SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL ACTION SUGGESTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-247-3-5-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 5, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
5, October 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : South Vietnamese Political
Action Suggestions
MORI/CDF
C03363789
Attached for your consideration is a memorandum entitled
"Suggestions for Strengthening the Government of South Vietnam. it
It is largely the product of the mind, pen-- and experience -- of
one of my immediate associates, who helped put together our
30 September response to your 28 September questions. This
officer has resided in Vietnam for close to a decade, during which
he wrote an outstanding record of professional achievement and
developed a superb insight into the realities and nuances of South
Vietnamese politics. He has a first class feel for the subtle
rhythms of the Vietnamese political pulse and a keen eye for what
is feasible or useful in Vietnam as opposed to what reads well
in Washington.
a . c..,. .
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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4 October 1972
SUBJECT: Suggestions for Strengthening the Government
of South Vietnam
1. For many years the U.S. Mission in Saigon and various arms
of the U.S. Government in Washington have periodically prepared papers
listing ideas for strengthening the GVN and improving its ability to
compete politically with its Communist opponents. These papers almost
always contain numerous proposals which, while perhaps excellent in
themselves, leave out of account the by nom well known political
preferences and personal proclivities of President Thieu, who must
first approve and then execute them, Among the commonest examples
are proposals for "broadening the base of the government," "opening a
dialogue with the non-Communist opposition," "establishing a council of
prestigious advisors," and "firing General Dang Van Quang." An effort
has been made to exclude from the suggestions offered below any
which, however valuable in themselves, Thieu would almost certainly
reject or simply ignore.
2. Revision of Presidential Election Law: The purpose of the
1971 Presidential election law which resulted in the "one man election"
last October was, according to its supporters, to insure against election
of the President by only a minority of those voting. The gravest
danger, in the opinion of the law's supporters, would have been a
well organized and disciplin d Communist minority electing a pro-Communist
or excessively malleable President. A secondary consideration, though
apparently one which weighed heavily with Thieu, was to avoid the indignity
of a President elected by only a minority of voters -- in 1967 Thieu was
elected with a plurality of less than 35 percent.
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3. The same objective of electing a majority President could have
been attained by a run-off provision, but Thieu had rejected such a
proposal. He argued that the administration and the voters were already
overburdened with elections,, since both Lower House and Presidential
elections were scheduled for the last half of 1971. (This argument is not
entirely convincing. It might have been possible to combine either the
first or second Presidential ballot with the Lower House elections. In
1967 Senate and Presidential elections had been held simultaneously.
Thieu may have had a better reason for opposing a run-off provision: fear
that on the second ballot opposition candidates would unite against him . )
4. It can be -- and within Vietnam has been -- contended that the
"one man election" was a huge success: it demonstrated that Thieu was
firmly in charge of the country. 'Nonetheless, it would be desirable to
have a presidential election law under which elections would invariably be
contested, while at the same time insuring against election of a minority
President. Avoiding the risk of a minority President would be especially
important if there were any chance of a negotiated settlement providing
for Communist participation in South Vietnamese elections. While there
may be other means to the same end, a run-off provision has several
advantages.. It is simple and easily understood, and it cannot easily be
viewed as a gimmick devised by an incumbent to retain power, since it
has been widely and successfully used in many parts of the world. It
would serve the same purpose as the requirement in the 1971 electoral
law that all candidates must be endorsed by a certain number of National
Assembly or Provincial Council members; but it would not make it
impossible for Communists or Communist sympathizers to run. (The
requirement for endorsements would have that effect because the
Communists, having been barred to date from participation in South
Vietnamese elections, have no known supporters in the National Assembly
or the Provincial Councils.)
5. A large number of unknowns make it impossible to estimate
with confidence how large a vote a pro-Communist Presidential candidate
would get in an open election in South Vietnam. Most estimates, by
Americans as well as by non-Communist Vietnamese, suggest that the
Communists would receive between 15 and 35 percent of the votes. An
attractive non-Communist candidate whom the Communists could control
or influence, however, might do better. A kindly father figure like the
late Phan Khac Suu, for example, might poll a surprisingly high vote.
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Vietnamese history since 1945 suggests that even the most serious Communist
threat would not suffice to persuade the nationalists to submerge their
differences and agree upon a single candidate. The likelihood of their
doing so would be even lest if the Communist candidate were
"disguised." While it is probably true that the rules governing any
election agreed upon as part of a peace settlement. would form an integral
part of the agreement itself ,it would nevertheless seem prudent to have
on the books in advance a law containing a run-off provision and
eliminating requirements blatantly unfair to the Communists.
