COMPARISON OF THE 1972 MR 2 BUILD-UP AND SITUATION IN THREE PREVIOUS YEARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-20-2-17-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 26, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANOV'M
ARMY review completed.
MEMORANDUM F9/DRy KISSINGER
UNCIL
r,V I
INF ORMATION
January 26, 1972
SUBJECT: Comparison of the 1972 MR 2 Build-up and
Situation in Three Previous Years
FROM: Phil
A key unanswered question in MR 2 is whether or not the ARVN will
have the resources to meet a major attack by the 320th NVA Division,
which is moving toward. the area.
OSD (Systems Analysis) has recently completed a good study (Tab A)
comparing the present situation with earlier years and the dry season
battles of Ben Het (1969), Dak Seang (1970), and Fire Support Base 6
(1971). The analysis shows that based on the air and helicopter support
required for previous battles, the RVNAF should be able to handle the
threat this year with only limited U. S. help. It shows that:
-- If the 320th is used to defend the trails in South Laos and is not
committed to the MR 2 attacks, the relative NVA/ARVN force levels
will be the same as in last year's battle for Fire Support Base 6 -- a
position of rough equality. (See Table 1)
-- If the 320th is committed and if the ARVN reinforces, as now
planned, with only two airborne and one infantry regiment, the enemy
would have a strength advantage of about 1. 5 to 1. 0. However, six
additional 23rd Division battalions and one of the two remaining general
reserve brigades could be provided to raise the force ratio to favor
friendly forces slightly.
--- The five ARVN artillery battalions under direct MR 2 control
can provide more than double the artillery support used during the three
previous MR 2 dry season defenses.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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MEMORANDUM
w
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
January 26, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KT,SSIIVGER
FROM: Phil Odeen Q
SUBJECT: Comparison of the 1972 MR 2 Build-up and
Situation in Three Previous Years
A key unanswered question in MR 2 is whether or not the ARVN will
have the resources to meet a major attack by the 320th NVA Division,
which is moving toward the area.
OSD (Systems Analysis) has recently completed a good study (Tab A)
comparing the present situation with earlier years and the dry season
battles of Ben Het (1969), Dak Seang (1970), and Fire Support Base 6
(1971). The analysis shows that based on the air and helicopter support
required for previous battles, the RVNAF should be able to handle the
threat this year with only limited U. S. help. It shows that:
-- If the 320th is used to defend the trails in South Laos and is not
committed to the MR 2 attacks, the relative NVA/ARVN force levels
will be the same as in last year's battle for Fire Support Base 6 -- a
position of rough equality. (See Table 1)
-- If the 9`20th is committed and if the ARVN reinforces, as now
planned, with only two airborne and one infantry regiment, the enemy
would have a strength advantage of about 1.*5'to 1. 0.' 'However, six
additional 23rd Division batta.ions and one of the two remaining general
reserve brigades could be provided to raise the force ratio to favor
friendly forces slightly.
-- The five ARVN artillery battalions under direct MR 2 control
can provide more than double the artillery support used during the three
previous MR 2 dry season defenses.
SECRET'
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SECRET
-- The three VNAF helicopter squadrons (over 90 helicopters)
now in the Highlands have three times the number of helicopters
furnished in the Ben Het/Dakto battle of 1969 by the U. S. Army.
U. S. support then consisted of an average of about 32 helicopters.
In more recent battles, such as FSB 6 last year, the RVNAF has
provided nearly all helicopter support.
-- Tactical air support in prior battles ranged from 240 per
month during the FSB 6 battle last year to almost 2000 per month
during the Dak Seang battle in 1970. Providing sorties at the
highest level ever, flown in MR 2 would require less than 15% of the
current US/VNAF capability. The highest*previous level of B-52
support would require 40% of current capability. (See Table 2)
In short, ARVN has the men and combat support to meet the projected
threat especially in a defensive action on home terrain. In MR 2,
ARVN is weak in command and control, planning and leadership --
the problems that plagued the Lam Son operations. Breakdowns in
these areas could result in an ineffective use of the available forces
that could permit enemy gains. However, the ARVN has forces
available in adequate numbers to meet such a threat if it masters
these problems.
