CONVERSATION WITH LADISLAV DERKA, FIRST SECRETARY OF CZECHOSLOVAK EMBASSY, MAY 16, 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-284-2-14-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 19, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM a3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS IiIN0TON
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
May 19, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Arnold Nachmanoff
THROUGH: Viron P. Vaky
SUBJECT: Conversation with Ladislav Derka, First Secretary
of Czechoslovak Embassy, May 16, 1970
During a conversation at dinner at my house Saturday evening, May
16, Derka and I discussed the following subjects:
Vietnam-Cambodia
Derka commented that US prestige had suffered throughout the world
because of the Cambodian action.
I said it was a difficult situation but the President had to do what he
felt was necessary. I noted that the President had made very clear
that the US wants to negotiate an end to the war and withdraw its
troops from Vietnam as quickly as possible; I, therefore, wondered
why North Vietnam, which obviously was suffering from the war,
continued to refuse to seriously negotiate a settlement and facilitate
the withdrawal of US troops.
Derka replied that there were various political forces involved--the
Chinese Communists, the Soviet Union, and various factions within
Hanoi. These forces see what is happening in the US--the dissent,
the social and political tensions, the economic problems, etc. They
feel that continuation of the Vietnam war permits the intensification
of these "internal contradictions" in the US society. Thus, it is in
the interest of "your opponents, such as the Soviet Union" to see the
war continue. Moreover, the North Vietnamese are prepared to take
losses and continue to sacrifice for another 20 years if necessary.
Their people are psychologically prepared to wait it out. "They be-
lieve time is on their side, not yours. "
I said it would be unfortunate if Hanoi and others based their policy
on a miscalculation of the effects of dissent in this country. The
State Dept. review
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CONFIDE L - 2 -
dissent is real and very vocal, but it represents a minority, not a
majority. They should not underestimate the depth of nationalism
in this country. Although the US, as a great power, can afford to
be generous in negotiating a settlement, if Hanoi continues to remain
intransigent, increases its attacks and inflicts higher levels of US
casualties, there is real possibility of a nationalistic reaction in
this country which would prove very costly and painful to North
Vietnam.
Derka said he understood my point, but he wondered what the US
could do--resume the bombing? I replied that that was not an
impossibility.
After my comments, Derka twice asserted in rather definite terms
that he did not believe the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong would
launch any more major attacks.
Communist China-Soviet Union
C.
Derka felt that there was some thaw in relations between China and
the Soviet Union. He felt that the Kosygin-Chou En Lai meeting had
been very significant in that an understanding had been reached to
ease tensions between the nations although the "ideological war"
would continue.
He believed that China would play a much larger role in the social-
ist camp in the next decade, a role which he believed would be
"positive". He felt that China's progress, as compared to India
for example, would enhance its prestige generally.
Cuba
Derka noted that his Ambassador had been in Nassau on his way to
Havana last week (the Czechs represent Cuba in the US) when the
Cubans called to ask him to return to Washington. The Cuban
Foreign Ministry officials indicated they were "too busy" for con-
sultation and that they wanted the Czech Ambassador to be in
Washington at that time to represent their interests. (He assumed
this had to do with Cuban concern over Cuban exile activities. )
His Ambassador was annoyed by the Cuban action, but Derka com-
mented that "this is the way the Cubans operate. "
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CONFIDENTIAL - 3
Derka raised the subject of the Cuban exile group, Alpha-66's kid-
napping of 11 Cuban fishermen. He asked if I thought the fishermen
would be released soon, but quickly added, of course "your govern-
ment claims that it did not have anything to do with it. " He said
he had seen the State Department statement concerning our inten-
tion to apply the neutrality laws, but he commented that Castro
does not believe that the policy of the State Department is the policy
of the entire US Government. Castro knows that there are other
agencies of the US Government such as the CIA, who are in con-
stant contact with the Cuban exiles, and he believes that they give
training and support to the exile groups.
I stated that I did not believe that the Alpha-66 activity was supported
by any agency of the U'S Government, and pointed out that it was
clearly not in the US interest to support or encourage the use of kid-
napping. Derka, however, appeared to remain skeptical.
Czechoslovakia
Derka, who on previous occasions expressed sympathy for the liber-
alization movement in Czechoslovakia indicated his personal depres-
sion over events in Czechoslovakia in the past year. There was
great disorientation among the people. He noted that these develop-
ments were now reaching into the Foreign Ministry and commented
that no one at the Embassy including the new Ambassador knew what
was happening and how long he would be staying at his post. (Derka
himself is going back on home leave in July.)
Derka said he did not agree with the opinion that Gustav Husak had
betrayed the nation. He felt that Husak did what he had to do under
the circumstances. The Czechs moved too fast in too many areas
and now they must wait--"the question is how long".
Derka expressed the view that in 1968 a signifcant factor in the Soviet
decision to clamp down on Czechoslovakia was the fear among leaders
of the Communist Parties in the Ukraine and in the Carpatho-Ukraine
that the Czech liberalization would "infect" their areas. Derka said
he believes that many Russians in various sectors were privately
sympathetic to the Czech liberalization although they recognized that
the Soviet system was not ready for such a development yet.
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