VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-23-4-3-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 15, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/16: LOC-HAK-23-4-3-8
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET icompietea. INFORMATION
May 15; 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Phil Odeen
SUBJECT: Vietnam and Cambodia
A member of my staff, John Bushnell, just returned from two weeks
in SEA. He reports the following:
Vietnam Military Matters
4100
Maneuver battalion manpower strength is a critical problem. If
maneuver battalions were at 90% of authorized strength instead of 65%,
ARVN would have nearly 50% more men to engage the enemy in this
offensive. Present for combat strength is 15 to 25 percentage points
below assigned strength because many troops are detailed to non-combat
duties, including unit farms and other irregular activities as well as the
usual leave and training. ARVN maneuver battalions were below 50%
present for combat at the end of March.
The Zlst Division's lack of aggressiveness can in large part be traced to
personnel shortages. Some men were left behind when the unit moved out
of the Delta and desertions have been heavy since they were sent to MR-3.
As a result, the maneuver battalions are at 35 to 40% of authorized strength.
Fortunately, the training system was full when the offensive began because
the GVN finally began to act on the personnel shortage last December. The
training cycle has been shortened from 12 to 9 weeks with a substantial
one-time flow to units. About 36, 000 men per month are coming,out of the
training system. But only a third are sent to maneuver battalions, and this
is probably less than needed to replace casualties and desertions. Permission
has been given to use RF trainees to fill ARVN units but this authority has not
yet been used (about 13, 000 replacements are being sent to. the RF monthly).
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/16 : LOC-HAK-23-4-3-8
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The GVN is trying a number of quick fixes such as releasing prisoners
for assignment to front line divisions and the drafting of 17 year olds
to keep the training camps full. The universities are being closed
but it is not clear how many of the students will be drafted for combat
units.
There has still been no basic reform of the GVN military personnel
system. Once assigned to a combat unit, the man stays there until
he is wounded, killed, or reaches age 40. Units do much of their
own recruiting. Support units (two-thirds of ARVN) fill all require-
ments with volunteers and once in a support unit you are safe from
combat duty. Nothing effective has yet been done to draft the estimated
130, 000 draft dodgers in PSDF units or the 250, 000 with various other
deferments.
What is needed is a system which directs most young men through a
couple of years in a combat unit with support and local units being
staffed by those having served a combat tour. MACV does not feel
this is the time to raise such basic reform, although several offices
in the Embassy feel this is the single most important reform Thieu
could implement under the special powers. It would be popular with
most of the people but not with many of Thieu's closest supporters
who benefit from running the present system (e. g., pay for deferments
Leadership changes have been for the better. But they are late and
still too few. We need to press for more changes.
The President's actions against NVN have greatly encour wed the GVN.
Thieu's initial response has been to be more positive and aggressive.
But there is danger the GVN will tend to await the fruits of U. S. actions
instead of doing everything it can to defeat the enemy. Bunker is aware
of this problem.
The Economy
The offensive is contributing to a recession resulting from the rapid
reduction of U. S. employment and the higher exchange rates of last
November. People will accept the lower' per capita consumption
levels caused by the reductions of U.S. economic support and the
offensive because of the military situation. But continued rapid
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/16: LOC-HAK-23-4-3-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/16: LOC-HAK-23-4-3-8
w
reductions of U.S. economic support in 1973 and beyond would put
severe strains on Thieu as per capita consumption would continue to
decline.
Cambodia
The Cambodian situation is depressing. The only thing functioning
well is our MAP delivery system. The GKR is paying about 240, 000
men; we are providing equipment and supplies for 220, 000; FANK
actual strength is estimated at about 150, 000. Lack of knowledge
about actual strength or effectiveness of its units is a major factor
making the GKR reluctant to move units to reinforce attacked positions
or to initiate any actions. The GKR is increasingly drawing in to try
to protect the capitol and a few major towns.
Establishing an adequate personnel recruitment, training, control
system is obviously highest priority. Lon Nol has just agreed to
move ahead. A few people will be needed in our MDT to help. It
is unlikely that an effective system can be established to bring FANK
to the planned 220, 000 level for a considerable period. For the next
year we must cross our fingers that the enemy does not devote many
resources to Cambodia.,
cc: Dick Kennedy
John Negroponte
SET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/16: LOC-HAK-23-4-3-8