ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE BLOCKADE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-23-3-15-6
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 9, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-23-3-15-6
OUTSIDE SYSTEM
May 9, 1972
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KIS,ST ER
FROM: Phil Ode en kV(
SUBJECT: Assessing the Impact of the Blockade
I foresee some very difficult decisions facing the President in two
to four months regarding the effectiveness of the blockade. There
is a good chance that at that point there will be considerable
ambiguity over the real impact it is having on the NVN logistics
posture.
-- Some will argue that it is not working and new policies
should be pursued.
-- Others will claim it is working and if we just hang on a bit
longer the impact will be apparent,
There will be a mass of intelligence reports related to the blockade.
But they will almost certainly be conflicting. Sufficient information
will be available to support almost any conclusion.
For this reason I believe we should develop an independent analysis
of the effectiveness of the blockade. It is unlikely to produce a
clear and definitive answer. But it should give us a feel for the
range of likely impacts and help us frame questions to probe the
proponents of various views.
In order to analyze the impact, three types of information are needed.
(1) Approximations of the stocks available in North Vietnam
and its supply areas in Laos and SVN.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-23-3-15-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-23-3-15-6
S CRET 2
(2) Consumption of supplies, to include materiel destroyed
by air and naval activity.
(3) The materiel being supplied to NVN despite the blockade,
bombing, etc., as well as the amounts produced within
NVN and captured in the South.
There is no ready source of the above data. Yet, I believe reasonable
estimates can be made and useful analysis carried out. Where there
is considerable uncertainty, parametric estimates can be developed
and at least we can say "if you believe... then we conclude that...:'
Such an analysis cannot be done in-house, as we will need considerable
data from the Joint Staff, DIA and CIA. Therefore, the best way to
proceed would be to assemble a small group from these agencies
,(plus OSD as Laird will insist) to develop the details of the analysis
and data needs. The group could be an offshoot of the VSSG or
completely ad hoc.
If you believe this approach would be useful, I can outline the study in
more detail for you or Al to review.
~._... Prepare detailed study plan.
Discuss with me.
Drop idea.
cc: Dick Kennedy
John Negroponte
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-23-3-15-6