IMPACT OF NVA OFFENSIVE ON PACIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-23-1-42-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: April 28, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/22: LOC-HAK-23-1-42-8
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET,
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
INFORMATION
April 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
JOHN HOLDRIDGI::
SUBJECT: Impact of NVA Offensive on Pacification
FROM:
CIA has prepared a preliminary damage assessment of the Pacification
Program in South Vietnam (Tab B) which makes the point that so far the
NVA offensive has not been as disruptive to pacification as the Tet attacks
of 1968. According to the report, this is due to the fact that the big-unit
battles in the current offensive have been fought in the remote border
regions, well away from population concentrations. Also, unlike Tet 1968,
the local Viet Gong forces have been replaced by North Vietnamese regulars.
The study also stresses the hazards inherent in drawing early conclusions
about pacification damage by pointing out that after the Tet offensive of
1968, Saigon was able to extend its infl nge beyond'what it had been before,
even tho-~gh it had largely abandoned the countryside at the outset.
The report does indicate, however, that the Communists have caused
significant damage to pacification in Quang Tri Province, along the coast
from Quang Nam to Binh Dinh provinces, in Binh Long Province and in
the Mekong Delta. Following is a summary of the report's damage assess-
ment for each of these areas:
The Northern and Central Provinces
While the North Vietnamese have seized half of the province of Quang Tri
and are claiming to have set up "liberation governments, " most of the
people have fled south, and what-the North really controls is a battlefield
that is subject to heavy allied bombing and shelling.
The Communists have done considerably better in the coastal lowlands from
Quang Nam to Binh Dinh in terms of population control. Sympathy for the
enemy has historically been strong in this area and the enemy has been
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/22: LOC-HAK-23-1-42-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/22: LOC-HAK-23-1-42-8
SECRET
.places. At least part of their success is due to the fact that many ARVN
units have been shifted to the battlefields in the central highlands and in
northern I Corps.
-several- others and cutting the north- south highway, Route 1, in several
successful in overrunning at least one district capital, surrounding
North of Saigon
The North Vietnamese have seized control of the northern part of Binh Long
Province but as in QuiLng Tri, much" of the population has fled southward.
In the area they control, the Communist troops carefully organized the
remaining populace, confiscated rice stocks, conscripted for labor details
and through secret VC cadre, carried out. public executions of some residents
who had been in GVN service or were staunch anti-Communists. Meanwhile,
local VC cadre and units have been giving urgent instructions to step up
harassing actions in the more heavily populated provinces closer to Saigon
in coordination with enemy big-unit attacks along the border.
Worry in the Delta Y
There are ten main-force enemy regiments in the Delta. This fact, plus the
departure of the ARVN 21st Division is a source of considerable apprehension
to South Vietnamese commanders. Twg VC regiments, heavily reinforced
with northern troops, are overwhelmi9ig G"VN forces in Chuong Thaien
Province and are reportedly extending their influence northward where they
could threaten Can Tho.City.
Two northern regiments have a direct affect on the situation in the Delta,
even though they are in southeastern Cambodia as the South Vietnamese
have sent nearly all of the regular forces they normally assign to border
defense into Cambodia where they have taken serious losses. The ARVN
have.prevented some regiments from pushing across.the border but have
been unable to pr--event other northern regiments from slipping into the
Delta farther east.
In other parts of the Delta, communist forces have been carrying out
widespread harassing attacks but since the night of 7.8 April, the level
of Communist activity has leveled off ccf.siderably.
GVN security forces in many populated districts have been hit but the
VC in the Delta, while still dangerous, are a much less formidable
threat than they were in 1968. A& in most other parts of the country,
the outcome of the battles between the main -force units of both sides will
play a major role in determining who controls the Delta.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/22 : LOC-HAK-23-1-42-8