CYPRUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 14, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/01 : LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
SECRET
WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING
February 14, 1972'
Time, and Place: 11:36 a. m. - 12:12 p. M. , White House Situation Room
Subject: Cyprus
Participants
Chairman
Henry A. Kissinger CIA
John N. Irwin
Thomas .Karamessines
John Waller
Joseph Sisco NSC Staff Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig
DOOD Armistead Selden
James H. Noyes
JCS Adm., Thomas H. Moorer
Col. Richard T. Kennedy '
Mr. Harold Saunders
Mr. Mark Wandler
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed that:
-- Dr. Kissinger will discuss the Clerides report with the President and obtain his
guidance.
-- Agency, spokesmen will respond to questions by saying that we are "following
developments.
SECRET
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Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Karamessines) Can.you give us a brief rundown on the
current situation?
Mr. Karamessines read the attached intelli
n
e
ge
c
briefing. When Mr. Karamessines
read "the Soviets doubtless see in the latest flareup on Cyprus an opportunity to pose.
as a defender of small nations against efforts to extinguish the sovereignty of any
UN member, " Dr. Kissinger asked him
"H
:
ow do we know that? it Mr. Karamessines
that it was just speculation,. s
Mr. Kissinger:
(to Mr. Sisco) Joe, what do you think?
Mr. Sisco: I think that as long as there is hope. of any kind of negotiation between
Greece and Cyprus, with Clerides in the middle, it is obviously in our favor. I also
think that any time they come to us, we should try'- to encourage them to seek a
peaceful solution to the problem. This is the line we have adopted, and we should
try. to maintain it as long as possible. This, of course, is the immediate problem,
as I see it. We will also have to address some long-term questions,
Kissinger. What kinds of questions?
Mr. Sisco: For one thing, we have to consider what we would do if the impas s e
continues. Interestingly enough, we learr something new from each of these cris
They rarely develop from the same.set of circumstances as the previous crisis. es.
Mr. Kissinger: But they are all in your area.
'Mr. Sisco: That may be. You know, I get no pleasure from working Saturdays and
Sundays. With all of you going to China in a couple of days, it is important to get
some answers to the questions I was talking about before. I don't have the answers.
First, are we still committed to the territorial integrity and political independence
of Cyprus? Second, is it in our interest to stick as close as possible to Greece and
Turkey, our NATO allies? How far will we go in giving them our support?
Personally, I draw the line in disassociating ourselves from military
intervention on the part of Greece and Turkey in carving up Cyprus. It is possible
that Greece could pull off a solution of the arms issue and come
up with a new government which would be more responsive to Athens. in9- the current negotiations result in a solution which preserves the political
independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus,,_ ._ - p
be satisfactory. front our point of view, this would
But can this be done, and what is our role? I think the question
Popper raises in paragraph 5 of his tel.egram'(Ncbsia_313,- 13-Februaryj gets to the
guts of the thing.
As Henry puts it so often, we have to ask ourselves where we want to come out and
what are we going to do to see that we come out where we want?
I have one other point. Makarios has not yet pulled out his Soviet card. I tend to
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 Gi?A _'"at the Sow: _~
N Ob f t D I if; ; f
i P rt 2010/07/01 LOC HAK 310 2 2 2
o
ec
on o ec assca
on n a
I
x
s
i
i
- - - - -
he may c'exanPle ar u together More limited
d than J
PP
ort the UN, procedra it has been in
xde to Pulp a
U
th
e Sovi -~-x'? Kxssin er: What et card. this wit givea~ng' we Pla t b cap,
d
a
.ni
o You lean by So v;." a
i01 c e. ,,
Mrs Si$co= I
t w
So
u
met
;
y
et
ca
b
e Political'rd?
would lnter su
ppo
vexa
rt,
e mi]it
Mr
? Kissin er. rilY in CYPrus elY in the UN,
'
flunk I do
n
t
Mr, Sis~o, that (Soviet nv.lYta mean that the
esidenti rp ., are rY int~;xventi
Into accounts trip and our any thngs they ona is out of the
. overall relat
s ould d ques
tican
? wh
.
io
ich ,
' Kx$ir~ Therefore, 0u d have an
er; Sovx effect
` ?-.' The ats hav nk we must t on th,e
Mr Sisco. Sure t have to take it in eke this
~0 ac
hey d
cout
O?
n to
00.
