CONDITIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-288-1-4-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 5, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ET ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: John lioldridgel* .(
SUBJECT: Conditions in North Vietnam
ACTION
January 5, 1970
5959
The President asked for your comments on the rather favorable report
which Fox Butterfield brought back from his visit with Cyrus Eaton
last month (Tab B).
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.
Attachments
NSS review completed.
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
? MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Conditions in North Vietnam
INFORMATION
You asked for my comments as to the rather favorable report on con-
ditions in North Vietnam which Fox Butterfield brought back from his
recent trip to Hanoi with Cyrus Eaton.
Butterfield's impressions are not unusual for sympathetically-disposed
observers paying their first visit to Hanoi. Harrison Salisbury brought
back much the same impressions from his visit three years ago.
Hanoi undoubtedly gives an impression of order and purpose and disci-
pline to those visiting it. The Vietnamese are, in fact, an orderly,
disciplined, and energetic people and would be likely to display these
qualities even when personally discontented. There are, however,
trends and evidence of various economic and political strains visible to
regular observers. These by no means suggest an imminent breakdown
in the system in North Vietnam, but they are important as indicators of
the types of problem with which Hanoi leadership must deal.
In October, CIA prepared for me the memorandum at Tab A, describing
the situation. The situation has not changed appreciably since that time.
The CIA analysis concluded that the principal problems are war-weariness,
economic dislocations (including declining exports and a food shortage),
and evidences of disagreement within the leadership as to the proper
political/military mix for prosecuting the war.
I believe that the memorandum represents a legitimate picture of con-
ditions, even though the impressions of people like Fox Butterfield pro-
vide a useful reminder that civil administration in the North continues
to function effectively despite the years of war.
Attachment
SECRET
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SUBJECT: Hanoi's Difficulties in North and South Vietnam
Introduction
I. This memorandum presents some of the difficulties facing
the Hanoi regime during the eleventh year of its atterript to seize control
of South Vietnam through a combination of political subversion and
military force. It is not offered and should not be read as a balanced
assessment of Hanoi's present situation or of its will to persist in the
war. Obviously, many of the problems noted herein are being countered
by the regime with varying degrees of success, or are being endured in
the expectation that continued resistance will bring a political settlement
favorable to the Communists. Factors which are favorable to Hanoi,
such as the state of U.S. domestic and international opposition. to the
U.S.. role in Vietnam, Hanoi's ability to control dissidence within its
own population, the high degree of discipline among its top level cadres
in the South, and its ability, with the help of the sanctuaries, to control
the level of the fighting in the South, are not cDnsiderecl herein. Conflicting
demands for North Vietnam's resources, a growing war weariness among
the population in the North, manpower, and economic problems, the heavy
.casualties, high defection rate and loss of population in the South, and the
growing capabilities of the GVN forces are elements of the Situation
collectively causing serious concern among tha Hanoi leadership and
have probably compelled the regime to scale down its military effort.
As trying as these difficulties must be for Hanoi, however, there is no
evidence yet available to suggest that these problems have reached the
point where the regime's will and ability, to continue the war in the South
have been seriously. impaired.
Problems of Morale and Discipline in the North
2. The war remains the central problem FIanoi faces. Weariness
with the long struggle and its deprivations is present in varying degrees
in all significant sectors of North Vietnamese society. During the past
year, the regime in Hanoi has mounted an across-the-board indoctrination
SiTRFT
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:campaign against a diminution of support for its policies among the
populace, the army, and the party rank and file7?Virtually every element
of society in North Vietnam has received a special bracing from the
leadership aimed at countering the emotional letdown.which set in following
the cessation of bombing, and eliciting a more enthusiastic response to
official directives. This effort has brought Hanoi's problems into sharper
. focus and has served to identify those segments of North Vietnamese society
with which the regime is dissatisfied.
3: The army seems to have come in for special attention because
of its role in the war. In May, Ho Chi Minh and three top-level politburo
members lectured a group of cadre representing "the entire army" that
their "primordial"duty is to support the war. Ho's address and subsequent
exhortative broadcasts leave the strong impression that the regime is
determined to improve the effectiveness of the army's support for the war
and performance in combat and that problems in this sphere were of
sufficient potential seriousness to warrant involving Ho's name and
? prestige in addressing them. Ho's admonition to economize with regard
to the expenditure of both material and men, suggests that Hanoi has
? become concerned about the drain that high caSuelties in the South are
making on its manpower resources.
