FRENCH INTEREST IN ADHERING TO US-SOVIET ACCIDENT AGREEMENT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-21-2-3-2
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
September 1, 2010
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 6, 1972
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 218.64 KB |
Body:
1P'
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-21-2-3-2
_BILCIRE-.11/ NOD
YES ONLY ACTION
March 6, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
French Interest in Adhering to US-Soviet Accident
Agreement
2001-X
In my memo of March 2 (Log #1934-Tab D), I noted Alphand's mentioning
to Watson that the French had raised this subject with the Soviets and that
the French are seriously considering adherence.
State on March 3 sent the attached message to Watson (Tab C), telling him
that we should not leave the negative US view of this in doubt but that -Watson
should tell the French to take the matter up in NIN ashingtort. I had asked
State to clear this message here 'because I wanted to discuss it with you)
but they sent it without clearance on the grounds dot it was only procedural.
The issue is troublesome because we really have no interest in French
adherence but also should not handle the matter in a way that unnecessarily
offends Pompidou.
When this first came up last September, at the time of Schumann 's visit to
the US and UN, we all agreed that it should be soft-pedaled. You recall of
course that we had kept the accidents agreement deliberately and carefully
bilateral and it was drafted with that consideration in mind. In the first
place, any agreement among allies on this subject should not be identical
with one between antagonists, especially when we are now talking about
nuclear safety with the French. More important, we did not want to let
the Sovi ts parlay this exercise into a scheme that isolates the Chinese.
We cannot of course stop the French from making an agreement with the
Soviets; nor should we, if they feel that this is a matter of either security
or self-respect, or both. But I think that we should give a clear statement
of our attitude to the French at the highest level so that it will not be mis-
interpreted and create unnecessary hard feelings. This is especially
important right now when Pompidou remains quite irritated over our monetary
policy.
NSS, State Dept reviews completed
--SE-6-R-E-TINODIS /EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-21-2-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-21-2-3-2
SE C T/NODI / YES ONLY
I think two things are needed:
-- a backchannel to Dick Watson (who is probably a little annoyed at
the State telegram anyway); and
a directive to the NSC (which was previously given the implementing
responsibility for the accidents agreement ? your directive of September 29.
1971). (Tab E)
Drafta of both are at Tabs A and B.
RE COMMENDATION
I. That you initial the message to Watson and have it dispatched;
. That you sign the Directive to the USC.
HS:mm
SE CRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-21-2-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-21-2-3-2
IP
March 11, 1972
SECRET
EYES ONLY TO Ambassador Watson, American Embassy, Paris, France
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger, The White House
25X1
25X1
I appreciated your report on your talk with Alphand (your Paris 596)
and I have also read the other reporting on Alphand's Moscow trip.
You will have received State's 036909 on the French interest in the
accidental war agreement. I would not have objected at all to your carrying
the ball on this but the message was sent without White House clearance.
In any case, I want you to know my thinking on this subject so that you
can make sure Pompidou. understands the situation.
Throughout the talks with the Soviets they attempted to draft the text
in a way that would make it suitable for others to adhere. But we resisted
this because we sensed in the Soviet tactic an effort to find a way to isolate
the Chinese who of course are not likely to adhere. We also felt that a
multilateral agreement might complicate relations between ourselves and
our allies since as a practical matter the problems addressed in the US-
Soviet agreement are hardly likely to arise between allies with whom we maintain
close relations and contact.
It is of course entirely up to the French whether they would like to
negotiate an agreement on this subject with the Soviets. We would be pleased
to consult with them fully on the basis of our own experience. But we want
to be sure the Elysee understands the reasons for a negative attitude toward
French adherence to the existing US-Soviet agreement.
Warm regards,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-21-2-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-21-2-3-2
I.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
ISECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR
? March 11, 1972
CHAIRMAN
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: French Interest in Adhering to US-Soviet Agreement
to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War
Between the USA and USSR
REFERENCE: My Memorandum of September 29, 1971
The President has noted recent French expressions of interest in this
subject. He does not wish the US to take any initiative to pursue this
t-natter .
However, in view of Ambassador Watson's recent report the President
directs that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee prepare for contingency
use a statement to be made in response to a further French approach
which would explain frankly the US reasons for opposing the adherence
of third parties.
The proposed statement should be submitted to approval on an argent
basis.
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-21-2-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-21-2-3-2
.,.- . IIP
^ ? aa LECRET Nopxs4IP
: oofew Op
-40".- 40 g A
V
Q e
? '
iNctiC.ATC,
0 cou.e or
et4Aaat
?
11'4r I
0. 0
. cep
? ? 4Ttie 0' ?
chueficathut,,./
Department Of-State
'
DisTIUSUTION
Acrlom PpEmbassy PARIS Ittil 'IMMEDIATE
Nom;
SUBJE&C Acceitsion to US-USSR Accident measures Agre42ent
commovy:
PMOILGarthoff/rea fQ 3/3/72
?
. .
REFt -Paris .3986 ?
s7i-c..et ? c:;610,
1. Departmmt agrees that we 'should not.leave LIS
position on question of French (or other) accession
to the, bilateral Accident Measures Agreement in doubt,
in view of corriments by Quai SecGen. Request that you
suggest to him that there are complexities with respect .
to this question and that it would be best rrenc4f2
Embassy in Washington would take up this matter with
the Department.
??
2. M. There are several difficult facets of this
?
question, relating to negotiation of the Agreement
itself, its final form and language., and UK queries on
this same question of accession which lead us to Wish
to pursue this question with the French Washingtoll'L1)
End rrx. GP-3
OrtAP TIN .1 DATE
70..cxt.
23302
APPROVE() Ely;
PM:RISpiers
4
- ?
ACDA/DD Mr. Farley
BUR Mr. Sprin
w ?
S/S 6014,
Mr. Miller
leWUMMIsc000r,(XXXXM7X4X'?
jC_Er#E_QJ2Ia____
No Objection to Declassification in Part.2013/03/26-: t5C-HAK-21-2-3-2