MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-269-4-2-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 2, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
University Student Body Presidents
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for I tional Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, March 2, 1971
5:45 - 7: p.m.
Or. Kissinger began by going over the ground rules. He said the students
were free to characterize him in any way they wished, but he did not wish
to be quoted. He did not want any substance to be repeated on the outside,
for this could go to the newspapers. He acknowledged that there were no
constraints on the students except their sense of honor. He then said that
rather than make long statements he thought it was better if he let them
ask questions. He noted that there were some constraints on the time he
had available to meet with them.
The Stanford representative (Political Science) mentioned that the students
had talked with others in the Administration, and in response to Kis-
singer's question, he identified some of them as being William Male %tate
Department, Dolf Droge of the NSC Staff, and Robert Finch, the Presidential
Counsellor. According to Droge, one of the principal reasons for a consider-
able presence in ViEtnaxn through this summer was to preserve a stable en-
vironmeat for the village elections. If the operations in Laos, Cambodia,
and the Delta were all successful, he wondered whether the Administration
envisaged the possibility of withdrawing all fighting forces within 12 months.
Dr. Kissinger said that he would like to state the general attitude of the
Administration toward withdrawals, to speak of philosophy first and their
tactics. He remarked that many students and university personnel seemed
to think that the Adminstration's overwhelming desire was to stay in Indo-
china as long as possible. Unless there was unremitting pressure from
the outside, we would find a clever way to stay. There were many argu-
ments, but he wished to discuss the purposes first to which tactics were
subordinate.
This Administration wants to leave Vietnam as much as the students do,
although it was a less personal problem than for those who might have to
go to Vietnam itself. He doubted the latter possibility. The students must
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believe that the Administration wants to get out as soon as possible or the
tactical answers would not help; they would consider them trick answers.
He recognized what had happened during the past years, no matter whose
fault it was, and that nothing the Administration said would convince them.
Therefore, the Administration will be judged by performance. If it is to
bring this country together, it ought not be so much by rhetoric as by
performance. Included in this is the question of how it handles the issue
of Vietnam.
Withdrawal deadlines are essentially tactical. He was convinced that if
the Administration wrote out its schedule for withdrawals and some of the
critics wrote out their schedule the difference between the two perhaps
might be worth a political debate, but certainly not a massive demonstra-
tion. There was a fundamental disagreement with those who say get out
now, whereas with the others it was a matter of tactics. For those who
favored some form of gradualism, whether a withdrawal schedule was 12
months or 15 months was essentially a tactical question. One important
tactical difference was the following. The Administration believed there
is a limited chance of getting out quicker through negotiations than through
a graduated deadline or at least ending the war quicker. It believed that
the best bargaining weapon was our troops and that therefore a certain
amount of ambiguity on the schedule gave the other side an incentive to
negotiate. Once they knew the unalterable deadline they had no choice but
to wait for that deadline. Once the Administration was convinced that there
would be no negotiations, the deadline would not be an important issue any-
more in this country. Therefore, the Administration's weaseling on the
deadline should not lead to a credibility gap. Students could judge after a
certain pe riod whether or not he was telling the truth. It is a question
whether genuine. negotiations could get us out faster than setting a deadline
now. Maybe the Administration was dead wrong; maybe it was impossible
to get negotiations. But one should think of what it would do for this country
if, after all this anguish, one could bring off such negotiations.
He could say that in 12 months almost certainly all combat troops would have
been withdrawn, However, the problem was that one then sees an MP stand:-:
ing around with a pistol and a problem arose. In the sense about how com-
bat troops would actually be used, there was a high probability, however,
that within 12 months they would all be out.
The Harvard representative (History Major). We are worried about differ-
ent residual forces, and are not sure what the Administration is doing on
withdrawals. For example, there would be 75, 000 Americans flying air
support, staying there, etc.
Dr. Kissinger said that he understood this concern. Once our troops were
below a certain point, then their significance in combat is more and more
marginal. He was worried about the debate on college campuses about the
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dropping of bombs. There was a tendency to break people down into two
groups, some who wanted to kill and others who wanted to end the killing.
