NEW FRICTIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND HANOI?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 25, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
0 1P
MEMORANDUM
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KI
INFORMATION
February 25, 1972
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
FROM: Helmut Vnnenfeldt.
SUBJECT: New Frictions Between Moscow and Hanoi?
and discontent with the Chinese became more open. and obvious
In the past few months, as. the China trip drew closer, Hanoi's nervousness
annex to the Vietnam report). It seemed that Hanoi regarded Moscow as
the more dependable of its allies. More recently, however, there has been
some rather sensationalized speculation in a Victor Zorza column in the
Washington Post (attached) that a split is developing between the USSR and
25X1
the DRV.
Kosygin on February 11, at the Ambassador's request, and that the con-
versation was described in Pravda as having taken place in a spirit of
"friendship and comradely frankness." This latter phrase permits Zorza
to speculate that there was an open disagreement. He claims that Hanoi
requested the meeting to make a demarche over Soviet failure to support
the PRG's February 2 statement elaborating on the seven points. He con-
cludes that Moscow is toying with the idea of striking some kind of bargain
with the US involving limits on arms to Hanoi; Moscow allegedly fears that
China will make the same deal as a result of the President's trip, and the
USSR wants to be involved in the final settlement.
The facts do not justify these extreme conclusions or interpretations, but
there is a suggestion of DRV concern over the Soviet-position.
It is quite right to point out the unusual characterization of the Kosygin
meeting as "frank" -- and in standard Comrnuntst parlance it usually means
some element of disagreement. However, it would seem doubtful that Hanoi
was presenting a demarche. Pravda promptly published the full text of the
PRG statement of February 2. Two days later, on February 4, Kosygin
received both the DRV and PRG ambassadors together to receive the state-
ment and the PRG's "stand" on the President's eight points. At that time
an i. tie oai s this on the fact that the DRV Ambassador called on
Zorza drawing on overt material published)
claims ,that there is now a bitter quarrel between Moscow
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
SECRET -2-
Kosygin publicly expressed Soviet support for the proposals of the DRV
and PRG. Moreover, the DRV government statement of February 5 was
reported by Moscow, and it included the fact that the DRV did not accept
the President's proposals.
However, Moscow was lagging behind Peking in granting more authoritative
support, either in the form of editorials or government statements. Not
until February 10, did Pravda editorially attack the President's plan and
the Soviet Government statement supporting the elaboration of the seven
points was not published until a few hours after Kosygin had his "frank"
conversation. It is extraordinary, however, that the Soviets published a
government statement at all -- never before has Moscow used this level
of support for any negotiating proposals.
At the same time, Moscow has been chary of going deeply into substance
in analyzing the DRV/PRG position and the President's plan.
Hanoi's own slight shift in tone regarding Moscow was also apparent in a
Commentator article that replayed the Trong Chihn speech and cited both
the Soviet Union and China as countries that the US was willing to negotiate
with. .
All of this may be the more or less normal byplay between the Soviets and
the North Vietnamese, which ebbs and flows according to Hanoi's nerves.
Nevertheless, it is a straw in the wind worth noting, but not as definitively
as Zorza does.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
 No Objection to Declassification
...r..w~r.~r
23 T y . /f 7=
A "17 I rr &% r{w~^........
IL.._t__ ..ut 'between the ~! ns."
in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6 thus saying. In
~.~....... .~,. ,,.,,: the US.,
the final terms for a Viet- 1WS.S.R., and China were
nam settlement. , trying to Impose a settle-
This is evident-from a So? ment: on North Vietnam. it
stet peace report that a explained that the summit
meetings were an attempt
meeting between the North by the White House "to get
Vietnamese . smbassaaer what it could not obtain by
and . Premier Kosygin has force of arms." It was there-
been marked by "comradely fore Implying that by agree-
lrankaess-" The' phrase is ing to the summits they had
betrayed their ally.
unprecedented in Soviet re- BUT WHY SAY THIS to?
