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CABLE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0
Release Decision: 
RIFLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
June 29, 2010
Sequence Number: 
51
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 26, 1974
Content Type: 
CABLE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0.pdf455.31 KB
Body: 
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 1 SECRET/SENSITIVE HAKTO rw TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM; SECRETARY KISSINGER REF: TOHAKS 104 and 107 1. I agree that you should give the numbers on the SALT agreement to Ikie and Colby on a strictly personal basis, And I think we can go ahead with the numbers with the Congressional leaders, too, but we must emphasize to them the importance of keeping them secret until, the exchange of notes has been completed, 24 I..think that the idea of a Presidential letter on MIAs and Soviet in the Middle East is a bad one, Please tell the President that I think the best way to proceed is for me to raise these matters directly with Dobrynin upon my return. ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY A joint press conference on Martinique, in my view, would be a grave mistake, especially given the differences in style and outlook of the leaders, I think you should firmly discourage the idea and note that we can decide later about a joint communique, 4w. On Jackson, I think we should invite him to attend with the other Congressional leader, No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 W W -'WM-J-baxwawy then I would prefer that 14. If we cannot than Sonnenfeldt. Since we will be giving the numbers to the leadership, you will obviously have to give him the 1 r+w nux tiers., tQo. Warm regards. V No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 you brief him rather No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 w No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 IO DE WTE34 40004 3?3:81645 . ZNY MMN$H Z, 2 440Z ' N V 74 FM SECRETARY KISSINGER //HAKTO .29// ,ZEM S E C R E T SENSITIVE, HAKTD 29 1. ' I 'AGREE .THAI' YOU SHOULD GIVE THE N'UMBERS' ON THE SALT AND I THINK. `WE ; CAN GO AHEAD WITH THE NUMBERS WITH` THE AGREEMENT, TO IKLE AND COLBY ON. A :STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS. CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, TOO, BUT WE MUST, EMPHASIZE TO THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF, KEEPING THEM SECRET UNTIL THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES HAS BEEN' COMPLETED. 2. 1 THINK 'THAT THE IDEA 'OF . A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER ON ' MIAS. AND; SOVIET INCITEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS A BAD ONE. PLEASE TELL THE ''PRESIDENT THAT I THINK ~ THE BEST WAY; TO PROCEED IS'FOR ME TO RAISE THESE MATTERS DIRECTLY WITH.DOBYRNIN UPON MY RETURN. 3. A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE ON MARTI NI.QUE', I N MY VIEW, WOULD BE A GRAVE .MISTAKE, ESPECIALLY GIVEN. THE DIFFERENCES IN STYLE AND. OUTLOOK OF THE LEADERS. I THINK YOU SHOULD FIRMLY DISCOURAGE, THE, IDEA AND NOTE THAT . WE CAN DECIDE LATER ABOUT A JOINT COMMUNIQUE. '4., ON JACKSON, I THINK WE SYIOULD INVITE HIM TO ATTEND WITH THE OTHER CONGRESSIONAL, LEADERS NEXT WEEK.. 'IF WE- CANNOT, AVOID IT, THEN I WOULD PREF R THAT, YOU BRIEF HIM ,RATHER THAN SONN:ENFELDT. SINCE WE WILL BE GIVING THE NUMBERS TO THE LEADERSHIP,,, YOU WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO WARM REGARD$. GIVE HIM TIE, NUMBERS TOO. THIS IS ESSENTIALLY A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION. 5. RE NIXON I THINK YOU SHOULD TELL. THE PRESIDENT WHAT HAPPENED. CALL ZIEGLER AND TELL HIM TO 'CALM NIXON DOWN. I WAS' AFTER. ALL IN ,JAPAN WHEN I T HAPPENED, AND NESSEN SHOULD ;STRAIGHTEN IT .OUT.:' 6,, THE CHINESE WOULD LIKE, SCHLESINCER TO VISIT'. THIS IS CLEARLY,OUT OF THE QUESTION BUT, I WOULD LIKE , To TURN IT INTO FORD .INVITATION, ASSUME PRESIDENT APPROVES.. COULD WE ANNOUNCE IT AS A RESULT OF THIS VISIT, 7. ;PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT_ SCHLESING.ER DOES NOT PUT OU STORY OF "TOUGH"~.PRESI DENT. AND "SOFT, SECRETARY'. to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29 : LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 SECRET/SENSITIVE HAKTO ?-/ TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT FLASH FROM- SECRETARY KISSINGER\*fI a REF : TOHAK l04,4U' 107"t /I 'Z 1. I agree that you should give the numbers on the SALT agreement to Ikle and Colby on a strictly personal basis, And I think we can go ahead with the numbers with the Congressional leaders, too, but we must emphasize to them the importance of keeping them secret until the exchange of notes has beenaompleted. 2. I think that the idea of a Presidential letter on MIAs and Soviet incitements in the Middle East is a bad one. Please tell the President that I think the best way to proceed is for me to raise these matters directly with Dobyrnin upon my return. 3. A joint press conference on Martinique, in my view, would be a grave mistake, mou especially given the differences in jW style and outlook of the leaders. I think you should firmly discourage the idea and note that we can decide later about a joint communique. 4. On Jackson, I think we should invite him to attend with the other Congressional leaders next week. If we cannot avoid it, then I would prefer that you brief him rather than Sonnenfeldt. Since we will be giving the SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 SECRET/SENSITIVE numbers to the leadership, you will obviously have to give him the numbers too. This is essentially a Presidential decision. 5. Re Nixon I think you should tell the President what happened. Call Ziegler and tell him to calm Nixon down. I was after all in Japan when it happened, and Nessen should straighten it out. 6. Chinese would like Schlesinger to visit. This is clearly out of the question but I would like to turn it into Ford invitation. Assume *OL President approves. Could we announce it as a result of this visit. 7. Please make w sure that Schlesinger does not put out story of "tough" President and "soft" Secretary. 8. Warm regards. SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 ? W SECRET/SENSITIVE TO; GENERAL SCOWCROFT FLASH FROM,. SECRETARY KISSINGER REF : TOAAK 104 and 107 HAKTO 1. I agree that you should give the numbers on the SALT agreement to Ikie and Colby on a strictly personal basis. And I think we can go ahead with the numbers with the Congressional leaders, too, but we must emphasize to them the importance of keeping them secret until the exchange of notes has beeraompleted. 2. I think that the idea of a Presidential letter on MIAs and Soviet incitements in the middle East is a bad one. Please tell the President that I think the best way to proceed is for me to raise these matters directly with Dobyrnin upon my return. 3. A joint press conference on Martinique, in my view, would be a grave mistake, 4waW especially given the differences in my style and outlook of the leaders. I think you should firmly discourage the idea and note that we can decide later about a joint communique. 4. On Jackson, I think we should invite him to attend with the other Congressional leaders next week. If we cannot avoid it, then I would prefer that you brief him rather than Sonnenfeldt. Since we will be giving the SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0 49 ID SECRET/SENSITIVE 2. umbers to the. leadership, you will obviously have to give him the numbers too. This is s essentially a Presidential decision. 5. Re Nixon I think you should tell the President what happened. Call Ziegler and tell him to calm ixon down. I was after all in Japan when it happened, and Nessen should straighten it out. 6. Chinese would like Schlesinger to visit. This is clearly out of the question but I would like to turn it into Ford invitation. Assume it President approves. Could we announce it as a result of this visit. 7. Please make a sure that Schlesinger does not put out story of "tough" President and "soft" Secretary. 8. Warm regards. SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-262-4-51-0