THE PRESSURE PACKAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-247-2-11-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 29, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
29 September 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : The Pressure Package
Per your request and v*hissinger's, attached is a rough
first cut at a way in which the pressure package might perhaps best.
be put together. What appears here is the framework and background
against which the catalogue of specific proposals -- yours, the JCS',
ours and anyone else's -- needs to be set and related. We are
developing and will forward early next week specific suggestions on
psychological and covert action operations against the North, political
steps that could enhance the strength and image of the GVN, and
some further specific suggestions on targetting and military action.
Obviously our inputs will need to be meshed and melded with those
you receive from other quarters. Section V, in short, needs to be
put together after Sections I-IV (or their revised replacements) get
jelled.
CA L %.
Ge rge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
MORI/CDF
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 SUBJECT: Project (X)
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1. ASSUMPTIONS
1. The action package outlined below for your consideration was
based on four working assumptions, which were taken as planning "givens"
and are not offered as predictions:
(1) That you are re-elected on 7 November.
(2) That there is no major change in the North
Vietnamese neogitating position between now and
7 November.
(3) That even if there should be a sharp flurry
of Communist military activity during October, ARVN
suffers no major defeats and as of 7 November there
is no imminent prospect of any kind of cease fire.
(4) There is no change in North Vietnam's
position with respect to negotiating a release of U.S.
prisoners.
I.I. OBJECTIVES
2. On your instructions, we have attempted to devise an action package
which -- if the actual 8 November situation resembles that posited by the above
four assumptions -- could be promptly initiated to maximize the chances of
achieving the following two objectives:
(1) Induce the Lao Dong Politburo to abandon its
current policy of armed struggle.
(2) Compel Hanoi to negotiate a return of all U.S.
prisoners -- military and civilian -- and, in good faith,
help account for all U.S. personnel (again, military and
civilian) currently carried on our records as "Missing
in Action."
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 ..,,,,i rl tike to nchieve a neeotiatecl settlement of the Indochina war. As a matter
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of prudence, not prediction, it should be recognized that such a negotiated
settlement -- committing Hanoi publicly to terms and arrangements acceptable
to the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments -- may be impossible to achieve
in the sense that even if Hanoi's behavior should change to a degree that meets
our - and Saigon's -- minimal requirements, this or any other Lao bong
Politburo may find it politically impossible to sign a document that in North
Vietnamese eyes would perforce be read as a public acknowledgement of defeat.
The Lao Dong Party will of'course never abandon its goal of acquiring political
control over all of Vietnam (North and South), plus de facto suzerainty over
Laos and Cambodia. It may nonetheless be possible to structure a situation
which will induce the Party to abandon for a significant period of time
(measured in years) its current policy of pursuing that goal through a strategy
involving extensive reliance on armed force. In short, the best feasible
solution in Indochina may prove to be one that in many respects resembles
an untidy, non-formalized version of the 1953 Korea pattern much more than
that of the 1954 Geneva settlement.
4. If Hanoi goes the route of negotiated settlement, or even negotiated
cease fire pending final settlement, objective (2)'s achievement will be subsumed
in the achievement of objective (1), since the U.S. would presumably not accept
any settlement or cease fire package of which prisoner return and MIA
accountings were not component parts. On the other hand, should objective
(1) be attained by Hanoi's going the "behavioral" route without formally
accepting a cease fire or settlement package, achieving objective (2) will become
a much more complex and difficult proposition.