Mr.Kiss-
xn er;
a
proof p OWez. P
preciate theOughts ern we dog We have ? 'r erne
popper
i
xnb
g
v$
Afr*er thoughe a o4 messiness We that soPara
graph 5 abo
ent+s notice. ,h y J sad reports that ets have th e samtehe
Mr,
t
needt
e wpxdtO stank?rces in can we drat,? on xs net ino? ,erested in the t
errito '~Oing. Cyprus can move
We
i
t
ha
e
he answer
no a ae~e
v
Mr?l~ico xsc
al integrity of is , tWhx, h will re ult in hor>rxun I doh s of an xmPenchng attack what cyWhat c The a
nsy~,er
t he dxsxnem It think we onclusiOns
.we shoal as
d be a bermen shout
Mx ciated with the Of Cyprus be ::::ted sci_a ,issi
ith an
Us, Cyprus. n er: We ar of force. e to w
t action
~r 1(Terre not talk, - g k u fight now ab
out Which will result g it , I donut
n a, ena
tee Thag+ C t',
ons the Cypriot Greek and x'ur sxs. if - he a anal lernent ~WOt, dBut/there is. a c Natxoaal Guard may frces la g o
ndih
figment Guard has take. The right_ n 'You have to
rigs has to cannot 0 men g eleme cohside
he ken in rely on t ' comma nts r what will Czech he Nation nded by 60 be under aetxons
unPs ?bably give these ?r his al Guard 0 Greek O Gen.
Gr.
our tU? In se ar own Becau fficers. iVas,
se, to a civil h s to Personal se Of-this in my
~atiOna exploit the sit, war, his owh e ?ul Guard. if situation
t$ ,xly
ation They hoes Will dete or the2~rzunxsts wd and to eft ~ a civil war brea
Y could do etth CO own good, suPPort M,zaka lg s) flpathizdrs
this witnetheneedo os
ntinge.nt$ tho f Gre ~ e, a Veiy speakin hDPang0
y a1r d Turkey to g, the ~,ay
ea Y have intervene
~_... .. .. Pn the island
or With
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the deployment of contingents from their home bases.
Mr.. Kissin er: What do we do if we assume there is a real threat to the et~ for on l
.integrity of Cyprus? There is no evidence that this is the case yet, the
theory that this is something they could do.
Mr.. Sisco: We don't have hard evidence yet.
Mr. Kissin ex: Then what kind of evidence do we have?
Mr. Sisco: The evidence comes from a close examination of all the cables. Greece
says ,it will pull out its Ambassador if Makarios doesn't offer any t nc there The
implication is that this could lead to civil war. And to me, at lea ,
implication that otheractions could be taken, as well.
Mr. Kissing, All it means is that the Greeks are applying pressure.
a
Mr. Sisco: Yes, but I was not referring to the immediate issue.
Mr. Irwin: When Clerides says "the Greeks are planning to move to igt ht,
Nicosia
-referring to Greek forces or the National Guard? [This is a refertnce
319, 14 February.]
Mr. Kissinger: I think Clerides is justtrying to get us involved. He wants us to act
as if we. think a Greek move is underway.
cl-
indicating that the Greeks are 25
X1'(1
Mr. Kax awes sines: We have nothin
ping to move tonight.
n rvA
-1
Mr. Kissinger: Have we ask
Mr. K:aramessines: We have, but there is no answer yet.
him at 1:00
Mr. Kissinger: I would like tp talk to the President about this when very soon.
yp
p.m. It's already 7:00 p.m./ W t 4y are planning a move, it will be Y
h' t ive us the evidence he has about a
o
g
Suppose we do go to derides and ask im
Greek move. If he gives us his evidence, what do-we. do? We have asked for all
the intelligence information -- and that is perfectly right under the circumstances.
What else could Clerides give us?
Mr. Sisco: Don't you think it is a good idea to ask him what evidence he has?
Mr. Kissinger: Why? If he gives us the evidence, what would we do?
Mr. Sisco: They have come to us and told us they have evidence of a Greek move.
Do we disregard them entirely? Frankly, I. don't believe the report. I was just
looking for a way to temporize.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/01 : LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
SECRET
either lVtr. Kls sin er: I don't believe this his report
there is eviaence,t we we wait can-.90 oto~Gl-erides.
Then,
gyn
om
t
.
b
o c
intelligence reports
o to him and stir the pot?
go
If there is no evidence, why s we
Mr. Sisco: I don't think we would be stirring the pot if we went to him-
Mr. essines] says the Greeks
n: Jr esin: How much evidence can there be? Tom [Karam
can move as soon as they are given the word*
they
issinge Suppose we go to Clerides and he says can move in ten minutes.
Mr.
What would we do? What is the next step?
r. Sisco: I don't know, Henry. This whole situation is in a delicate balance.
M we don't want to give
We want to stay as close as possible with our Allies, yet
the impression that we are in collusion with them.
Mr. Kissin er: With whom would we be in collusion? We haven't done anything.
Mr. Sisco: It's a question of what kind of contacts we maintain.
Mr. Karat' essines? For whatever it's worth, the Russians have already put out a little
squib, linking us with the Greeks.
Me. Kissi'xx e :: They would do that anyway.
Mr. 5i s co: I think that if we could give some low-key indications of sympathy, this
t t of the Cyprus picture -- to not having Makaxias come
x
shrewd, tough customer. We cant pay g
o for
d
Soviets for help will be based on his assessment of what the Soviets
can our analysis.
I'm bringing all these things up because l m just trying to -understand
the situation.
Mr. Sisco: We are not yet in the position to make a judgment about when e we will do
more, as against the Soviet option. We just haven't reached that juncture yet.
would contribute in the con e
to the conclusion that we were playing any
or
would hat d the onl way of role in to asaveshisp k nn ?
also help 'prevent him from saying t only
Cyprus' skin, because the two things are different -- would be to turn to the Soviets
for helps
Mr. Kissin ex: What do you mean? What kind of help? Mr . Sis co: Basically, political operations and support in the UN. Makarios may,
however, also ask for additional arms.
I can't believe that he would ask them for help, unless he thought he
Mr. Kissinger-
was in real trouble. Let's assume that is his state of mind. If we can't p
him, and he thinks the Soviets can, he will turn to them. He strikes me as being
I 1 times with him. His decision to go to the
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/01 : LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
 SECRE7 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/01 : LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
Mr. Kissinger: Against what option? What are we trying to prevent?
Mr. Sisco: We would be satisfied if Greece and Turkey could achieve a settlement
which would put the arms issue away and which would come up with a. framework
for a unified government more respcnsive to Athens. We can't associate ourselves
with anything beyond that.
Mr. Kissinger No one is arguing that point.
Mr. Sisco: I know. We have a very delicate balance here. We can't appear to be
undermining the territorial integrity of' Cyprus by giving support to our Allies.
Mr. Irwin: Joe is saying that we have to be concerned with appearances. It's not
that we did anything, - or that we are going to do anything, or that Greece might do
something quickly. Joe is. just saying that we should avoid giving the imprryes:sion that v
are helping Greece -- or that we did nothing when we had- information about Greece's
plans,, `
Mg _,Kis-sir er: I know of no law that says we have to do something..in every instance?
Many times, in fact, we have information about something, but do 'nothing.
Mr. Sisco: I am
Simply suggesting that at some point we have to face the choices
about what kind of supporting role we will play.
Mr. kissinger: What kind of support are you talking about? -
Mr.,Sisco: Support for a peaceful resolution of the problem, along the lines I have
already described. I'm talking about the possibility of an American role, as
compared to leaving the situation open for violence and leaving it open for the
Russians to make some political capita.
Mr. Kissinger: How do we translate that into operational terms? If we indicate
to Makarios that we will support him, it will not necessarily settle anything else.
We want to see what evidence our own intelligence turns up, and Tom is trying to
get it. This is perfectly right. In the meantime, isit in our interest to give
Cyprus the idea that we will get involved?-
Mr. Sisco: We have not done that. We are trying to stay as uninvolved as possible.
Mr. Karamessines: What Joe is driving at, I think, is that we might be put into a
difficult propaganda position.
Mr. Kissinger: With whom?
Mr. Karamessines: With the world at large r~d cla adatsor to Makazios r
party ,resu-h1Y to find
xata
et 4th P3nawko`~
T% G aridt i t ?
- y
.
a way to resolve the Greok
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/01 : LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
Gr to thy.
