U. S. OPERATIONS TO LOWER ENEMY MORALE IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 15, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
, MEMORANDUM
PACOM, JCS, OSD, NSS,
Reviews Completed
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDZ'M FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
ACTION
December 15, 1969
SUBJECT: U. S. Operations to Lower Enemy Morale in
Vietnam
In response to your request for information on our programs to reduce
morale in Nor.h Vietnam and among the VC, I earlier gave you a
report on our covert activities in this regard. The following reports
on our other related programs.
1. Within South Vietnam, the following major programs are under
way:
Radio. Our Mission presently produces an extensive range
of we,:kly programs describing GV:1 progress and other
favor;tible themes. These are broadcast over the growing
network of GVN radio stations and are estimated to reach
about 70 per cent of the populace which is now fairly well
suppL' ed with receivers. Expansio:i of the network now
underway will enable the GVN to reach some 95 per cent
of the populace by the end of 1970.
Print,:d Matter. Our Mission prod ices and distributes a
two-p ige newspaper which is air-dropped in about 1. 3
million copies fortnightly over contested areas. On special
occas:.ons (your speech of November 3rd), circulation is
over R; -million.
Chieu Hai Program. This rightly falls within the area of
undermining enemy morale. Altho-igh it is primarily a
GVN program, there is a strong U. S. input. During the
pasty ear, for example, U. S. efforts have resulted in the
expan 'ion of the "Third Party Indus ement Program" which
rewards those who induce others to rally. There is evidence
that this program has had a rather strong impact on enemy
moral
MORI/CDF per
C05098935
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
SECRET
U. S. Military Programs. The U. S. armed forces conduct
extensive air drop leaflet operations in connection with
B-52 strikes to explcit the psychological impact of the
bombi.zgs. These have been found to be among the most
effective of the psywar programs. Tactical operations on
the ground against the enemy are also normally supported
by leaflet and loudspeaker operations.
2. Within and against North Vietnam, our psywar operations are far
more limited at present, mainly because of the cessation of hostile
military operations against the DRV. Prior to the end of the bombing,
we air-dropped many millions of leaflets over the North and conducted
occasional marine forays against the coast which were partially designed
to have a psywar impact.
At present, the: only overt program directed against North Vietnam is
a radio service called the "Voice of Freedom" which beams many hours
of broadcasts from. Hue. Its power has rece:itly been expanded, but
it is still considered unreliable in reaching ptanoi audiences and the
heavily populated Red River Delta during the daylight hours.
There is also an extensive air drop leaflet p ?ogram in operation in the
Laos Panhandles aimed at NVA troops infiltrating South Vietnam. This
is intended to strike at the effectiveness of NVA troops by encouraging
defections, dissatisfaction, and anxiety. There is some evidence that
it has been effective, but like the other programs this is hard to prove
and to measure explicitly.
Possible Imprc vements:
Conversations between my staff and personnel connected with the prograrrs
at USIA, DOD and CIA indicate .that in South Vietnam, at least, we
probably have an adequate volume of operations going in the demonstrably
effective programs. Changes suggested wer3 largely in the nature of
refinements best left to the organizations themselves and to field personnel
associated with the programs.
There was sorr.e fear that our increasing emohasis on Vietnamization
and the consequent juggling of our assets might result in displacement
and abandonment of some valuable psywar efforts. We should, of
course, guard against this.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
In reference to North Vietnam, it would appear that there is definite
room for improvement in our overt radio output and that there is need
for considering whether we wish to renew air drop operations. This
has been proposed, but has been rejected a' lower policy levels of the
Government because of the political implications in connection with the
negotiations.
RECOMMEND:4TION:
I believe you should request the Secretary of Defense and the Director
of USIA to give us a formal assessment of their psywar programs and
any suggestions they may have for bolstering them, particularly in
connection with the North Vietnamese populace. If you approve of
this, I will undertake to request a study from them.
App4oveY " Disapprove
'go
SECRET
Other_
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
MEMORANDUM 1.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: US Operations to Lower Enemy IVlarale in Vietnam
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
f .
y
t
o
In response to your request for information on our pro rams
range of weekly programs describing GVN progress and
other favorable themes. These are broadcast over the
growng network of GVN radio stations and are estimated
to reach about 70 percent of the populace which is now
fairly well supplied with receivers. Expansion of the
network now underway will enable the GVN to reach some
95 percent of the populace by the end of 1970.
Printed Matter. Our Mission produces and distributes a
two-page newspaper which is air dropped in about 1. 3
million copies fortnightly over cortested areas. On
spec-'.al occasions (your speech of November 3rd),
circc.la ion is over 2 million.
Chie Hoi Pro ram. This rightly falls within the area of
uncle mining enemy morale. Alth >ugh it is primarily a
GVI program, there is a strong UUS input. During the
past year, for example, US efforts have resulted in the
expansion of the "Third Party Inducement Program" which
rew2.rds those who induce others lo rally. There is
evidence that this program has had a rather strong impact
on enemy morale.
v,~- f?