The first characterization must be stopped. He pointed out that it was not
just the South Vietnamese who were killing or who were invading. There was
no question that the killing of innocent ciarilians should be stopped. What the
US has attempted to do is bring about the possibility for self-determination.
In Cambodia, for example, no South Vietnamese were ever there until last
year. If the North Vietnamese withdrew, there would be no need for anyone
else to be in their country. Otherwise one'is, in effect, saying turn the
country over to the Communists. This was the thesis of the Dan Ellsberg
article in the New York Review.
The Administration's intention was to eliminate American participation in
the war, including the dropping of bombs. The number of Americans involved
is kept deliberately open for the reasons he had explained. Maybe there is
one chance in three or four that we could end the war through negotiations,
and this the Administration was trying to do. He asked the students to look at
the specific proposals the US had made. It was hard to say that we haven't
tried, recognizing that elections had a different significance in Vietnam than
they do here.
The Vassar representative (Political Science) said that Dr. Kissinger should
distinguish between the students who were there as individuals, particularly
their majors, and the campuses they represented. He said that last Novem-
ber he had been at West Point and there were two sections of people discus-
sing the war. The first section upheld Nixon's negotiating proposals and
the second were in favor of points 5, b and 7 of the NLF's proposals. It was
no longer a question.of rational assessments. There was an emotional mood,
psychological-_gut-reactions, built up by the time factor and the conflict of
ideas and ideals. The students perceived the criticality of the emotional
issue and the time factor more than Washington saw it. They had to deal with
it administratively everyday; it was not just hearsay. The students saw
these reactions reflected in ways not connected with the war or student
government.
Dr. Kissinger proposed a hypothetical choice. Suppose there were great
demonstrations and President Nixon went on TV and said that he couldn't
take it any more and he was going to end the war the next day. Compar e
this scenario to a reasonable time frame in which the Administration did
everything it said it would and ended the war and the U. S. role, ideally
through negotiations, although with great travail. He asked which would
be better for the students three years from now. In the first case would
they say the bastards collapsed and had no courage of their convictions,
and in the second case that although they didn't like the Administration
they at least ended the war. They would then debate something else. Did
they know which was better in 1971?
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The Stanford representative (Political Science). What concerned us was
that several schools would not even come to these sessions. They were
through talking to the Administration. Many were here last Spring, but
had a feeling they were going nowhere. Many students, under the reported
theory of alienation/ apathy really wanted nothing to do with the system or
were very mad. He wondered what would happen if this emotion kept
building up.
Dr. Kissinger said that he could assure them that by next year they would
see that every month the promises that the Administration had made were
being kept.
The Harvard representative said that it did not seem that they were talking
about the same thing. For example, Governor Harriman said that we could
negotiate if we really wished to. Niether the U. S. nor North Vietnam
wanted China to control the region and they could between them set up a
stable coalition government.
Dr. Kissinger said that Harriman said this to him often at great length.
The Harvard .representative continued that Senator McGovern talked about
the indiscriminate raining of bombs on people. Jim Thomson, who had the
same information as government officials, comes to completely different
conclusions. These different views were mystifying to-him.
Dr. Kissinger remarked that after his session last year with Stanford,
he never had faculty present with students. He would always meet them
separately. Students talked about fundamental problems whereas the
faculty concentrated on tactics. He noted that the names that had been
mentioned were all good friends of his. McGovern was a fine, sensitive
man that he had known for a long time. And he used to work with Harriman.
The Harvard representative remarked that this made it more mystifying.
Dr. Kissinger rejoined that the students' generation has the problem of a
demoralization of his generation for complicated reasons. As for Harriman's
contention that there was a possibility of a negotiated settlement with North
Vietnam on terms other than those of handing over South Vietnam, there
was not one scintilla of evidence to this effect. If the Administration could
ever publish negotiating efforts on various levels, it could at least demon-
strate that it had looked at these things. Hanoi says that we must withdraw
unconditionally and set up a coalition government consisting of 1/3rd from
the Saigon Administration, 1/3rd from a third force and 1/3rd of the coalition
government and have a veto over the other 2/3rds, accepting only those who
stood for "peace, independence and neutrality".
