DISRUPTION OF ENEMY LOGISTICS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-24-4-28-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: June 28, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/01/14: LOC-HAK-24-4-28-0
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A&M
MEMORA. D M p'0Rs G IE RA L lb
J 2$, 1972
'" W, >r S JOHN M. H LORI r
FRO M% WILUA . L. ST"AlMAN
ON-FILE NSC
RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
,SUBJECT- Diar pot a of hn.* Logistics in South
Vietams aas
,. yve .rnt bt want t. agg.at & at a gpgtroator ssd at. raarcatart*d
0 disrupt the n-"my's supply at e.m is nth Vtetsan.
a s.#* w.am do get have the toil to ewssure the flow of ~my supoiems,
to nth Vi.tsa ., wra have paid *csat attention what is parobaabty the
most difficult MW vulsatrubie v* t of the eaaaeaastr"+s martials, logistics s 'utema'.
Tb. iaamtelliges-c* coa awstty he* eveorally *40 the itapr.ss1on *At the
ea ;tr's s"ply problem ends wwh.se b, *46M*" # # " xobpat - to border
brae ore as) wb,n, is fact, it to pr.daei:yr at )ts point where hi, 'iogiaart'lcs
task b.coi s most dt cult and coasapltcst.d. As a result. we
focuarsed alas ost ,*ttr.ly on trail" t rdtctiaaa , (t .stly its Laos) : t
~..
wortld&# elat s ?ystoasmaAattie approach to bl*ck %ba, 114W Of sap t?a:
forces with is 304th V ettmaaab.
is g * ; ar . f 1969, who toe stns y bad tis was? 9** karilte
* uaaarad* teal of sspptfss wore br taruck*d t4 t board *r .*sc-
t*atriss (tbea totally. *ta tsturh*d) a*&r MR-S. t h* a ra re w*, stt11
a *perte >t . toostics prrsbl*Ma is MR-3, even to aaiam eloaram to + a..
(this came out wary clearly in the July 1969 C YN & es ?1 tt r * .) + Y
p ficstlas efforts bad awtd, it difficult to callsct. rice &aaad %x** (roams
the pea"o s at*d to impress izbor to carry 6%PpliG?aramf, ed acsaade it rt.ky
to taaaasve asupply columns tat. MR -3 sad had nw4e *dv*aced cadres valuaatr*bto
to discovrery.
to m.uy aar"o Wboro pa*cifkc*tl a US b*40 therm, + by the present a ff**Ave
Asa well a# in atom lly paaistsd ratio**), a r y" &**=a 9 be =ovuw
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/01/14: LOC-HAK-24-4-28-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/01/14: LOC-HAK-24-4-28-0
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little fear of iaterrdiatlon: however, in many cases he I.
.,...~_ ~._ r1b sly Moving these supp2#es by bicycle or backpacKust*i impressed
civilian porters and rear service troops. We know from e p erioate
that such supply columns are very vulnerable to ambush and that the
enemy is most reluctant to send eupplias rough corridors which might
be interdicted :a the ground.
The exemy I. making an Intense effort to collect, move, and cache as
much of th Vietnam's fifth month rice cr: p as possible -- and 1a
succeeding well to s h areas as Blab l a - Province.. It is little
nppracat.d that roost of the rice cerenssssxed by Cor rsraeumist troops in
Sooth Vietnam comes from within country. (We have, for eza .e,,
reports of food aborrtsg.s in the 308th Division which to only a short
dts""wo from North Vietnam.) if one, c kd, in theory, decay to
all of this lsdlgneoars rice, it is difficult to see b he cad fight m s&
of a war to the
If, for .ztaa iplee, the enemy to able to saa .in offensive Operations in
t 1g?3 Y"rront through the summer, it will probably be largely due to
artce brought across (uMssxterddicted) trails from Stab Dinh Province.
`tae Syr bass conscripted large numbers et civilians to move this rice,
(and oar supplies). no is also sending Civilians into YN-cantro led
areas to bay supplies.
As far as can be ascertained from here. there is no systematic, countrywide
effort to counter the above described enemy logistic efforts.
The following are some suggested measures wh ierh, it proper;
could significantly disrupt the Ayr's internal (SVN) logtatica system
and make it very difficult w- it not isgrssp~ sasible ~- for him to sustain his
present Military effort-
-- Av"ire increased intelligence on the enemy'. internal LOCI*
and entry and snit points adjacent to populated areas. (for exa se:
the 7th Division troops.blocking Route 136geettira their supplies?
Now is Trice mimed from Kish Xiuh Previte* to XMtum province )
..N interdict LOC's wits ambushes (mec sa,esical or direct) *et by
guerrilla units made up, for oxxnWe, at Kit Carson Scouts and Armed
P ropagaaads Teeme.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/01/14: LOC-HAK-24-4-28-0
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/01/14: LOC-HAK-24-4-28-0
W 1P
tlisb s pttrywtde rewards for Worm tto* laa& +
will be .ad"#ers"d Li they tarry supplies for the *wml-.
... Worm ctL4Ua** i^ C annuist?coatrOUsd ?rrs;s that their W
discovery sapol ca has (m*W of which are bath b unwilling tabu,
sit o"r tba v vt of s roars train
#e"ar&uy tocai or bit-&M-mist b&atA6 hat is needed to a rowcsrtr-d
bigb priority a psis rear. # "It a sainpat.e "a costln t
low up the *sows logistics --,*ad at l est - *ft.r we have ra ces
or *70* Stapp" Mr afar l rdictiou of hail sad of :QC's 1* k. North.
Vlttmatsty, * - V?t*taat`s varT s%rWJ**1 might d.pa d ou the sua sa
of tbis, wort.
Most of tl above measures w-re prfsOQUy 100119 isnpra
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/01/14: LOC-HAK-24-4-28-0