Thus, we face real risks in MR 2 should the enemy launch a main
force offensive, but the forces needed will be available to deal with
it and should be effective if ARVN leadership is adequate. There is
no reason for panic.
cc: John Negroponte
Dick Kennedy
SECRET
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Table 1
BATTLES IN KONTUM/PLEIKU
Combat Bns
Friendly
20 (8 US)
Enemy
19
Fr/En Ratio
1.1
Combat Str (00p)
Friendly
15.6
Enemy
5.8
Fr/En Ratio
2.7
971
1972
(FSB 6) (320th NVA)
in
Out
16 (3 US)
18
25
26
25
38
25L/
26
.9
1.0
.7
1.0
8.6
11.6
11.6
11.6
5.5
8.7
13.5
8.7
1.5
1.3
.9
1.3
Results
Enemy KIA
3241
1699
4526
Friendly KIA
330
708
577
En/Fr Ratio
9.8
2.4
7.8
a/ Assumes the two airborne brigades and a regiment of 23rd Division are
moved to the battle area.
SECRET
1969 1970
(Ben Het/Dak:-To) . (Dak Seang)
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w w
SECRET
Table 2
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
196&9 1970 1971 1971
(Ben Het/Dakto) Dak Seang) (FSB-6) (Lam Son-19)
Tactical Air
Sorties
Supporting Operation
(Monthly Average)
% of Current Monthly 6% 13% 2%a 35%
Capability
B-52
Sorties
Supporting Operation
(Monthly Average)
1,020 2,035 240 5, 700
Sorties Sorties Sorties Sortiea
404 90 32 906
Sorties Sorties Sorties Sorties
% of Current Monthly 40% 9%
Capability
SECRET
3%n 91%
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BATTLE PROSPECTS IN THE MR 2 HIGHLANDS
Summary. Recent assessments indicate the t
s r
o
offensive in M2 early possibility of an enemy
1y in 1972. The enemy has historically mounted
offensives in the highlands of MR 2 normally employing'a 3 regiment force.
The major difference in thissear's enemy build-up in the deployment of
the 320th Division to the B-3 front. This will substantially increase
enemy capability. The critical factor in judging enemy intentions is the
employment of the 320th NVA Division; its arrival from North Vietnam
is imminent but there are-two-differing views on its likely employment.
- Strong Offensive. This view, strongly held by COMUSMACV, sees the
320th augmenting organic B-3 Front units in MR 2. This would lead to a
1- to 1 force ratio in favor of the en
t
e
Iny,
he worst in the history of
the Highlands but not as bad as the 2 or 3 to I 'faced by RVNAF during
Lam Son 719.
- LOC protection. Those holding this view believe the 320th will
provide a reserve to protect the enemy logistic network in Cambodia and
South Laos. This would release all of the organic units of the B-3 Front
for action in MR 2 but the force ratio would be about the same as in
.last year's FSB6 attacks.`
Despite the adverse ratio of forces if the 320th is employed, MR 2
units will be on defense in familiar home terrain, in contrast to RVNAp
in Lam. Son 719. Should it become necessary, the adverse ratios could be
improved to about 1 to 1 by using more units from the ARVN 23rd Division
or MR 3.
Analysis of support furnished during past ene
that combat support now available to MR 2 should beyadequateves reveals
.. Of 13 ARVN artillery battalions available, the 5 under MR
control would more than double the amount used at Ben Het/Dak To.
The three VNAF helicopter squadrons now in the Highlands provide
about 3 times the support furnished RVNAF during Ben Het/Dak To.
Major engagements in MR 2 have never received more than 8% of the
total US/VNAF tactical air sorties, and support equalling the highest
level ever flown in MR 2 would require less than 15% of the current
US/VNAF capability,
In May-June 1969, Ben Het/Dak To received almost 25% of the B-52
sorties being flown in SEA. Support equivalent to that provided at
Ben Het/Dak To would require 40% of the current capability.
Since last year's battle in MR 2 a new armored cavalry squadron has
been activated and a VNAF gunship squadron transferred from MR 3. More
recent RVNAF actions to counter the expected offensives include alerting
two brigades of the general reserve for
Z' vemen to MR 2 and replacement
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g a Intense action at
Lam Son were battlefield coordination and casualty replacement. 'After
action reports from MR 2 cite the same deficiencies in addition to poor
staff planning.
PrincipalRVNAF shortcomings noted dur? th
On
of the 23rd Division's commander.