Otherwise the Communists could claim that the law was obviously
unfair and undemocratic, and they could more easily insist that it be
changed immediately -- at a time when negotiations were coming to
a head and when it might be difficult to give the matter of an election
law proper attention. Even on the assumption, however, that the
war drags on and Clause 4 of the Constitution (outlawing Communism
and pro-Communist neutralism, etc.) remains operative, a run-off
would still have the advantages of reducing the danger of a "disguised"
Communist slipping in and of giving the newly elected President a
more solid mandate .
6. Doubtless Thieu could obtain passage by the present National
Assembly of an election law with a run-off provision, but he is most
unlikely to do so unless persuaded by the U.S. Although Presidential
elections are not due until fall 1975 and the matter cannot be said to be
extremely urgent, it is, as explained above, desirable to have the law
on the books as soon as possible. Furthermore, promulgation of a new
and more liberal presidential election law now -- if properly and
judiciously publicized -- might significantly enhance the international
image both of the GVN and of Thieu himself.
7. If a run-off electoral provision were enacted, it should be
fairly easy to schedule the first or second Presidential vote at the
same time as Lower House elections, since both Presidential and
Lower House elections are on the same four-year cycle. Alternatively,
it might be possible to compress a first and run-off vote into one by
having electors indicate their second and third as well as their first
choice for President. Under this arrangement (which apparently has
worked well in Australia), if no candidate received a majority of first
choices, then the second choice votes would be counted, and so on.
Although such a system might be a bit complicated for the Vietnamese
electorate, it would presumably tend to encourage alliances and
moderate divisive attacks among competing nationalists, each
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seeking to obtain the second choice endorsement of his rivals.*
Even though the mutual mistrust of candidates might militate against
the effectiveness of alliances, such an election law would give
the winner a more solid mandate and claim to legitimacy.
8. Revision "of National*Assembly Election Laws: The present
Lower House and Senate election laws would similarly tend to favor the
Communists, should they ever participate in South Vietnamese elections.
Like the presidential election law, they offer substantial advantages to
any well organized, cohesive minority -- which in South Vietnam means
the Viet Cong. Thus in the 1970 Senate election, it required only 5%
of the vote for the third place Huyen list to be elected, and even the
first place Mau list got only 26.6%. In the 1967 Lower House elections over
half of the winners received less than 20% of the vote in their constit-
uencies. (Pluralities of winning candidates tended to be somewhat higher
in the 1971 Lower House election.) In an open election, it is by no means
inconceivable that pro-Communist lists could sweep the Senate elections
or that a majority of pro-Communist Deputies could be elected to the Lower
House. In either case, less than 30% of the popular vote might suffice. The
danger would perhaps be greater in the Lower House, where many of the
individual elections would be fought out on local issues, with ideological affil-
iations blurred or obscure. Moreover, a Communist or NLF sympathizer --
*Thus in an imaginary election in which the principal contenders were,
from right to left, Tran Thien Khiem, Tran Quoc Buu, Duong Van Minh,
and, with Communist support, Truong Dinh Dzu, it is perhaps not too
much to hope that the candidates would make recommendations to their
supporters along the following lines: Khiem would recommend Buu as
second and Minh as third choice; Minh would recommend Buu as second
and Khiem as third; Dzu, though he might recommend a second and third
choice, would find himself isolated. Of course things would not be quite
as simple as in the above outline: partly because voters would not always
accept the second and third choice recommendations offered by their first
choice, partly because there would be a frantic effort to make deals which
might cut across putative ideological affinities -- e.g., Khiem and Minh
endorsing each other as second choice rather than Buu, or Dzu and Minh
forming an alliance.
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who has never worked or the French or the Americans and has remained
poor -- may often look more attractive to peasant voters than the typical
anti-Communist candidate -- who is usually urban, middle or upper
class, and tainted by collaboration with the French, the Americans, or
Thieu. Also, Communist cadres are likely to be better organized and
motivated and more effective campaigners than those of the nationalists.
9. For these reasons, many of the same Vietnamese politicians who
belittle the potential pro-Communist vote as no more than 20 or 25 percent
nevertheless warn against accepting a parliamentary -- rather than a
Presidential -- election as a basis for a peace settlement. They feel certain
that, if ever the Communists did feel constrained to accept an election of
which the outcome was not predetermined, they would try to insist upon
a parliamentary election.
