MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-268-8-4-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 13, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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:,MEMORANDUM
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THE WHITE HOUSE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Participants:
Under Secretary Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas, Under Secretary
Greek Foreign Ministry
Basil. Vitsaxas, Ambassador of Greece
Michael Cottakis, Chef du Cabinet
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff
Date and Place: October 13, 1970 in Dr. Kissinger's Office
Under Secretary Palamas opened the conversation by saying he brought a
message of friendship from Greece-from the government and from the people.
Lately, he felt, there had been some rather hopeful developments. Always
there has been friendship in Greece for the United States, although there have
been some rough spots in our relationship. However, the re-establishment
of full military shipments and the visit of Secretary Laird had been important
demonstrations of U. S. interest in the area. There are really two important
sides of the problem in that area--the NATO element in Europe and in the
Eastern Mediterranean and then the problems beyond in the Middle East. The
Greek government considers it an asset that U. S. policy shows strength in
both parts of this area. Greece feels that this will help improve the political
climate in the Balkans. It is not possible to separate the Eastern Mediterranean
and the Balkans. . The Greek people-owing to the trip of the President to the
Mediterranean-know that the Americans have decided to play a strong role
in this area and are pleased that the USSR will have to take that into account.
Dr. Kissinger said he felt the Under Secretary's statement of the situation
was generally correct as was his characterization of the purpose of the
President's 'trip.
in the Mediterranean.
Under Secretary Palamas said there were two points on which he wished to
know Dr. Kissinger's views. The first was how he viewed NATO as a factor
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appreciated the cooperation of Greece in the recent period. The sense that
we could count on Greek cooperation helped us in the formulation of our own
policy. Going on, he felt that it is difficult to distinguish NATO Europe and
Dr. Kissinger said he wished to say at the outset that the U. S. greatly
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the Middle East. The U. S. remains committed to NATO. We will. - as was
said at Naples - not unilaterally reduce our commitment without consulting
with our allies. With the increase in strategic weapons, the forces available
to NATO should be strengthened rather than reduced.
Under Secretary Palamas asked whether Dr. Kissinger expected the same
view from the allies. He said that Greece's troubles in NATO seemed to be
starting to subside, even with the Scandinavians. This is one more aspect
among recent developments which is favorable. The key question in Greek
minds is whether in a crisis the NATO Council would be a good vehicle for
decision.
Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Under Secretary had an alternative organization
in. mind.
The Under Secretary said that he did not. Greece always felt the alternative
would be what the U. S. could do by itself.
Dr. Kissinger said that personally he found it hard to imagine that if Greece
was attacked we would let assistance be vetoed by Denmark, for instance.
Under Secretary Palamas replied that Greece trusts the U. S. .
Dr. Kissinger said it was incredible to him that the U. S. would stand idly by
while Greece was being attacked.
Under Secretary Palamas said that at the same time Greece is trying to smooth
its relationship with its neighbors. He then asked how Dr. Kissinger viewed the
situation in the Middle East.
Dr. Kissinger said it looked as if circumstances favored the extension of the
Arab-Israeli cease-fire. The U. S. certainly does. He did not feel that any
country would want to be responsible for breaking it, even the UAR.
Under Secretary Palamas said the Greek communities in the Arab world give
Greece an unusual position there. There are twenty-five thousand in the UAR.
There are technicians in Libya, and the Libyans have asked for technical
assistance in maintaining some of their aircraft.
Dr. Kissinger said there are many problems in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli
problem is the most immediate, but there also the problems of the future of the
Persian Gulf and of the various radical movements in the area. During the
Jordan crisis, one of the purposes of the U. S. was to demonstrate that we could
not be pushed out of the area.
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SECRET - NODIS = 3 The Under Secretary asked whether Dr. Kissinger felt the Suez Canal would
be opened.
Dr. Kissinger replied that he thought it would be if there were a peace settlement.
He could not exclude its opening without a peace settlement. There is some
chance that Israel might be interested at some point.
The Under Secretary said that Greece is not directly involved in the Middle East
problem. It is not possible to find a general solution of the problem but there
might be sectors of the problem which are susceptible of solution. He felt that
the situation is improved now in Jordan and that it was good that Hussein's
hand had been reinforced. When the Undersecretary noted the difficulties caused
by the Fedayeen, Dr. Kissinger replied that it is difficult enough to negotiate
with governments; it seems all but impossible to negotiate with non-governmental
forces such as those.