SEVINIET -
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ra~u~ai_ r i
g
L, y o an
of
enemy offensive in western MR 2 around mid-February 1972. Despite gen-
eral agreement on the enemyy capabilities in the area, there are some
understandable differences among analysts as to his actual intentions.
Moreover, RVNAF preparations and activity will influence not only the
outcome but also the intended scope of the enemy's activity. This analysis
discusses current enemy capabilities and intentions, the historical data
on past enemy offensives in the Highlands, and RVNAF preparations to
counter the expected offensives this year. .Additional perspective is
provided by comparing the scope of past and projected enemy offensives
with Lam Son 719,
W
Introduction. Recent assessments indicate the stron
ossibil`t
Current Ene Capability and Intentions
The OJCS/CIA recently updated last spring's assessment of enemy ca
abilities in RVN and noted that enemy preparations since then in the B-3
front (increased personnel and unit infiltration) give them an added cap-
ability to launch an offensive in the Highlands early in 1972. In addition,
Hanoi's search for a dramatic (albeit temporary) tactical success might
focus on this region, where RVNAF units are more dispersed and of poorer
quality than those in MR 1.
Informal discussions with intelligence analysts from several agencies
reveal considerable unanimity not only with regard to the capability
assessment but also the enemy's probable scheme of maneuver -- a main thrust
in Konturn province with supporting attacks in Pleiku and northern MR 1 to
tie down ARVN forces there. To further restrict the RVNAF reinforcing
capability, increased activity is also expected in MR 3 and the coastal
provinces of northern MR 2 and southern MR 1. According to some analysts,
the intelligence signals countrywide are mare reminiscent of 1964 (heavy
attacks in the Kontum area and northern MR 1, low level activity elsewhere)
than 1968.
The principal difference in analysts' views of the current situation
revolves around the intended use of the 320th NVA division whose arrival
in the B-3 front is imminent and thus the probable intensity'of this year's
enemy offensive-in the Highlands compared to those in the past.
g
Strong Offensive. This view, stronger-held by-COMUSMACV, assumes
-
employment the 320th NVA division in the battle area and thus the largest
enemy effort since TET 1968.
LAC Protection. Those holding this view believe the 320th is to
provide a reserve and protect the South Laos portion of the supply network,
while the three regiments normally organic to the B-3 front conduct an
offensive similar to the Ben Het/Dak To campaign in 1969.
In addition to the 320th Division, the B-3 front has apparently been.
augmented by up to a battalion of 122mm field guns (10-12 tubes). The
significance of this added combat support to an enemy offensive, however,
SEC ET
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-20-2-17-8
an
155mm and has only been sighted behind tracked vehicle movers.
Intelligence reports from the field show no distinct pattern and
could support either view, depending on the analyst's interpretation.
Since there has been no significant change in enemy capabilities over
the past weeks, Cc WSMACV'srecent request for new authorities may simply
reflect his growing conviction in the strong offensive interpretation,
The LQC protection view is primarily based onthe importance of the
expanded Ho Chi Minh Trail to the enemy and declining levels of US sup-
port to RVNAF:
may be more psychological than real; the 122mm guns have a greater range
than the ARVN 155m>. howitzer (22km vs 15 km) but the 155 is more accurate
and 'its projectile weight is nearly twice as large. Moreover, the 122mm
gun is vulnerable to allied air strikes: it is 15vt heavier th th
Elements of two B-3 regiments have been helping to expand and
protect the routes through South Laos and northern Cambodia sincemid-1970.
enemy sensitivity to RVNAF ground interction threats may have dictated
the dispatch of the 320th to assume this mission. This would release
organic B-3 units for action in the Highlands this year, leaving them
the option to employ the additional division in 1973.
- Return of all B-3 units for a 1969 style activity upsurge-would
probably achieve the desired publicity this year, while next year would
be more opportune for a major offensive. US combat support to EVT14',
already reduced over previous levels, will be essentially nil by 1973,
and the 320th would have gained valuable familiarity with the terrain.
Historical Perspective. The highlands of MR 2 have been the scene of
large scale enemy action for the past several years, usually beginning in
late March/early April, peaking in May and subsiding in June after which
,enemy units retire to their sanctuaries across the border.
Enemy attacks in the eastern portion of MR 2 are smaller in scale
and generally avoid major confrontation with friendly main force units.