10. Unlike the Presidential election law, the existing Senate and
Lower House election laws, though full of theoretical pitfalls, seem to
work out more or less satisfactorily in practice, so long as the Communists
are excluded from the contest. If there is any chance at all, however,
of eventual elections with Communist participation, then it is not too soon
to begin examining changes in the Senate and'Lower House election laws
which would minimize the chances of a pro-Communist minority dominating
either chamber. The sooner this is done, the less it could be said to be
merely an anti-Communist ploy -- although the basic aim of the amendments
would be obvious. The Constitution itself, not merely the election laws,
would probably have to be amended. The thrust of new election laws
should be to encourage alliances (among nationalists) and to make certain
that winning Senate lists or Lower House candidates gain a majority or at
least a strong plurality.
11. Various techniques might be used to this end. The French in
the 1950's had a similar problem of a strong Communist minority -- as well
as, on the right, a strong Gaulliste minority -- and they devised electoral
legislation which succeeded in giving a solid majority to the center without
undue offense to democratic sensitivities. Although much of the 4th Republic
electoral system would probably be too sophisticated for Vietnam, the French
experience is worth examining for ideas on how to encourage alliances
among nationalists and to reduce the parliamentary representation of a
disciplined minority. (A separate memorandum can be prepared on this
subject if one is desired.)
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12. Upgrading the PSDF and RF/PF: The recent appointment of two
generals as inspectors-general 25X1
in the PSDF served as a reminder of the second class status usually
accorded not only the PSt F'but also the RF/PF. These forces are, however,
a vital part of the SVN defense structure, and their role would become even
more critical after a cease-fire . Nevertheless, to them are assigned the
dregs of the Vietnamese officer corps. Most often the officers in these
forces-are men whose training, qualifications, abilities, and ambitions are
below average. Some are officers who are simply not highly motivated and
who prefer assignments to the RF/PF so that they can remain near home,
pe s m onli hting on the side. Occasionally, however, as in the case
of officers in disgrace wind up in the RF/PF or PSDF. 25X1
13. Given the higher priority needs of the elite units and ARVN as
well as the mathematically inescapable fact that about half of the officer
corps must be below average, it seems certain and even desirable that the
PSDF and RF/PF should continue to be commanded by officers who are
rather the "skimmed milk" than the "cream." Nevertheless, sprinkling a
very few really top-notch officers into key posts in the PSDF and RF/PF
could be disproportionately beneficial in raising morale, instilling esprit,
and improving efficiency. An aggressive, ambitious officer on his way
up -- rather than, as is now often the case, a tired out officer on his way
down -- would have real incentive to make something of his command, and
merely the appointment of a few such officers would probably help to atten-
uate the second class soldier complex. Colonel Ngo Tan Nghia, the highly
regarded. Binh Thuan Province Chief, is an example of the kind of tough,
hard-working officer who might be able to do a great deal for the PSDF,
RD or PF, especially if it were made clear to him that a good job would be
rewarded with a general's star. It is important that any officer chosen as
part of an effort to upgrade the PSDF and RF/PF should be known to enjoy
the confidence of Thieu. Otherwise the appointment could still be viewed
as a form of disgrace or, at best, a "kicking upstairs," with unfortunate
consequences for morale.
14. Improvement of Police: The importance to pacification of a
highly competent and well motivated police force is obvious and has already
been stressed It is possible, however, 25X1
that police effectiveness could be improved not only by the assignment as suggested above for RF/PF and PSDF -- of a few more top-notch ARVN
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officers but also by the assignment of. a substantial proportion. of the top
graduates of the Thu Due (reserve) and Dalat (career) officers training
schools and of the National Institute of Administration. Assigning many of
the best young officers to police work would show the importance which
the government attaches to the police and would presumably tend to raise
prestige and esprit as well as the general level of competence.
15. Buddhist Charter Issue: The An Quang Buddhists have for
several years remained quiescent, neither seeking to organize demon-
strations nor even issuing the once traditional strident declarations in
favor of peace at almost any price. Since the August 1970 Senate
elections, the Buddhists have increasingly participated in the system
as a kind of "loyal opposition." Moreover, they are not at present
clamoring for immediate resolution of the religious charter issue.' Hence
the time may be propitious for the GVN to address itself to this issue with-
out losing face and without appearing to give in to political "demands."