5. Any leadership group demonstrably willing to take or spend lives
by the thousands or even tens of thousands for doctrinal reasons or in an
attempt to gain transient military or political advantage simply does not comprehend,
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 . _ -- _ L _. .L_ U.S, position
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i, f tut -Ut.OVv 00al ?r?u Ft. t`1
on the prisoner question. For reasons of political convenience, Hanoi's leaders
refuse to acknowledge the existence of NVA prisoners in allied hands and clearly
consider any proposals for their return a source of acute embarrassment. The
extent to which concern for our prisoners (numbering only in the hundreds)
constitutes a major determinant of U.S. policy must strike Hanoi as a rather
extreme example of baffling occidental inscrutability. Our obvious if mystifying
concern, however, is clearly regarded by Hanoi as one of its biggest hole cards,
through whose well timed play face can perhaps be saved ord~n? otherwise
lost hand recouped. In any event, to Hanoi our manifest concern makes the
U.S. prisoners a windfall asset not to be squandered lightly. Thus should objective
(1) be achieved by the "behavioral" rather than the "negotiated" route, its
very achievement could complicate rather than facilitate the achievement of
%.4 I.. 4?y fo 1"'
objective (2). Our action proposal package, therefore, has :
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III. PRESSURE POINTS
6. Achievement of either or both of the above objectives involves
inducing the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party to adopt certain courses of action
or lines of policy. This, in turn, involves either (a) persuading a preponderant
portion* of the current Politburo to change the Lao Dong's current policies
or (b) inducing a change in the Politburo's composition sufficient to produce
the required change in Party policies. The whole point of our action program,
in short, is to affect attitudes and outlook -- not to inflict any given range,
type or level of physical damage but to shape the opinions, perceptions and
*This is a rather turgid phrase, bu preponderant portion" of the Politburo might,
or might not, constitute a numerical majority.
i~44 ~~iJ?a~'~ l.ce.we . Cat'1y f~'aj, i,'d7
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UUZi% . our
action mix should be specifically structured to focus on key pressure points --
topics, issues or situations likely to have the greatest impact on Politburo
thinking. We believe there are four such pressure points. which -A Have labelled
policy, priorities, cohesion and expectations.
The Communists initi 25X1
(or, more accurately, resumed) the policy of armed struggle in the late 1950s for one
basic rc son: to prevent the evolution of a viable non-Communist state in South
(47
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 simply not woricing. ny au canons of logic or analysis, the varty?s superior
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conesion anu vr};antzauvn, uactceu Uy Juaictvus use of terrorist pressure, should
have made the Party a swift, inevitable victor in any contest with the French-tainted
shell of a non-government Diem was given charge of by and soon wrested from Bao Dai.
But as so often happens in Indochina, events confounded logic. By 1957 it was
becoming painfully and unavoidably clear to Hanoi that political struggle would
not work and any hope of preventing the evolution of a non-Communist state
in the south would have to involve a resort to arms. This argument carried
the day at the Politburo table in early 1957,, .soon .after Le Duan left his twelve
year tenure as director of the Party's southern apparatus, rejoined his
Politburo colleagues at the meeting table in Hanoi and took over Truong Chinh's
former responsibilities as Party First Secretary.
9. From Hanoi's perspective, thte worst possible outcome of the Indochina
struggle would be a U.S. disengagement which left a non-Communist state in
the south capable of indefinitely resisting aggressive pressures from the
Communist- Northwith -support from the U. S. no -different in essential kind or
degree from that which Hanoi demonstrably receives from China and the Soviet
Union (thus erasing the propaganda utility of the "neo-colonialist puppet"
charge). To the Hanoi Politburo, this would be a graphic description of defeat.
10. The strongest possible inducement to change a given policy,
particularly one pursued at horrendous cost involving the sacrifice of other desired
objectives -- and the strongest possible inducement to call to account that policy's
architect and principal advocate -- is undeniable, unignorable evidence that the
policy is failing. Successful "Vietnamization" entails precisely the kind of
politico-military developments in the south that Hanoi's armed struggle policy
was specifically designed and adopted to prevent. 25X1
V. t M1 I3 ~+i ~M t~ . esMt ON.` icy a!
It is also why all signs of increase in its range, ept i or, scope -- put particularly
severe and acute pressure on the Lao Dong Politburo in Hanoi.
l.l. 22eration.il Corollaries. Maximizing this area of pressure entails
. t, ")
putting in our action mix specific steps designed to facilitate the following. 'i^krs
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/09: LOC-HAK-247-2-11-3 vement in.the
dircctiorl of achievement will of itself help generate the kind of pressures we are
trying to create (though, obviously, the greater or faster the movement, the greater
the pressure.)
