched to NambO in
late 1949/early 1950. Like Duan, he was a
ranking DLD official. It seems clear from, the
evidence, however, that Tho was envisaged as a
subordinate of Duan's resonsible for administra-
tive and internal party affairs and the organi-
zation of fronts and mass groups. He was
consistently identified as Duan's second-in--com,m .no.
5. Tho seems to have clashed with Duan
almost immediately after his arrival. The crux
of their dispute has never been made clear.
Some sources suggest it was personal, others
that it revolved around tactics and style.
According to this school, Dunn favored persistency.
and severity in implerent.-g directives while
Tho counseled patience and moderation.
6. Most sources agree that some re-alignment
of poser soon took place in Na;ttbo. Duan, 'cco-'r'-i=c'
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to these reports, retained titular command, rut
his de facto authority* `tiyas rivaled, if not sur-
passed by Tho's. For example, Tho reportedly,
remained at Mambo's central headquarters while
Duan shifted his operation out into the provinc,:i ~ ,
7. On the sur.face,.this would appear to
indicate that Tho had prevailed. Later events
suggest, however, that the DT-,D leadership (ma3'b
Ho himself or then Secretary-General Truong ChIr h )
chose not to meet, the matter head or,,, but
dispose of it indirectly, perhaps due to the
stature and talents of the an tagonis is . It
is clear in any case that the rift did not
damage Le Duan.
8. Duan was recalled to 1:orth Vietnam
in early 1953 and Tho formally assumed his
titles and authority. It.. pre: umably was during
this period that Duan. solidified his position ill
the DLL hierarchy (one report indicates he became
party Secretary-General pro u_n.nore during one
of Truong Chinh's trips to China) and establishes
himself as the party's top man for affairs in
South Vietnam. Following the 19
Genova AccOT'
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swu~- _
Tho returned to North Vietnam and becamo a MaMh(ez:
of the DLD politburo. He, then, apparently
his long career as the top party organization
official.
Meanwhile, Duan too: unchallenged
control of the Communist effor below the 17th
parallel. Some evidence suggests Tho assisted
in this effort from time-to-time, but clearly
under Duan's direction. At the same time, Dugan
was rising rapidly through the I)LD- hierarchy
He returned to North Vietnam sometime in 1957
and immediately emerged as ,a major party spokes-
man. He is believed to' have become de facto
DLD first, secretary soon after Truong Chinh's
Ouster in late 1956, At the 1960 Party CortgrCSS
Duan was formally invested as First Secr'etary'
and ranked second in' the DLD, only below Ho.
10. Sonte
claiz ~ that the Le Duan--
Le Duo Tho rift still r nkie-s and conipli_cates
theii: personal relationships. Not surprising l Y ,
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that this could be ate of thy: mythologies,
nurt;UrLC: by t3.I1ie and La- : o" olid jllfQ`_'"'?"i~,ti
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which have grown about Hanoi's. leadership
11, 111 his dual party role-: as a member
of the DLD central committee secratar1a.te
and head of the DLD organization department,
Le Duc 'mho is x Spores ICI to x first Secretary
Le Duan. Some sort of close personal, contact
would seem to be suggested here and, since both
have held their present position: for about a
decade, their relationship c, auld appear to be
at least workable.
12. There also is an association betvloen
the two men in running the insurgency in the
South.. Le Duan's primary responsibility for
policy formulation in this area has been well
documented. Le Duc The' s association with this
Problem is reflected in his appointment as head
of the Communist delegation at the Paris talks.
13. The record of the past 15 years
contains no solid -indication that the Duan--The
problems of the early 50's have persisted to the
present. On the contrary, the association of
the two in important areas ' of policy -- party
and the war -- succgest r~lore harmony than discor-:11,
in their personal relation= .
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