Moons : ?trith Hanoi- ' It the Kremlin at the very
means. In Communist jar time Mr
, Nixon was
.
gon, that the comrades were going to China? Any peace
~' ' " ? r" ? ;,? . -,,t?;{;r_ * ,-,! frank with each other to the settlement would depend on
tctor n ea ?,., .., :?a point of rudeness.' ~... :~... : an agreement to limit the
- - ,.v..b. -? icccaaa7, ar.w. a. of ~.?.~.
complaint at the highest "n,,,ct hp nerntiated" with
rftindlkl W Lh'r"Rf0 "" ? means that 'it wished ta. As Seeretarv Laird arrued
n Moscow S tint1
the Hanoi press the day be?
fore. For the first time since
Mr. Nixon had launched his
summitry e a m p a i it n.. a
Hanoi editorial identified
the Soviet Union by name
as the President's dupe. The
new Ilanot line, based on a
statement by i a politburo
hardliner, Truong Chinh.
had It that Nixon's meetings
with "the Soviet Union and
China"-In that order-were
designed to bring about a
detente only among the hid
powers, "whlle continuing to
level. It was the Kremlins Russia during. as he hop-rd,.
closed the quarrel, worm, sa same token, since' the Pe- ?
? far as can be established. king, summit Is taking place
has not been mentioned by now, the same issue. would
?' Hanoi- This means that the have to ? be raised with
Kremlin was very angry Hanoi's Chinese suppliers
with Hanoi, ' rejected its during. Mr. Nixon's present
complaint, and decided to visit.
let the' world know about it. ? In return for, limiting
why? their -arms supplies to
Earlier in the month, there Hanoi, the Soviet Union and
bad been a stream of Cam- _ China. might be offered the
munist government state- advanced technology and .
dents condemning Mr. Nix-' the Investments which they
on's latest eight-point peace want so badly from the
plan from the Vietcong United States. ,
"government" of South Viet- It a 'bargain along these
nam, from Peking and from lines Is made with China
Hanoi. But not from the. first, .the Kremlin could not
:,Kremlin. A Soviet statement expect to get as good a deal
vas issued only a few hours later as It could obtain now.
.after. ? Kosygin's meeting It would, theref are, be
,.with the ambassador - thus, tempted to get in on the
suggesting that it was pub-- ground floor now. Indeed,
fished only in answer to his Mr. Kosygin seems to have
complaint. ' ?.? . told Hanoi that, with the war
. ' But the statement gave no drawing to a close, the big
joy to Hanoi. While formally powers should join in a co-
supporting- the Vietnamese ordinated economic aid pro-
Communist line) it was more gram for Vietnam.
-lukewarm than the other The day after Kosygin's
government statements. "frank" talk with the ambas-
T1IS AMBASSADOR'S In. sailor, the Hanoi press Intt-
..struetions for the Kosygin mated much. by saying
meeting may be deduced that the e big
countries" powers
.from editorial comment In'. the t smaller settle
b by
economic pressure. Hanoi
rejected this as "a very ob-
solete doctrine." But the
Kremlin had made its point:
Its disclosure of the quarrel
with the ambassador may
have been Intended to show
to the United States that
Moscow was really putting
the heat on llanul, not just
pretending to do so. But the
disclosure also made It pos-
sible to attempt the present
reconstruction of what took
place. p teYttaUral* . ? ,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
? SECRET ? zt ttb.147z
No Foreign Dissem
HANOI-PEKING-MOSCOW: HOW STABLE THE TRIANGLE?
There has been ample evidence over the past
several months that North Vietnam's approach to for-
eign policy questions is gradually changing. Hanoi's
forthcoming attitude in its recent exchanges with
the Japanese suggests that the North Vietnamese are
beginning to allow practical considerations--including
their concerns over their country's position in the
post-war era as well as the uncertainties of the cur-
rent diplomatic picture--to soften the long-standing
prejudices that have limited their international flex-
ibility. The gradual broadening of Hanoi's ties with
India and perhaps the contacts that apparently have
been made with Indonesia seem to be part of the same
trend.