a. Visible and accelerated disengagement of direct
U.S. participation in Indochina combat, keyed to a goal of
reducing U.S. support for South Vietnam to a type and
level roughly comparable to the support Hanoi receives
from Moscow and Peking.
b. (The obverse of a.) Equipping, training and
supporting the South Vietnamese in a manner that enables
them to match Hanoi's military capabilities in all major
areas (e.g., air power and air defense).
c. The expansion and consolidation of the GVN's
administrative control over -- in priority order --
South Vietnam's (1) population and (2) territory.
d. Continued, and visible, improvement in the
cohesion of South Vietnam's state structure, the legit-
imacy of its government's mandate, and the latter's
efficient responsiveness to the aspiration and needs of
its people.*
e. To the extent feasible, preventing and/or
changing GVN actions which damage its domestic and
international image as an effective, legitimate and
responsive government.
*Our concrete action suggestions in these areas, outlined below, eschew utopian
prescriptions and attempt to take full cognizance of the realities and givens of
South Vietnamese political life -- including Thicu's temperament, outlook and
Personality. (T1115 IS IIOT ON 10AiRL-! N4
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12. For years there has lain under the Politburo table a time bomb
the
whose fuse it is clearly in our interest to shorten.
policy issue on which the Politburo's sensitivity makes it most vulnerable.
With equal accuracy, and inadvertence, this bomb has been succinctly
described by the editorial writer of Hanoi's Army newspaper, Quan Nhan
Dan:
"Our entire party and all our people and armed forces
are bringing into full play their determination to implement
President He's testament, to persevere in and advance the
anti-U. S. national salvation resistance to total victory, and,
at the same time, to intensively*and successfully build
socialism. The task of fighting the Americans and the task
of building socialism in the north are the two strategic
tasks that-arc closely interrelated-and that must be, simul
t eousl carried out."*
13. The Politburo has set itself, and the Party, two basic tasks:
(1) building a socialist (i.e., Communist) state in North Vietnam and (2)
pursuing the southern struggle (i.e., acquiring Party control over the south).
As the editorial writer indicates, the official line is that these two tasks are to
be pursued "simultaneously." The question never asked is what choice is made
if events should create a situation in which these two tasks clearly cannot be
simultaneously pursued, if in fact one clearly must be subordinated to the
other for an indeterminate period of time. This question of basic priority is
never asked because it raises an issue no one on the Politburo wants to face
head on, since facing it surfaces a divisive issue that could shatter the Politburo's
collective unity. The devisive potential of this issue is rendered especially acute by
x'24 June 1971 commentary "A Basic Task nd a Noble Duty," 24 June 1971. Text
given on page K19 of F1;1S 1V, 28 June 1971. Emphasis added.
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 two further factors: (11 WLUl171 Lnc rv&IIuu,v a......- ..w.. ?...?b No Objectiiiool toZDeuclaGssification in Part 12010/08/09-:: LOC-HAK-247 2 11_3 _ struggle
firsters," (2) the former coalesce around Truong Chinh; the latter, around
Le Duan.
14. The fuse on this priorities issue was inevitably ignited by Ho Chi Minh's
death in September 1969. Until his dying day, Ho was the unchallenged (and
unchallengeable) head of the Party, the umpire whose rulings no Politburo,
or Party, member would seriously consider questioning. His very presence,
hence, guaranteed that all disputes, no matter how potentially divisive, could
be kept within bounds and prevented from posing serious threats to Party unity.
But the umpire has now been dead for three years. His chair still sits empty at the
head of the table; his still vacant post of Party Chairman has not yet been filled.
H 'there is clearly now no such umpire. If there were, he would be named
Chairman and sitting where Ho once sat. The Party, in short, is a regency --
the king is three years dead, but no heir has yet been chosen; let alone crowned.
Regencies, including Communist ones, are inherently unstable; committee-headed
regencies particularly so.