Enemy base areas supporting his coastal units sre more vulnerable to
friendly penetration, which restricts his ability to-mass without detec-
tion in this area. Y v
Battle Detail. The enemy opens these setpiece battles in the highlands
with scattered attacks by fire which build to a crescendo and are followed
by multi-battalion ground assaults against isolated GVN outposts. Nor-
mally two infantry regiments and the bulk of his artillery regiment attacks
in Kontum, with one or two regiments and the rest of the artillery in
Pleiku.
Since 1969 this two province area has been on a par with all of MR 3
in number of enemy ground attacks during the April-June period. Moreover,
during this same period in 1971 friendly regular KIA there equalled the
SEC7cT
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total for both MRs 3 and 4. A comparison of these past battles and
projected force ratios for this year in the area (Table 1) shows:
- Employment of the 320th NVA Division is the key issue. 11 `
- If the 320th is used in the enemy attack, friendly to enemy force
ratios approach'that for Lam Sari' 719 (.7 compared to .5).
- If the 320th is not used, force ratios will be about the same
as last year (about 1 to I),-
Despite the adverse ratio of forces should the 320th be deployed, in
contrast to Lam Son 719, the MR 2 forces will be on defense in'their home
territory. Moreover, the ratios above assume only the same reinforcement
as last year. As discussed later in the RVNAF preparations section,
it would be possible to provide enough reinforcement to raise the com-
bat strength ratio to nearly 1 to 1, should that prove necessary.
TABLE 1
BATTLES IN KONTtTh1/PLEIKu / LAM SON 719
1969 - 1970 1971 1972 1971
k.ben a sin) (DZFTe_a_n_
FSB 20th NVA
Combat Bns
Friendly 20 (8 US)
Enemy 19
Fr/En Ratio 1.1
Combat Str (000)
Friendly. 15.6
Enemy 5.8
Fr/En Ratio 2.7
Enemy Attks (per month) 72
Results
In out
16 (3 US) 25 259 j 20
18 26 38 26 40
.9
1.0
.7
1.0
8.6
11.6
11.6
11.6
5.5
8.7
13.5
8.7
1.5
1.3
.9
1.3
72 24
Enemy KIA 3241 1699 4526
Friendly KTA 330 708 577
En/Fr Ratio 9.8 2.4 7':8
GVN Control (%)
Before Battle 34 52 - 50
After Battle 27 48 50
60(Nov 71)
J Data is for the entire two province area during the course of the battle. KIA
results are operational (OPREP) figures, not final verified casualties.
Assumes the 2 airborne brigades and a regiment of 23rd Division are moved to
,the battle area.
.5
12.5
27.1
.5
N/A
1361+2
1532
/ Although'there are some tentative indications that the 271st Regiment may also be
'.destined for the B-3 Front, it was not included in our assessment, because the sketchy
intelligence information available indicates that the 271st currently consists of only
one battalion, and this would-not ,:-a ?;~~;- -materially affect either the calcula-
tions or outcome.
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albHt I W
Artillery and He Support. Since much of the enemy KIA in these
battles is credited to artillery and air we examined available data to
determine the scope of such support in the past and the impact of US
redeployments
US forces furnished all of the helicopter support and most of the
artillery and TAC AIR support for the 1969 Ben Het/Dat To Campaign.
Two battalions (36 tubes) of light and medium artillery augmented
by a composite heavy 175/8") battery(5 tubes). All of the heavy artillery
and half of the light medium tubes were US.
US Army Aviation units provided 32 helicopters (6 gunships, 20
utility, 6 heavy) per day. In sharp contrast, more than 20 times that
number (659) were used on LAM SON 719.
By the time of the FSB6 attack in 1971, US artillery in MR 2 had been
reduced about 2/3 (to 5 bns). A medium (155mm) and heavy (175/8") battalion
were in Pleiku but were not employed in the actual battle area. According
to the commander of the VNAF 2d Air-Division,* his division furnished all
.of the air support in the actual area of operations (2 helicopter squad-
rons, 2 fighter squadrons, and a liaison squadron).
Based on the above, RVNAF seems to have adequate combat support
available : n MR 2 for the predicted enemy offensive even though all US
artillery has been withdrawn and US helicopters have been reduced:
-.Of the 13 ARVN artillery battalions, the 5 under MR control would
mare than double those employed in the Ben Het/Dak To battle.