Accompanying these tentative efforts to widen
Hanoi's diplomatic contacts have been numerous ex-
pressions of concern over Hanoi's triangular relation-
ship with Moscow and Peking.
North Vietnamese press
anoi s deeply a one patron or the o er
mig make w ea wi a at the expense o Viet-
ver en ne.p the u to divert is attention away
from the Vietnam issue. T s concern h been
ex-
Dressed different ways. 25X1
severs North Vietnamese
diplomats were saying, with varying emphasis, that
their faith in the Chinese was wavering and that
Moscow might now be the more dependable patron. More
recently, Vietnamese Cormnunist officials in Paris and
elsewhere have characterized China as an 25X1
indifferent al y o growing preoccupation with the
United States might help to strengthen President Nixon's
political hand both at home and abroad. .Meanwhile,
Hanoi's media have warned Peking and Moscow alike
against being taken in by the "duplicity" of US diplo-
matic strategy.
Awl
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
SECRET
No Foreign Dissem
__]the North Vietnamese
press Ind cate that Premier Pham Van Dong came
away from his talks in Peking last November reas-
sured that the Chinese would continue to look after
North Vietnamese interests. Furthermore.
the party first
secretary recently said that, though Vietnam would
be discussed at the Sino-US summit, Peking would
stand squarely behind Hanoi. t even at this level
the confidence may not be comnle
Truong Chinh, the number two man in the coon :y,
weighed in with a speech expressing apprehension
over dangers o ig-power summitry
e e xon had demonstrated great courage
in going to China and must be re arded as a very
c 1ey~rman. The tenor of this remark sugges s hat
even an experienced pragmatist like Le Duan now
foresees political and diplomatic variables that
Hanoi has not had to deal with before.
Thus evidence fails to provide a
clear gauge of the depth of Hanoi's worry over its
relationship with its two big allies--a relation-
ship that still forms the cornerstone of its for-
eign policy. North Vietnam could not continue the
war at its present pace without the support of China
and the Soviet Union, and a key goal of North Viet-
ngmese diplomacy has always been to ensure an ade-
quate flow of moral and material backing without
coming under the thumb of either patron. ~Up to now
Hanoi has been able more or less successfully to
play Moscow and Peking off against each other be-
cause both have been ready to vie for influence in
the Indochina war, and---more important--because
neither has been willing to see the other become
dominant in Hanoi.
No Forei n Dissem
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
SECRET
No Foreign Dissem
other factors, of course, have had a bearing
on Hanoi's relations with its two patrons. Both
China and the Soviet Union have been the objects of
deep-seated prejudices that have little direct re-
lation to the generosity of either patron or the
pressures they have exerted. No one outside Hanoi's
inner circle can estimate the effect such intan- -
gibles have had on policy-making in North Vietnam,
.but it seems inevitable that they have played some
(role in shaping Hanoi's contingency planning and
may have affected the ebb and flow of its self-
confidence.
Over the Years the North Vietnamese have also
to face u to the implications of ovle ea ings
with their rican e o ev en as
learned to 1 ve wit s ehavior--helped to do so,
per aps, by the continuing flow of Soviet assistance
to North Vietnam. At no time up to now, however,
have the had to make similar allowances-for the
Chinese, Whose activities in the foreign policy field
never seemed deliberately to serve the interests of
Hanoi's enemies. The establishment of contacts be-
tween Peking and Washington has clearly re-opened
the question of Chinese motivation, and it ma be
this, feeding on the old le ac ust that
ac-
counts for the shrillness of Hanoi's initial reaction.
zn Nor Vietnam s highly emotional-- albeTt
criticisms of China last August, in fact, the pre-
dictable calls for Communist solidarity in support of
Hanoi were supplemented by elliptical references to
the centuries-old threat on Vietnam's northern border.