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He suggested the students read the President's April 20 speech and its
political principles which had been reaffirmed several times since. We
have proposed elections, but recognize that elections are not the traditional
method, of settling issues in Vietnam. If the other side talks reasonably we
would be flexible. Each side should have the power that its support entitles
it. The other side never come to us and said let's talk about some non-
electoral process for political power. The Administration would leave to
history a judgement on negotiating efforts.
He could understand Harriman's feelings that :he had almost a negotiated
settlement in his grasp as a capstone to his career. His generation had
had a traumatic experience having lived through a decade which started
with the assassination of JFK and ended in Vietnam. Two assassinations
and the war symbolized all this. There was a profound malaise and so
many predictions had gone wrong. People now believe the only way to end
the war was to destroy all previous theories.
He noted the minority platform at the Democrat's 1968 Chicago convention
which Humphrey had refused, to accept. The Administration has exceeded
this platform in every respect. He didn't mean this as criticism but only
to show how fast and far things had evolved in the last couple of years.
He pointed out the problem that the Administration had in not being sup-
ported by those elements of leadership whose support it needed.
The Vassar representative said that a false dichotomy was set up. There
was a third possibility, that of restructuring the nature of government.
Government had usurped power and didn't incorporate all elements of
society. What happens on campuses was hearsay and was not incorpor-
ated as other parts of the system were in the government. Droge's pre-
sentation had struck them. He had information available which was not
disseminated to the public. Unless one were an expert it was difficult.
The information could be presented in ways that would bring out a rational
debate.
Dr. Kissinger agreed that the campus felt alienated and so did many of the
faculty and the intellectual community. Vassar remarked that there were
more than these. Dr. Kissinger contended that he took no comfort in the
fact but it was nevertheless true that students were alienated from the vast
majority of society.
Vassar remarked that 75% of the youth under 30 had had some experience
with college.
Dr. Kissinger remarked that not all of them agreed with one another, how-
ever. He had spent more time with students than with any other group,
including Cabinet members. During the Cambodian operations he had
spent two hours every day with students. He invited everyone to come back
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later. Few had come back. Some said we will put the dialogue on the
basis of stop murdering children. He asked how many campuses he
could appear at without there being riots. He therefore thought that part
of the problem was on the side of the university as regards dialogue. Essen-
tially the first thing that happened when people disagreed was that they began
to destroy the character of those with whom they disagreed. The vicious-
ness of the dialogue required policing by the students on the campus. Dia-
logue was not a one way proposition. Government leadership had to build
4/5ths of the way, but the campuses in turn had to go 1/5th of the way.
The NYU representative in response to the question of why there was vio-
l ence and terrorism noted the tactics that the President had used in the
elections last year. These were very purposeful and very deliberate.
They incited the working man to look at long hair with disdain. It was a
deliberate attempt to polarize the electorate. He thought that history would
condemn the President more than any other for this. A civil war was one in
which one type of person was polarized versus other groups.
All his conscious life he had lived with Vietnam with no impact. He noted
that Dr. Kissinger and others had eliminated other people from policy
making. The structure rfrnained the same. He mentioned also the records
of civilians that the military kept. All this was scary, for youths who knew
nothing else in their conscious lives.
Dr. Kissinger mentioned the least important point that had been made
first, namely that the army civilian investigations Imad been a problem that
this Administration had inherited and stopped. He agreed that it was still
a problem. The growth of investigations, even where legitimate, were
resulting in files that were a national problem. Even if one. took the inves-
tigations of defense employees, this problem multiplied and it was an impor-
tant national question. It was not a question of evil people out to do something,
but rather that bureaucrats performing their functions were creating jugger-
naut.
Dr. Kissinger commented on the allegation that the President and he bypassed
elected officials. Many said this, but it simply was not true. On of the rea-
sons for the changes in the government machinery was to stop the practice
of the previous Administration where there was no formality and where the
last person in the Oval Office might come out with a decision. There used
to be a meeting with advisors once a week and no record, no decisions
kept, and no systematic look at the consequennces. The new NSC system
gives every agency an opportunity to be heard. He did not deny that he had
great information, but every decision was made with senior advisors pre-
sent. The responsible Cabinet members were always present. No decision
was ever made without the Under Secretary level first looking at it. For
example, the Senior Review Group agencies all looked at the issues and
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said that they sa the following choices. He had a staff member who
checked published literature to make sure that no choices were left
out. Then these analyses were sent to the NSC. At the NSC meeting
he would start and outline the choices for the President. Then the
Secretaries of State and Defense and the others would each present
thier views.
