REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO CONDUCT A MULTI-BATTALION DIVERSIONARY OPERATION NORTH AND EAST OF THE PLAIN OF JARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-21-2-40-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: March 10, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-21-2-40-1
MEMORANDUM
V /W
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4 !?
ACTION
/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY March 10, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
Request for Approval to Conduct a Multi-
Battalion Diversionary Operation North
and East of the Plain of Jars
Director Helms has sent a memorandum (at Tab A) to you, Under
Secretary Irwin, Deputy Secretary Rush, and Admiral Moorer asking
for early approval of a new diversionary maneuver by Vang Pao's
forces. The operation would seek to utilize our advantage in mobility
by helilifting sizable elements of Vang Pao's forces east and north of
the PDJ in order to divert the enemy from Long Tieng. The plan is
summarized on the map at Tab A-1.
Current indications are that it is merely a matter of time until the North
Vietnamese attack Long Tieng in overwhelming force. The NVA forces
which countered Vang Pao's earlier diversion southeast of the PDJ have
returned westward toward Long Tieng.
The question, then, is whether Long Tieng (and ultimately the Mekong
Basin and the RLG) is better defended by using the approximately 5, 000
irregulars to strengthen Long Tieng's immediate defenses or by the
proposed maneuver. If retained at Long Tieng, they could add strength
to the defenses and serve as a reserve. But there is general agreement
that Long Tieng itself probably cannot be held if the NVA put all the force
they have available into the effort to take it. The real defense will have
to be one in depth using the excellent terrain to the south to delay and extract
a heavy price for further enemy advances. This is essentially the strategy
we have visualized since the start of the dry season, and Godley has moved
to be in a position to implement it. Moreover, there is the danger that
in static defense the Meo might be destroyed as an effective force, even
if they succeeded in holding Long Tieng.
NSS, OSD and JCS
reviews completed
25X1
25X1
SEC ET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
.- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-21-2-40-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-21-2-40-1
SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
Alternatively, the proposed operation seeks to defend the base indirectly
by threatening the enemy's lines of communications. That the North
Vietnamese are sensitive to such attacks was shown by their rapid reaction
to Vang Pao's earlier initiative south and east of the PDJ. The earlier
effort successfully substituted mobility -- where we have a definite
advantage -- for manpower and ordnance; casualties were light and
ordnance expenditures conservative. The new proposal would,continue
to use Vang.Pao's forces in the mobile role in which they are most
effective, retain the initiative, dissipate some of the enemy's energies
and supplies in response, and probably cause him to expose more targets
to air attack than otherwise.
There is the risk that the enemy may attack a weakened Long Tieng
while this 5, 000 man force is maneuvering behind his lines and we will
face the difficult task of extricating them. But the chances are at least
even that this diversionary effort will take some pressure off of Long
Tieng and may even thin out the NVA forces there to an extent which
would diminish the likelihood of a successful assault against the defenses.
We believe that this chance argues for going along with the plan.
The U. S. Commander 7/13 AF assesses the risk to the 5-9 CH-53 helicopters
which would be flying to support the . operation.as moderate to high from
possible enemy reaction in planned landing zones and possible AA fire
along some of the proposed flight paths. Flak suppression sorties will
be used to lessen the risk.
All elements of the American Mission concur in the plan, and Ambassador
Godley urges early approval so that the helilift can get underway no later
than March 10. Director Helms suggests telephonic concurrence and no
WSAG meeting unless we see serious problems with the plan. Admiral
Moorer favors the plan. State favors the plan and recommends approval.
(Sullivan wants to use approval to force the issue of whether we go for an
increase in the ceiling. The added cost of about $95 thousand clearly will
have no effect on the ceiling and we consider this a red-herring.) Secretary
Laird has witheld judgment pending further JCS assessment of possible
U. S. helo losses, overall level of U. S.. support required for the operation,
and plans for extricating the force if it gets into trouble (This assessment
is to be provided to Mr. Laird today. ).
We believe the likely gains outweigh the costs and risks. The previous
operation of this type accomplished the purpose at little cost to the attacking
force and this one has as good a chance to succeed as the earlier one.
Accordingly, we believe we should agree with Godley.
== =_= No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-21-2-40-1 'W
 n. ni,. o.,.4 ')n1 Ir I1O ? I n/' UAV'-1 o) nn I
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SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
RECOMMENDATION:
That you concur in the operat' d authori a us tc(inform Director Helm
Approver
Disapprove, schedule WSAG mee ing
Other
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-21-2-40-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-21-2-40-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-21-2-40-1