ENEMY ASSESSMENT OF OFFENSIVE AND FUTURE PLANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-25-3-19-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: July 28, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-25-3-19-0 826)
MEMORANDUM
SECRET
SUBJECT: Enemy Assessment of Offensive and Future Plans
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
INFORMATION
July 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE J
The document, issued in mid-July, notes that VietCong objectives have
not been achieved in the general offensive and blames the lack of decisive
victories on a poor performance by local forces. The paper indicates
a new offensive will be conducted in August and September to tie down
ARVN units and destroy pacification, particularly in MR 4. The enemy's
local forces are repeatedly urged to attack the GVN much harder. The
principal objectives of the attack will be to force President Nixon to
accept the enemy's 7 point negotiating position and then to lose the
Presidential election ("If he remains President, the VC will meet with
great difficulty despite a ceasefire"). The study reportedly states that
the enemy may make some negotiating concessions but will not present
a new proposal, as such. Even after a ceasefire, however, the enemy
will continue its attacks to seize control of provincial and local govern-
ments ("not in the name of the NLF but against the regime of Nguyen
Van Thieu" -- a possible sign that the enemy may back away from its
demand that we remove Thieu as the price of a ceasefire). As a final
point, the study asserts that if a political settlement is not reached
before November, the enemy will revert to protracted warfare.
Comment: The document, if accurate, represents a major evaluation
of the current situation and provides useful insight into the enemy's
future plans. It confirms that the VC will make a maximum military
SECRET
- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-25-3-19-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-25-3-19-0 2
SECRET W V
effort in August and September to influence the Presidential elections
and force acceptance of the major elements of its negotiating position.
In this offensive the enemy will again employ its April/May strategy
of tying down large concentrations of ARVN forces in remote battle-
fields while attempting to exploit the resulting vacuum in lowland and
Delta pacification areas to expand population control. The offensive's
principal objectives are the electoral defeat of President Nixon and a
settlement of the war by November, both of which the enemy believes
feasible.
Based on the document's assertions, we cah expect no change in the
enemy's basic negotiating position (i.e. no ceasefire prior to agreement,
at least in principle, to a three part coalition government) but there may
be some give on its demand for President- Thieu's resignation. Its
statement that post ceasefire military actions will continue against
the Thieu regime despite "combined control commissions" openly
presages a concession in this area and may be intended to prepare
the cadre for such an eventuality. Based on personal recollection
the report, however, cannot be viewed as authoritative but we ten-
tatively conclude that it provides a reliable preview of a last minute,
maximum effort to end the war by November.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-25-3-19-0