Whenever anyone claims that they were excluded from the decisions,
this was a flat self-serving lie. There was no exception to this rule.
He would present issues and say nothing. The President calls then
on the Secretary of State and Defense. After the NSC meeting the
President would often go off by himself and write down the.. pros and
cons. He might ask him in for leis opinions and ask what he might
have left out. He did not deny that he had influence. However,
people were always present when decisions were made and announced.
This did not make the decisions necessarily right, he acknowleged.
One thing one could say about this government as opposed to the LBJ
administration was that it wa s not capricious. They had gotten a sense
of formality and seriousness. They asked where we wished to be five
years from now.
For example, in this Administration, Arms Control and State could
help formulate the Defense budget, whereas previouslythey had a crack
at the budget only two weeks before it went to the printer. In a Monday
meeting they had started to consider Defense programs for FY 73. Arms
Control, State and domestic agencies all had a crack at the Pentagon.
One could attack the Administration's decisions and they could be wrong.
However, he wanted the system to survive, and it was designed to spread
responsibility rather than to concentrate it. We don't let anyone run into
the President, neither the JCS or anyone else, with an end run point of
view,
NYU commented that CIA seemed to have complete autonomy, for example
in Laos or overthrowing governments.
Dr. Kissinger remarked that this was a different problem. The CIA role
in Laos took place long before this Administration came into office. CIA
had a smaller role in this Administration'than previous ones. For example,
they only presented factual briefings not policy forma.lations, although he
recognized they could sneak in their prejudices in their briefings. CIA
could not overthrow governments. An example of an overthrow was
Cambodia. The Administration believed that they had a finite chance to
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bring off negotiations when Sihanouk was overthrown. At the time there
were no CIA personnel even in the country. Outside groups greatly
overestimated the ability of CIA to do things. The big problem of
modern government, CIA included, is that it becomes inpenetrable.
The students' problem was how in a big government and a society run
by big structures they could get hold of decisions. Big decisions were
made often by default. That was the important problem, not CIA which
was not the biggest one in any event. It was easier to manage than
others in the bureaucracy.
Dr. Kissinger agreed that the student generation had despair; this was
a universal phenomenon in many countries with very different social and
political structures. This was the problem of our time. He had no good
answers or any answers. One should recognize, however, that it was
not only due to any particular evils occurring at one time. There was
a problem of dialogue.
He cited the example of the Annual Report. Five members for the last
three months had killed themselves getting out this report. There was
nothing in it for the Administration. They could have put out balderdash.
However, we had gone ahead. Not everyone would agree with the con-
clusions but we hoped they would believe that serious and concerned
people were addressing their destinies. He didn't know whatever emo-
tional reassurances it would give, but at least it would help to get people
to be compassionate. He hoped to separate disagreement over philosophy
and disagreement over tactics. There should be greater opposition on
details rather than philosophy.
The reaction [to the report] had been disappointing. It was mostly on
Laos, and the philosophy of the document was not mentioned and no
debate was sparked. With that sort of response we could have put out
a report in two weeks and a press release.
He was noting that the difficulties of dialogue existed on both sides. This
group had nothing to do with the reaction. He said that the people who had
put the report together had killed themselves and were not necessarily
Republicans and couldn't care less about this particular Administration.
Penn State said that the crisis was in democracy in general. There was
a general withdrawal from governmental processes, a blowing up of
buildings. Regardless of good intentions, there were not perceived or
proved by action. People were no longer willing to believe. He cited
the examples of the number of planes shot down and how if only the
tail of our helicopter was left it was not considered shot down. He
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also cited misleading body counts. The public never seemed to get
real factual data. Thex$were always contradictions. They wondered
if anythingwas the truth.