The Chinese have since worked hard to persuade
the Vietnamese that their role in Indochina has not
altered, and Hanoi may learn to tolerate Peking's
big-power waywardness as it has Moscow's. Neverthe-
less, the temptation to read the worst into Peking's
motives may now be stronger than any rational assess-
ment would warrant, if only because the shifts'in US-
Chinese.relations, as the North Vietnamese press
commentaries point out, raise the specter of a new
form of great power hegemony with which Hanoi has
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
W SECRET W
No Foreign Dissem
never had to contend. So long as the North Viet-
namese are determined to a~hV their maximum you t--
ca aectives in Indochina, they will undoubtedly
-sens ive to any sucficiangee
po tical environment which might limit weir free-
dom o -ac ion or r ce their leverage on world
o inion. Even now, Hanoi almost certainly is less
than satisfied with Peking's public position on the
Vietnamese Communists' peace proposals--a position
that has often given pride of place to the call for
US military withdrawal while saying little about the
demand, equally important in Hanoi's eyes, for major
US concessions on the political side. Nor can the
North Vietnamese be entirely happy over the apparent
reluctance of the Chinese (and the Soviets as well)
to condemn with suitable vigor the notion of a new
Geneva-type conference. Hanoi has resisted this
notion in part because such a conference might give
Peking and Moscow a chance to intervene more directly
in Vietnamese affairs.
None of these concerns regarding Peking, how-
ever, are likely to lead to a basic shift in Hanoi's
approach to the two superpowers--something that
might happen only if Moscow'or Peking seemed willing
to give up their competition for influence in Indo-
china. Thr. continuing series of "supplemental" aid
agreements being signed with both parties su gests,
in
an
act
or
at
s
t
re
Ei Ion,
o i i v o plan on the Slno-govieE riv
for some time to come. ing
and the occasional bouquets for Moscow among lower-
level North Vietnamese officials sou not be taken
to mean that the regime may a mov ng c oser o e
oviets in any fundamental sense. athe~ x Ehan opt
for a course that would mortgage its independence,
Hanoi is likely to concentrate on looking for ways
to bolster the triangular relationship which has
kept it safely equidistant from the pressure centers
in Moscow and Peking. The recent explicit commen-
taries in the North Vietnamese press, and much of
A- 4
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
SECRET
No Foreign Dissem
Bets-against the- ntuiq
the diplomatic gossip about Chinese failures and
Soviet dependability, may even be designed in part
to prompt a more positive response from both allies
that would confirm the value of Hanoi's traditional
balancing act.
But no matter how successful they are in this
effort, the North Vietnamese will probably never be
able to convince themselves that their world is what
it was prior to the first tentative feelers between
the US and China. In part, of course, their changing
perspectives are due to international shifts which
predate the announcement of the US-China summitry.
The recent US negotiating initiatives toward North
Vietnam, as well as the longer term retrenchment of
US interests in Asia and the emergence of Japan as
an independent regional force have all contributed to
the pressures and opportunities confronting Hanoi in
the foreign policy arena. In addition, after so many
years of war, the North Vietnamese may simply be
taking more seriously the prospect of a post-war en-
vironment in which regional contacts will undoubtedly
become a more important complement to relations with
the great powers. Many of Hanoi's recent tentative
feelers toward such countries as Japan, India and
even Indonesia may simply e s
Without the extra incentive provided by the
changes in big-power relationships, however, it seems
unlikely that Hanoi would be pursuing the new possi-
bilities for international exchange and cooperation
as vigorously as it has been over the past year.
North Vietnam's apparent efforts to keep Moscow and
Peking in the dark about many of its new contacts,
particularly with Japan, may be a measure of its
suspicions--and an indication of the complex inter-
relation between its old and emerging foreign policy
objectives. In pursuing its new contactb'abroad
Hanoi cannot, of course, hope for the kind of mate-
rial aid'it has gotten from Moscow and Peking; nor
A- 5
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6
SECRET 1W
No. Foreign Dissem
can it realistically expect such countries as Japan
or India to come out four-square behind North Viet-
namese objectives on the war. But it may well have
decided that any effort to expand its international
ties would be advisable and opportune, not only as
political and economic insurance for the future but
also as a way of reminding its two major allies that
they can no longer take their role in North Vietnamese
affairs for granted and had better look to their basic
long-term interests in Hanoi..
A-6
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-20-6-15-6