- Although ARVN does not have heavy (17Sxmn./8") artillery in MR 2,
available US heavy artillery was not actually used in the battle area during
the FSB6 batty last year, although it was used during ben Het/Dak To.
- VNAF in MR 2 has three of its four UH-1 helicopter squadrons (31
helicopters each) stationed in P1'iku, giving them about 3 times the
,number provided in support of-the Ben Het/Dak To battle.
S r.
RRRET
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W
Tactical Air and B-52 Support
Tactical air sorties have not been used extensively in Kontn and
Pleiku provinces. Even in the months characterized by major battles, no
more than 8% of the total U.S. and VNAF sorties in Southeast Asia (and
17% of all those flown in South Vietnam) were flown in support of operations
in the-two provinces. This is in contrast to the air effort devoted to
LAM SON 719 which, during February and March 1971, received about 30% of
all tactical air sorties flown in SEA and over 50% of those flown in
South Laos.
The level of B-52 effort supporting the significant engagements
in Kontum and Pleiku provinces has never exceeded 25% of the total sorties
flown during the period of the battles. However, during the time tAM SON 719
was in progress over 80% of all B-52 sorties flown (and 90% of those
flown in Laos) were in support of the operation.
The table below shows the level of tactical air and B-52 effort support-
1n the major engagements in Kontum and Pleiku during 1969-1971, as well
as the levels during LAM SON 719. Sorties flown in conjunction with these
operations are compared w?th the air activity in the remainder of SEA during
the times the operations were in progress, and with the capability now
available.
S E.T
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Tactical Air
Sorties supporting
b
t
l
a
t
e 2,037
(monthly avg.) (1,019).
Sorties in all SVN 37,154
Total SEA Sorties 6b,767
of SVN total for battle 5
% of SEA total for battle 3
of current monthly
capability
B-52
Sorties supporting
operation
(monthly avg.)
Sorties in all SVN
Total SEA sorties
of SVN sorties for
battle
of SEA sorties for
battle
% of current monthly
capability
Dak Seang
70
APE-May
FSB6
A r-June. I t
LAM SON 719
Feb-Mar 71
-
.
-03
8,512
(2
5)
(240)
(5,674)
15,519
12,675
16,o63
2/
32,343
46,846
.
293824
17
6
53
/
8.
.2
.,
29
13
35
804
(4o2)
114
(90)
96
(32)
gob
3,019
1,015
791
)
(
1
485 c/
-3.,544
1,778
3,425
,
.
1,664
27
11
12
91 C/
23
6
82
40
91
a Sortie data for Ben Het/Dak To and 15ak Seang from USAF reports of air sup-
port for the operations. Data for FSB6 include all sorties in Kontu and
Pleiku provinces. LAM SON 719 data from USAF report of COLA NDO HUI']T V.
Includes gunship sorties.
c/ Sorties in South Laos for LAM SON 719.
`CURRENT US VNAF AIR CAPABILITIES
Tactical Air (sorties/month)
US 10,000
(Air (Navy)orce) ....()
(3,300)
VNAF 6,500
Gunship
US
VNAF
B-52
750
8o0
1,000
SE. Cl T
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 :1A.KC i 9
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Through 3unn972 Air Force aircraft based Iouth Vietnam and Thailand
will have the capability to fly 6,700 tactical air sorties, 750 gunship
sorties and 1,000 B-52 sorties each month. Navy aircraft will add an addi-
tional. 3,800 sorties monthly to the tactical air total. The VNAF have been
programmed to fly 6,500 tactical air and 800 gunship sorties monthly;
however, their contribution will probably not be more than 5,000 tactical
air sorties and 500 gunship sorties each month. Thus, about 15,000 tactical
air 1,250 gunship and 1,000 B-52 sorties should be available each month
until June 1972 (this does not include monthly totals of 3,000-3,500 T-28
and 200 gunship sorties flown by the Lao).
As can be seen in the above- table, engagements of a magnitude similar
to Ben Het, Dak Seang and FSB 6 would not require significant portions of
the current US/VNAF tactical air monthly sortie capability.- To fly the
level of B-52 support flown during Ben Het would require 40Oo of the cur ent
B-52 capability. B-52 support equivalent to that at Dak Seang and FSB,b would
require 9/a and 3%, respectively, of the current sortie level.*
As noted previously one squadron of A-ls (24 aircraft) are at Pleiku.