Dr. Kissinger acknowledged the truth of this, but said that sometimes
there was a malaise and distrust also among the press. He cited the
e xample of Lao s where all hell was breaking loose a year ago so the
Administration tried to put out all the facts on U. S. policy in that country.
We asked the Pentagon how many advisors had been killed and were told
that none had been killed. At the time 50 would have sounded like a small
number. During the next six weeks we found that twelve had been killed
and spent all our time trying to explain why we had lied to the American
people. It was simply a matter of a stupid bureaucratic goofup. There
was nothing in it for the White House to say thalino advisors had been
killed. We could have made the point with a small number of killed in
action. They had all been killed in the previous administration in any
e vent. By the time this process was through it was not that the Admin-
istration for the first time had told the truth about Laos, but had added
one more lie to the series. This kind of episode demonstrates where we
are today in this country.
Penn State noted that 70 percent of the American people did not believe
that U. S. troops were not being used in Laos.
Dr. Kissinger remarked that a large majority believe that we are already
there.
Georgetown (English) thought that accountability was a big problem, on
campus where students want control over their lives in the big environment.
He mentioned the Symington speech and the Kissinger influence on decisions
and not testifying.
Dr. Kissinger said he would describe the situation exactly. He had no
discretion. There was a long standing practice where for every President
the Assistants to the President did not testify. No Presidential Assistant
had ever testified before Congressional committees. The reason was that
Presidential Assistants do not act on their own. The Secretary of State,
for example, represents a department and is confirmed by the Senate and
is therefore accountable. He was not supposed to have, and had tried not
to, represent an independent influence. His advice was personal. He
repeated that assistants to the principals do not testify before the Congress.
George Shultz, as Director of the Budget, was in a position where that
person always testified about the structure of the budget and nothing else.
No other assistant in the Administration, in any Administration, ever testified.
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The President and he had recognized the problem of communication,
however, and therefore had proposed to Fulbright last year that while
he could not come before the Committee, if he was invited by the
Chairman to his house for drinks and all the rest of the Committee
showed up he would be willing to answer questions. There were two
such meetings of three hours each. There was a hiatus after Cambodia
which was not caused by him [Kissinger]. He called Fulbright last
December to try to establish the dialogue and got no response. He
then went to Javits and asked him to talk to Fulbright. He said he was
prepare4o meet with the Committee on a personal basis. After Fulbright
spoke on Sunday he again offered to meet again with the Committee at
his home or on a quasi-social occasion. He had met with every member
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee individually, with Senator
Church, for example, three different times. He was not formally
accountable, but had made every effort within limits of not taking a
public position. It was an established rule that Presidential assistants
sh ould m t operate as public figureson their own. The problem for the
President is that everyone wants something. Someone must order the
tons of paper that flows into him.
As for the Symington speech, he recognized that it was getting close to
election year, and he supposed that he would be taken on in public. He
believed he had stretched the rules to the limit. That is why he always
reque9ted that he did not want to be quoted. He wanted to protect the
President, not himself. The President or his Secretary of State were
the spokesmen for foreign policy.
Georgetown said that when he asked why the cost of the war in lives and
dollars and in the social fabric had to continue, why this had to happen,
he got a number of different answers. From Sullivan, for example, he
got ethnic diversity and stopping the imperialism of the Tonkinese.
Dr. Kissinger had mentioned self-determination. He wondered what the
conditions were for getting out. What would happen if they pulled out in
1Z months and then there was a collapse?
Dr. Kissinger noted that the "'Original decisions were made in 1963. He
had expressed his views on the purposes of our Vietnam policy in an article
he had written in 1968. And his vie,ws.remained basically the same, He did
not believe the consequences of actions were examined, and the assumptions
of actions were not tested. That was one reason this Administration had
s et up its governmental machinery, to try to look at consequences. They
might still make the wrong choices. The problem of this Administration
was not why we should stay but how we should get out without doing more
damage than had already been done. The judgment of the Administration
was that that peace. of the world and the coherence of our society meant that
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we should go out gradually. If it were demonstrated clearly that Sauth
Vietnam could never defend itself, then we would have to make difficult
decisions. It was inconceivable to him that we would keep a government
in power propped up for all eternity if it couldn't keep itself going by
o ther means.
