COMMUNIST CONGRESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND REPORTS ON HANOI STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-291-6-19-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: August 22, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/09: LOC-HAK-291-6-19-2
MEMORANDUM
SECRET
1P
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
INFORMATION
August 22, 1970
SUBJECT: Communist Congress in South Vietnam and Reports
on Hanoi Strategy
Recent defector reports about the second congress of the Communist
Party of South Vietnam, held in September 1969, reflect Hanoi's
concern about Communist prospects and interest in a cease-fire
before U. S. withdrawal and installation of a coalition. Though the
congress was held almost a year ago, some of the material
emerging from it is still pertinent today.
Problems Discussed. Several leaders of Hanoi's effort in South
Vietnam cited the following problems to the congress:
-- The Communist political and military structure had
suffered great losses.
-_ There had been a decline in the morale and quality of
Communist party cadres.
--- The Allied programs which created the greatest troubles
for the Communists were the accelerated pacification pro-
gram, the Phoenix program, and the Chieu Hoi (defector)
program.
Possible Countermeasures Discussed. Several countermeasures were
emphasized:
To recruit new Communist party members very fast.
To infiltrate party members into the GVN apparatus.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/09: LOC-HAK-291-6-19-2
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-7. To break up large Communist units into smaller units.
-- From the middle to the end of 1970, the "general offensive"
must be implemented.
General Options: According to the leading statements at the congress,
Hanoi envisaged two possible outcomes to the struggle
(1) A Communist defeat of various GVN programs, leading to
acease-fire. The earlier the GVN programs could be defeated,
the earlier the cease-fire could come into being,
(2) If this could not be achieved, the result would be a more
prolonged struggle. The delegates attending the congress did
not even want to consider this situation.
1969 was the worst year of the war for the Communists.
-- The immediate effects of Cambodian developments have
been very detrimental, although the situation there will have
long-range benefits for the revolution in South Vietnam and
t'-fir e tifie Communist cadres would zCttempf 'to-infiltrate the
cities and would-attempt to foment uprisings against the GVN. Moreover,
after the withdrawal of U. S. forces, the Communitst forces then antici-
Cease-Fire Conditions. The conditions which the Communists anticipated
for the cease-fire included the continued existence of the GVN and the
presence of U.-S. forces in Vietnam at the start of the cease-fire. During
c"~p etely, At so ne ecifiecl poixzt,? _after U. S. withdraw ! he
rated turning on the South Vietnamese forces and defeating them
be imposed
-
-
coal"ition overnxnent w xtCommunist control of key. positions._would
The sequence thus envisaged was (1) cease-fire, (2) U.S. withdrawal,
and (3) a coalition government.
confirmed many of the above appraisals but reflected
some changes in tactics. The following appraisals were given to him
as reflecting the view of the Hanoi Politburo:
Cambodia.
SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/09: LOC-HAK-291-6-19-2
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North Vietnam.
-- Fighting on three fronts is a great drain on the resources of
--.. Viet Cong finances and rear services have been cut to the
bone.
-- But the situation in Saigon was considered to be basically
favorable to the revolution because of demonstrations and
opposition against the GVN.
Vietnamization gives hope because it means that the power
of the allies will be reduced and that the GVN will face great
military and economic problems.
Recent Tactical Changes. Communist
plans for future ways to end the war were very closely held and only a
few top cadre were briefed. He said, however, that plans were to be
completed by 1970 so that operations could start at the beginning of
1971. (This schedule shows considerable slippage from the earlier
expectation that the "general offensive" was to be implemented from
the middle to the end of 1970.
The recent plans also place a great' deal of emphasis on the attainment
of a new GVN _- without Thieu and Ky -- as an intermediate objective,
rather than on the immediate attainment'of a coalition government. The
Communists would hope that the new GVN would be less effective on the
ground and would be more ready to compromise in Paris. They described
several ways in which they then hoped to move from the creation of a new
GVN to the ultimate formation of a coalition.
Comments Although there have been changes in Communist plans and
timetables since the 1969 Congress, it is still noteworthy that at that
time they were seriously contemplating-a cease-fire before U.S.
withdrawal and before a coalition, but that they planned to violate
it after we had pulled out.
It is also noteworthy that there has been some slippage in Hanoi's
timetable since then.
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/09: LOC-HAK-291-6-19-2