4. The leadership is not satisfied with the current state of.
popular response to official direction in the civilian sector as well. To
a large degree, this seems to be a direct result of the party's desire to
'reimpose doctrinaire party programs on every fatet'of life in the North
after several years during Which rigidity and discipline were permitted
to slip in the interest of focusing all efforts on countering the bombing
and carrying on a high level of warfare in the South.
5. Young people, in particular, appear to he causing problems.
The party issued a new set of instructions in March to tighten responsiveness
and discipline among the, young. In May, the chairman of the party's
youth group confessed publicly that it had not adequately responded to
higher authority's directive,e--: The precise nature of the difficulty is not
clear, but it seems more prevalent among urban young people than among
rural youth and there are some signs that even austere Hanoi is facing a
long hair, tight jeans youthful restlessness problem.
6. A decline in the general state of morale in the North has been
clearly discernable since at least mid-1968. It has not generated outright
criticism or resistance to Hanoi's policies, but in-are-as of -econornie and
social policy, -where the regime prefers to rely primarily on persuasion
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and individual motivation, the leadership has had difficulty in bringing
the populace in line. The press makes it clear that the populace is not
responding to exhortations to work harder and that petty crimes such as
thievery and blackma.rketeering are still prevalent.
7. Of all the real or imagined Crimes facfng North .Vietnamese
leaders, "individualism" appears to be the most dangerous, judging from
the party line. In essence, individualism seems to mean placing personal
profit and comfort ahead of compliance with party and government
directives. The North Vietnamese press suggests that it has been spotted
by party agents in the armed forces, among youth, in cities and in rural
areas and even in cadre ranks of the government and party itself. Ho's
death has brought even more vigorous morale-building and mobilization
efforts.fr.prn the leadership.
? ? Divisions Within the Leader sliip
8. The party leadership has been divided n recent years over .
various aspects of the war.. Evidence on differences in the politburo is
extremely difficult to come by, but some inkling of disagreements. at the
top over policy can be discerned from analysis of public statements. It
has been evident for some time, for example, that some in the 'politburo
.would emphasize steady military pressure to aclieve objectives in the ?
South, while others prefer a mix of diplomatic, .political and military
efforts. The merits of expending ?substantial North Vietnamese manpower
and material resources to ?take control of South Vietnam is another basic
policy question which has divided the leadership. Some have preferred
to devote more of the Party's energies to developing a stable and prosperous
society in the North. Others have insisted that.fae war in the South should
have a priority .claim or virtually all the North's resources and ,energies.
9. Ho's death almost certainly impacts heavily on intra-leadership
relationships and the 'questions of how power is distributed and decisions
made. What this impact may be and how it is translated in practical
terms is not clear. Whatever fissures might be present within the
politburo are obscured by the regime's? persistence in deliberately
presenting a business-as-usual facade to its people and the world at large.
Economic Problems in the North
10. Although the bombing of North Vietnam was halted about a
year ago, the cumulative effects of almost four years of bombing continue
to present North Vietnam with serious economic problems. In addition,
much of North Vietnam's attention has been directed at the war effort in
the South which has been a drain on the country's limited. resources.
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11. Traditional problems of low labor-productivity were aggravated
by the war-time manpower demands. Managerial expertise particularly
has always been in short supply and the number of managerial cadres
available for the economy has undoubtedly been substantially reduced
by war-time casualties and military requirements.
12. Food continues to be in tight supply-even though rice output in
1969 stopped the downward trend of the 1966-1968 period. Output of rice
this year will still be about 500,000 tons below the 1965 level and this
shortfall, coupled with population growth, will force North Vietnam to
continue sizeable imports of food throughout 1970.
13. Many-,-industrial facilities which were damaged or rendered
inoperative by the bombing have been left:in an unrepaired state, including
the Ba.c Giang fertilizer plant; the Nam Dinh textile complex and several
thermal powerplants. Some limited repair work has been accomplished
recently on other large industrial facilities such as the Haiphong cement
plant, and the Thai. Nguyen iron and .steel complex.. The productive capacity
of these partially restored plants.; however, is still considerably below
pre-bombing levels.. The slow pace of industria:. reconstruction to date
? is probably a result of the combined effects of managerial shortcomings,
and shortage of labor, and possibly the reluctance of other Communist
. Countries to rebuild these prime 'targets while the continuing war in the
South leaves open the possibility of a resumption, of US.bornbing_
14. As a consequence of reduced industrial output the value of
North Vietnam's exports have remained considerably below the pre-bombing
level and the country's dependence on aid from o_her countries was
increased accordingly. The reduction in exports to the Free World has
substantially reduc,..d North Vietnam's annual hard currency earnings.