Georgetown said that it was really therefore a domestic political question.
Dr. Kissinger replied that it depended on the Administration's judgment.
If before the South Vietnams se fate was clear, the Administration judged
that the American political system could not tolerate further involvement,
then we would have to quit before making a judgment about Sou: Vie tnam' s
future. We had not judged that the domestic situation was such up to now.
Dr. Kissinger remarked that he had to go to a dinner for the SALT delegation
and asked the students how long they would be here. They replied that they
were leaving that day and asked him to dinner. Dr. Kissinger said that he
would very much like to do so, but had to attend this other dinner. He
invited them to come back in a few weeks and have 'dinner. Then they
could continue to ask their questions.
New Hampshire said that he could not go back to his campus without
saying to you the feelings of the students that he had 'talked to. The feeling
on the majority's part was that after last spring what good did nonviolence
do. It did not seem to get anywhere. Now students dropped out and -were
indifferent. Now with Laos during the last couple of week's they were
frustrated in a way that he hadn't seen during Cambodia. .:Re was scared,
and he wanted to relay this feeling to Dr. Kissinger. New Hampshire was
basically conservative, and the students were not radical, yet he was
scared with what the students were showing. The question in most peoples'
mind was are we trying to save face when we say we want an honorable way
out. This reflects back on negotiations. How much pressure was there
for .negotiations when there is a matter of saving face over the real con-
sequences. The students believe that Laos and Cambodia were examples
of how we were trying to save face for the American public.
Dr. Kissinger asked whose face we were saving. The Administration's
belief has been that an honorable withdrawal was a more meaningful
way of putting it than the slogan of saving face. The question is how to
do things that we must and want to do. We want to end the war but not
to turn over the country to the Communists unless this was the decision
of the South. Vietnamese people. This was our one irreducible position
in negotiations. He asked them to look at the evolution in negotiating
positions. In 1969 no one agreed that the Communists should participate
in the electoral process even as individuals in the political life. We agreed,
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and two months later m t only individuals could participate"--but they
could participate as a political party, and two months later they could
share in power by elections. The one condition that we were not prepared
to fulfill was to turn over the country to the Communists as a result
of an American negotiating role. Dr. Kissinger remarked to the NYU
student that he had said that the President would go down as the most
hated man. He was not sure. It won't be recognized what he was doing
but what he has done is to make possible our getting out of Vietnam without
tearing this country to the pieces from the right. This occupied thought
of the first two years.
He related one experience he had had. After the November 3, 1969 speech
there were a flood of letters and cables, a large percentage of them spon-
taneous. He looked at selected ones -- 95 percent were strong endorse-
ments of the speech. A constant sounding was "thank God my son didn't
d ie in Vietnam or was not wounded in vain. " The President must think
not only of the students but of that group. We had to get out in a way that
would not turn over the country to the Communists by virtue of an American
decision. We believed in withdrawing through negotiations or unilaterally
during a time period which the political process could stand. We had to
judge whether some heat now was worth it for the longer term reconciliation
later on. If the Administration were wrong they were in deep trouble.
It was a tragic process. Any time one acted -- a point he had tried to
make on TV but had been misunderstood -- there were degrees of doubt.
Harriman sounds like he is a hundred percent committed ,but really his
judgment is 52/4.8 and then he must stick ,with it a hundred percent.
Similarly, the Administration might believe that it was right 55 to 45
percent and it had to act as if it were a hundred percent convinced. If it
succeeded we:,, were geniuses. If it failed we: were disastrous idiots.
The real margin of success of failure was narrow and in either case it
was a complex, delicate process. He recognized there might be little
consolation from this philosophy. Only some of your colleagues could
be less absolutists and recognize the contingency nature of motivations.
Stanfordsuggested that Dr. Kissinger might come to campuses and speak
over radio stations, which would get away from the problem of riots.
Dr. Kissinger replied that he tried to avoid getting quoted in the papers,
although he recognized that he was beginning to lose his virginity. It
would sort of be difficult to speak on the radio without it getting into the
papers, but he would think about it.
The meeting then concluded at 7:00 p.m.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/03: LOC-HAK-269-4-2-7