-%L4:,r'' F L~:l
Radio. Our Mission presently pro iuces an extensive
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
~ Icintn~ Chi situ Cron ?a cc~what rnig t~-be derrre? rrmpro~r ?th
p esent-effo-rt.-
1. Within South Vietnam4.4 d the following major programs are
underway:
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
-? US Military Programs. The US armed forces conduct
extensive air drop leaflet operations in connection with
B-52 strikes to exploit the psychological impact of the
bor. things. These have been found to be among the most
effective of the psywar programs. Tactical operations
on the ground against the enemy are also normally
supported by leaflet and loudspeaker operations.
2. Within and against North Vietnam, our psywar operations are far
more limited at present, mainly because of the cessation of hostile
military operations against the DRV. Prior to the end of the bombing,
we air dropped many millions of leaflets over the North and conducted
occasional marine forays against the coast which were partially
designed to have a psywar impact.
At present, the only overt program directed against North Vietnam is
a radio service called the "Voice of Freedom" which beams many
hours of broadcasts from Hue. Its power has recently been expanded,
but it is still considered unreliable in reaching Hanoi audiences and the
heavily populated Red River Delta during thy: daylight hours.
There is also an extensive air drop leaflet program in operation in the
Laos Panhand.e aimed at NVA troops infiltr3.ting South Vietnam. ,.,This
is intended to strike at the effectiveness of NVA troops by encou:- aging
defections, di;isatisfaction, and anxiety. There is some evidence that
it has been effective, but like the other programs this is hard to prove
and to measure explicitly.
Possible Irp movements:
Conversations between my staff and personnel connected with the programs
at USIA, DOD and CIA indicate that in South Vietnam, at least, we
probably have an adequate volume of operations going in the demonstrabli
effective programs. Changes suggested were largely in the nature of
refinements best left to the organizations themselves and to field personnel
associated with the programs.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
SECRET
w
There was some fear that our increasing emphasis on Vietnamization
and the consequent juggling of our assets might result in displacement
and abandonment of some valuable psywar efforts. We should, of
course, guars against this.
In reference to North Vietnam, it would appear that there is definite
room for improvement in our overt radio output and that there is need
for considering whether we wish to renew air drop operations. This
has been proposed, but has been rejected at lower policy levels of the
Government because of the political implications in connection with the
negotiations. CWT-do ow;7of -tour se, -that, mo-rale-irr the-- DRV.-has.,
actually-_declined since-the termination of the bombing.
I believe you should request the Secretary of Defense, the Director
of USIA aftcl --__t* F `~to give us i formal assessment of
their psywar ,,arograms and any suggestionH they may have for
bolstering them, particularly in connection, with the North Vietnamese
populace. If you approve of this, I will undertake to request a study
from them.
Approve Disapprove Other
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
SECRET
December 15, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY
SUBJECT: Psywar Operations Against the Vietnamese
Communists
The President has requested that you prepare an assessment of
your programs designed to lower the morale of the Viet Cong and
the North Viet:iamese populace. The assessment should include
suggestions for improving the programs, particularly against
North Vietnam, and should also deal with any problems you fore-
see in the disruption of the psywar program,3 as Vietnamization
proceeds.
Henry A. K.s-singer
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
SEAT
MEMOR.ANDU FOR
\fi=iE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF U,, S. LNFOItMATION AGENCY
TAE DIRECTOR OF C. T.R.AL INTELLICENCJ4;
SUE-JECTs Pay-war Operations !tgainat th it Vietnamese Communists
The Presicl a. t has requested that you prepare an assessment of
your prop ra3r:s dasi,- ed to lower the morale of the Viet Cong and
the North 'tai z.tn .mesa populace. ;`T to aaacasmsnt should iniiude
suggestions or irnprr vin, the pro3; rams, particularly aZ;atust North
Vietnarn, an should also deal wi fi 6.py problems you foresee in the
disruption of Cho psywar pro rarns ;r .Vice :namixatioa proceeds.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE
SET November 24, 1969
MEMO FOR:
THRU:
FROM:
John Holdridge
Secretariat
Al Haig
The President has asked about our programs
for reducing morale in North Vietnam and
among the VC. Could you please prepare a
memorandum from HAK to the President
indicating what programs we have in these
areas (if we have any with regard to North
Vietnam), their eadequac a, and what we
might dc to improve them.
SECRF
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0
MEMORANDUM ~G
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA3HxNOTON
ACTION
SECRET December 11, 1969
4942
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: John H. Holdridge \)"'J
SUBJECT: Psywar Operations Against the Vietnamese Communists
In response to the President's request for information about our
programs designed to reduce enemy morale in North and South
Vietnam, we have reviewed the existing effort with the DOD and
USIA. I have prepared a draft memorandum to the President
recounting the status of our effort, making ;some general suggestions
for improvements, and suggesting that a me re formal study be under-
taken on the matter by the concerned Departments.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum for the Pre: ident at Tab A.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/11: LOC-HAK-3-4-3-0