MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-281-1-17-0
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
December 14, 2010
Sequence Number:
17
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 17, 1975
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 106.81 KB |
Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-281-1-17-0
%IFMORANDI.-?\I
SECRET /NODIS /XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
WASHINGTON
'I'IIE WHITE HOUSE
DOS, OSD REVIEWs
COMPLETED.
Friday, January 17, 1975
9:35 .10:30 a, m..
The Oval Office
Kissinger I think we have to sell a little more the purpose of your
program. More conceptual.
The President: I am talking at 11:00 to the Cabinet; to Governors and
Mayors at 2:00; and I'm having lunch with Sulzberger.
Now the Democrats are dragging their feet. They're thinking of
barring the import restrictions. If they are going to be negative, I think
we will be in good shape because we have a tough-positive program.
Kissinger:
CLASSIFIED I:Y Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS `~ IY`'I)T'I E OIF U:ZCUTVE ORD R 11652
rx \ii'IIC~. CATEGORY 5(b)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASS.FIED Off' _ Imp. to Det.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-281-1-17-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-281-1-17-0
""SECRET /NODIS/XGDS
I get the impression from Dobrynin that they are anxious to
keep detente on course. I said I could send Robinson to Moscow to
talk about what we could do. at the summit to present to the Congress.
I said, why couldn't we agree on a small MBFR cut for the summit?
He said, why couldn't we cancel Trident and they would cancel somthing?
I said not the Trident but to propose something else.
He said they fear the U.S. is too weak to do business with.
Brezhnev is having a Party Congress this spring. If we have more set-
backs by thenk it will really be bad. I said we were in better shape -
you now had your house in order, you were tough, and you now had a.
Vice President. I told him to keep up the press pressure for a while.
On the Middle East, they have given up on Egypt. They now are
worried about Syria. When I think what we could do if Israel would
cooperate . . . Maybe we need a letter to Brezhnev on the Middle East.
All in all, it was a very encouraging talk. He said their decision
to open up Siberia was a major, one.
On Allon, I told him they had to move -- there was no choice.
His problem i. how to present it in. Israel so it does not look like surrender.
He said it would help if we could reconfirm what we have already
promised. I think we can we'll deliver what we promised by April 1,
and let Schlesinger discuss MATMON-B, but in a dilatory way. I urge
you to be a little warmer personally than I had recommended, but be
very tough on substance. One has to wonder if modern democracies
can survive. They can't make tough decisions without being demagogued
to death -- unless something like the Soviet trade bill happens.
I am keeping Allon here so he can't be there on Sunday so we
have a week without leaks.
General Scowcroft: [Harsch and Thimmesch articles.]
Kissinger: The new Congressmen were sweet as pie yesterday, not at
all belligerent.
SECRET /NODIS /XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-281-1-17-0