SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-288-4-28-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: February 12, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/05/01 : LOC-HAK-288-4-28-8
9 4
February 12, L970
4s T ohn H. Hol4 rid e
)UM FOR DR. K 51NG R
pecial National Intolii ence .stixrate on North Vietnam
We have received the $peciat Nattonat intelli a*ce Tatimat* on North
Vietnam, &ad prepares the meworaodum, from. Y'an W the Pr*sidsnt
rya rti ; the ceatesxto of the N ; E .
REC OMME I . TiONs
"t hat you sign tl att*c ied xsa maranadui i to the resi nt at I ah A.
Jl-HH:W 1, 3p h ZItZl70
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/05/01 : LOC-HAK-288-4-28-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/05/01 : LOC-HAK-288-4-28-8
F OMS Hoary A. F30$iAg*Z
UBJECT -peciaal National lathe once st:isp asasLaaat on J Ac to rs :=, ae,ctie.
North Viaeta&'s PoliacY On the Vi,bam
>ed Special National isestelU *ace Estimate an Norte Vietnam
aclus4es the SUlow n s
__ I .,he most likely course for Hari dung 1970 is to pursue pr
ioarat, af3 war tactics much along present lives. The North Vietnamese will
continue to try to Maaintaia sufficient military pressure to impose L7, 115,
casualties, to inflict **t backs oa Vietaamtxation and, ww4ci.l"ication and
perhaps to engage l* major tests Oaf 'VietneMUattton.
-- "S he Con rnunists will r,3ot prepared to nee3otiatee a igenaer*l
*eettlerneaaaRt in Vietnam, but they might sea some utility in probing the
po.slbility of srraa ernants w4ich might hasten or fix a, timetable for
U. ' ithdrawyeL in-. sis rrocess, any cony eassi es that 11 ianot might
make would be limited and not aimed at an overall sesttlerneat. Hanoi is
couxastiag of the odds cwing,i in its favor once the LL ~'- withdrawal has
become militarily vi ~sa-lfti:caant.
-- i'..aaasoi will not dertake an all-out military effort which would,
the rsator risks and hoavter losses than it see s. wiltia to..aco
template at this itaaa. Moreover, such action titeen in the newt six
swaths wouW slow U.. departure rather than hasten it.
..F The Cornw% nists are in trouble is.soattth Vietnam. and they
recoa size it themselves. They fear that they have ovaeresupha*ihed
military action and neglected the political and subversive base. They
are now utakin a great .ffor"t to restructure their apparatus is South
Vietnam ant: enhance its staying power.
-- WttUe the Communists believe that thoy can prevail over the
Fewth Vietn*as esee Qtvvernmoaas strI :tssre over the long run, they cannot
caertain of this saws long as U. I. forcer are in the, ?;outh. They believe
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/05/01 : LOC-HAK-288-4-28-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/05/01 : LOC-HAK-288-4-28-8
that Vietnami-Cation aresentae the risk of an indefinite 4,treaerican presence,
A44 they thus see the,mselvos, faced for the first time with an atiiea atrrate y
`
tetnaa a-
t to challaasu o their fundamental a asaaatrrlatioax. bey see the '
a;..aatieaa pars aar~a< aasaz e*ssezniaally fragile but they recotw,ni?e that it mi, ht work
1C.'ag aaeou ;h and well eno a;b t ~.rt t:te %V a fair -:hanez.e of > Adint ,; its own..
Hagsai p$articaelarly fears the raacification progran-a.
,.,. Chi Mia9Eb's eieaath has plicated the task; of achfevAn a united
policy in iiaaa eei, though t leadership loss not yet aae sn.aaa Sala,. e or
as a stets of disarray over policy dttafsren =ea or succession f4ia+s 'a+ tes.
ietnaaEm is suffering from economic pratalearaa aa, is ;:~ula a;
of dtataffecti;xu with the areal ins ` s , salsa, and ir~irza
ro+ralsrns which art pierh1pss- mote qualitative than gwraAntitative.
."here has eeeae. a e aersl domestic letd?do within the Nort'x. :hies situation
a arotaaaitaly c aaao aeal:leed the leatlesraihip to .ive nacre of its attention to the
North tiara it has had to flu in. earlier years.
-- 'l ?^ae ian - ;ovlet if it. remains at present levels, to a
cou plicattti bat "t deterxMntn fa for in )kart* Vietnamese poli.: y c*l-
cu1a6ons. iK n it 1 tialit Olx hresk out, the North Vietuaaa esee Leadership
would reasonably ;:ertaln that it ' uld still got the support it a.eedas.
if the hostilities s prwea and. persist. ilsnoi would deem it prudent
le down its effort in the youth and perhaps to move toward a pease-fire.
at: ` -te judgment* c;ontsiad;ed in the est ma.t& impress us as ue?n;
id. We would w id, though, that the estimate's analysis if :iaooi"s pa llcy
losses over asomewhat the real dill outnas w :each ',Janoi currently faces.
. cha.il+ra:e the -naacifiw,,;ation program it gust ,ommit its stain for~we:nnits
which it as been holding In the base areas alr a ; the ';.,aam dian *n,4' Laotian
uders; hr>wever, these units when =#omrnitted ran the risk of heavy losses
and na,ilitaaary -efeaat. On the otieer hand, if it holds back its a ath forces units
to avoid casualties and to keep its turves in o.in.. its infrastructure in tlts
co*wtrysi ie Qntinueas to suffer under the paacittcation prro r*na and its
access t the people for i*o) sup, Ay & *d combat suppart erodes turthor.
The longer it delays, the worse off It finds itself militarily in the south
-- always the key eeiemtnt in ktanoi's aeleutstiona+. Meanwhile, by stalling
,on the xaee,; otiatione, Hanoi permits the L. S. to carry oat. Vista ihativn at
its ;own pace. Xh. alternative is to offer concessions v s cda the North
Vietnamese are presently loathe to make. - e believe we can see the
pressures be i rrntnl to build up_ = n ;.lanai for some movement -- Casa "reach
Dele, *to General in Hanoi. f- tor example, as raparted that to North
Vietus&n3esee Leaders seem _,epraea axai sod aware that th.iut,s have not gone
ss plaiua ed -- althou h we ',aabt that any -`'olicy