DEFENSE PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE AUGUST 17, 1973

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-301-6-19-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: August 17, 1973
• Content Type: MISC

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DEFENSE PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE
August 17, 1973
Time and Place: 3:11 p. m. - 4:09 p.m., White House Situation Room
Subject: General Purpose Force Modernization
Participants:
Chairman Henry A. Kissinger
State William Porter
Seymour Weiss
Leslie Brown
Defense William Clements
Robert C. Hill
John Ahearne
JCS Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
CIA William Colby
Bruce Clarke
Treasury
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed that:
Roy Ash
Dr. Fred. Ikle
Col. Robert Behr
B/Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Philip O de en
John Knubel
Jeanne Davis
James Barnum
...a small group will meet shortly after Mr. Kissinger's return from
San Clemente for consideration of contingencies in the 1980's and to lay the
basis for an analysis of our force level projections based upon these consid-
erations.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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Mr. Clements: We have a cable from our Ambassador saying the Saudis are
asking to cancel the naval contract.
Mr. Kissinger: Why?
Mr. Clements: They claim that the time frame and the amount of money involved
constituted a signal that we didn't want to do it.
Mr. Kissinger: Can't we explain it tot1 m in confidence?
Mr. Clements: We need better representation there. I'm not talking about the
Ambassador. We just need better people all around.
Mr. Porter: Draft a cable and we'll send it.
Mr. Kissinger: How did the delay happen? _
Mr. Clements: It didn't just happen.
Mr. Porter: It's hard to tell. Don't believe everything the Saudis say.
Mr. Kissinger: Where was the delay? It wasn't here, was it?
Mr. Clements: The delay was getting the force into being -- getting the ships
there. Weere not complaining.
Mr. Porter: You guys sat on that (referring to Defense).
Adm. Moorer: Let's go talk to them and find out what their problem is. Tell them
we will take actions to meet their objectives. I think they are trying to tell us
something that doesn't have a thing to do with these ships.
Mr. Porter: That may be so.
Mr. Clements: We need to establish some relationship with them.
Mr. Kissinger: Or try to deliver on our contract--one or the other.
Adm. Moorer: There is nothing due for delivery yet.
Mr. Kissinger: Are you waiting for a ship that plays the national anthem when it
turns to the left?
Adm. Moorer: We need something that plays the national anthem!
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Mr. Clements: You (referring to Mr. Kissinger) walked in at the wrong time.
Mr.. Kissinger: Let's get on to the subject of the DPRC. It would be helpful to
have a briefing from Defense.
Mr. Clements: (Referring to Mr. Ahearne) John has some charts to show you
as a starting point. (Charts attached at Tab A. )
Mr. Ahearne: These are projectionsof force levels. The first chart that you
have shows the total amount of dollars estimated to be available to the DOD. If
the large blob on the top for Southeast Asia war costs is subtracted, you can get
an idea of our force planning. As you will note, DOD funding is roughly constant
if you subtract what the Congress may be expected to cut out.
Mr. Clements: Is manpower included'
Mr. Ahearne: That shows up on the second chart. After 1974, it doesn't take
much more of the defense budget. That's assuming the all-volunteer force
works.
Mr. Kissinger: And if it does not?
Mr. Clements; We haven't considered that.
Mr. Kissinger: What are the cost implications if it doesn't work?
Mr. Clements: This is highly problematical. ; What do you do about pay scales?
It opens a whole Pandora's Box of questions. It's a helluva problem. But I am
not prepared to talk about this today. The costs are reasonably comparable with
the civilian sector, but if we have to start over, it will be a tremendous problem.
Mr. Kissinger: The alternative to AVF is the draft, isn't it, unless you start
impressing people on the street. Aren't the manpower costs of the draft the
same or less?
Mr. Clements: I'm not sure that's right.
Mr. Kissinger: Why does the draft cost more?
Mr. Clements: Not more, the same.
Mr. Kissinger: If it's the same, the percentage will not go higher?
Adm. Moorer: It won't, at present pay and force levels.
Mr. Kissinger: If it hasn't increased, why the jump from 45% to 60%?
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Mr. Ti: essHow does the 44% compare to 1964?
Mr. Kissinger: What was it in 1961?
Mr. Odeen: It is about the same level as in 1961; there has not been much change.
Mr. Kissinger: What is the Soviet manpower cost percentage?
and
Adm. Moorer: Somewhere between 26/30 %. About 70 % plus of their budget
goes for hardware; ours is about 40 percent.