Hanoi's Relations with the USSR and China
15._ Relations with the Soviet Union and China dominate Hanoi's ,
foreign policy problems. The necessity for Hanoi to maintain cordial and
workable relations with both to insure a continued influx of material ?
assistance is compelling, and their mutual animosity significantly
complicates Hanoi' approach. The best of all worlds for North Vietnam
would be a Moscow-Peking reconciliation, but the North Vietnamese clearly
realize that this is not in the cards for the foreseeable future. Therefore,
they have been forced to devise a middle-road policy which almost guarantees
a constant state of tension in foreign policy making.
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Hanoi's Difficulties in the. South
16. The magnitude of the problems the Communists are facing
in South Vietnam continues to grow. In some areas, the seriousness of
the enemy's plight has forced him to shift to a defensive footing in order
to preserve his dwindling military and political assets. Steady Allied
military pressures resulting in heavy enemy losses, and a decline in
enemy infiltration during 1969 have contributed to attrition among all
echelons of his military forces, and a loss of influence over large
segments?of the populace. This latter, in turn, has reduced the enemy's
recruitment potential, his supply of labor for the battlefield and for '
agricultue production, and his taxation base.
Loss of Population Under Communist Control
17. Communist control of the total population has declined from
about 17 percent in January 1968 to about five percent as of the end of
August 1969. An even more significant loss of influence has occurred
among the population categorized as "contested, "where the Viet Cong and
government have been vying for the upper hand. Between January 1968
and August 1969, Q-le percentage of the total population in this category
declined from about 22 percent to about seven percent.
Weakenin,Y of the Communist Infrastructure
18. The decline in Communist influence over the p?eoPle in South ?
Vietnam is being achieved in largo part by the steady upgrading of govern-
ment security in the villages and hamlets. Moreover, with Viet Cong
local forces and guerrillas being barred from entering the villages, the
Communist apparatus (infrastructure) in them Ills been left unprotected
and more exposed to Allied police-type operations. During the month of
August, operations against the Communist infrastructure achieved their
greatest success this year, acecunting for the defection, capture or death
of over 1,800 principal Communist agents. Although most of these
eliminations were from the lower ranks of the Communist apparatus, the
loss of these trained cadres is causing considerable disruption to the
enemy's administrative apparatus. VC documents lament the drying up
of assets in whole villages. Other documents complain about the increased
efficiency of the South Vietnamese police. Several have stated that anti-
infrastructure program (PHOENIX) is the most dangerous the Allies have
launched so far. Moreover, in uprooting these cells, the government is
being increasingly assisted by the voluntar-y heli3 of -the local people. As a
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result there are fewer seasoned cadre available to direct Communist
political, and military affairs.
Defections to the GVN
19. Large numb'ers of Communist fighters and supporters lacking
leadership, fearing for their lives, and doubting Communist propaganda
are continuing to defect to the government under the Chieu. Hoi program.
These defections, although mostly southerners from the lower ranks, are
running at the highest level in the history of the war, and averaged over
4, 000 per month in: the last quarter. As of 4 October over 35,100 had
rallied to the government this year, exceeding the total of an-Y previous
year. Tie high rate of defection reflects in large part the expansion of
territoria:security by the government. Moreover, Vietnamization of the
war seems to have ha,d-little adverse effect on those trends thus far. In
the delta provinces, for example, the rate of defection among the Communists
continues to remain high despite the redeployment of the US 9th Division,
and the delta, in fact, accounts for a major portion of the national Chieu
Hoi total.
Declining Morale
20. As a re3ult of the shortage of seasoned leaders and their growing
isolation from the people, there has been a widespread decline in the
morale of North V:etnamese and Viet Cong soldiers. Continuously heavy
combat losses, thE rumors of peace, loss of faith in a Communist victory,
and the shortages of food, reported almost everywhere in the South, have
been important factors contributing to lower morale and the high rate of
defections.
21. Recent1;, captured documents from aroughout South Vietnam
reflect yet another major Communist problem -- the lack of positive
direction. Communist indoctrination progx-axns for their supporters
reflect some degree of indecision on the part of the Communist leadership
as the future conduct of the war and reflect the inability of the enemy's
propagandists to present, in a palatable form, an acceptable rationale for
their failures this year.