On the contrary, 'a GVN move to resolve the problem now would be seen,
at home and abroad, as an indication of self-confidence and magnanimity.
The "Quoc Tull faction as representative of Vietnamese Buddhism has
become more than ever a fiction in which no one -- not even Quoc Tu's
own leaders -- really believes. Loss of Quoc Tu's support would cost the
GVN nothing; besides, the few northern refugee Buddhists who remain loyal
to Quoc Tu are, as staunch anti-Communist's, bound to be on the GVN side
anyway. By contrast, An Quang is the most important non-governmental
and non-Communist political force in South Vietnam; and it -- especially
leftist elements within An Quang -- may, under certain circumstances,
flirt with the Communists.
16. The method of resolving the charter issue poses a problem.
The GVN would be understandably reluctant simply to take the charter
from Quoc Tu and restore it to An Quang. At a time, however, when
Thieu is promulgating new legislation by decree affecting the press,
political parties, corruption, etc., it would seem appropriate to issue a
decree regulating religious associations. (Or, it might be wiser for Thieu
*This issue revolves around the question of which Buddhist sect -- the
An Quang or the Quoc Tu -- shall be granted a semi-official government
charter as the recognized Buddhist leadership of South Vietnam. The
Quoc Tu sect (a small minority of the Buddhists in south Vietnam) now
possesses the charter. The An Quang Buddhists, who are far more
numetous, want it.
.S EdWls his 111 VE
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to seek legislative approval for this act, which he could easily obtain.
This is a matter which could be left up to Thieu and his advisors to
decide.) Such a bill, superceding previous legislation including the-
famous decree-law 10 of 1950, need mention no religion by.nai e. Rather
it could set general criteria' far defining bona fide religious associations in
South Vietnam -- e.g., minimum numbers of adherents, some facilities
for educating and training of clergy, etc. The result would be that both
An Quang and Quoc Tu -- as well as Catholicism and various Hoa Hao
and Cao Dai factions -- would be recognized as legal religious associations.
17. This would still leave Quoc Tu in possession of most of the
property which belonged to the United Buddhist Church before it split in two.
That problem might be solved by directing the Ministry of Interior to take
a religious census. Such a census, if carried out more or less honestly,
would find An Quang far more representative of Vietnamese Buddhists than
Quoc Tu. An Quang would then seek a court order requiring Quoc Tu to
turn over to it certain properties formerly held in common. The courts
would doubtless find in favor of An Quang, if that were what Thieu desired.
Indeed, if Thieu wanted it, the courts would even now -- without a new law
on religions or a religious census -- settle the matter in An Quang's favor.
This would, however, imply that in the past the GVN had been wrong,
whereas the somewhat roundabout approach proposed above would put the
GVN on the lofty plane of being the first Vietnamese government to regulate
all religious associations in an entirely just and comprehensive fashion.
Furthermore, An Quang would not be placed in the position of seeking or
being granted favors from the GVN, a matter on which militant Buddhists
are extremely sensitive and on which they might be exposed to Communist
accusations of having "sold out."
18. Resolution of the Buddhist charter issue along the above lines
would not cause An Quang's followers to support Thieu. It would, however,
remove one of their principal (and largely justified) complaints, quite
possibly making their opposition less bitter and systematic and making it
easier for them to collaborate with the GVN on matters of overriding anti-
Communist interest. It would at least facilitate the task of An Quang leader
Thich Tri Quang in maintaining present moderate policies; and it would
tend to weaken the position of those leftist elements within An Quang who
look upon the PRG as a "lesser evil" than the present GVN. It would also
improve the GVN's image abroad,
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19. Resolution of the charter issue may fall into the category, noted
in paragraph 1 above, of "recommendations which Thieu would never accept.
There is perhaps a chance, however, that Thieu could be influenced by an
approach which stressed the point that he was acting, not in response to
pressure from An Quang but in order to regularize, once and for all and
equitably, the status of all religious associations in Vietnam. There are
obviously legal problems to'solve, but the President's legal advisory staff,
under'Vu Ngoc Tran, could almost certainly work out satisfactory legislation.
Although Tran is a conservative northern refugee Catholic, he is fair-
minded, and at least one of his principal aides, Colonel Do Trong Hue, is a
Buddhist who enjoys good relations with An Quang, despite his proximity
to Thieu.
