MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-271-4-2-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 7, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-271-4-2-4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET /EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY August 7, 1973
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President
Richard Helms, US Ambassador to Iran
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff
DATE AND PLACE: Friday, August 3, 1973 at 4:30 p.m. in
Dr. Kissinger's Office
Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Helms had spent ten minutes or so
in private conversation before Mr. Saunders joined them and began
taking notes.
Helms: Well, Henry, I don't think I have too much business that
remains to be done.
Kissinger: When are you going back?
I will be back in Tehran on August 15. I will be at the
shore this weekend, then in New York seeing my mother.
I will stop over for a couple of days in London where 25X1
will be available through the embassy.
I think we have the Kurdish problem on circuit.
They are doing
an assessment of whether the Kurds have enough arms-25X1
Depending on that assessment, then the issue will be
whether there should be any more hardware or whether
the issue is simply providing or not providing additional
economic aid.
Kissinger: What do you think they should have?
Helms:
my views.
I will not know until I have this assessment. Perhaps
Saunders could telegraph it to me so that 1 can give you
SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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Kissinger: I have thought about your message from Arafat. We have
a nothing message to send back to him. It doesn't say
anything. As long as he hears from us, that is something.
Helms :
I will to keep the channel open and to
say that if they have anything to tell us, he will be avail-
able.
Kissinger: We have a few paragraphs here which you could
ass on. They don't really say anything. [Me25X1
a tacked. ]
Helms: [After reading] The last paragraph is a1l,thak really is
needed.
Kissinger: My experience with these channels is that all one really needs
to do is to keep them open and to see what the other side puts
into them.
Helms: I will keep this piece of p 7 If. It is too formal to
give them a paper. I will pass on the substance
orally. 25X1
Kissinger: From whom will you say this is a response?
Helms:
The US government. I think it is desirable to keep this as
general as possible. They should know that they will just
clog up the system if they press for too precise an answer.
They are beggars, not choosers in this situation.
Kissinger: I will see Ambassador Zahedi and give him some language
to use in his briefing for Ismail.
Kissinger:
SECRET /EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Helms:
There is divided opinion-on that. On some issues he
is pretty good, but on others he gets quite emotional
and is not effective. In short, he is not effective. In
short, he is not a known or predictable quantity.
Kissinger: What issues has he handled well?
Helms: He did the Bahrain negotiations very well, but be gets
emotional on some things and then isn't worth very much.
Kissinger: The President is still smarting from Zahedi's having
invited McGovern to his dinner for the Shah and the President.
Whoever made out that guest list?
Saunders: Zahedi made it up.
Helms: If I were making up the guest list, they are not the people
I would have chosen to put on a list for a social evening
with the President. But as it turned out, I think it worked
quite favorably for the President.
Kissinger: I do too, but that is not the view elsewhere in this building.
I don't mind seeing these people. I see them all the time
socially. Kay Graham called me and asked my advice. I
urged her not to accept the invitation and she was very good
about it. I don't know what the President would have done
if she had been there. He might have left. That would really
have ripped it. I don't know how relations with the Post
could get any worse, but that would not have helped.
I asked the Israelis whether they would consider retro-fitting
the Jordanian tank. They promised to consider it. The
retro-fitting and the C-130 are both money problems for us.
Helms: I don't really have any view on these Jordanian issues. But
please Just keep me informed so I can tell the Shah where this
issue stands.
Kissinger- -Why don't we ask Rifai whether he would rather have a C-130
than some other items in his military assistance program?
SECRET /EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-271-4-2-4
 lat
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Some people keep raising the question of a mission
to Saudi Arabia. That mad man Clements wants to
go out to Saudi Arabia ;on a mission.
Helms: I got an ear full yesterday when I saw him yesterday
about the undesirability of having any contingency plans
that involve Iranian involvement in Saudi Arabia if there
is trouble there.
Kissinger: We had meeting, on this subject. I just raised the G JA 1 13
issue of what we would do of we woke up some morning an
found a radical government in Saudi Arabia. Clements made
an impassioned plea that Iran must never become involved
in Saudi Arabia. He sees the answer as a mission to Saudi
Arabia on which he serves. His solution is to pour arms
into Saudi Arabia and then to squeeze Israel for a solution
to the Arab-Israeli problem.
The way I see it is that any settlement Israel is likely to
buy will be ,unfavorable to the Arabs. Therefore, we should
get the radicals to sign it. If the Saudis are involved and
have to sign it, if the Saudis yield to Israel, that could shake
the monarchy. My strategy is to keep them uninvolved.
Clements should not go to Saudi Arabia. He has too many
business interests out there. I understand that an economic
mis-lion under Casey might go to Saudi Arabia. That would
be a good idea.
Kissinger: I am trying to get Simon to go.
Helms: That's not a very good idea. We shouldn't be sending him
out if he is Jewish. Casey is an intelligent man and he
could do a good job.
Kissineer: Is Simon Jewish? I hadn't thought of that.
Saunders: One alternative is to invite Prince Fahd to come here. I
have sent you a memo recommending that.
SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY ' - 5 -
Kissinger.
Saunders:
Where is the memo? That is a good idea. I would
approve having Fahd come here.
Does that mean I should go ahead with the recommendation
in my memo? I sent the memo over earlier in the week.
Kissinger: Let me look at the memo. I will approve it tomorrow
morning. What do you think of having Fahd over here?
Helms: I think it's a fine idea. My view has been that we have not
done enough for the Saudis. Do I understand that we now
have asked for agrement on Jim Akins as ambassador?
Kissinger: Yes, I removed the hold on him. Do you think this is a good
idea?
Helms: Yes, it will be all right. Akins has been heavily involved
in oil. But he is a big enough man to put that in the back-
ground and to show that he can deal with other issues.
Kissinger: Whom do you think would be a good ambassador?
Helms: As I said before, I just think you need someone who has
?RNA' stamped on his forehead..
Kissinger We can build him up when he gets out there.
Helms: Akins is a bright fellow.
Is there anything that came up in the President's con-
versation with the Shah that I should know that I would not
normally deduce?
Kissinger I will show you the notes before you go.
At this point Dr. Kissinger was called out by General Haig. After seti~ :-al
minutes he returned and agreed with Ambassador Helens that Helms vvr.: ,d
follow up on the contingency planning which the Shah promised to do on
Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Mr. Saunders left, and Dr. Kissinger and
Ambassador Helms continued their conversation.
SECRET /EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY Harold H. Saunders
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-271-4-2-4