Mr. Weiss: The cultural lag!
Mr. Clements: Our manpower costs are twice as much as theirs.
Mr. Odeen: Manpower costs cover more than military pay. It includes training
and a lot of civilian pay.
Adm. Moorer: Our retirement costs are figured in there. Defense is the only
place in the Government where retirement pay is figured in the yearly budget.
Mr. Ash: Could we shift it to the Veterans Administration? I want to keep it
in the proper committee.
Mr. Ahearne: If you accept a constant manpower. cost, the money available
for non-manpower purposes will be roughly constant.
Mr. Kissinger: Am I to assume that our purchasing power will decline infinitely?
Mr. Ahearne: All these figures are in constant dollars. In the remaining charts
we have addressed specific weapons systems. You, will notice that the first one
on general purpose nuclear subs.....
Mr. Kissinger: What do we use attack subs for? To interdict the sea lanes?
Adm. Moorer: They attack other subs.
Mr. Clements: All kinds of things. They are the best sub defense we have.
Mr. Kissinger: Why is the increase in attack subs so dramatic?
Adm. Moorer: It isn't--it's actually reduced. We now have 105 subs, both
nuclear and diesel.
Mr. Kissinger: And these are all nuclear?
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Adxn.? Moorer: Yes, we've reduced by 15. We're replacing diesels with
nuclear s.
Mr. Ahearne: (Turning to the carrier charts) The dotted line shows our carrier
force. Two carriers are currently under construction. A third will be ready
in 1978. We will be in trouble in 1987 when we will have 12 carriers that are
over-age. It takes 5-7 years to build one carrier and there aren't many ship-
yards that can build one.
Mr. Weiss: In thirty years carriers will be that much more expensive.
Adm. Moorer; We figure 30 years for submarines, 25 for surface ships.
Mr. Clements: The problem is that as the carriers age, they are not very effi-
cient. Their systems get to a state of obsolescence.
Mr. Kissinger: I don't understand this down-turn in carriers. Will this
happen unless we reach decisions soon?
Mr. Ahearne: We will have to reduce the force level or keep them for over 30
years.
Adm. Moorer: During theEsenhower Administration we built a large number of
carriers very fast. We retire them when they get to be 30 years old.
Mr. Kissinger: When do these decisions have to be made?
Mr. Clements: The lead time on a carrier is seven years.
Adm. Moorer: Counting the budget process, contracting and construction.
Mr. Clements: Right now we are under pressure to build more carriers. We
have to look seven or eight years ahead.
Mr. Kissinger: Are we planning to do this?
Mr. Clements: That's a subject of considerable discussion. We haven't decided
yet. .
Mr. Kissinger: It will be decided on what basis?
Mr. Clements: There are a lot of unanswered questions: strategy, mission,
force structure. We can't decide it now. But when we start buying carriers we
had better have something in mind.
Mr. Kissinger: As a veteran of the Middle Eastern and other crises I want to
make sure the decision is not made on the basis of surface considerations. We
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need gn analysis of our strategy. If we hadn't had our carriers in the Middle
East and Vietnam we would have been in a helluva position. In 1988 maybe we
will need more but smaller carriers. Before we decide on a turn-down in
carriers, we need some analysis.
Mr. Clements: (to Mr. Kissinger) Do you want to be a part of that consideration?
Mr. Kissinger: I want to take part in consideration of contingencies in the 1980s.
State should, too. Whether we have 8, 10, 1Z or 15 carriers could be an impor-
tant consideration in what the President can do in the 1980s. If we decide our
carriers in the Mediterranean couldn't survive in the '80s, that's a different
situation. That part of the decision I want to get a look at.
Adm. Moorer: We have to start with our military objectives. What are our
tasks? That's what dictates our force levels. Then we have two choices: if we
reduce our force levels, we have to reduce our commitments or increase the
risks. If we can't meet our commitments, we have to raise force levels.. The
levels are driven by what we expect the forces to do. Some people just don't
understand that.
Mr. Kissinger: That's the point I'm making. We have to get a little group
together to look at the conceivable contingency situations in the late'80s. (to
General Scowcroft) See that we get that done. Jim Schlesinger agrees.
Mr. Clements: Admiral Moorer and I agree.
Adm. Moorer: We have our basic NATO commitments and the latest NSDM on
the Far East (NSDM 230). That's a basis for addressing additional contingencies.
Assuming we maintain our NATO commitment, that anchors part of our force.
Mr. Clements: Some of the concepts in DOD as to how the threat might be met
are still evolving. We don't want to get locked in.