20. Postal Relations with North Vietnam: The Geneva accords
provided for a carefully controlled exchange of mail between the two
"zones." Rather early (around 1956) the Diem government put an end to
these exchanges, which had consisted mainly of post cards. Given the
well-known strength of family attachments among the Vietnamese, any
proposal to revive such exchanges would prove very popular among the
million or so. Northern refugees, almost every one of whom -- from ex-
Vice President Ky on down -- has some close relatives living in the North.
21. Such a proposal would be a cheap, risk-free way of advertising
"anti -Communism with a human face." Almost certainly it would lead
to nothing: even if Hanoi did not reject it outright or simply ignore it,
working out the modalities of a postal exchange would, under present
circumstances, probably drag on interminably. But the mere offer, coming
from Thieu, would show him as sure of his position, humanitarian in out-
look, and, above all, without an inferiority complex vis-a-vis Hanoi.
His "image" would thus be improved among practically all segments of
South Vietnamese political opinion: among Northern refugees, because
they would hope to take advantage of the exchange; among Southerners and
leftists, because it would show Thieu as less rigidly or blindly anti-
Communist. Similarly foreign opinion would tend to see the proposal as an
indication that Thieu is more reasonable and flexible than previously
supposed. Probably, following the Korean model, Thieu should suggest
that South and North Vietnamese Red Cross representatives meet together
to discuss the problem. In the unlikely event that this suggestion were
accepted, the resulting contacts could become a useful step towards
Vietnamization of negotiations.
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22. Austeri . One of the most frequently heard criticisms of the
Thieu regime and its predecessors, including the Diem and, doubtless,
the Bao Dai regimes, centers on the contrast between the conspicuous
consumption of a privileged few and the squalor in which the majority of
Vietnamese must live. Objects of especially severe criticism include the
still prevalent Mercedes cars, construction during wartime of opulent
private villas, shopping vacations in Hong Kong, Tokyo or Europe, and
study abroad based on parental ability to pay rather than qualification or
national priorities. No doubt a considerable element of envy enters into
much of this criticism, but there is a curious streak of deep-rooted puri-
tanism in the Vietnamese national character which should not be underrated.
It is especially strong among Northern and Central Vietnamese -- whether
Communist, Catholic, or Confucian-Buddhist -- but it influences in lesser
degree Southerners as well. This puritanism is mixed with a vague sense
of social justice which is shocked by the contrast between a general's
play-boy son driving a sports car around Europe and his less fortunate
contemporaries risking their lives on Vietnamese battlefields. Most non-
Communist Vietnamese, moreover, grant the superiority of North Vietnam
in this area, and they often point with admiration to the simplicity of Ho
Chi Minh's life.
23. When the Army, led by Ky and Thieu, officially took over the
government in June 1965, a social revolution involving a considerable
measure of austerity was proclaimed. The emphasis on austerity lasted
no more than a week or two, Ky and most of his fellow generals setting
instead an example of high living. It was the era of Maxim's night club,
of mahjong by night and cock-fighting by day for high stakes. Hondas
were the opiate of the masses (or at least of the lower middle classes).
Despite its rapid reversal in practice, the Army's austerity program never-
theless represented a valid insight concerning the feelings and desires of
the Vietnamese population. It still does.
24. It would be unrealistic to suggest a thoroughgoing policy of
austerity similar to that practiced in London during the "blitz." Never-
theless, a few small but visible gestures might help to modify widespread
feelings of inequity
Allocations of foreign exchange to stu en s s u yIng
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EVE, 01111y,
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abroad ~--:other than bona fide scholarship students might be halted;
The money: thus saved could be used to improve the standards of Vietnamese
universities. (It is almodt- certain that the.GVN has spent a great deal more.
money subsidizing the foreign studies. of the rich -- many of whom don't
return to Vietnam -~- than it. has subsidizing all the private universities,
Catholic, Buddhist, and Hoa Hao, inside Vietnam .) The main effects of
.an austerity policy in Vietnam would be psychological and symbolic; it
would not. really make the poor any less so, though it might make their
poverty' somewhat. more tolerable and less politically.. combustible. It would
soften the image of South Vietnam as a country of glaring ,contrasts between
rich and poor. To be meaningful, however, it would have to begin at the
top, with- President. Thieu setting an example of relatively simple and
austere. living. (He need not go uncomfortably far, as exaggerated austerity
would be regarded as hypocrisy;)
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