~ 1 ? dx c' reek will return
alto rgLb10
m nd as a~s~aadot
;: . ? ~n be willing to
t
id sing
s cats)LOS kris os = osa 34~ans? ~
hea? efforts have
fa also sa~-~ - - its pwzx
thax-sn1Y only on
. _ .i..1
ro,i4a ther?
L,Vrivts,.
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the Grme ~.
Al thous ? ,~ axe I.t~`tu~ r
ter*"s? det ,h, , va8 ,n0
u1 that Kkarj?g
theit ef
said on
p
rr hO
e
~=~,'vatelY they aP weir demands that he
utlp ICY?
l ] caituate - to over to
not only turn un-
ex'b~
also a na his gov en
h d
but that ntt $~.
legy
lud? nxc~~Grivag e
ire
~ce~ign as ?resident. the Czech
a Q r to be Using their
..,e Greek assart
to 're-
E ? an e~tc.~se
nr~s. issue as sawthIn9~`
influence over taria~
time ?
_
lacked -for Home :
hamece are Wand
aa decidad to cive Cr i~zh
to r great to the ?urk
YY i ric-
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/01 : LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
maxari,os tuVA wEr
Aura sJ1Pr0TtS the Czech arm to thw,
he
Greek 8~and' that
UN force c< tre t,? ?_
- :will regain aloof on
The -rons _ AmrnarCha.
as ctg of and the Turkish 151:
"XVLra Off icialhe events .in I Cyprus
C
s
<
play doe
in Gr?OC $
continue to
tuat Ort ruins cal
i
curitY
-
~
lity
.~+uxkeY ?
sad c,ontinta.ing
i.
'have
he TurY to and detariQrat
to resrond fo~rcefuilY
,ald threatan the
itvation that are no reports
of t.
but there
Turkish Ap G ots is 0,11 alert
litany
that
the TUT* spatus. ki.~h naval
iov$ly schadulQd T '~ astern
A ,rev c is o ,,r vaY 1n the indication
ercir no i
- - there t9
editerr:+nenn bnt
ay hated to the cam.*
t+atit' is in a~+Y
rent averts on Cypr` s <
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/01 : LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/01 LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
bg at
normally be the f - rtes to
rgrip
The Gre6kSpec alerted for afY
ixst
i$1 ForC
gents can Cyprus itsel 3ati Dina
Gram;-controlled
"
e
their bases and, co"
rus.-?are
ti?'~ ' nujng ;nor l
ac t~
aot~.~ri~~es ? - - ~,ilita~`~ gmacl8p"'
e bean. ~? . sic~if~~'rit
There hav f
A?
obse ed in. haft 1
regular police ~i f?~s -
raga $~~-t Cyprus
future course ?f 4 In
to the the Crech
Crucial the disp
the osition of
is question of
ar%a ?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/01 : LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
a
Esc '1140
e~ uni.ta of t
tsr are
a
g
gib usual
Guard. at strategic points
aseiza ,ts
noai.tionc~ those
nd around Vicosiat but
r alerts
a
-
are not on a
s have n0TJ gh ft '
reporteelly O
n
O
The WXltiqh-Gyp'riOt tY
oh is no`1,x~
,
to an alert statua.-
tance$?
these eixcu
a have been
rant p?lic
Sow creek CyP Esther than
C. 1 Brass
e
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/01 : LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
to civilians the. ~rchb.8
OXMIS
flf the police.
told Makarias hflu can not
The head v
that if he distributes the
riot police has
the Creek Cyp
count an that Vass"
(;reek GQvern~nent sources assaz't
legt-wing political
a
Lys;s+rides; who heads
received sow of the arms, bait
party* has
*3r .
these re its remain uncoa}
n
r-ist have not
Th,& Greek CXPriot Co u
$r still
ios so far dogs not appear
,akar doubtless
the CUSS ? The Soviets
to involve
see in the 1ato st gls,retzp r of snail
ortunity to pose as a doger-aQ
oPP to extinc~~ish the
nations against efforts
- sovereignitY of any UN rseer*
approach the
gresua--b3 y they
heard from ye vs in the event
cormitted to support i
with CrelmX mainland elenentso
of a clash to want
w kax3~os has not yet move0 to
~e tray ai.t at least until he has
1with the
played a few ~norc of his cards
Creeks.
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/01 : LOC-HAK-310-2-2-2
$ gull BuPPo"