Under Secretary Palamas noted the possibility of turning the West Bank into a
Palestinian state, and Dr. Kissinger replied that there was some fear that the
Palestinians would try to destroy Israel if they had their own state.
The Under Secretary said it will be important how the UAR develops. Greece
has its own information that there is an increase in anti-Soviet feeling there.
Dr. Kissinger agreed that it is hard to imagine that the Nationalists in the UAR
are anxious to trade British imperialism for Soviet imperialism.
The Under Secretary agreed that there had been a natural reaction against the
Soviets, "who are everywhere. "
Dr. Kissinger asked how the Under Secretary would explain the violations of the
standstill agreement in the UAR. Dr. Kissinger said he could not understand
why the UAR had not waited until a deadlock had developed in the talks before violat-
ing the agreement.
When the Under Secretary asked whether the violations were important, Dr. Kissinger
said that they were "massive." There are large numbers of sites that did not
exist before the cease-fire came into effect; there are sites that had been started
before the cease-fire and had been completed since; there are sites that were
completed before the cease-fire but which had had no missiles in them and now
did have missiles in them. At first, Dr. Kissinger said he thought that the
violations were technical, but as time passed and our knowledge of them became
clearer it became impossible to describe them that way. Also, these violations,
we think, would have been impossible without the Russians. Moreover, there
has been no attempt at concealment.
The Under Secretary asked how Dr. Kissinger evaluated the Soviet move.
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Dr. Kissinger replied that the Soviets must feel that an Israel alive is better than
an Israel dead. The Soviets, however, may not know how to apply enough power
to push Israel back without killing Israel.
The Under Secretary said that the Soviets, it seemed to him, wanted to avoid
war but not to have peace. Greeks are concerned about the increase in pressure
on Greece as a result of Mid-Eastern developments. There is the question of
the Straits and the need of the Soviets for free communication. He feared that the
enhanced Soviet position in the Middle East would bring Greece under increased
pressure as the Soviet need to keep open its lines of communication became
more pressing. It has always been a Soviet dream to be in the Mediterranean.
The fleet was not so dangerous but it was a base for Soviet operations.
Dr. Kissinger replied that the fleet is dangerous to Israel and a nuisance to the
U. S.. The U. S. could probably destroy the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean at
some price.
The Under Secretary said that the question of the Soviets having a permanent
establishment on the ground in theMid-East is of important concern to Greece.
Dr. Kissinger replied that we are going to be very insistent in any peace settlement
to bring to their attention the inappropriatness of such a permanent Soviet
establishment.
Changing the subject, Dr. Kissinger said that we sometimes tend to harrass the
Greeks about their internal problems, "which I will not do. " At the same time,
he hoped that the Greeks would remember U. S. problems. The U. S. ability
to work with Greece is affected by the internal climate in the U. S. , and that in
turn is affected by developments in Greece. The Under Secretary said that the
U. S. has a friendly government in Greece. Governments change but people remain
friendly. There is a real feeling of friendship among the people of Greece.
Dr. Kissinger, concluding the conversation, said that when he was in Greece in
1961 he enjoyed himself very much, and the conversation ended with a series of
pleasantries.
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4P W
SECGRE`I:" /: ODI
Backgrou
iDi:U.M OR ..Lsll.. KISSINGER
H a r o .l H. Saunders
K has seen
October I Z, 1970
Your T7dk with Under Secretary Palarnas
You may recall that k~aljEx_s was Greek Ambassador here when you
first came to lashtngton. You talked with hLm at least at the ti ?.+e of
the NATO i nini,sterial ax eetin.g here in Washington in the spring of 1969
along with Foreign Minister Pipinelts. Since the death of Pipinelis this
July, he has become the operational head of the . "oreign Ministry.
Prime Minister l apadvpoulos retains the portfolio of Foreign Minister.
Patamas is in New York at the head of the Greek delegation to the UN
ceremonies. (lto at Tab A. I
The Greeli are relatively happy in our relationship in the wake of the
September 22 resumption of a full military assistance relationship and
Secretary Lalyd's visit to Athens. The trick in our overall relationship,
as you know, Is to maintain this active alliance and security relationship
while still evincing in an unoifenst've but serious way the U. S. interest
in continued -:reek progress to a Parliamentary situation. axhi.le Fapa