Adm. Moorer: Primarily because of changes on the other side.
Mr. Clements: We should have complete flexibility on how we approach the
problem.
Mr. Kissinger: On the projection of the construction budget, will we be funding
carriers?
Mr. Ahearne: We have two under construction, and one in 1978.
Mr. Kissinger: And there will be a down-turn under present construction plans?
Adm. Moorer: Yes.
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Mr. Kissinger: We would have to increase if we want to keep 12 carriers?
Mr. Clements: Yes.
Mr. Kissinger: The dotted line (on the carrier chart) shows what will happen
on current projection?
Adm. Moorer: The top dotted line.
Mr. Ahearne: (Referring to the Active Escorts ASW and AAW chart) On escorts
we have a sharp drop leading into 1974, then the FYDP starts rising.
Mr. Kissinger: But without procurement, that's not likely.
Mr. Ahearne: That's right.
Adm. Moorer: We made a deliberate decision to sacrifice quantityyor quality.
That's the reason for the abrupt drop. We deactivated ships to get the money
for modernization.
Mr. Clements: The drop is 43% in the actual number of ships. We've reduced
numbers but increased quality. There's a real efficiency factor but, of course,
we can't prove that one F-14 equals three or four F-4s.
Mr. Kissinger: You can't have one F-14 in four different places.
Adm. Moorer: Yes. And we have to observe what the other side is doing.
Mr. Weiss: In the last two years we have had to decommit some category A
ships to NATO. Will we have to in next year's budget?
Adm. Moorer: If we're down to 12 carriers we can't maintain our current
deployment levels without home-porting.
Mr. Weiss: If we could get that information sooner rather than later, it would
help.
Adrn. Moorer: We don't know what the Congress will do. If they reduce personnel
we will have to reduce forces.
Mr. Clements: In our commitment to NATO, the quality factor was considered
a plus. They were counting surface units--old destroyers, for instance. We'll
let you know.
Mr. Porter: Have you decided on your home-porting requirements?
Mr. Clements: No.
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Mr. Weiss: (to Mr. Clements) You still owe us some judgments on Greece.
Mr. Clements: I didn't know that.
Adm. Moorer: Se cretary Rogers owes something to Senator Fulbright.
Mr. Hill: (to Mr. Clements) We just got that.
Mr. Clements: We want home-porting.
Mr. Kissinger: Is that why you won't answer?
Mr. Clements: There's no question in the Pentagon about this. We need to get
together. (to Mr. Porter) I'll get something to you.
Mr. Kissinger: The DPRC promotes togetherness.
Mr. Ahearne: (referring to the Support Ships chart). We see somewhat less
demand for support ships for deployed forces.
Mr. Kissinger: If we don't have some real improvement, our Navy is going
under.
Adm. Moorer: That's absolutely right.
Mr. Ahearne: (referring to the aircraft charts) When the Air Force planes get
older, they tend to put them in the reserves. So the FYDP line and the procure-
ment line are relatively close. The Navy and Marine aircraft are under greater
strain, and after 12 years the line drops steeply. This is partly related to the
negotiations that were underway when the budget was submitted.
Mr. Kissinger: Why?
Mr. Clements: We were having the big fight with Grumman. The F-14 is shown
at 135 on the curve. As we move forward in the out year, the full number is not
now in the budget. It would have a significant impact if we were talking about
400 planes.
Mr. Odeen: You mean the money for 400 planes is not in here?
Mr. Clements: No. Congress is aware that modernization of the Navy fighter
program must be addressed, but we're having a helluva fight with Grumman.
Mr. Kissinger: The only available plane for modernization is the F-14?
Mr. Clements: At the moment. We're trying to improve that. We're trying to
get to a total of 700.
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Mr. Ash: We're back to the same situation we were in with the carriers. We
have to reduce elsewhere.
Mr. Kissinger: We have two choices: to take from existing forces or increase
the budget. Since our forces are dropping, would you say our budget is inade-
quate?
Mr. Clements: Yes.
Mr. Ash: The FYPD doesn't build in any adjustment in the numbers to reflect
greater performance. Where we have fewer numbers showing in the out years,
if we adjust for equivalent performance, it would not be exactly as the charts
show.
Mr. Clements: It would not be as dramatic.
Mr. Ash: If we could draw performance capability lines, the gap between. the
lines might close.
Mr. Clements: Conceivably, but this relates to plans, contingencies, force
levels. My judgment is that the capability curve would not come up to the FYDP
level.