22. Since early 1968, when the Communists were able to deliver
severe blows against the GVN, the Communists have not demonstrated
their usual resiliency by replacing personnel losses and rationalizing for
their errors. In part, this has resulted from the failure of their political
line to reflect the realities of the political- scene and the Military-battlefield.
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Declining Enemy Capabilities in the South
23. Over the last year Viet Cong and North Vietnamese combat
forces in South Vietnam suffered a net decline in strength for the first
time since the beginning of the war in South Vietnam. Recent estimates
of VC/NVA force levels show a net drop in combat forces of 40,000-
50, 000 from about 170,000-200,000 during the third quarter of 1968 to a
level of about 130,000-150,000 at the end of the third quarter of this year.
24. ,The principle reasons for the net erosion of enemy forces over
the last year are a decline. in the capability of the VC to recruit personnel
in South Vietnam at the. same high rate as in past years, and the lower
level of infiltration during the first nine months of this year. During
the recent three-month period of reduced combat, enemy battlefield.
deaths have averaged almost 2, 500 per week and may have reached 3,000
per week when deaths from wounds, sickness and other causes a.re.
Included. The continuation of even the recent casualty rate and a low
level of infiltration for the rest of this year would cause a further erosion
of enemy combat strength by the end of the year.
25. In addition to the erosion of VC/NVA combat forces, available
evidence indicates an overall decline in the strength of VC irregular forces.
A recent study shows that the guerrilla forces declined from 110,000-
135,000 in mid-1967 to 80,000-125,000 at the end of the first quarter in
1968. Since then, the guerrilla strength has probably declined to a current
level of about 60,000-80,000. The decline is mostly attributable to loss of
manpower upgraded to higher echelon units, high casualties sustained by
fighting elements of the guerrilla forces, and an inability to recruit
sufficient able-bod:.ed personnel to bring village and hamlet unit strengths
up. Of the guerrif a forces remaining, furthermore, only about a third
are well trained, highly motivated, and in the prime age group.
? Other Enemy Problems in the South
26. Captured documents, prisoners and ralliers continue to mention
the existence of friction between Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnam Army
(NVA) personnel. The increasing use of NVA parsonnel as fillers in VC
units suggests that this problem will grow. The extent to which this is
affecting Communist military capabilities may be minimal at this stage,
however.
27. There are indications of increasing alienation of the population
under Communist control. Increased demands by the Communists upon
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the shrinking population base, particularly taxation and labor impressment,
is causing heavy Migration to the GVN-controlled areas. Captured
documents also reflect a greater popular reluctance to cooperate with the
? Comthunists. The resort to terrorist tactics and random shellings,
which inflict heavy casualties on the civilian population, , is also alienating
the population. The most extreme example is the VC massacre of civilians
at Hue during Tet 1968, which has had a strong impact on the Population
? in northern I Corps -- an area in N.vh ch pro-GVN sentiment previously
was weak.
? Deteriorating Viet Cong Economic Position
? 28. In contrast to a peak year as 1965, when the Viet Cong. (VC)
? -.control over various sectors of the South Vietnamese. economy was at
?? its peak, autumn 1969 finds the VC with far less area and population
.?control and a deteriorated economic position. The prime source of
domestic revenues, ?the taxation of the agricultural output -- mainly rice
has been losing its importance because of reduced area control and the
flight of a considerable number of those who formerly tilled the soil in
VC-held areas. Another important: source of VC revenues, the plantations
of. South Vietnam, can no longer provide large a.rlounts of funds- because
of a sharp decline ia the output and profits of the 'rubber industry: In
order to.cOmpensata for declining revenue sources, the VC have attempted
? to extract larger arloUnts from those farmers rEmaining under their control
? and to shift toward obtaining greater revenue's from businesses and
'individuals in areas held by the Government of Vietnam. Up to now the ?
VC have been unable to obtain the considerably larger revenues needed
from the latter .source, possibly because of an inability to develop the
?-expanded tax network necessary to exploit the resources of the GVN-held ares.
29. Although The VC have been able to depend on external financial
aid from North Vietnam and other Communist countries to supplement
deficient domestic revenues, information in captured documents suggest
that there are definite limitations on the amount of external aid. Despite
a temporary reversal of their military fortunes as a result of the offensives
in 1968, tax revenues appeared to have declined in that year. Although the
VC still are able to collect considerable sums in certain areas of the
delta, their overall economic position in autumn 1969 has continued to
decline. Hence, the VC now confront .the dilemma of being far less able
of meeting greatly increased costs from an eroded tax base.
