THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-26-1-10-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 11, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

Mr (lhicrfinn +r% flcrl~ccifir~finn in 1 1111')n1ninam"~ I nr'_uoV )R_1_1n_n
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUN
6128
TNF'ORMi ATIQ,
August 11, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HAIG
FROM: Phil OdeenQ
SUBJECT: The Situation in Cambodia
After nearly a year of effort through the VSSG Working Group, CIA
has issued the first report in what will be a quarterly series wrapping
up the situation in Cambodia (attached). This is a good start in pre-
senting some consistent statistics and an analytical view of Cambodia.
..The high-lights follow.
FANK. The report seems optimistic in estimating FANK strength
at 200, 000 in July. However, it is good news that the payroll has
been reduced from 240, 000 to 217, 000 over the past two months.
Unfortunately, most of this cut is in the general reserves, which do
most of the fighting, and there is little indication that the various
head counts are making honest units out of the much larger territorial
forces. Either the reserves and their commanders are losing fringe
benefits which are being retained by other units or the reduction in
actual personnel has been greater in the reserves.
Analysis shows that less than 20 percent of FANK's operational
battalions have been involved in more than oue of the nearly 30 major
operations conducted since November 1970. In other words a small
part of the force is doing most of the fighting.
tions or urban centers).
Since the Chenla II debacle in late 1971 FANK forces have been shifted
closer to Phnom Penh and to the Mekong corridor. FANK strength in
the Angkor Wat area has also been increased. The result has been a
decline of over 20 percent in battalion days in the countryside (defined
as 20km from the capital and 15km for other major military installa-
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/03: LOC-HAK-26-1-10-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/03: LOC-HAK-26-1-10-0
SECRET -
FANK now considers that more than 130, 000 personnel have been
trained. However, this figure includes the entire 35, 000 original
force whose training was of dubious quality as well as all those trained
since 1970 who have become casualties or deserters. Some people
have been trained twice - usually in different skills. I would conclude
no more than half of FANK has thus far received effective training.
The enemy/FANK kill ratio dropped to 0. 7:1 last December but
returned to about 2:1 in recent months. However, the improved ratio
appears to be due more to better FANK results against the less effective
KC, who are carrying a sharply increasing part of the action, than to
any improvement in FANK. (Since data are weak but the baises probably
fairly constant, trends in the kill ratio are more meaningful than its
absolute level.)
The Countryside. The two province maps on pages 24 and 25 illustrate
how widespread enemy control is south of the Lon Nol line as most of
the villages are enemy controlled and there were few combat incidents
near a majority of these villages. The Takeo map also indicates that
self-defense units have been organized to supplement FANK actions in
a majority of areas where FANK was stationed.
The number of ralliers which had been running 200-300 a month dropped
to about 50 a month in March-June. However, the number of incidents
in this period was about 25 percent higher than a year earlier. Both
these indicators confirm FANK's defensive posture.
The KC. The report does not include an estimate of the number of KC,
apparently because the intelligence community and even CIA itself is
divided on the number. However, the report does point out the rapid
development of a widespread KC infrastructure:
-- in some areas the initially rudimentary infrastructure has been
expanded to include recruitment of manpower for both civilian and
military purposes, the formation of mass political associations, trade
associations and cooperatives, cottage-type industry, and even schools
for administrators of local government;
-- the NVA/VC are increasingly turning over responsibility for
local administration to the KC, particularly to KC who have been trained
in NVN.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/03: LOC-HAK-26-1-10-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/03: LOC-HAK-26-1-10-0
v W
SECRET.
Economic Situation. The economic situation appeared stable during
the first half of 1972:
-- prices actually fell;
-- government spending as well as tax receipts were below
expectations;
-- rice planting was expanded.
However, the first half of the year is the prosperous period for Cam-
bodia. Harvests tend to keep food prices down in the capital if the
roads are open as they have been. It is likely that price rises will be
substantial in the second half since the money supply has continued to
grow rapidly because of the large government deficit which will be
even larger with the recent government pay increase and the expansion
of military spending for materials and construction. Since GIR foreign
exchange reserve have been reduced to less than $25 million, there is
no margin to overcome domestic shortages with imports.
NSSM 152. The Cambodian NSSM should be wrapped up by the end of
August. The military section is completed. No. significant ways of
improving FANK effectiveness have been identified. The exercise
has been useful in getting attention to minor improvements General
Cleland wants and in laying the groundwork for a more penetrating
analysis. Once the State political-economic section is completed we
shall do a memo for you and HAK suggesting a few additional steps that
would improve FANK. We then plan to push for a comprehensive country
program memorandum under NSDM 112 so that decisions can be made on
the basic Cambodian issues toward the end of the year.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/03: LOC-HAK-26-1-10-0