A squadron of A-37s (24 aircraft) is at Nha Trang. To fly the level of
tactical air support flown during Ben Het would require the sortie capability
of one A-37 or two A-l squadrons. Twice that number of aircraft would have
to be used to support an operation of the magnitude of Dak Seang. B-52
support as used at Ben Het would require approximately 18 aircraft; support
as used at D.ak Seang, 4 a-52s and FSB 6, less than 2 B-52s.
RVNAF Shortcomings. In LAM SON 71-9, battlefield coordination and casualty
replacement were considered the principal RVNAF shortcomings. In addition,
a series of MR 2 RVHAF performance assessments during periodically intense
combat since 1969 shows a consistent set of deficiencies. The previous
MR 2 senior advisor noted in his final report that "shortcomings which
existed at Dak Seang (1970) were also present to a lesser extent at FSB 6
(1971). Among those cited were:
Command and Control. Failure to quickly establish a forward command
post when the operation is large and involves units from several organizations.
- Planning. MR 2 has neither a campaign nor a seasonal plan. Although
MG Dzu moves forces quickly to the scene of action, there is no accompanying
scheme of maneuver, chain of-command, or fire support plan.
- Coordination. Coordination of intelligence, aviation, artillery,
and Tac air was poor. ,r - -
Personnel and Unit Management. Casualty reports were not timely
or accurate and there was little or no attempt to establish a priority
system for casualty replacement. Moreover, units were often rotated in
and out of the battle area without regard to their performance potential,
or casualties taken.
* bile not germane. to the current build-up in MR 2, air support of
an operation of the magnitude of LAM SON 719 would require 35% of current
US/VILF tactical air and 91% of the current B-52 capability. Since the
period of LAM SON 719 combined US/VNAF.tactical air capability has decreased
less than 10%; however, since early 1970 the decrease has been over 300.
B-52 capability is do~-m--10 from a year ago and down 3Cr'/% from early 1970.
SECRET
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W _ab G t 1. W 10
Current RVNAF Preparations
In addition to the two ROK divisions-(18 bns) along the central coast
of MFt 2, there are 35 RVNAF maneuver battalions operating generally as
follows; ...
- The 22d Division (17 bns) has two regiments operating in the threatened
northern Highlands (Kontum and Pleiku) and-two in the perennially trouble-
some Binh Dinh area.
- The 23d. Division (13 bns) has its three regiment '3 operating over
a wide area from Binh Thuan on the southern coast to Da:rlac in the highlands
south of Pleiku.
MR forces (5 bns) include a 3 battalion ranger group and a 2 squadron
armored cavalry brigade now operating around Pleiku.
The OJCS RVN assessment (January update) cited measures taken to
strengthen MR 2 since last May--an armored cavalry squadron activated
and a VNAF gunship squadron transferred from MR 3. More recent actions
include: -
Two airborne brigades (3 bns each) withdrawn from Cambodia and
alerted for movement to MR 2, leaving 2 brigades (1 Abn, 1 Mar .ne) as
JGS general reserve in MR 3.
- Replacement of the 23rd Division commander by the deputy MR commander
and new province chiefs in Binh Dinh, Darlac, and Quang Duc.
While it seems strange that the 22nd Division commander, whom COMUSMACV
rates' incompetent, was not relieved, it is probable that the MR commander
(MG Dzu) will personally direct operations in the northern highlands as he
did in last year's FSB 6 attacks. Thus having his former deputy in command
of the other division might facilitate rapid movement of reinforcements
to the battle area from the-23rd Division.
In past years,--MR 2 commanders have reinforced the highlands with
regiments from either the 23rd Division or the Binh-Dinh area. The present
MR 2, senior advisor has stated, however, that the-two regiments now in Binh
Dinh would remain there to preclude the usual GVN control losses in Binh
Dinh which have accompanied this turbulence.
In addition to the 6 airborne battalions then, 6-8 battalions could
be provided from the 23rd Division. Depending on the situation in 14R 3
and MR 1, one of the two remaining general reserve brigades might also be
made available., since the JGS has alerted a reinforced regiment in MR 4
for possible movement to MR 3.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-20-2-17-8