Adm. Moorer: We also have to consider the improved quality of the other side.
Mr. Clements: With regard to Trident, the Russians have their first Delta
boat in operation. They have 4 in the water and 11 in the program. There are
16 new Russians subs while we argue whether or not to continue the first
Trident on the 1978 schedule. That's damn serious.
Mr. Kissinger: I have an uneasy feeling our technology rather than our stra-
tegy is driving our weapons development. Every service is building bigger or
more complex systems. Their missions are invented by what the technolgy
makes possible.
Mr. Clements: In part, you're right. But our industrial base and our society
is one of high technology. The tendency is to get less man-power and more
technology.
Mr. Kissinger: Over Vietnam 60% of our missions were either diverted or
scrubbed. Our planes must have been designed for fighting over the desert at
40, 000 feet. And the weather in Europe is not much better than in Vietnam. We
have designed a plan for nuclear war, but we don't have any doctrine for tactical
nuclear war. And we would have to adapt it for conventional war. We have sub-
stituted masses of materiel for thought.
Mr. Clements: One of the best services we could perform would be to start thinking
about what the hell we are trying to do.
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Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Clements) I'll call you and Tom (Moorer) to see how we
can do this without getting into your area.
Adrn. Moorer: There was nothing wrong with our airplanes. We got 300-400 planes
over Hanoi and out again in 30 minutes. But you wanted weapons that could home on
a weapon or a truck, while the rules of engagement limited us to targets outside the
city limits. The dif?ioilty was in the area of weaponry, not in aircraft.
Mr. Kissinger: That could be.
Adm. Moorer: I was on the mock-up board for the F-4 in 1955. No one then thought
of it as a bomber, but it turned out to be a pretty good bomber. When we build a
plane, we don't always know how it will be used. Cost means what it costs to
place a weapon on a target. On Trident, it's the cost of the missiles, not the cost
of the ship.
Mr. Kissinger: My remarks were not addressed to Trident. I have no opinion one
way or the other. But we can't substitute resources for thought. We need a concep-
tual base. We have to know our likely targets and mode. If we had had a stand-off
missile with a 300 mile range in Vietnam, we might have done more good.
Adm. Moorer: Not necessarily.
Mr. Kissinger: But it wasn't ever really considered. The F-4 turned out to be a
pretty good airplane for a purpose for which it was not designed.
Mr. Clements: Versitility is a great virtue.
Mr. Colby: These curves are pushing us toward an agreed reduction of forces on
both sides. There are other kinds of confrontation.
Mr. Kissinger: Like what?
Mr. Colby: Buying them off. Subversion.
Mr. Kisser: I see no one is commenting.
Mr. Ahearne: On the fighter attack aircraft cost trend chart, the cost increases
for the 100th unit are a function of time.
Mr. Ash: These data deal with front end R&D in the same way. The contracts
could be different.
Mr. Ahearne: These are actual production costs. The R&D cost is not in here.
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Mr. Kissinger: (referring to chart) What does CAIG mean?
Mr. Ahearne: Cost Analysis Improvement Group.
Mr. Odeen: This is estimated as opposed to the official projection.
Mr. Ash: Each is treated the same even if it is bought under a different contract.
Dr. Ikde: Are the F-.14s worth it?
Mr. Ahearne: It depends on what you mean by "worth it".
Mr. Ash: We could always go back to the P-38.
Adm. Moorer: The first squadron I reported to had an airplane called an F-4--a
Boeing plane. One of today's F-4 weighs more ardcosts more than all 18 planes in
that squadron. And it can fly faster straight up than my first airplane could.fly
straight down.
Mr. Kissinge : And what is the lesson?
Adm. Moorer: If you want performance you have to pay for it.
Mr. Ahearne: On the helicopter chart, there is a gap between what the Army wants
and those under 10 years old.
Mr. Weiss: Suppose we met the FYDP level? What amount of increase are we
talking about?
Mr. Ahearne: $2 1/2 billion a year for procurement including support items.
Mr. Clements: In making these evaluations it was agreed that some concepts of
weapons systems will change.
Mr. Kissinger: When we understand what we are talking about, we will have to get
the President involved. Where does that leave us?
Mr. Clements: We're talking about the budget we're going with now. We're com-
fortable with it. We've cut the cloth to fit .the pattern. Until your questions are
answered, we wouldn't suggest any major changes.
Mr. Kissinger: You have fewer units, but you haven't shown what that does to the
Army, for example. What aboutlanks?
Mr. Ahearne: There's not much problem there.
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Mr. Kissinger: What is the impact of the reductions in the Navy on our flexi-
bility?
Adm. Moorer: They bring into question our ability to support NATO. If we're
fighting in NATO, we're fighting the Russians, and we would be fighting in the
Pacific as much as in the Atlantic. We would be limited in the sea areas that
could be covered. Also, we would have the energy problem. In 1980, we will
have a super-tanker at sea every 50 miles. That gives the Soviets a chance to go
for the jugular.
Mr. Porter: And another line going to Japan.
Adm. Moorer: Three subs could beat Japan.
Mr. Clements: What should the Japanese be doing for themselves? How much
responsibility should they take and how far out?
Mr. Kissinger: We'll be lucky if they don't push out 10, 000 miles.
Adm. Moorer: That's right.
Mr. Kissinger: We'll have a meeting on this the first week I'm back.
Mr. Porter: How soon will we know the effect of the recruiting shortfall on our
overseas units--in Korea, for example?
Mr. Clements: These shortfalls are not as serious as the newspapers are making
them out to be. The Army is the only service that's really affected. We will be
plus or minus 15, 000 when we finish the fiscal year. I think the all-volunteer force
will work. There will be some pains and some soft spots and it will take a different
mentality.
Mr. Kissinger` What will be the percentage of blacks?
Mr. Clements: Around 20%.
Adm. Moorer: It's around 18% now. I've been up on,the Hill eleven times on this
budget. It would be suicide to tell them we now want to change the FY74 budget.
The first time we can do anything is in FY75.
Mr. Ash: If then. The situation is not wide open.
Mr. Kissin er: The President will fight for his '74 budget and will ask for more in '75.
Mr. Ash: That's agreed.
Mr. Clements: Roy Ash has conveyed that to us.
Mr. Kissinger: We have to do what is right.
Mr. Ash: The budget strategy is simple. We need to provide the rationale to the
Congress to get the highest possible figure.
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DOD REAL PROGRAM VALUE
(TOA - FY 74 $ Billions)
Incremental
SEA War Costs
and Retired Pay
75
76
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February 73 FYDP
77 78
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Percentage of DoD Program in Constant FY 74 Dollars
PERCENT
OF
DOD
BUDGET
DOD MANPOWER AND RELATED COSTS AS A PERCENT OF DOD TOTAL PROGRAM COSTS
64 66
g
e of DoD Program in Current Dollars
Percenta
i ?1 - -
68 70 72
Fiscal Year
76 78
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 SE REI
110
100
50
0 73
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GENERAL PURPOSE NUCLEAR SUBMARINES
Not over 25 years with
procurement of 3/yr FY 75-79 (-'\ . - Z -- .
75
77
79
-FISCAL YEAR
81 - 83 85
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Carriers Under
30 Years w/o Procureme
With Procurement %-
73 76 79 82
a
85 - 88
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 .% ... ! d -.10 wv"M
Ships Under 30 Years
With Procurement
73
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SECRE
ACTIVE ESCORTS ASW & AAW
W/O Procurement
75
77
79
SEC ET
81
83
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85
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r'N ET
SECR
SUPPORT SHIPS (UNREP, TENDER & MflOR SUPPORT)
73
Ships Under 35 Years
W/O FYDP Procurement
t 11
With 7YDP Procurement
75
77
79
Fiscal Year
81
83
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85
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AIR FORCE FIGHTER/ATTACK
3500.1 FYDP Force Level (AAI)
3000
2500 Aircraft Under 14 Yrs. With
FYDP Procurement
1500 . Aircraft Under Ili Yrs.
w/o Procurement
500
73 75 77 79 81
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83 85 87 85
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73
\ With FYDP Procurement
12 Yrs. W/o Procure
FYDP Force Level (AAI
Aircraft Under Aircraft Under 12 Yrs.
-
went
75
NAVY/MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK AIRCRAFT
77
i
83
85 87 89
79 81
Fiscal Year
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FIGHTER/ATTACK AIRCRAFT COST THE D
(points in parentheses not used in fitting ez+rve)
48
52
56
6o 64 68
PROCUREMENT YEAR (FY) OF 100th UNIT
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76
8o
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120&t F'IDP AAI (118
73
75
77
tom`
79 81 83
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85
87 89
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/30: LOC-HAK-301-6-19-0
LnDacts of Trend Toward More Expensive -stems
1. -Increase in DoD budget .
2. Increase average age of systems
Decrease force levels
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/30: LOC-HAK-301-6-19-0