ITALIAN DIVORCE REFERENDUM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
November 13, 2009
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 6, 1974
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9.pdf | 207.14 KB |
Body:
V
e 77,9,9)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 ?,
Mtiva,KANuum ZIA S.L.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
.1786-X
SECRET/SENSITIVE INFORMATION
May 6, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Italian Divorce Referendum
On May 12, Italian voters will decide whether or not to uphold or abrogate
a 1970 law that made divorce legal in Italy. The outcome of the referendum
can be expected to have a major impact on Italian political developments.
The referendum campaign has driven a wedge between the Christian
Democrats who are campaigning hard for cancellation of the law,and their
coalition partners, the Socialists, Social Democrats and Republicans, who
are urging retention of legalized divorce.
The split in the coalition over divorce comes at a time when the parties
are already at loggerheads over economic issues. Prime Minister Rumor's
coalition had been in office only eight months when it fell apart in early
March over economic policy differences between the Socialists and the
Republican Party. Rumor hurriedly patched together the current government,
but the refusal of the Republicans to accept any cabinet posts indicates that
the parties made no progress toward resolving their dispute over economic
priorities. Rumor's coalition is widely regarded as a stopgap affair con-
trived to get the country through the divorce referendum.
The Communist Stake Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer had been
pushing since October for an "historic compromise" between his party
and the Christian Democrats -- a clear bid for admission to the national
government. 13erlinguer thus tried to get Christian Democratic leader
Amintore Fanfani to go along with a plan to cancel the referendum in order
to avoid an open battle between the two parties. Fanfani's refusal to
cooperate, however, gave substance to the concerns of more militant
Communists who doubt the wisdom of Berlin.guer's search for a modus
vivendi with the Christian Democrats.
MORI/CDF pages
3-10 C03317080
SECRETiS
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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111.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
It is unlikely that even a major Communist victory in the referendum
would lead to their immediate_pa.rticipation in the Kovernment. More
probable alternatives include: a) an all-Christian Democratic caretaker
government to preside until the dust settles; b) the eventual reforming of
the center-left coalition (both the Christian Democrats and Socialists
have stressed during the divorce campaign their desire to continue
governmental collaboration); c) the outside possibility of a "technocratic"
government designed to deal with the country's severe economic problems.
Elements of the Italian military are probably concerned over the potential
for increased Communist influence but are not now proceeding with any
concrete plans for action. This might change, however, if it appeared
that the Communists were on the verge of winning a major government
role in the immediate future.
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