15. Where the Lao Dong Politburo is concerned, there are several other
apples of potential discord that any basic priority debate would spill right out
on the table. If Le Duan were not now occupying the First Secretary's chair, Truong
Chinh would probably now be sitting in the Chairman's empty seat. Until 1956,
Truong Chinh was the First Secretary, Ho's principal lieutenant and virtually
annointed heir. Truong Chinh lost that post and its accompanying primacy because
of the disasterous consequences of the "Land Reform" program, of which he was
the principal architect and executor and which, by 1956, clearly had to be
abandoned. When the "Land Reform" policy was shelved, Truong Chinh lost his
job (though through Ho's patronage he kept his Politburo membership).
"Land Reform" was a northern consolidation and control program, never seriously
essayed in the south (where, in that era, the Party had nothing like the extensive.
often contiguous areas of territorial control that it had in the north). The man
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 .,,hn ruivritanted Truong Chinh, at least as First Secretary, war Le Duan
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brought north from a twelve year stint spent in directing (or helping direct)
Party operations in the south. Soon after he moved into Truong Chinh's chair,
Le Duan successfully advocated -- and has since directed -- the policy of
pursuing southern ambitions through armed struggle. No one on the Politburo or,
for that matter, in the Party -- least of all Truong Chinh (and Le Duan) can
possibly be blind to the fact that Le Duan is every bit as much the architect and
executor of the current southern struggle policy as Truong Chinh was of "Land
Reform." Nor can anyone in the Politburo or Party possibly miss the potential
implications of this fact should the armed struggle policy's failures prodc:ce an
impasse in any way comparable to the 1956 situation created by the disasterous
consequences of "Land Reform."
16. Operational Corollaries. The above factors and bits of Party history
all combine to make the priorities issue a highly sensitive pressure point. We
hence want to force the Politburo to focus squarely on this issue and in a way
That patently favors the argument of the "North' Vietnam firsters." To do this, our
action mix should include components that:
a. Level and/or keep out of commission everything the
Hanoi regime inherited from the French or, particularly, has
built since 1956. This is not -- repeat not -- an argument for
or advocacy of indiscriminate attacks against population centers
or civilian targets such as schools, hospitals, apartment
buildings, etc. Indeed, this point is feasible to advance
because -- and only because -- improvements in weaponry
delivery technigs permits
recisitxa-...As exp fined in more ail below,
e about ports;'r lines, high%ys,
ower plant radio t z mittcrs, major 1 ctories, and /
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 and delivcrv technioues nermit some venuine decree of
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surgical precision. As explained in more detail below,
we are talking here about ports, rail lines, highways,
power plants, radio transmitters, major factories, and
the like.
b. Make perceptible progress preferably with an
attendant aura of inexorability -- toward a clear cut division
of labor; the defense of South Vietnam is a GVN account; the
-attack on the north, a U.S. account. "'This clearly dovetails
with the operational recommendation of paragraph 11 above.
Again, however, it is stressed that we are not expecting
to achieve this situation in any month-measured time
frame. What we want is an action mix that will make it
crystal clear that this is the direction in which allied (U.S.
and GVN) policies are moving.
c. Through the proper, emphatic execution of a
and b, convey the very clear message that there is not
going to be socialist or any other reconstruction in North
Vietnam until the policy of armed struggle is abandoned
and satisfactory accommodation reached with the U.S.
on the matter of our prisoners.
C. Cohesion
17. Since its founding by Ho in 1930, the Vietnamese Commt ist Party's
greatest source of strength - hits greatest asset -- has been its unity, cohesion and
_
concomitant organizational discipline. We therefore need to mount a focused
attack on that cohesion at several levels. This involves a set of explicit activities
or operations (outlined below) expressly designed to:
a. Sow and/or fan rivalry. distrust and discard
within the Politburo itself and, if possible, precipitate
the priorities c kbate described above.
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 b. Sow and fan doubts within the Party cadre
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about the leadership's unity and the wit: