WSAG ON SOUTH ASIA--2:30 P.M. NOVEMBER 22

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-309-6-2-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 22, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATTONAI,. S~CURTTY CC3LTNC
MEIvTC7RA.NDUM FE7lt. T7R.. KIS~IluGER
F12.QM: HA~.O ~ ~;`~SAUNDER.S ~ y
- `"' p
\~ ~,~~.~.CT1Oiti /his
November ZZ. T~? r ~
5UBJECTc WSAG on South Asia-.-Z:30 p. m. NYoveznbex ZZ
.Attached at 'l'ab A. is a brief xxaexno on what we know of the situation
at thYS xngnl4nt,
At Tab S is an intelligence study o? what a wax might look like,
Ferhaps the best way td conduct this meeting is to lay out the thxee
possibilities that this morn.ing's news may represent, Discussion of
steps that xx~.ight be taken caez].d irzdica.te what modifications might be
required. in e~.ch case, Thase thxee possibilities are:
1, .This could be a major Tn.dian attack in stxppart of a Mukti
I3~hi,ni affei~stv:e i:o sei.~e a portion of westexn East Pakistan,
2, Ths Pakistanis might have becoxrae desperate over the rising
pressure of Indian an,d guexxilla activity and decided to accase
'India publicly of having started the wax. so that .Pakistan would
feel free to act in any way it considers necessary.
3, This xrxay have been an unplanned escalation growing out
of the irxcreased fighting of recent days,
Talking Paints -
The following talking poixits axe designed to address the steps that x~niht
be taken so that you will have established a WSAG base far de-visions on
each?
1. if this is a general autbrealc of hostilities, what steps xa~ight
be taken to lixrzit hostilities to the East Pakistan barc3er? [This
would be m
t
as
possible if thzs wexe a~x unp].anneci esca.latian.
NSS, State Dept.
reviews completed
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SECRET
2. Should we urge the Soviets to associate themselves with
a call for. an early end to hostilities ?
-~ -Should this be done bilaterally or in the UNSC context?
3. What axe the pros and cons of involving the UNSC at this.
stage?
4, Is now the time fox a direct approach to Mrs, Gandhi .urging
time for the political process? 7.n the President's name ox not?
5, ,Should the Chinese be approached or allowed to do what they
might naturally be inclined to do?
What public line sharxld we take?
--What are the pros and coz~.s of a staterxxent by the President
or the Secretary when the facts become clearer?
What Is Desired from the Meeting
All of the above wi11 be prefaced by the fact that we do not have the full
story or what is actually happening. The purpose of the meeting is to
discuss what steps should be taken if the next few hours indicate that
there has been a .significant escalation of any kind. Perhaps you should
ask State to be in d:raftin~ the following on a contin~exicy basis:
1, Instructions for an approach to Mrs. Gandhi (a) urging a halt
in military activity with a special word about preventing spread..
to the west and (b) allowing time for the political process.
Z. Instructions on a US posture toward UNSC invalvemerit.
3. Draft public statement.
Instructions far Farland to review situation with Yahya.
The:.subject of aid is being dealt with in a separate xnema.
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'1'I-i E 4V' i.t I i I: t-f O U$ E
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: .THE PRESIDENT
FR.(7M: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUI3JEGT: Inda~Palc Fighting
INFORMATION
The :Perks are claimizag in radio broadcasts that India "without a formal
declaration of war, has launched an all~out offensive against East Pakistan."
They claim that the attack is concentrated in the 3"essone sector nat t:ao
far from Calcutta and intcludes infantry, arxx~or, and aircraft. The Perks also
claim that. fighting has flared up in several other locations along the East.
Pakistan border. 'rhe Indians claim that these reports are. "absolutely
false" although they say that several Pak planes have intruded into their
airspace and that the Perks .are trying tv increase tension and create a "war-
like situation. "
,At ?-hi s goin*, use ianxzat tel',. e:;:actly .what these reports indica4e aL- gut wii~,c
is happening. We have no independent evidence yet of significantly increased
fighting, although there has, of course, been a continuing series of serious
incidents.alang the India-East Pakistan border. There are .three possible
explanations for today's developments:
--The Indians rxzay have stepped up support for a rrz.ajor guerrilla offensive,
including mare direct participation of their farces.
--The Pakistanis might have decided that war was inevitable and could
have decided to charge the Indians now with having begun it in order to.
,free them for whatever reaction they may feel. necessary..
--There may have been an unplanzzed escalation of the fighting.
I am holding a special WSAG meeting this afternoon to consider what we
can do to perhaps head off a war. Much `vill depend,. of course, an what has
actually.l~appened and it may be awhile before we get a reasonably good fix
an that.
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 arr~aawt, rnwrrt Na ~o
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UNITED STATES GOVI.ItNMENT' ~k(,K~~~fdU FUFZ~iGPi
FROM
SUBJECT'
SCCftET/(10 FOREIGti
11~er~2or~~z~~~m
NEA - Mr. Christopher Van F{olden
INR/RNA - Herbert J. Liebesny ~'~`~'
~~/
Tndo-Pak Contingencies: Three Faces of War
DATE: November 17, 1971
In response to ynur request, we have revie:ved the most likely
patterns which major hostilities between India and Pakistan might
take during the next few weeks. lie have reviE~red t-~ese patterns in
terms of each country's likely actions, objectives and prospects in
order to assess the possibilities -(or modiaticn and compromise short
of capitulation by either side. ble have hat considered international
reaction to these contingencies; although there ~vauld be same important
assessments to b2 made in this area, international reach qns tivould not
be likely.ta alter the situation appreciably in any ofi these contingencies.
Nor have vre considered the passible role of ~angla Desk representatives
in any negotiations trhich might be attempted during the course of
hostilities since they appear unlikely to be able to play a role sub-
stantially separate from India's in such circumstances. .
5ummar~Y: i here appear to be three patterns of hosti 1 i ties .wtii cfi .could .
occur 7n sequence, concurrently or independently. The most immediate
and likely possibi]ity is that India may initiate rnajor but undeclared
hostilities in the Fast ~~rhich would quickly i=nrce Pakistan to choose
between an accomadation and retaliation in the West. Limited hostilities
in the i~lest are possible, but ~~rould constitute, in effect, merely a
prelude to total hostilities. In t7~e event of total hostilities,
Pakistan would ultimately be i`orced to capitulate, and it is likely that
,neither side tirould be in a position to accept a ceasefire nr negotiations,
..international efforts natvrithstanding, until fire Government of Pakistan
had accepted defeat: Under such circumstances, them ti?rauld be a very
real question as to the ability of the Pakistan's Army to retain central
over Hest Pakistan. .
I. Qorder 41ar in the East; The mast ir~~ediate and likely contingency
would~ie a su~stantia expansion of tl7e present undeclared hostilities
along the Eastern borders in ti?rhich both Sides :~rauld seek to engage and
destroy units at` the other but neither ~~rould attempt to seize and hold
territory except for short--term tactical purposes. India could, at any
time, expand its present limited incursions heretofore concentrated in
the Tripura-Sylhet areas, to deeper probes by bricjade size units across
any nr al1 sectors of the border. Pakistan would probably not initiate.
an escalation of harder hostilities. Ho~vever, Pakistan Yrould respond to
Indian. initiatives with cross--border attacks an Indian positions, probably
limited to multi-batta]ion attacks at most,~and might attempt to lure
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.,~_
Indian forces across the borders into ambushes. both governments would
teeny responsibility far initiating the incidents; in most instances, it
-would probably be impossible to confirm Yrhich side started the action,
ascertain the results of the action, or, on the Indian side, the extent.
~to which guerrilla rather than Army forces. were involved. ---~
In this contingency, India's strategic oh}ective would continue to
be to force Islamabad into an aecommodation~trith the Gengali resistance
movement, particularly t;~e.Awami league and. P~1u;jib, vrhich would at least
provide for the return of the refugees; its tactical objectives would be:
a) to increase pressures on Pakistan; b) to sap the strength and morale
of the Pakistani Army in the East 4iing; .and c) to pin do~rrn regular
Pakistani forces in order to permit greater freedom of action by the
.hiukhti ~ahini. India vrould continue these actions at least until
a) serious discussions began.betti~reen the GCA and C3a.ngla Desh representatives
without undertaking an outright invasion in the East or initiating
hostilities in the GJest.
acceptable to ~iujib, or b) the guerrillas controlled substantial amounts
of territory and had established a decisive edge over Pakistani forces.
Should serious GOP-Bangla Desh discussions start, Indian Army actions
might be reduced, but full support for the guerrillas ti?rould continue and
Indian military operations tirould probably be stepped up should snags
in the negotiations develop. 4Pith its ability to outnumber Pakistani
forces at any point along the Eastern bard~rs, India could, and probably
would hope, to maintain this strategy until it had achieved its objectives
of border warfare in the East well. beyond that tivith ~rhich the Pakistani
Army could cope. It could probably do so well` before the netiv Pakistan,
National Assembly would convene. Thus the chances are that Pakistan would
soon be forced either to accept negotiations frith the F3angla Desh
t'epresentatives or to respond militarily some::here in the :dent where it
enjoys. a relatively more favorable position. A limited Pakistani
retaliation in the Nest might not lead iranediately to total d~rar (see
II belo,~r), but the risks ~rauld be sufficient *o cause Islamabad to
consider seriously the possibility of a genuicte accommodati an 4?ri th the
hostilities could continue far several ~rionths tritP~out leading to general
hostilities. Hos~rever, India is in a position i:o raise rapidly the level
legitimacy to force effective international restraints on continued
Indian intervention.
Boar countries would have much to gain try restricting hostilities
to the East and Peeping them at a relatively low level, thus avoiding the
cammittment to combat of their expensive hard:rare and the risks of a full
scale arar. It is possible, therefore, that a limited expansion of border
Pakistan's initial objectives in this contingency would probably be
to maintain a holding action until the "bye-elections" had been completed
and. ostensibly representative civilian government established. at both the
national and provincial levels. In such a situation, the Bangla Desh `
representatives would be faced with a fait accompli, and the Army would
.insist that they deal with the "electedd govea?nment, rather than directly
with the t;lA. Pakistan would probably also hope that the establishment of
a civilian government of some kind would restore sufficient semblance of
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 '-~"~ ~,.~. SECRET/Nq FOREIGN
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-i.cut off line~'of`communication to Kashmir .and engage
Possible, but less,l'ikely, would be a.Pakistani effort to penetrate deeply..
?~~I'u~jab launching strong counterattacks into.Indian Punjab., if necessary.
~~ Ranrt of Y~[atch and attempt to remain an the defensive in central
~,~~la probably:launcli attacks into Kashmir, southern Rajasthan, and/or
themaio body of Indian forces in an'effart to cripple Indian military
c~pabil'itie5 and thus to improve Pakistan's position in a. subsequent war
?t~i` att_rition. India. would ,probably ::launch afull-scale. attack on the
SECRET/C~0 FOREIGTF
No Ob~ection to Declassification in Part
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 No Objection
Lahore-5ialkot'sector, attempt to take both cities, cut Pakistan's lines
f
:forces in 3-5 -?reeks, but might be forced to r~m~in ;n fact na~,~+~., ~~..
~'..a..T M.{liy III a ~~Q'~~~?a ~~: dna' tine anSEL or a tirar of attrition outside:..th.e.~..
Lahore and Sialkot in a ti?~eek or ten davs. to a slntr_ rnStly a~~~n~a
y
p
pardons of Indian terri tort' in Kashmir (al though not the Vale} ,
Pakistani forces, but, to the extent possible, -~~o.r:~d~probably~seek~
withdraw, leaving tdukhti Bahini forces in control..'
The praspects~are~that Pakistan might be able to hold terr
orarl
._ ~. ___,_.. _........ ....7.,v uTav uc.4c{a~,rh
'a smaller oi"fensive against targets and lines of communication--furti~er
a, cammun~cat~an between Rasvalp~ndi_and Lahore, and to destroy as ?rrany
q
m
Y. ue
Xndia~ territr~ry in the 4fest as possible and hope for acease-f'
.. ,
~'akistan's obectives would probably be ta'seize`
uickl as
h
continue fighting until forced to capitulate. _
`the outbreak of full hostilities; should Pakistan's or"fEnSive falter`~~d
e
~ ni ~ a y successful and her det
ense of Pur~~ab appear trc~:~~
Paki$tan would probably accept a ceasefire and mediation within d -
during which to negotiate the best cornpramise possible: Should Pkist '~
attacks b
?t? ]l
'
e
~ 3 1v~5
Mould .probably expand to include tha in~nediate re]ease of t' "b d
u
t
'MOnce engaged in general hostilities India's minimum ob'
ct'
remained an Indian territory, and it is unlikely that any use~Ful negotiat~s~rss
~: a rc;u~us tit~u~es Lnere ~?1au i a ac a very. real question as to the ability of
~ti6 dSL;.?+.,.;: nom.,.... r._ .__~_-.- -- .. - - - - -
r
b
an
full inddpendence...for,East Pakistan. In order to achieve her abjecti~?es,
r?
Tnrlin i.inul.I ..i...b. -.7.. ~~..i'2-.._ n ? ti _.. _ _ _
::'25X1
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SECRCI'/tlp' .FOREIGN
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