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The Improving GVN Position
?
30. On the other side of the coin, Hanoi's problems. are .further
compounded by the ..steady, if not spectacular, ? across-the-board progress
:being made by the Government of South Vietnam. . The political situation
remains generally stable,. with the Thieu government secure and facing
.no significant internal threats. The National Assembly is demonstrating.
a reasonable sense of responsibility, while retaining its independence vis-
a-vis the executive. Representative government has been firmly
established at the national level, . and the government!s?writ is being
extended into the countryside through the rural development program and
local ham. lot and village elections. Religious dissension has subsided, ??
??
?and sOme Social progress is being made, including a-start on. such endemic
.problems as corruption: and land reform. The economy, while plagued
with budget deficits and inflation, shows many signs of strength. Markets
.are 'functioning, industrial output has picked up, 'transportation routes are ?
reasonably secure, the labor front is quiet, farmer income is rising,
and post-war planning is underway..
31. Finally, ? at a time when Communist military capabilities are.
declining, the GYN armed forces conversely are growing in. strength, in
firepower, and in fighting capabilities. The size of the government's
forces continues to grow, having: successfully .passed its July 1969 target
level of 875,000. Most notable has been the increase in the strength and
firepower of the Regional and Popular Forces, the government's front
line of defense against the Communists in the .villages and hamlets. The
strength of the RIP/PF stood at nearly 454,000 at the beginning of . .
September 1969, up more than 50. percent from early 1968. The accelerated
issuance of M-16 riles has ?boosted firepower to the point where it almost
.always .exceeds that of attacking Communist forces. Although problem's
of inadequate leadership and poor" communications equipment persist,
the desertion rate among these soldiers who are based in their home areas
is significantly lower than in AVN regular units.
32. The size of the People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) reached
nearly Z. I million by mid-September, surpassing its target level of 1.8.
million.by a wide margin. The 350,000 weapons issued to the PSDF is
somewhat below the September target. Weapons are issued to armed PSDF
units on the basis of one weapon to three personnel with the weapon in the
hands of the member on duty. Other PSDF support units are unarmed.
Qr.PE)r-r
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33. Both the II18/PF expansion and the PSDF program serve to
mobilize large numbers of rural Vietnamese behind the South Vietnamese
government. These forces effectively deny the Communists manpower
for their military and political organizations and erode their popular support.
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.. THE WHITE HOUSE
AC I A A.," 4 'I 4., X .3., ..? `.../ A ,, NJ. NI-, ?.? , v ,
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1.1 A J 11 IA L. L..1
\
Data': Monday, December 22, 1969 Time: 6:30 pp
FOR ACTION: Dr. Kissinger
FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY
DUE: Date: Tp,esd.ay, January 6, 1970
Time:
2:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
President's request for your comments on the Fox Butterfield
article regarding the attitude of the people of North Vietnam
toward thlza war.
ACTION REQUESTED:
For Niecessary Action. ?
Prepare Agenda and Brief
For Your Comments
. REMARKS:
?
f , ?
For Your Recornmen!acilion
Draft Reply
- Draft Remarks
PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.
If you have any qu(ntior.s or if you art;icipc::9
delc_y insul.1.71.:LKr.g :he please
telzpl-,cne the 2:,z.creiary irm,,ediot,21y.
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TAM
K. R. COLE, JR.
For the Prezid.ent
LOC-HAK-288-1-4-7
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-288-1-4-7
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE-
WASIIINOTON
December 22, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
The December 16 issue of the New York Times contained an
article by Fox Butterfield, grandson of Cyrus Eaton, reporting
that there seems to be no sense of panic or depression in
wartime Hanoi. In fact, the atmosphere is natural and relaxed and
the people seem confident that they will eventually win the war.
There does not appear to be any substance to the theory that morale
in the North has fallen. Le Duetho, political adviser to North
Vietnam's Paris delegation said that Hanoi has always wanted to
end the war and that they have been conciliatory. He added, "with
a wide grin," that Senator Fulbright had accused RN of trying to
prolong the war with Vietnamization. An East European Communist
said, "The Vietnamese are in the grip of an idea. The people don't
care that the war is hurting them. They won't give up this idea of
independence and to them that means driving out the Arnericalis.
On reading this the President noted that the author of this is a
special pleader but requested a report from you on the facts.
Please submit your report to the Office of the Staff Secretary.
Thank you.
JOHN R, BROWN III
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-288-1-4-7