SITUATION REPORT NO. 9 SITUATION IN VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA AS OF 0600 HOURS (EST), APRIL 7, 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-263-3-30-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: April 7, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-263-3-30-3
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FOR COMMCENTER USE 'ONLY
PRECEDENCE CLASSIFICATION
DEX
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INFO: 7
9
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
DIA, DOS, review
completed.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-263-3-30-3
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. ~,K... No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-263-3-30-3
? "" - -C.RET/EXDIS
DEPARTMENT SDI' STATE
Operations Centex
XROO--CHINA 'ASK FARCE
Situation Report, No. 9
?
Situation in Viet-Nam and Cambodia
as of 0600 !'ears (E5T), April 7, 1925
CA14BODI,A ." .
Political ? `SECRET iErrDX "9)
to find a peaceful end to the conflict in Cambodia. He
stated that if the American, people deny the GKR :ac1iitior,]
Estimated Days of Supply (SECRET)
A
Acting GXR President Saukham Khoy sent a. mensagg to'
L'resident Ford saying that the CKR xteeded additional time
.
assistance, the GKR will have to abandon its search for a
i/S-'4 solution which will give ' CamhQdians some freedom of chgice
,/P as to their future.
31S-4
(MIL ,rep) %n an April 7 _ conversation with Ambassador Dean Sauk+t
ham f lacy saki tftaE the?' CKR would decide whn t- to do up~pni the
return of Prime Minister Long Soret that afternoon. He
)/,r4%0 ila%Av a 4_ 44a- . w& Giae next 4`l noure the uNR would try tdi
/i*I get a confIdetltial message to the other side throt4gh U.s,
;.A. channels or go public.. He also asked the Ambassador about
protection for his family and was assured that we Would < ..;
-~1D takq care of as many key Xtuner leaders as possible.
iIn/nIS
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5Y-2 orphans (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).
Ammunition 1.3.5
POL 12
,,r I 16
SECRF,T/EXDIS
GDS
titan of orphans and attendants to the U.S. it is expected
that AID will agree to a request from our Embas$y in Bangkok
for $100,000 for Cambodian relief in Thailand, including a
itarian assistance funds for relief, including transports. -
families are now prepared to accept Cambodian orphans. Our,
Mission in Phnom Penh indicates that about 20 orphans have
been located so gar and plans-to ask authority to use human
na: uovts 3.4aivr,u1rjp? rnnQm eenn zrnat about z4i American
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY,
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-263-3-30-3
SECRET ZXDIS
VIET-DIAM
E and E' Situation (CONFIDENTIAL)
Embassy Saigon estimates 173,719 poienti;l evacuees In-
cluding 5,022 American citizens, 14,000 local cmployees and
1000000 to 150#000 local employee dependexita.
Liberation Radio on Thieu's 'April 4 $pee~h (UNCLASSIFIED)
w !,
Liberation Radio cha actevized Thiou'+s speech as a demon- -
stration of weakness and said his future was "dark and gloomy"..
The commentary reiterates the previously heard line -that an
administration must be formed in Saiejon "willing to implement
the Faris Agreement" and states if a stubborn fellow such as
'rhieu remains in power, no problem can bo zi 3.ved in South Viet-.
Nam."
Refugees (SECRETS .
The situation on-beard chips off Phu Quoc Island has'im'
proved. Food and medical supp1 es have been distributed and'
2r2hans (UNCLASSIFIED)
According to a UPI story a senior aide to. Social Welfare.
M1inister Don, told the Director of World Vision in VietnaM that- . .,
once the exit visas for 1,400 orphans had been processed no I
additional visas will be issued. We have queried the Embassy.
According to a neuter story from Cttmberra, the GOA can"
called a second orphan flight to Vietnam because of the re-
ported decision to grant no more exit visas.
Ices Iranian Withdrawal (SECRET/EXDIS)
The GOI.Foreign Ministry on April 6 told our DCM that tha
OOr wished to play a constructive role in Vietnam but tat
events had made that impossible. Accordingly, the Shah' had.
ordered evacuation. Ile said that no decision had been ade on
a residual delegation. Our bCM estimated that. about eight was
the number in mind. The Foreign Ministry said that COI sources
indicated that Saigon would fall within two woks and asked for
SECRE'L'f EKDIS
$EC
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-263-3-30-3
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any information which might lead to a different ~Goncl.usion.
We have, provided additional' information 'and havcx 'risked Saigon
to provide guidance an inclusion of. Iranians in E & E plan...
FPS' iT Personnel Iteduct ton (SECRET
?Er,,bagsy Saigon .has approved thht propoGc~d red- ti *r
U.S. delegation personnel stating that tho IFJMT o asration
will not be degraded.
.'LPI'ROV $7(t_ .~`y'Yr1. _ _?:.... _.. .r...<
TDEPUTY Dit :C'rOR FOR Q?RAx1o13
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-263-3-30-3
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NO r?ottE1GN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DIES M
TUP SECRET/E)CDIS/SPOS E
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center
INDO-CHINA TASK FORCE
Supplt?men4 l i f.tIA t i C~YI R~~+or No . 8
VIETNAM
Military activity continues at a relatively low level
throughout &M-3 rand 14n-4, an t3axn:tntnim l gr727t a +tv~;stir~ i.etcx Lei
their positions in. the regions .
Early this morning, about Go rounds of communist rocket
and mortar fire struck South Vietnam's main oil depot 'at
Nha B~---, which- is loci tet3 seven riles scutheas t cat Saigon.
Little damage occurrod. Elsewhere: in MR-3, the communists -
threaten several key urban centers and the major highway
linking the delta with Saigon, but no significant battles
have developed.
frz MIS--4, DAO Saigon reports that" the NVA 4th Division
continues to pressure ARVN forcer defending Can Tho City*
However, major fighting has not yet oceurrAc3.
The Defense Intellicjcnci4 Agency report-s% t.hut eunutittnjrati.cins-
NVA 1st Corps are moving into northern South Vietnam. If
truer this would be a significant shift of forclu-0, since
other units would then be free to move farther south.
rochentonq airfield Gaps and penetration
- - - - ~ - - - points are rePc+rtt,a-
Penh continues to increase. The northwest defense line remains ;;.
the m st 'sensitive, troublesome area. The weste?rn portion. of the~i :.
northern dike line has been pushed back and the most forward
4- 4
e-. es ~+e~ wrr .. .-..~ww wr -i~~+a _. a.. : .-... .. ... r. 1._._~_.. -.. _ i ,{-;':t
Communist pressure on the defense Perimeter around Phnon ?'
No FOREIGN DISSEM/NO 019SEM ZDROr D
BACxCROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM
TOP S ;CRLT/EXDlfi/SPOIE
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1.UIIL 1
NO rORU:TGN DLSSt".M/,NO DIS:I M ABROAD
BACKGROUND USE OtdLY/cONTItOT LtD 1IS6EM
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/SI'OKE
The situation has deteriorated further alony the western
dsfenses. A new defenSQ line has been establishod
near Ang Snoul on 1ioute 4, hoar, than six miles from FANK's
main ammunition depot. An assistant JS Army attache who
has visited the area reports that government forces may be
pushed. back another two miles along Route 4, thereby
sustanLially increasing the threw try the ammunition depot
and the airfield.
North of Phnom Penh, FANIC positions near Prek Vhnom also
zam inf?d subiect to KC around attacks with no further
finalizing plahs for future combat operations whiles using
the time to rest and refit their forces.
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that shore, may be some do] ,ay in th, intIventont of those forces
as KC commanders alone the lower J kpng are. apparently
mva a c cant riu 5 to w. :
at
P~4i1
no phnorn Penh rL?port r t
decline generally, and most units remain underatrertgth and
ill-prepared to repulse a major insurgent push anywhere around
the capital's defense perimeter.
NO 1'ORUIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM. ABROAD
BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM
TOP 3$CttET/I:XUIS/SPOKE
SCR
territorial loss. Positions along the east bank of the
Luang battlefield. Recently inLerccptod messages indicate 1
Southeast of the capital there was little change in the
level of combat activity, despite prodding by cantor XC
cnmtnandors to immr?d lately deploy troops from the Neak
ULItwty j'L Gail ~i ~+ n.:. ?..aiv