CABLE TO PETER RODMAN FROM DICK SMYSER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-259-1-41-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: December 17, 1973
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/22: LOC-HAK-259-1-41-8
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FM THE SITUATION ROOM TOHAK 117
TO AMEMRASSY LISBON
S E C R E T SENSITIVE EYES ONLY WH37b71 TOHAK117
DECEMBER 17s 1973
FOR: PETER RODMAN
FROM: DICK SMYSER
PETER: I HAVE NOW SEEN WINSTON LORD'S MESSAGE REGARDING OUR
MEETING WITH LE DUC THO. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS
TO LARRY AND THE SECRETARY:
" I CONCUR WITH WIN'S RECOMMENDATION THAT WE SHOULD BE MAKING
PREPARATIONS FOR ANOTHER MEETNG IN THE NEW YEAR, AND WITH HIS
PREFERENCE FOR SCHEDULING ANY FUTURE MEETING AS LATE AS POSSIBLE,
SUCH A MEETING WILL HAVE LITTLE VALUE IN RESOLVING ISSUES,
BUT WE DID VAGUELY PROPOSE A LATER MEETING. (THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
HAVE INTERPRETED THIS AS MEANING THAT A LATER MEETING WILL PE HELD
"SHOULD vIT-, BE NECESSARY.")
I ALSO CONCUR THAT WE SHOULD APPOINT GRAHAM MARTIN
TO HANDLE ANY ANCILLARY TALKS WITH THACHS IF WE EVER GET DRAFTING.
HOWEVER, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL BE PRIMARILY INTERESTED iN ASSURING
FUTURE TALKS BETWEEN YOU AND THO AND MIGHT NOT ACCEPT THACH AND
MARTIN NOW AS SURROGATES. WE SHOULD PROPOSE MARTIN IF HE THINKS HE
CAN KEEP HIS SANITY AS WELL AS HIS RELATIONS WITH THIEU.
I DD NOT CONCUR WITH ,SIN'S RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WE SHOULD
ON DECEMBER 20 OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER ANNOUNCE DEFINITE PLANS
FOR ANOTHER MEETING. THERE IS No SENSE COMMITTING OURSELVES FORMALLY
TO A SESSION THAT MIGHT BE HELD AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF A NORTH
VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE. IT WOULD BE BETTERS IF WE HAVE TO SAY
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SOMETHING PUBLIC, TO STATE THAT " THE TWO PARTIES AGREED TO HOLD
FURTHER MEETINGS AS APPROPRIATE." PRIVATELY WE SHOULD TELL THO
(ANDS OF COURSEs THIEU) THAT FUTURE MEETING PLANS WILL BE RELATED
TO DRV BEHAVIOR (E.G.s CESSATION OF ATTACKS AND OFFENSIVE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *WHSR COMMENT * * * * * * * * * * * * * * .*
SEC FILES
RECALLED
DEC 73
PSN:011994 PAGE 01 TOR:35.1/23:292 DTG:172250Z
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No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/22 : LOC-HAK-259-1-41-8
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PREPARATIONS.) IF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT A MEETING OFFERS US ANY LEVERAGE'.
WE MIGHT AS WELL USE IT.
I ALSO 00 NOT CONCURE THAT WE SHOULD ASK THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO
SUBMIT A SPECIFIC PROGRAM OF ACTION ON TIGHTENING THE CEASEFIRE,
OR SHOULD OFFER ONE OURSELVES. WE KNOW IN ADVANCE THAT WE WILL ASK
THEM TO STOP INFILTRATION AND PULL BACK THEIR FORCES, WHICH THEY
WILL NOT DO EXCEPT UNDER DU.,IRESS. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THEY WILL ASK US
TO PUSH THE GVN TOWARD THEIR INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL CONDITIONS,
WHICH THE GVN WILL NOT DO EXCEPT UNDER DURESS. I SEE NO REASON TO
INVITE THIS KIND OF FRICTION UPON OUR OWN HEADS.
IF WE HOPE TO USE THESE MEETINGS FOR CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT, WE
CANNOT ACCOMPANY THEM WITH AN OPEN BATTLE AGAINST THE GVN OVER SUCH
A PROGRAM OF ACTION. THE CONGRESS IS NOW MORE READY THAN EVER TO
OPPOSE THE PRESIDENT, AND THAT KIND OF BATTLE WOULD GIVE IT A
PERFECT EXCUSE TO CUT AID TO THE GVN ( AS IT IS ALREADY DOING) RATHER
THAN TO SUPPORT PRESSURE AGAINST THE NORTH. JOHN LEHMAN
BELIEVES THAT OUR HESITATION TO HOLD FUTURE TALKS, ESPECIALLY
DURING AN OFFENSIVE, WILL NOT GIVE US ANY GREAT PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESS.
HE FEELS THAT THE DECEMBER 20 MEETING WILL SUFFICE IN CONVINCING THOSE
IN CONGRESS WHO CAN BE CONVINCED THAT WE MADE A SERIOUS EFFORT
TO DEFLECT THE OTHER SIDE FROM OFFENSIVE ACTION.
I WILL NOT ADD ANY EXTENSIVE HOMILIES ABOUT NORTH VIETNAMESE
TACTICS IN RELATING MILITARY ACTIONS TO NEGOTIATIONS. YOU KNOW MY
VIEWS, BASED ON EXPERIENCE AND ON HANOI DOCTRINE. THE OTHER SIDE
REGARDS INCREASED MILITARY PRESSURE AS ESSENTIAL IN BRINGING ABOUT
NEGOTIATIONS AND ACHIEVING FAVORABLE DIPLOMATIC RESULTS.
OF COURSE, AS WIN HIMSELF SAYS, PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATION no
INCITE INCIDENTS SUCH AS RECENT QUANG DUC ATTACKS AND THE
AMBUSH OF THE U.S. MIA TEAM LAST WEEK.
WE CAN ONLY CHANGE HANOI'S MIND ABOUT ANOTHER OFFENSIVE BY
CONVINCING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT WE CAN AND WILL FORCE THE GVN
TO MEET COMMUNIST TERMS OR BY CONVINCING THEM SUCH AN OFFENSIVE COULD
WELL LEAD TO A U.S. MILITARY RESPONSE. DESPITE EVERYTHING, HANOI IS,
STILL NOT CERTAIN THAT WE ARE TOTALLY IMPOTENT IN EITHER REGARD.
IT IS CLEAR THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WANT TO CATCH US AGAIN
BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE, THEY ALSO WANT TO
EXERCISE MILTARY PRESSURE AGAINST THE GVN WHILE WE EXERT POLITICAL
PRESSURE. IT IS AN ABVIOUS AND NOT TERRIBLY ORIGINAL GAME,
AND I SEE NO REASON FOR US TO PLAY IT ANY MORE THAN ABSOLUTELY
ESSENTIAL.
I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU WEDNESDAY EVENING IN PARIS,
AT YOUR CONVENIENCE.
RECALLED
PSN:011994 PAGE 02
TOR:351/23:29Z
DTG:17225OZ DEC 73
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No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/22: LOC-HAK-259-1-41-8
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No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/22: LOC-HAK-259-1-41-8
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AS ALWAYS, DICK SMYSER
RECALLED
PSN:011994 PAGE 03 QM 03 TOR:351/23:29Z DTG;172250Z DEC 73
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No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/22 : LOC-HAK-259-1-41-8