ITALIAN DIVORCE REFERENDUM

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
November 13, 2009
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 6, 1974
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9.pdf207.14 KB
Body: 
V e 77,9,9) No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 ?, Mtiva,KANuum ZIA S.L. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON .1786-X SECRET/SENSITIVE INFORMATION May 6, 1974 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: Henry A. Kissinger SUBJECT: Italian Divorce Referendum On May 12, Italian voters will decide whether or not to uphold or abrogate a 1970 law that made divorce legal in Italy. The outcome of the referendum can be expected to have a major impact on Italian political developments. The referendum campaign has driven a wedge between the Christian Democrats who are campaigning hard for cancellation of the law,and their coalition partners, the Socialists, Social Democrats and Republicans, who are urging retention of legalized divorce. The split in the coalition over divorce comes at a time when the parties are already at loggerheads over economic issues. Prime Minister Rumor's coalition had been in office only eight months when it fell apart in early March over economic policy differences between the Socialists and the Republican Party. Rumor hurriedly patched together the current government, but the refusal of the Republicans to accept any cabinet posts indicates that the parties made no progress toward resolving their dispute over economic priorities. Rumor's coalition is widely regarded as a stopgap affair con- trived to get the country through the divorce referendum. The Communist Stake Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer had been pushing since October for an "historic compromise" between his party and the Christian Democrats -- a clear bid for admission to the national government. 13erlinguer thus tried to get Christian Democratic leader Amintore Fanfani to go along with a plan to cancel the referendum in order to avoid an open battle between the two parties. Fanfani's refusal to cooperate, however, gave substance to the concerns of more militant Communists who doubt the wisdom of Berlin.guer's search for a modus vivendi with the Christian Democrats. MORI/CDF pages 3-10 C03317080 SECRETiS ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 111. SECRET/SENSITIVE It is unlikely that even a major Communist victory in the referendum would lead to their immediate_pa.rticipation in the Kovernment. More probable alternatives include: a) an all-Christian Democratic caretaker government to preside until the dust settles; b) the eventual reforming of the center-left coalition (both the Christian Democrats and Socialists have stressed during the divorce campaign their desire to continue governmental collaboration); c) the outside possibility of a "technocratic" government designed to deal with the country's severe economic problems. Elements of the Italian military are probably concerned over the potential for increased Communist influence but are not now proceeding with any concrete plans for action. This might change, however, if it appeared that the Communists were on the verge of winning a major government role in the immediate future. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 25X6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 25X6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 25X6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 25X6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 25X6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 25X6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 25X6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13: LOC-HAK-300-4-4-9 25X6