OUR OPTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-22-3-18-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 4, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/07: LOC-HAK-22-3-18-4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR DICK KENNEDY
JOHN NEGROPONTE
FROM: Phil Odeen 11~
SUBJECT: Our Options in Southeast Asia
April 4, 1972
Most of the discussions of our options and possible actions during
the current SEA crisis seem to focus on what we can do unilater-
ally. Yet, we all recognize that the key is not what we do but what
the South Vietnamese do.
I suggest that we give more attention to what we can do to help the
GVN to defeat the NVN attack. If we rely on bombing and the GVN
copes with the NVN assault, the press will say, "U. S. aircraft bail
out the ARVN. "" Such headlines do little to convince the American
public that the Vietnamization policy has been a success. Thus, our
emphasis both. publicly and operationally should be on the ARVN
role.
What follows are some random thoughts on what we might do now to
help the ARVN.
Military Actions
As you.know, my personal prejudice is that our air operations are
not likely to be crucial to the outcome of the MR-1 battle. The real
question is, will the ARVN stand and fight effectively. U. S. efforts
should focus on how we can help them do this. Our options are
limited, but there are some things we might do:
.'?- Provide whatever tactical airlift is needed to move reinforce-
ments. MACV has undoubtedly done this, but we should make sure.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/07: LOC-HAK-22-3-18-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/07: LOC-HAK-22-3-18-4
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SECRET
-- Help the GVN plan an amphibious end-run, to cut off the
NVN forces and regain lost ground.
40000*1
-- Replace equipment (e. g. , artillery) lost during the initial 400000
attacks.
-- Provide specialized logistics and maintenance support.
This might include moving some U. S. support units north.
-- Return some limited number of key advisors. Could we
find 15 or 20 former advisors to the ARVN who were exceedingly
effective during their tours or who have excellent relations with the
key Vietnamese commanders? If so, let's send them back on 30
days TDY.
-- Provide funds for some financial incentive for the ARVN.
The units moved north are liable to have serious desertion problems.
Could we provide some special relocation pay? Perhaps we could
provide some financial incentives to leaders or soldiers who perform
in an outstanding manner.
-- Prod the GVN to fire some incompetent commanders. Our
advisors know which leaders need to be replaced. If a key commander
blows it, let's press the GVN hard to get rid of him. This could have
significant military as well as psychological impact.
Psychological Steps
This is the big test for the GVN and the ARVN. Are they treating it
as such? If there is more that they can do, we should press hard to
get them to act. For example, the CIA report today stated, "Saigon
was calm." This beats having a panic, but one would hope a more
positive spirit would a .verge.
Tet 68 was a real turning point for the GVN. The current
attack provides another opportunity to mobilize support and attack
problems that seemed beyond solution a week ago.
.- Has Thieu been on radio and TV accusing NVN of a blatant
attack, violation of the Geneva accord, etc? If not, why not?
In laying out a series of steps, we believe the GVN should take it as
important to remember they will equivocate and resist. Thus, we
should overbid, hoping that some fraction of the needed actions are
taken.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/07: LOC-HAK-22-3-18-4